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THE GREAT POWERS IN WORLD POLITICS

International Relations and Economic Nationalism

BY

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THE NEW EDITION

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GREAT POWERS IN WORLD POLITICS
E. P. 3

MADE IN U. S. A.

TO
BETTY BROOKS
AND
JUDY HEYWARD

PREFACE

This text undertakes the study of international relations from a new vantage point. Instead of approaching the contemporary situation by means of an extended survey of the historical background the authors focus attention upon the present national policies of the great powers whose influence is dominating in international relations. These national policies they seek to interpret in the light of their basic factors, economic, ethnic, geographic, and historic.

The fundamental objective is thus *to resolve the Present* into its essential elements, both current and past. This departure from the more conventional type of treatment is, moreover, demanded not merely because of its pedagogical advantages but also by reason of its practical merits at a moment when so many aspects of the subject itself have hitherto been slighted or still remain uninterpreted.

The years which have elapsed since the onset of the Great Depression have witnessed a swift and striking transformation in the nature of the problem of world peace. For the old questions of nationality which dominated the Paris Peace Conference there have been substituted economic issues that have today become all-important. And whereas the old questions were exclusively European in their bearing, the new issues are world-wide in their implications.

This book constitutes an attempt to examine the causes and circumstances of this transition from the political chaos of the immediate postwar years to the economic catastrophe which has accompanied the Great Depression. It undertakes to prove that precisely as European peace was impermanent a century ago because of the political inequalities existing in the condition of the nationalities of the Continent, so, today, world peace is precarious because of the economic disparities in the circumstances of nations everywhere.

The argument of this volume is that Fascism and National Socialism, although on the surface indistinguishable from familiar nineteenth-century imperialism, are at bottom, at least in their latest stages, the characteristic expressions of great peoples in revolt against the limitations placed upon their national prosperity by their poverty in national resources. The aim of the authors is not to prove that new wars have already become inevitable but simply to demonstrate that no viable system of organized peace can be founded upon the contemporary status quo of economic inequality.

The purpose of this book is to make clear how real and great are the disparities between material resources of the several Great Powers, how disastrous are the consequences of these disparities for the material and social conditions of the peoples of the less favored countries, and, finally, how idle is the hope that the world can escape new wars so long as no peaceful means can be discovered to abolish inequalities which in the eyes of those who suffer from them seem the proof positive of intolerable injustice. Its further purpose is to explain how all the experiments of the postwar period

for insuring peace have eventually collapsed because in effect if not in design they would perpetuate rather than amend the economic status quo despite the patent resolution of more than one great people to resort to war rather than to endure inequality.

The text was written by Mr. Simonds in constant consultation with Dr. Emeny, who supplied the economic background, maps, and charts—also the Bibliography which lists (with indication of the publishers) the various books, periodicals, and pamphlets mentioned in the footnotes accompanying the text. The authors acknowledge their indebtedness to Miss Ethel Peterson for drafting the maps, to Miss Phyllis Parker for stenographic services, and to Mrs. Lovell Thompson for authoritative editorial direction.

F.H.S.

B.E.

Louisiana Purchase,
Snowville, N.H.
January, 1935.

PREFACE TO THE NEW EDITION

The second revision of *The Great Powers in World Politics* has been completed under the stress and strain of events which transpired during the first seven months of 1939. The changes produced in the policies of many states and in the balance of power between them, however, have not served to alter the validity of the fundamental thesis of this book in so far as concerns the basic factors of contemporary world politics.

In the two revisions, thirteen new maps have been inserted for the purpose of further clarifying the various international problems considered. Many new references have been made to recent publications, the Bibliography has been correspondingly enlarged, and fifteen additional documents of interest and importance have been added as appendices.

The author is most grateful to Mr. Edward S. Claflin, who has brought the Chronology and the Bibliography up to date, and has given invaluable assistance in research and in criticism of the manuscript. Acknowledgment should likewise be made to Mr. James Simonds, who has largely rewritten Chapter XVI. The text has been typed and corrected by Jane M. West, to whom the author is particularly indebted for the efficient execution of such an arduous task.

B.E.

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INTRODUCTION

The sixteen years which followed the coming into effect of the treaties made at the Paris Conference (1919) naturally fall into three well-defined periods of approximately equal length. A fourth period, precipitated by the Japanese, Italian, and German challenge to the collective system, commenced at the close of 1936.¹ Each of these periods, too, was marked by a characteristic event of special importance. In the first, the occupation of the Ruhr epitomized the years between 1920 and 1925; in the second, the Truce of Locarno was equally illuminating; in the third, the rise of Hitler in Germany was similarly significant; and in the last, the settlement of Munich announced on September 30, 1938, proclaimed a new departure in postwar world trends.

The first of these periods, which like the third was one of revolt, was precipitated by the response of the German people to the Treaty of Versailles. Instinctively and violently they strove to break the chains imposed upon them by the Settlement of Paris. Inevitably, however, that attempt brought them into direct collision with France, and the consequence of that collision was

¹ The following books dealing with the postwar history of the world are recommended for the attention of students: Bennis, F. L., *Europe Since 1914*, 1936; Gathorne-Hardy, G. M., *A Short History of International Affairs 1920-1934*, 1934; Jackson, J. Hampden, *The Post-War World*, 1935; King-Hall, Stephen, *Our Own Times, 1913-1934*, 1935, 2 vols.; Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs*, annual.

the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, which for Germany was economically as disastrous as the World War itself.

Beaten, the Germans again sued for peace. This time, however, they were fortunate enough to find a statesman abler and wiser than any they had possessed since Bismarck. Under the leadership of Gustav Stresemann, German policy during this next period was based upon the clear perception that for the present the Reich could not hope to escape from the restraints of the Treaty of Versailles, and that her immediate problem was to avoid the social perils which threatened as consequences of the World War and the occupation of the Ruhr.

Fortunately by 1925 Great Britain and France had begun to emerge from the shadow of war psychology, and were now looking forward and not backward. Even the United States, while still resolutely determined to avoid all political association with the Old World, was in a mood to participate financially in European reconstruction. In Briand and Sir Austen Chamberlain, too, France and Great Britain found statesmen animated by the new spirit and ready to co-operate with Stresemann.

The stage was thus set for a complete change in course, and that change, marking the second of the postwar periods, was symbolized by the various accords signed at Locarno in the autumn of 1925. In effect, these accords adjourned to the future all the territorial disputes arising from the Treaty of Versailles save the question of Alsace-Lorraine. In this detail, Germany renounced voluntarily all purpose to recover the provinces which she had taken by the Treaty of Frankfort (1871) and lost by the Treaty of Versailles (1919). Great Britain and Italy, for their part, guaranteed the status quo at the Rhine against either German or French aggression.

Germany also entered the League of Nations, in the autumn of 1926. For the next few years, in fact until 1929, the year of Stresemann's death and the fall of the Tory Ministry to which Chamberlain belonged, Geneva became the scene of the close association of a great triumvirate of peace, in which Briand was the acknowledged chief. The dominating purpose of these three statesmen was to restore peace by re-establishing prosperity. And the re-establishment of German prosperity was the first task, for if Germany was unable to live tolerably in her new circumstances, she was sure in the end to revert to that program of violence which had characterized the years between Versailles and Locarno.

During the next few years economic recovery was rapid, and as German prosperity returned, German passion and despair, awakened by the effects of the World War and of the Ruhr, were largely dissipated. Insensibly the entire atmosphere of Europe changed, and throughout the whole world there spread the conviction that genuine peace had at last been restored and that in the League of Nations mankind had at last found an effective instrument to prevent war in the future.

All of this new structure, however, was built not upon rock but upon sand. German prosperity actually had its origin, not in the restoration of the old circumstances of the prewar era, which had witnessed the almost fabulous growth of German industry, trade, and commerce, but instead in the vast influx of American and British loans. By these foreign loans, Germany was able to keep her industrial machine in full operation because they furnished her with the resources necessary not merely to pay reparations but also to purchase abroad the essential raw materials which she lacked.

When, however, events in the United States produced a sudden arrest of American lending, and the British loans also terminated simultaneously, the fundamental insecurity of German prosperity was disclosed with tragic clarity, and there ensued a collapse followed by a further disintegration in the economic life of the Reich which continued for several years. And with that crash the whole program of Stresemann fell also, for that program had been based upon the major assumption that if Germany accepted the terms of Versailles loyally she would be able to find material prosperity in association with her former foes.

The financial prostration and the economic paralysis which marked the course of the Great Depression in 1930 and 1931, however, constituted in German eyes a clear demonstration of the fallacy of Stresemann's policy and the futility of any attempt to live up to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Thus a fresh revolt set in and found its expression in the person of Adolf Hitler and in the program of National Socialism.

In point of fact, Germany's new plight was only to a slight degree the consequence of the Treaty of Versailles. On the contrary she was now suffering primarily and chiefly from the ultimate consequences of the Industrial Revolution, and not from the immediate effects of the World War. The difficulties which confronted her were economic and not political, and they were not to be exorcised by restoration of her old frontiers or removal of the restrictions placed upon her means of defense.

The calamity which had now overtaken the Reich was actually a detail in a world calamity. But the German people saw their new hardships and handicaps in terms of their old grievances. They were really suffering from

evils which were inherent in their material circumstances, but instinctively they responded to the repetition of the old slogans of the pre-Locarnian era. Wrongs had been done them in the peace treaty. Removal of these wrongs they were justly entitled to demand, but that bestowal of justice could not bring about a restoration of prosperity.

Explosion, however, had become inevitable; and to understand that explosion, which is the dominating circumstance of the third postwar period and responsible for the fourth, contemporary problem, it is necessary to turn back to the years between Waterloo and the Marne. During those years the world had been evolving politically and economically in accordance with principles which had been asserted by the three great Revolutions, the English, American, and French. Together these had prepared the way for the contemporary national state in which equality in political rights and security in property are assured to all citizens or subjects irrespective of distinctions of class or condition.

The eventual effect of the three revolutions, therefore, was to strip Aristocracy of the political power which it had inherited from the age of Feudalism and to transfer that power to the masses of national populations. And since by the close of the World War universal suffrage had been generally adopted, the right of majorities to rule, and therefore the power of the masses to control, had thus been established. •

In the meantime the Industrial Revolution, in its turn, had transformed the circumstances of the world in respect of property. In the place of a society in which land had been the chief element in production and the masses largely composed of peasants who lived in the

country and worked the soil, there had been gradually developed a system whose characteristic feature was a huge urban population which dwelt beside factories and mines and was dependent upon employment in these for its existence. And in exactly the same fashion the old mercantile class, which had been largely occupied in trade and commerce, had evolved into a capitalistic class, now chiefly the owners of the new instruments of production.

Between Capital and Labor, thus defined, there was, on the whole, no open break before the World War. The former enjoyed the benefits of rapidly expanding industry and consequent increase of wealth. The latter, in turn, enjoyed the blessings of a steadily mounting standard of living. Between the two, a certain balance of power was exercised by the political parties which had developed. Dependent upon the capitalist for their financial contributions and upon the proletariat for their electoral support, these parties bestowed upon the former protection from confiscatory legislation and upon the latter relief from extreme exploitation.

As a consequence, the real issue in the prewar years was not over the distribution of property but over the extent to which the possessors of property should share their profits with the working masses. Decade by decade, too, the workers saw their conditions improving and the outlook for their children widening. They became increasingly conscious of the power residing in their political rights. The whole social system was fluid; its obvious inequalities did not assume the aspect of irremediable injustice, because, like Napoleon's soldiers, the workers carried the baton of a marshal, if not in their knapsacks, at least in their dinner pails.

On the heels of the World War, however, the Russian Revolution, having adopted the program of Karl Marx, undertook to abolish the whole democratic system. For political liberty it substituted the domination of the workers; for private property, state ownership; and for the national state it aimed to substitute the world community. The design of this threefold program was to take the machinery of production out of private hands and transfer it to a state that was exclusively directed by and for the workers, and to replace the old rivalry between sovereign states by a struggle between Capital and Labor within one world-wide state.

This challenge of Communism was a direct threat to the owners of property who constituted the capitalist class. Under the democratic system the right of the majority to rule had been made effective by the adoption of universal suffrage. As a consequence, merely by employing the existing political machinery, the workers in Great Britain, France, and elsewhere could, if they chose, follow the Russian example and destroy the whole capitalistic system. In a word, they could substitute for the progress by evolution of the prewar era the new tactic of revolution. And danger that this might happen arose from the possibility that the workers, who had supplied the cannon fodder in all armies, might rise against the system which had sent them to battle.

In point of fact, however, nothing of the sort happened in Great Britain or France. Alarmed by the obvious threat of the Red Revolution, the governments of the Allied nations furtively financed and secretly favored the counter-revolutionary campaigns of the White Russians. All of these, however, came to nothing. The Russian Revolution, like the French, succeeded in mak-

ing good its control at home. On the other hand, it was unsuccessful abroad, and the defeat of the Red army under the walls of Warsaw in 1920 broke the invasive power of Bolshevism. As a consequence, a military truce presently ensued between western democracy and eastern revolution at the frontiers fixed by the Treaty of Riga.

Defeated on the battlefield, the Russian Bolsheviks did not at once abandon the struggle. On the contrary, they undertook to promote world revolution by means of the Communists within the democratic countries, financing campaigns of sabotage and strikes from the Kremlin. This second offensive, however, was no more successful than the first in the western countries where the economic structure was strong. In these states the workers looked with disapproval upon the excesses of the Bolsheviks and manifested no inclination to follow their example; and as Labor remained loyal to the democratic faith, Capital had no reason to desert it.

In Italy, however, quite a different situation existed. There the strain of a war too long protracted had produced genuine unrest among the masses. Again, the disappointments awakened by a victory too little rewarded in the peace treaties had aroused a violent resentment among the veterans. Thus there was, on the one hand, a decided drift toward Communism, and on the other a violent nationalism which found a leader in Mussolini and expression in Fascism.

At the same moment, Italian Finance and Big Business, taking alarm at the apparent inability of the existing parliamentary regime to preserve order or to protect property, decided to throw its lot in with Mussolini and his movement. And this turn to Fascism was

made not merely by the owners of property, as Marx had foretold, but also by those who held posts of profit and dignity under the capitalistic system and were not ready to join the manual workers. On the contrary, as their employers were alarmed for property, they were concerned for position. Thanks to this double reinforcement, Fascism triumphed and liberty was thus sacrificed to the double desire for national greatness and domestic order.

What happened in Italy in 1922 was, moreover, a close repetition of what had occurred in France a little more than a century before. Then the Bourgeoisie, which had made the French Revolution to overthrow Aristocracy, having subsequently become weary of the excesses of the Republic, appealed from chaos to Caesar and assisted in the overthrow of the Republic and the establishment of the Empire. In 1804, Napoleon was thus commissioned to re-establish domestic peace and order. In 1922, Mussolini accepted a similar mandate. And in both instances, since the instrument of reaction was a man of genius, his personality invested that reaction with a character all its own.

Like Napoleon, Mussolini addressed his appeal to national pride. In place of a free Italy, he proposed to make a great Italy. And in undertaking his task he returned to the traditions of the Risorgimento. His march on Rome was thus conducted in the spirit of the Expedition of the Thousand to Sicily, two generations earlier; and as Garibaldi had been the symbol of Italian unification, Mussolini now became the incarnation of Italian greatness.

Arrived at the seat of power, Mussolini, like Napoleon, proceeded to sweep away those democratic institu-

tions which, while they existed, would have constituted a constant peril to his regime. Parliament was abolished, free speech ended, the press regimented. The workers were deprived of their power to establish a Communist regime by the exercise of their voting rights. All this domestic reaction, however, was accomplished in the name of a fiery and frenzied nationalism. Fascism promised to Italy that glory and those rewards which democracy had failed to gain for it, either in battle during the World War or around the green table at the Paris Conference.

To the internationalism of Communism, Fascism opposed Italian nationalism. Lenin's revolution had sought to move horizontally through all the workers of the world. Mussolini's operated vertically up through all the strata of the Italian population. Communism called upon the masses everywhere to march to class warfare under the Red Flag. Fascism summoned Italians to march to victory in a new national war under the Tricolor of Savoy. Common to both, moreover, was hostility to democracy. The Russian Revolution destroyed democracy to gain power, and the Italian Reaction abolished it to prevent a Communist triumph.

Like Communism, however, Fascism failed to effect any immediate lodgment in the western democracies. As the workers there had rejected Communism, the employers now rejected Fascism. Feeling its position as yet unchallenged, Capital continued to view without alarm the possession of the instruments of political power by Labor. And Labor, in its turn, remained confident that under the gradualness of democratic processes it would achieve greater and more lasting benefits than through the violence of the Communist tactics.

By 1926, therefore, it seemed as if Revolution and Reaction had come and gone without serious consequences for democracy in the world at large. Communism and Fascism both appeared domestic experiments without exportable value. Under the direction of Stalin, too, the Russian Revolution was moving toward the Five-Year Plan, and thus away from the program of World Revolution. And, in a similar fashion, Fascism, under the guidance of Mussolini, was more and more concentrating its attention upon domestic reorganization.

As early as 1925, too, Germany, under the inspiration of Stresemann, had made the Pacts of Locarno in association with her French and British foes of the war. Thus, as in November, 1918, the Social Democrats, led by Ebert, had crushed the brief Red Revolt, so now the less extreme Nationalists seemed to be following Stresemann and putting aside the program of *revanche*, which had its origin in the passions provoked by a lost war and a Punic peace. When, too, in 1926, Germany came to Geneva, welcomed by Briand and Chamberlain, the world at last seemed safe for Democracy and equally insured against Communism and against Fascism.

Three years later, however, the Great Depression suddenly cast its shadow over the world; and that shadow rested first upon the Reich. The German workers, who during the years of the Truce of Locarno had begun to enjoy a rising standard of living and had therefore, in increasing numbers, deserted the Communist for the Republican cause and parties, now turned to the Left. Capitalism in Germany, as in Italy, was thus confronted by the possibility of domestic revolution. Immediate or remote, as the danger may have been, this Red Peril constituted the basis for a German Reaction conducted

in faithful imitation of the Italian; and as Mussolini had been the instrument of the Italian Reaction, Hitler became the agent of the German.

In Germany as in Italy, therefore, Capital aided and abetted in the overthrow of the existing democratic regime, in an effort to prevent the possible employment of the democratic machinery by the workers, who constituted the political majorities, to establish a Communist system. And having mounted to power, National Socialism followed the example of Fascism and swept away the institutions of democracy—parliament, free speech, and an unshackled press. All political parties, save the dominant National Socialist, were abolished; and Republican and Communist met in the same concentration camp.

To gain power, National Socialism exploited patriotic emotions as Fascism had done. Upon the democratic elements in the country was thrust the responsibility for the collapse of 1918, for the submission to the Treaty of Versailles, and for the continuing humiliations of the postwar period. As Mussolini had revived the memory of the glories of Ancient Rome in the very name of Fascism, Hitler now recalled the greatness of the First Reich in his prospectus for a Third in which were to be gathered all the lands formerly included within the limits of the Holy Roman Empire. Once more unity was exalted above liberty, and again the objective of domestic unity was represented to be foreign conquest.

Internationally, the repercussions of the German Reaction were immediate and important. While the triumph in Italy of a man and a movement proclaiming the gospel of intransigent nationalism did not have decisive influence in the world at large, the conquest of Germany

by a leader and a party dedicated to the same gospel more than doubled the danger of war and necessarily arrested all the experiments of Geneva—experiments based upon the twofold assumption of a continued sway of democracy in the world and of the enduring supremacy of international ideals within the various democracies.

When, however, first Italy and then Germany renounced democracy for dictatorship and adopted a program of immediate armament and eventual war, there remained no basis for co-operation between them and the British, French, and American democracies which still sought to evangelize the world by their own prospectus of peace. Nor did the rise of the Military party in Japan and the suppression of Liberal democratic elements in that country encourage the hopes of the western democracies for a peaceful solution of Far Eastern conflicts. Between the ideal of conquest and that of co-operation, there could be no common ground. And for the neighbors of Italy, Germany, and Japan, there was left no alternative but to prepare themselves for a conflict which seemed impending and would in the end prove inevitable if the declared purposes of these dynamic states long went unmodified.

On the political side, therefore, the World Crisis has had its origin in the three Reactions, the Italian, the German, and the Japanese. Provoked by the Russian Revolution, each of these Reactions borrowed the same ideology of nationalism to overthrow Democracy in order to forestall Communism. The inescapable consequence of such strategy, moreover, was to arouse the fears of those nations which lay in the pathway of the national aspirations and ambitions thus aroused, and

to drive them to military preparations calculated to guarantee their own security against threatened aggression.

Apprehensions awakened among the nations adjacent to Germany and Italy by the nationalistic purposes proclaimed by the dictators and the dominant political parties of these states, were likewise intensified by the course of Japan following the Manchurian incident in 1931. That course was, in effect, no more than the translation into action, by the masters of Japan, of a nationalistic program indistinguishable from the prospectuses of the German and Italian dictatorships. What the German and Italian dictators had been publicly announcing an intention of doing, the Japanese government actually did; and what their government did, the Japanese people approved.

The Japanese people thus disassociated themselves from all the endeavors of the democracies of the western world to establish a system of peace and order internationally by means of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris. They set Japan's national interests above respect either for the specific obligations undertaken by treaty or the general restraints of public international law. The withdrawal of Japan from the League (1933), and that of Germany in the same year, were decisive disclosures of the pursuit by both countries of national policies irreconcilable with the whole international conception of Geneva, and incompatible with the assumptions upon which the League had been based. This conception and these assumptions, moreover, were still further undermined by the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and the German occupation of the Rhineland in 1936.

The political crisis, too, was intensified by an economic crisis not less acute. While the Great Depression, like the Russian Revolution, failed to destroy the political institutions of the western democracies, it did, in a later stage, bring about a complete transformation in their economic practices. The evils attendant upon growing domestic unemployment and shrinking foreign trade, which accompanied the "Economic Blizzard," were so threatening that Great Britain, France, and the United States broke with all the traditions of *laissez-faire* and launched themselves upon policies of inflation, currency manipulations, higher tariffs, and quotas.

These programs constituted an appeal to the instincts of economic nationalism quite as open as the German, Italian, and Japanese appeals to political nationalism—and the effect was hardly less disastrous. International trade everywhere languished, and the nations of the world were presently engaged in a struggle with one another for existence, waged only with economic weapons but fought in the same spirit as armed conflict and producing a devastation hardly less complete than that of military battle and in fact followed in logical sequence by vast armament programs.

While all countries suffered heavily from this new upheaval, the situation of some was very much more serious than that of others. Among the Great Powers, the plight of Germany, Italy, and Japan was by far the most threatening, because their resources in the essential raw materials of industry were inadequate to their needs. They were dependent, therefore, upon foreign supplies obtainable only by an uninterrupted international commerce and the maintenance of a sound foreign exchange position.

Under the stimulus of the Great Depression, countries necessarily sought to expand their own industrial output and to restrict their use of foreign goods and labor and thereby to relieve domestic unemployment. While Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia, thanks to their resources and wealth, were able to purchase or dispense with foreign manufactures and labor and yet to maintain their own industrial life, Germany, Italy, and Japan were faced by the prospect of a declining standard of living if their supplies of foreign raw materials were cut off. Economic necessity, therefore, gave fresh impulsion to policies which had their origin in territorial aspirations, and thus bestowed a new aspect upon the problem of world peace.

To understand that contemporary aspect, the student of international relations is confronted by a double task. First, he must examine the origin and development of those political issues and traditions to which both Fascism and National Socialism appealed in the face of a real or imagined threat of Russian Communism; for only through the knowledge of the territorial, ethnic, and psychological issues dividing European peoples is it possible to comprehend how Mussolini and Hitler were able to mobilize the passions and patriotisms of their two great peoples and thus capture the power to destroy democratic institutions. Second, the student must, in the same fashion, acquire knowledge of the nature of the material circumstances of the Great Powers—of their resources and deficiencies in the essentials of industry and in foodstuffs, and of their possession or lack of means to make good their wants in this respect, for only such knowledge can explain the economic aspects of their national policies. And to comprehend the problem of

world peace it is further necessary to examine the various programs for the organization of peace in the light of the political, economic, and strategic circumstances of the Great Powers¹ in Europe, Asia, and America.

Always in considering the postwar circumstances, it must be remembered that the quarter-century following 1914 constituted an era of convulsion without parallel since the period of the French Revolution and the First Napoleonic Empire.

Twenty years after the summoning of the States-General, which marked the opening stage of the earlier upheaval, the attention of the world was concentrated upon the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte and the fortunes of Imperial France. The future of both, moreover, was then necessarily interpreted in the light of Wagram which had just been won and without suspicion of the retreat from Moscow less than four years distant. In 1809 the idea that the French Revolution, but recently ended, and the Industrial Revolution, not yet well begun, would together shape the affairs of mankind throughout the century that was to follow, and bestow new and unimagined forms alike upon political and upon economic life, must have seemed incredible. And to the contemporary audience of 1809 any suggestion that the Napoleonic drama was destined to prove but a brief if brilliant episode, without lasting meaning, would have appeared absurd.

¹ One detail of importance to note at this point is the fact of changes in the political and economic circumstances of Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1938 and 1939. Since some of those changes were not yet completed when the present Revised Edition of this book went to press, it was thought best to let the charts and most of the maps stand as in the preceding edition of 1937. The fundamental conditions of 1920 to 1937 are also of greater importance in most of our study than the dynamic conditions of July, 1939; but those later conditions are shown clearly in portions of the text and in the corrected or newly added maps on pages 55, 291, facing 374, following 432, 470-471, and 703.

The same limitations of perspective manifestly exist today. Unmistakably the world is again in crisis, but on a vaster scale, for the crisis includes not only Europe but the Far East and the Americas as well; and the present is now as obscure and the future as unfathomable as it was a century and a quarter ago. It is this uncertainty, however, that invests living with the character of genuine adventure and bestows upon the study of current events the charm of an authentic voyage of discovery.

PART ONE

FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

Chapter I

THE NATION STATES SYSTEM

THE contemporary world is organized upon the basis of the nation states system; that is, each of the countries among which the surface of the earth is divided constitutes a politically self-governing national state asserting itself to be sovereign.¹ What are commonly described as international relations are no more than the sum of the contacts between the national policies of these independent sovereign states.

National policies are systems of strategy employed by states primarily to insure territorial security and to promote economic welfare or prosperity. Though the systems of strategy applied will differ according to the circumstances of the nation concerned, security² and

¹ For further analysis and critique of the doctrine of sovereignty, see: Laski, H. J., *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, 1917; Lauterpacht, H., *The Function of Law in the International Community*, 1933; MacIver, R. M., *The Modern State*, 1926; Mattern, Johannes, *Concepts of State Sovereignty and International Law*, 1928; Russell, F. M., *Theories of International Relations*, 1936; Van Vollenhoven, C., *The Law of Peace*, 1936.

² While "security," used in this sense, refers primarily to that of a nation's territory, states are also concerned with the protection of the property and persons of its citizens abroad. (Borchard, E. M., *The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad*, 1927; Ladas, S. P., *The International Protection of Industrial Property*, 1930; Liu Shih Shun,

prosperity remain, withal, the common ends of every sovereign state. This is true, moreover, even where a nation's policy appears to be chiefly designed for the attainment of such objectives as ethnic unity or the exercise of prestige or power politics.

Sometimes a distinction is made between the foreign and the domestic phases of national policy, but in reality such a distinction is largely imaginary; for what a state does at home and what it does abroad will invariably be dictated by paramount concern for its domestic interests. This applies even where attempts to serve such interests may have world-wide repercussions, as is the case in currency and tariff regulations.

There are now more than sixty sovereign states, and since their interests not only vary but are often directly opposed, collisions between their national policies are frequent. But whereas the individual citizens of a state, although claiming equality in the eyes of their domestic law, nevertheless acknowledge a common duty to conform to that law or are speedily brought to obedience by local courts or police, no like situation exists in the case of sovereign states. And whereas the presence of a supreme sovereign authority within each state excludes the necessity of violent adjustment of domestic issues, the absence of any superstate in the International sphere permits resort to force in the solution of conflicting national policies.

During the past five centuries, which have witnessed the development of the nation states system,¹ there has evolved concomitantly a body of public and private

Extraterritoriality, Its Rise and Its Decline, 1925; Offutt, Milton, *The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United States*, 1928; Stowell, E. C., *Intervention in International Law*, 1921.)

¹ Mowat, R. B., *The European States System*, 1935, 2nd enl. ed.

international law.¹ From the days of Machiavelli and Grotius to the present hour, principles and precedents in the conduct of nations, of which treaty engagements form an important part, have been continuously expanded. Unlike domestic law, however, this vast body of rules of conduct has not received the backing of police power but depends entirely for its sanction upon the voluntary acceptance and good will of the sovereign states.

Likewise in the realm of international government, a significant growth in administrative and arbitral agencies has taken place.² The century preceding the World War witnessed the frequent convening of world assemblies devoted to the peaceful adjustment of causes of conflict. But whereas long-established practice in international conference technique received eventual constitutional recognition in the Covenant of the League of Nations, its effective functioning was not thereby assured. For, although the Assembly and Council and the Secretariat of the League, and the World Court, were intended to be the international counterpart of the state Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary, their authority as international governing agencies was from the beginning challenged by the paramount and particularist authority of member and nonmember sovereign states.

Faithful to the doctrine of national sovereignty, the nation states have, through their refusal to conform their national policies to the dictates of public international interests, resisted the fiat of public international law, the establishment of an international police, or the

¹ Brierly, J. L., *The Law of Nations*, 1928; Butler, Sir G. G., and Maccoby, Simon, *The Development of International Law*, 1928; Lauterpacht, H., *Development of International Law by the Permanent Court of International Justice*, 1934; Stowell, E. C., *International Law; A Restatement of Principles in Conformity with Actual Practice*, 1931.

² Zimmern, Sir Alfred, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918-1935*, 1936.

imposition of any superstate authority. In identifying regional or world jurisdictions as a direct challenge to their own sovereignty, nations have renounced the obligation to conform to policies of "peaceful change" in the adjustment of their programs of action to changes in world conditions.

As a consequence, for the settlement of disputes between nations, the use of public international law or resort to arbitral authority is purely voluntary, whereas between citizens or groups within a state the legal determination of disputed issues is compulsory. In practice, too, although states not infrequently appeal to international agencies when they find such a course convenient, it is only upon issues which are relatively insignificant. By contrast, when questions of security, prestige, ethnic unity, or other vital matters are at stake, states hold the assertion of national interests beyond the restraints of international authority.

The classic example of this practice was the German invasion of Belgium in 1914. Even the German Chancellor himself admitted publicly and frankly that this action was illegal, judged by the precedents of international law. But he discovered complete justification for it, nevertheless, in the fact that Germany, at the moment, found herself in a "state of necessity";¹ and al-

¹ "Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity (*Norwehr*), and necessity (*Nor*) knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory.

"Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. It is true that the French Government declared at Brussels that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. . . . He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through (*durchhauen*)."

(From the speech of the German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, delivered before the Reichstag, August 4, 1914.) See also Crecraft, Earl W., *Freedom of the Seas*, 1935; Turlington, Edgar W., *Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law*, Vol. III, *The World War Period*, 1935-36.

though the declaration of Bethmann-Hollweg was widely and roundly denounced as a cynical defiance of the conscience of mankind, it was in fact no more than a stupid but honest assertion of the doctrine often followed in similar circumstances.¹

Again, although Great Britain cited the Belgian episode as justification for her declaration of war upon Germany and made much of her championship of the principles of international law and of the sanctity of treaties, she and her allies during the World War frequently showed equal disregard for both. As a consequence, protests against open violations of international law, lodged by the United States while it was neutral, produced no practical result and were forgotten when, at last, the United States also became a belligerent.²

Thus before the World War and during that struggle, public international law exerted no effective restraint upon the national policies of states. Nor has the postwar period seen any material change. On the contrary, although the world is today far more richly endowed with means for settling international disputes by law and not by war than it was before 1914, states still disclose the same unwillingness to subject their sovereignty to the restraints of the League of Nations that they formerly did to subject it to the restraints of international law.³

That unwillingness was clearly illustrated in the history of the Pact of Paris (1928). While all nations read-

¹ Rodick, B. C., *The Doctrine of Necessity in International Law*, 1928.

² Garner, J. W., *Prize Law During the World War*, 1927; same author, *International Law and the World War*, 1920; Moore, J. B., *International Law and Some Current Illusions*, 1924.

³ Hawtrey, R. G., *Economic Aspects of Sovereignty*, 1930; Keen, F. N., *A Better League of Nations*, 1934; Madariaga, Salvador de, *Disarmament*, 1929; Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Future of the League of Nations*, 1936; Steed, H. W., *Vital Peace: A Study of Risks*, 1936; Wheeler-Bennet, John W., *The Pipe Dream of Peace*, 1935; Williams, Sir J. F., *International Change and International Peace*, 1932.

ily ratified this Pact, which constituted a formal renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy,¹ none consented to the modification of national policies which could reach their goal only through war.² Nor was any state ready to provide force to insure the keeping of the pledge which the Pact constituted. Instead, when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, in clear violation of the Pact and of the Treaty of Washington, and when five years later her example was emulated by Italy in Ethiopia in contravention of the Pact and the Covenant of the League, the other nations, parties to the above engagements, limited their actions to vain protests or half-hearted support of trade sanctions.

For the student of international relations, therefore, the point of departure must be a clear perception of the

¹ The two articles of faith, without benefit of sanction, contained in the Pact of Paris, are as follows:

Article I

"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Article II

"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

² Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of May 19, 1928, to the American Secretary of State, defining the British interpretation of the meaning of the Pact, has become the classic definition of national foreign policy under the prevailing international system.

"The language of Article I, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States have comparable interests any disregard of which by a foreign power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government."

paradox disclosed by the performances of nations in the postwar period. On the one hand, they have indulged in an incredible multiplication of the instruments for insuring peace, but on the other hand they have consistently rejected all responsibility for employing these instruments where their own interests were not advantaged thereby. Between the various means for preventing conflict and the evident desire of peoples to escape war, it has therefore been impossible to establish any effective connection. But without some belt stretching from machinery to motive power, only paralysis can result.

There appears, too, a second paradox even more striking than the one above stated. Parallel to the unprecedented expansion of the machinery for preserving peace, the effectiveness of which has at all times depended upon the development of economic and political internationalist tendencies, there has also occurred an equally impressive spread of the spirit of intransigent nationalism. In fact, precisely as the French Revolution was followed by an enormous wave of ethnic nationalism, the aftermath of the World War has been an explosion of economic nationalism not less destructive.¹

In effect, then, the world of today is a lawless world, not because systems of international law and administration are lacking, but because nations refuse to shape their national policies to conform to that law, or to submit disputes arising from conflicts of vital national interests to proper tribunals, or, finally, to invest the existing peace machinery with the necessary police power. But in a lawless world, force must be the ulti-

¹ Angell, Sir Norman, *The Unseen Assassins*, 1932; Dutt, R. P., *World Politics 1918-1936*, 1936; Foreman, Clark, *The New Internationalism*, 1934; Hayes, C. J. H., *Essays on Nationalism*, 1926; same author, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, 1931; Woolf, L. S., *After the Deluge*, 1931.

mate means of pursuing policy, and resort to force must mean war.

War, too, has actually been the unfailing concomitant of the nation states system throughout its history, as of the city states system which preceded it. In fact, the western world has known but two periods of peace; one absolute, when it was united under the single sovereignty of Rome; the other relative, when the medieval Papacy was able to moderate the conflicting ambitions of princes.¹ And in both instances the sovereign states were lacking.

Since nations are unwilling to subject their policies to international restraints, it follows naturally that they must seek to clothe them with force. In fact, armaments have always been the most familiar and characteristic prerogative of sovereignty. Thus, even in peace, nations are commonly engaged in strengthening their armies and navies, thereby unconsciously disclosing their conviction that war will continue a recurrent feature of international relations.

Differing as they do in extent of territory, size of population, and amount of natural resources, however, states also vary in the degree to which they can clothe their national policies with force. As a consequence, only a few—and these the most considerable—will possess the force necessary to support their national policies effectively; and these alone constitute the Great Powers. Thus, ours is not only a world without enforceable international law but also a Great-Power world.

Such, too, it has always been during the centuries which have seen the development of the modern nation

¹ Eckhardt, C. C., *The Papacy and World Affairs*, 1937; Eppstein, John, *The Catholic Tradition and the Law of Nations*, 1935; Wright, R. F., *Medieval Internationalism, the Contribution of the Medieval Church to International Law and Peace*, 1930.

states system. In that time, it is true, there have been many changes in the ranks and even in the regional location of the Great Powers. Nevertheless, the interplay of the national policies of these Powers has constantly had a disproportionate and even a dominant influence upon international relations.

It is equally evident, despite popular conviction to the contrary, that while rulers and forms of government within nation states have changed frequently, national policies, by contrast, have varied surprisingly little in purpose from century to century. Such modifications as have occurred have been due far more often to economic than to political causes.

Mutual comprehension of national policies by people of different nation states, however, is rendered difficult by the fact that, while for every people its own policies are far more a matter of instinct than of conscious calculation, those of others are invariably measured by their effect abroad rather than by their cause at home. Thus people think of the objectives expressed in their own national policies as their rights and identify challenge or resistance to these rights by other states as constituting injuries; although such opposition must in its turn appear, in the eyes of the peoples responsible for it, to be no more than the legitimate defense of their similarly self-determined rights. Not infrequently, moreover, those nations which most uncompromisingly resist all foreign interference with their own national policies are the ones that most insistently assert their right and competence to meddle with those of others.

The student of world politics who would understand the true motives of the national policies of states must, therefore, avoid judgments on principles of right or

wrong.¹ For the appeals which statesmen make to legal or moral courses are to be taken not necessarily as the true basis but as the popular justification of policy.

The implications, then, of the nation states system are clear. It insures the existence of a world of international anarchy, in which force is the determining factor in the relations between sovereign states. In that world, also, only the Great Powers, by reason of their disproportionate strength, can invest their national policies with real international importance.

¹ "The simple formula of right and wrong does not afford an adequate basis for the settlement of international disputes. It presupposes that perfect independence and that formal equality of sovereign authorities, which are in reality the foundation of the international anarchy." (Hawtrey, R. G., *Economic Aspects of Sovereignty*, 1930, p. 145.)

Chapter II

NATIONAL POLICY

IN the preceding chapter (page 21) national policy was defined as the system of strategy employed by a state primarily to insure its security¹ and to promote its prosperity. In addition, states are naturally concerned with their honor and prestige, but in practice these are seldom called into question when more vital material interests are not also at stake.²

Implicit in the use of the word "strategy" is the suggestion that, even in peace, states commonly conduct their international relations in the same spirit as their military operations in war. That point of view was clearly set forth by Clausewitz in his famous definition of war as "the pursuit of policy by other means."³ What he had in mind was that the *vital interests* of states,

¹ "Security! The term signifies more indeed than the maintenance of a people's homeland, or even of their territories beyond the seas. It also means the maintenance of their economic interests, everything, in a word which goes to make up the grandeur, the life itself, of the nation." ("The Permanent Bases of French Foreign Policy," by Jules Cambon, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 1930, p. 185.)

² Bratt, K. A., *That Next War?*, 1931; Hawtrey, R. G., *Economic Aspects of Sovereignty*, 1930.

³ Clausewitz, Karl von, *On War* (translation by Col. J. J. Graham), 1911.

which include all elements contributing to national security and economic and military strength, are essentially competitive. Whether the methods of national policy are peaceful or warlike, their objectives are the same. Since, too, a nation's ability to assert its sovereign right depends upon its strength in relation to that of its neighbors, a premium is placed upon all those conditions and elements which favor the development of national power.

The important bearing, economic, political, and strategic, which the material disparity between nations has upon their peace and war relations, will become clearer in the pages which follow. It is sufficient to note here that the experience of the World War and the unstable conditions which have characterized international politics since its close, have served to draw in dramatic fashion the lines of distinction, not only between the inheritors of the world's natural wealth and the disinherited, but also between different inheritors themselves.

The size and effectiveness, too, of national power is no longer determined by the extent of a nation's territory and population, the wealth of its treasuries, or even the strength of its armed forces, but rather by its capacity for industrialization. For inasmuch as large-scale industrialization depends upon the possession or ready availability of vast quantities of the basic raw materials, nature, through her unequal distribution of these, has rigidly set a limit to the number of states capable of achieving a Great Power status.

Fundamentally, then, the central dilemma of the peace and war relations of nations derives from the fact that the absence of a superstate authority imposes on each country ultimate dependence upon its own re-

sources in the defense of its economic and territorial security. Ordinarily these ends of national policy have been sought by means other than war; that is, by diplomacy, financial and commercial pressures, armaments, or alliances. On occasion, however, when the issues at stake were vital and all other means had failed, nations have resorted to war.¹

Although war as an instrument of policy must enter into the calculations of the national strategy of every state, it becomes a dominant consideration only in those regions of the world in which the vital interests of the Great Powers are directly involved. Thus, with minor exceptions, it is in Europe and the Far East that the pursuits of power politics give rise to serious conflicts of balance of power involving prestige and national interests. In the Americas, on the other hand, the dominance of one nation, the United States, precludes such regional considerations. It is to the nature of the conflict between the Great Powers that the student must turn to discover the meaning of national policy under the present international system, because the conflicts of lesser states hold significance in international relations only as they relate to the rivalries of the Great Powers.

By reason of their physical circumstances, the Great Powers may be divided into two classes, the "Haves" and the "Have-nots." Of these, the first class, to which the British Empire, France, Russia, and the United States belong, is composed of the nations whose territories are large and rich and whose ethnic unity has been achieved. The second class of Great Powers, which are

¹ Cowan, A. R., *War in World History*, 1929; Fuller, J. F. C., *War and Western Civilization, 1832-1932*, 1932; Hull, W. I., *The War Method and the Peace Method*, 1929; Porritt, Arthur, ed., *The Causes of War*, 1932; Wheeler-Bennett, John W., *The Pipe Dream of Peace*, 1935.

characterized by lands that are relatively exiguous and poor in material resources, include Japan, Italy, and Germany. In the case of Germany, moreover, the situation is further aggravated by lack of ethnic unity, because of the inclusion of important German minorities within the boundaries of some of Germany's immediate neighbors.

For the first group of states, the Haves which are sated and therefore satisfied, security through the maintenance of the status quo is the sole objective of national policy. Having, their chief purpose is to hold. For the group of Have-nots, on the other hand, their present situation being precarious, through deprivation of many of the essentials of security and power, the acquisition of what they lack assumes primary consideration.

In theory the existing disparity between the "Have" and the "Have-not" Powers might be abolished in one of two ways: the sated states might consent to sacrificing a portion of their territory or that of some smaller nations as a means of restoring the balance of material wealth; or they might share with the "Have-nots" equal rights and security in investment and trade in their own resources. In practice, however, no relief by such means is discoverable for the less fortunate states; for both solutions run counter to the basic principle of sovereignty, which holds the national territory and the control of its resources to be inalienable. Faithful to that principle, states are rarely willing to cede their land voluntarily to others, and never to surrender any part of their right to the privileged exploitation of their national wealth.

The fact that forty-two millions of French not merely possess a homeland area large and rich enough to satisfy their needs and their aspirations, but also control a vast

colonial empire, while a larger number of Italians are crowded into a narrow peninsula and were, up to the conquest of Ethiopia, extremely poor in colonial territories, has appeared to Italian thought clearly the consequence of accidents of history and not of the operation of divine law.

In the same way, the fact that the sixty-five millions who constitute the white population of the British Commonwealth own and exploit the well-nigh inexhaustible resources of an empire on which the sun never sets, while about the same number of Germans in 1918-1938 were cooped up in a relatively insignificant and economically insufficient region of Central Europe, was explicable to the German mind only in terms of luck, of the good fortune which enabled Great Britain to achieve national unity centuries before Germany.

It is customary to think of the territory of a state in the same fashion as of the private property of an individual; but it is evident that there is here a double contrast. Within states, courts and police uphold titles and maintain lawful owners in possession of their land, which was acquired by the lawful processes of inheritance, purchase, or barter. By contrast, in the matter of national territory not only is there lacking any international authority to maintain the present owner in possession, but also that nation's title almost invariably derives from war.

In Europe, at least, all present frontiers are derived from former conquests. As a consequence, states which were anciently possessors of provinces, until their eviction through defeat in war, still regard the present tenure as based upon neither legal nor moral warrant. Furthermore, such states are entitled to believe that the present

tenure may also prove transitory like the past. For example, the Italy of the Roman era ruled all of what is today France and England, while the frontiers of the original German Empire—called the Holy Roman Empire—enclosed a third of contemporary France and half of modern Italy. To take a more recent illustration, between 1912 and 1922 Adrianople belonged to Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece in turn and ultimately became Turkish again.

The student of international affairs, then, is confronted with two mutually exclusive conceptions of national policy, the first static, and the second dynamic.¹ Here, too, he also touches the very heart of the problem of peace in the contemporary world, which is posed by the demand of one group of peoples for security based upon the status quo, and of another for a prosperity, prestige, or ethnic unity attainable only by a modification of that status quo. And the collision between these conceptions is as old as history and has obviously been, hitherto, an inescapable concomitant of the nation states system.

Today, as always in the past, the static theory is naturally embraced by those states which already have prosperity and now seek security. For these, their present fortunes conform to their own estimates of national necessities, and their policies, therefore, are devoted to the maintenance of the status quo. Thus it is found to be the familiar thesis of the peoples of such states that

¹ Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, *We or They: Two Worlds in Conflict*, 1936; Balla, V. de, *The New Balance of Power in Europe*, 1932; Foreign Policy Association, "Chaos or Reconstruction," by Raymond Leslie Buell, *Foreign Policy Pamphlets*, No. 3, 1937; Freund, Richard, *Zero Hour, Policies of the Powers*, 1937; Schuman, Frederick L., *International Politics, An Introduction to the Western States System*, 1937, rev. ed.; Simonds, Frank H., *Can Europe Keep the Peace?*, 1934, rev. ed.; Williams, Sir J. F., *International Change and International Peace*, 1932.

mankind has, at last, reached the point where the territorial division of the earth's surface has become immutable because the title of the present possessors is both legally and morally imprescriptible; legally, because it is established by treaty; morally, because it can be assailed only by war—and war has now been adjudged a crime. Furthermore, it is alleged that war has become so terrible in its destructiveness that even the victors in the next struggle must, on balance, prove actual losers, whatever their nominal gains in territory or prestige.¹

Against that thesis, however, there must be set the contention of those countries which, being dissatisfied with the status quo, advance the dynamic theory. They assert that for centuries history has been no more than the record of struggles between states. In these struggles nations have risen to power, ruled, and ultimately fallen. But why, Italian Fascism, German National Socialism, and Japanese Militarism demand, should the traditional ebb and flow in the fortunes of states be interrupted merely to suit the views of those peoples which happen at the moment to be sated and therefore satisfied? As to the argument, so frequently on the lips of the fortunate peoples, that war has in the contemporary era become more terrible than ever before: to that, Mussolini and Hitler reply with one voice that war has always been in the process of becoming more terrible, but this fact has never yet exercised effective restraint upon the resolution of peoples to achieve liberty, unity, or well-being.

¹ Angell, Sir Norman, *The Great Illusion*, 1933; Bogart, E. L., *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War*, 1920; Dumas, Samuel, and Vedel-Petersen, K. O., *Losses of Life Caused by War*, 1923; Folks, Homer, *The Human Costs of the War*, 1920; Lewinsohn, Richard, *The Profits of War through the Ages*, 1936. For detailed study of national losses to individual belligerents during the World War, see Carnegie Series, *Economic and Social History of the World War*, under the nation in question.

After each of the many general wars in Europe, the victors have, without exception, attempted to exploit the immediate war weariness and horror of the world, due to recent agony, to make the terms lately imposed upon the vanquished a basis for perpetual peace, seeking thereby to consolidate the gains which they have achieved upon the battlefield. Hitherto, however, all such attempts have failed, because the vanquished have eventually recovered their strength without ever accepting as final those decisions which were the consequence of military defeat.

Accordingly, the old drama has presently been repeated and a fresh challenge has been directed at another status quo. In the eyes of the peoples still satisfied, such undertakings to revise the existing order by violence have always seemed crimes both legally and morally: legally, because they inevitably involve a breach of existing treaties; morally, because they lead to war. But in the eyes of the peoples who embark upon them, they express the inalienable right of nations to resort to force in the presence of injustice.

Nor can it be questioned that, in the past, the various attempts to make immutable a contemporary state of European frontiers, had they been successful, would have perpetuated injustices and wrongs which today would appear intolerable. Thus, had the effort of the conquerors of Napoleon to perpetuate the system of the Congress of Vienna prevailed, the German people would have been denied unity; the Italians, liberty; and the Poles, like many smaller nationalities, would still be subjected to alien tyranny.

Again, although the spirit disclosed today alike by the Italian, Japanese, and German peoples seems, in the

eyes of the citizens of the sated states, compounded of imperialism and of barbarism, to these peoples themselves it is indistinguishable from the spirit which created the British or the French empire beyond the seas. Between British occupation of Egypt or American seizure of Panama, on the one hand, and Japanese operations in Manchuria or Italian conquest of Ethiopia on the other, to all but British and American eyes the difference is one of calendar and not of conscience.

Precisely in the same fashion, the long-standing Italian ambition to replace France in Tunisia as France replaced Turkey in Algeria, legally and morally abhorrent as that aspiration seems in the eyes of all Frenchmen, can be pronounced unethical by an objective mind only if it be assumed that in recent times there has been a revolution in international morals. And even in such case, it is not to be mistaken that this moral transformation inures exclusively to the benefit of nations which were forehanded with their imperialism as well as with their idealism.

In any event, the fact is unmistakable. After 1918, as after 1815, the victors have undertaken to organize the world on the basis of a settlement imposed upon the vanquished by force. All the several programs of peace—the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact, the fugitive Protocol of Geneva—have been sponsored by the successful and satisfied powers. By contrast, all the violent reactions against the status quo have been among nations which were either actually defeated or later disillusioned as to the status quo of 1919.

A century ago, it was the defeated French, the irreconcilable Italians, the victorious Prussians who in turn challenged the Settlement of Vienna; today it is the

vanquished Germans, the dissatisfied Japanese, and the victorious Italians who have called the Settlement of Paris or the principles of Geneva into question. But while the actors have changed, the lines of the drama remain unmodified.

It is apparent also that the developments of the post-war era have enormously strengthened the demand for a change in the existing situation because they have rendered progressively less favorable the condition of the dissatisfied nations.¹ In that period the Great Depression has stimulated a spirit of economic nationalism everywhere, and inevitably the effect of that spirit has borne most heavily upon countries which are relatively poor in the essentials of industrial and agricultural life.

What is novel in this spirit of economic nationalism, too, is that it dominates whole peoples. And the explanation of this phenomenon is to be found in the fact that within a relatively brief time the masses have everywhere risen, not merely to political power, but also to national consciousness. It is, therefore, no longer the kings, cabinets, or ruling minorities who alone grasp the implications for their own country of the national policies of other states. On the contrary, peoples everywhere have become acutely aware that their very standard of living can be profoundly influenced for evil by the policies or pretensions of their neighbors.

¹ Douglass, P. F., *The Economic Dilemma of Politics: A Study of the Consequences of the Strangulation of Germany*, 1932; Einzig, Paul, *The Economic Foundations of Fascism*, 1933; Greaves, H. R. G., *Raw Materials and International Control*, 1936; Hindmarsh, Albert E., *The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy*, 1936; Lichtenberger, Henri, *The Third Reich*, 1937; Lutz, Ralph H., ed., *The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918*, 1935; McGuire, C. E., *Italy's International Economic Position*, 1926; Orchard, J. E., *Japan's Economic Position*, 1930; Rohde, Hans, *Franco-German Factors of Power*, 1932; Salvemini, Gaetano, *Under the Axe of Fascism*, 1936; Schuman, F. L., *The Nazi Dictatorship*, 1935.

Under the conditions of the contemporary industrial era, the traditional rivalry between nations has, in reality, become a life-and-death struggle; and of the nature and stakes of that struggle, peoples are today universally aware. As a consequence the masses demand of their governments, on the one hand, that they enforce and defend national rights uncompromisingly, and, on the other, that at all hazards they insure tolerable conditions of national existence. And where democratic regimes have failed to satisfy popular demands, peoples have flung themselves unhesitatingly into the arms of dictators, identifying in programs of violence the promise of the realization of their aspirations.

The difference between the rivalries dividing states in the prewar era and the issues separating them today is profound. In the former age, it was in Asia and Africa that the Great Powers were quarreling over colonial empires and spheres of interest. The stakes of that game were power, prestige, and profit, and the game itself was a clash of imperialisms in which national existence was never in the balance. Even in Europe, where territorial rivalries were acute, the gage of battle was still only border provinces.

Today, however, the face of things has greatly altered. Rivalries between nations no longer have their basic cause in a race for the possession of distant colonies, but in the struggle for the control of the sources of those raw materials which are essential to the achievement of industrial strength and national self-sufficiency. National policies no longer have their origin exclusively in the search for power and prestige; rather they have become expressions of the resolution of peoples to survive.

Nevertheless, it must be evident that British and American national policies, like French and Russian, are founded upon a determination to retain existing and disproportionate material advantages. That American and British Dominion publics are less aroused and articulate in the matter of security than the citizens of Great Britain, France, and Russia is due solely to the fact that the challenge to their well-being inherent in the purposes of dynamic Powers is less direct and apparent. And it is less apparent because both the United States and the English-speaking Dominions seem today far beyond the reach of nations at once less fortunately circumstanced and determined to better their conditions by force if other means fail.

In all their conceptions of world peace and international order, however, both British and American publics instinctively adopt the static conception, accept present possession, in their own case at least, as proof of moral as well as legal right, and never consider a modification of their sovereignty or sacrifice of their territory to satisfy the necessities of less well-favored peoples. Such a point of view, however, ignores the actual problem of peace which is posed by the fact that for at least three of the Great Powers and many more of the smaller, their present situation seems both unequal and unjust, and for them war appears to provide the only ultimate means of escape from that situation.

Chapter III

GEOGRAPHIC POSITION

THE basic factors of national policy are fourfold: the *geographic*, the *economic*, the *demographic*, and the *strategic*. Of these, the first is constituted by the territory of a state, viewed from the standpoint of position¹; the second, by its land and people considered from the aspects of raw-material self-sufficiency and standards of living; the third, by the population examined in respect to size and ethnic make-up; and the fourth, by physical geography and armaments regarded in relation to territorial security.

First among these factors is the geographic. It is evident, of course, that all the physical circumstances of geography have a measure of importance for the policy of a state, since the character of the land surface is directly related not only to the type of national economy but also to the structure of national defense. The potentialities for the production of foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials is determined by the distribution of moun-

¹ "The geographical position of a nation, indeed, is the principal factor conditioning its foreign policy—the principal reason why it must have a foreign policy at all." ("The Permanent Bases of French Foreign Policy," by Jules Cambon, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 1930, p. 173.)


tains, plains, and plateaus, and the climatic circumstances of temperature and rainfall. In like manner, national defense is enhanced by the presence of natural barriers such as mountains, deserts, forests, ice, swamps, rivers, and seas, or is handicapped, on the other hand, in cases where open and level boundaries are subject to direct attack.

The details of the relation of physical geography to the problems of self-sufficiency and defense have so intimate a bearing upon the economic and strategic aspects of national policy that they will be considered separately in Chapters IV and VI which follow. In examining, in this chapter, the strictly geographic aspect of national policy, the question of *position* of the territories of states is to be considered from three standpoints: *world*, *regional*, and *inter-regional*.

As to the *world* aspect of geographic position, history discloses that the occupation by city and nation states of situations advantageous for trade and commerce has insured them prosperity and power. Extension of the known and exploitable world, by discovery and changes in methods of production and means of transportation, have, in their turn, weakened the positions of some states and enhanced those of others. And the result has been a decline in the fortunes of the former and a rise in the power and prosperity of the latter.¹

Accordingly, when the known and exploited world was practically limited to the eastern half of the Med-

¹ For general discussion of the influence of geography upon history, see: Colby, Charles C., ed., *Geographic Aspects of International Relations*, 1938; Harris Foundation Lectures for 1937; Fairgrieve, James, *Geography and World Power*, 1924; Febvre, L. P. V., and Bataillon, Lionel, *A Geographical Introduction to History*, 1925; Hennig, Richard, *Geopolitik*, 1931; Mackinder, H. J., *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 1919; Thomas, Franklin, *The Environmental Basis of Society*, 1925; Whitbeck, R. H., and Thomas, O. J., *The Geographic Factor; Its Role in Life and Civilization*, 1932.



iterranean region, Athens, because of its obviously favorable situation in that world, seated as it was midway between Asia Minor and Italy and opposite Egypt, enjoyed its hour of prosperity and power.¹ Later, however, when the frontiers of civilization were extended to include the whole of the Mediterranean Basin, Rome, by reason of its central and therefore more advantageous situation in this larger world, prospered, while Athens declined in wealth and power.²

In the same fashion, more than a thousand years after the fall of Rome and following the further extension of the limits of the world due to the discovery of America and the sea route to the Far East, England, advantageously situated at the edge of the Old World and facing the New, and also fortunately located in respect to the ocean road to India, rose to commercial importance and political power.³ Concomitantly, the importance of Venice and Genoa, the great trading city states of the Mediterranean, declined.⁴

Today, when the limits of the known and exploited world have become almost conterminous with those of the planet itself, it is manifest that the position of the United States in respect to Europe, Asia, and Latin America strikingly recalls that of Rome in respect to Europe, Asia, and North Africa when the world was restricted to the Mediterranean Basin.⁵ Similarly,

¹ Ferguson, W. S., *Greek Imperialism*, 1913.

² Frank, Tenney, *Roman Imperialism*, 1914; Semple, E. C., *The Geography of the Mediterranean Region*, 1931; Newbigin, M. I., *The Mediterranean Lands*, 1924.

³ Day, Clive, *A History of Commerce*, 1928; Hayes, C. J. H., *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, 1924, Vol. 1; Sargent, A. J., *Seaways of Empire, Notes on the Geography of Transport*, 1930, rev. ed.

⁴ Bryce, James, *The Holy Roman Empire*, 1919.

⁵ Brigham, A. P., *Geographic Influences in American History*, 1903; Semple, E. C., *American History and Its Geographic Conditions*, 1933; Turner, F. J., *The Frontier in American History*, 1921.

the position of Japan in relation to the mainland of Asia, on the one hand, and to America and Europe, on the other, largely reproduces that of England in respect to Europe, Asia, and America three centuries ago. Nor is it less evident that both in the case of the United States and in the case of Japan, a commercially advantageous position has once more produced familiar results.¹

In fact, the mere extension of the frontiers of the world to their present and ultimate limits has produced a change of prodigious import. Whereas from the days of Imperial Rome to those of Victorian Britain only those states, the seats of whose governments and power were in Europe, were reckoned Great Powers, today the accession of the United States and Japan to that rank is universally recognized.

With the arrival of the Industrial Era, the significance of geographic position in its world aspect underwent a revolutionary change. Before that time states had owed their material prosperity and consequent political power largely to the advantageous situation of their territories in relation to the principal trade routes and commercial centers of the globe, but thenceforth another consideration acquired far greater importance. This was the situation of the territories of states in respect to what can perhaps best be described as "the world that matters,"² i.e., those limited areas of the globe wherein lie vast deposits of coal and iron which form the basic materials of industrial power.³

It is clear that in the present Machine Age the development of the national industry has become a matter of supreme importance for every state, because upon the extent of that development must turn not only its


¹ See map, page 55.

² See map, page 51.

³ See chart, pages 46-47.

"THE WORLD THAT MATTERS"

KEY:
CENTERS OF INDUSTRIAL POWER BASED UPON
AVAILABILITY OF COAL AND IRON
OCEAN TRADE ROUTES



commercial power in peace but also its strength in war.¹ In fact, only those states which have reached a high degree of industrialization can now hold the rank of Great Powers, with all the implications that this circumstance has for national policy.

But the extent of the industrial development of a state must obviously be conditioned by the degree of accessibility of its territories to the reserves of energy, primarily in coal and secondarily in water power,² and by the possession or ready availability of iron and the other raw material resources essential to industry; reserves and resources which constitute "the world that matters." In addition, a factor of primary importance is the climate of a nation's territory, for only in the temperate zones does human energy attain the high degree of efficiency necessary to large-scale industry.³

Obviously, the question of accessibility to the essential raw materials is twofold, since states may either possess within their own frontiers a considerable share of the primary elements of industry, or their territories may be located in close proximity to those of states enjoying such advantages. In all respects, the former situation will be more fortunate than the latter, particularly from the viewpoint of war efficiency. Thus, the condition of the United States, for example, which possesses vast reserves in coal and huge deposits of iron, will be more advantageous than that of France, which has much iron

¹ Emeny, Brooks, *The Strategy of Raw Materials; A Study of America in Peace and War*, 1936; Inter-Parliamentary Union, *What Would be the Character of a New War?*, 1931; Tryon, F. G., and Eckel, E. C., eds., *Mineral Economics*, 1932.

² Although water power may be used as a source of energy for the establishment of light industries, it cannot be utilized as a basis of large-scale heavy industrialization for which coal and iron are the indispensable prerequisites.

³ Huntington, Ellsworth, *The Pulse of Progress*, 1926; Taylor, T. G., *Environment and Race*, 1927.

but insufficient coal, or that of Germany, which has much coal but little iron. Nevertheless, since the frontiers of France march with those of Germany, their respective resources will be mutually accessible in time of peace. Italy, too, while deficient in coal and iron, is near enough to Great Britain, Germany, and France to draw upon them and thus to support a considerable industry of her own.

By contrast, the situation of the South American states, located as they are upon a continent singularly lacking in coal resources,¹ renders them incapable of achieving considerable industrial development and therefore of attaining the status of Great Powers, despite the fact that several are advantageously situated in respect to trade routes.

It follows, therefore, that while states whose territories have easy access to "the world that matters" (page 51) and are thus capable of relatively great industrial development will likewise benefit from a favorable location in respect to the great trade routes and the chief commercial centers of the world, nations deprived of the former advantage will not be compensated for that lack by the possession of the latter.

The *world* position of a nation, then, has two aspects. First, its location in relation to "the world that matters" will influence its ability as a nation to play a decisive role in world affairs by defining its industrial potentialities; and, second, its position in relation to the principal trade routes and chief commercial centers of the earth will continue to have a large part in determining its wealth and power. In both respects the influence of position upon national policy must therefore be evident;

¹ Brazil has considerable iron deposits.

for, on the one hand, it will determine the status of a nation as a Great Power, and, on the other hand, it will have a large part in deciding the nature and importance of its relations with other countries.

From the *regional* standpoint, the question of position relates to the continental location of a state's territorial base which is the seat of its government and the center of its wealth. In this respect it is obvious that in order to be a Great Power a state must be situated in Europe, Asia, or the Americas.¹ Since, moreover, the political circumstances in each of these continental regions differ from those in the other two, it is evident that very different consequences to national policy will result from the location of the territorial base of a state in Europe, in Asia, or in the Americas.

Thus, in the case of Europe, traditions of rivalry and persistence of territorial disputes have produced political conditions which necessarily exercise a decisive influence upon the policies of all states having their territorial bases in that continent. Accordingly the problem of national security and even of national existence is always an immediate concern of European governments. That problem, too, is posed by dangers peculiarly European and existing just beyond the frontiers of every Continental state.

In the Americas, by contrast, while economically the United States has manifestly the same concern with Mexican or Canadian conditions as have European states

¹ In international politics, Africa must be considered as a continental region apart, being composed politically, with the exception of Liberia, of European colonial possessions and of states having a unique position in that they are members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, with Dominion status, such as the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, or enjoy only limited sovereignty, as Egypt, which, although independent in law, is in fact under British influence. Precisely the same detachment also characterizes the Australian continent.

with those of their neighbors, politically the absence of all territorial disputes or of any serious national rivalries spares it regional anxieties. And the same is true, of course, in the case of both Mexico and Canada. In Central America and South America, to be sure, territorial disputes sometimes disturb the relations between states, as was recently illustrated in the Chaco War between Peru and Bolivia (1932-1935). Certain suspicions and jealousies do thus, in fact, exist in the New World, but the national policies of the considerable countries of North and South America, alike, are not dominated by the fears and dangers which necessarily shape the policies of European or Asiatic states.

In Asia, Japanese national policy is similarly shaped by conditions peculiar to the Far East. And these conditions also explain the possession by Western nations of large continental and insular areas in the Asiatic region. For Japan, which alone of the Great Powers has its territorial base in that region, the policies of the Western nations as they relate to Far Eastern questions are of vital importance. By contrast, since the Japanese possess no territory beyond the Asiatic region, their policy is without considerable European or American implications.

The significance of position in its regional aspect is therefore evident. Each of the three important continental regions, the European, American, and Asiatic, possesses a set of political conditions which differ profoundly from those of the others. As a consequence, the national policies of states, since they are shaped by their regional circumstances, will vary correspondingly. For all of the Great Powers save the United States, moreover, their regional circumstances constitute a restriction

upon their policy elsewhere. For the United States, by contrast, the conditions of the American region constitute a guarantee of freedom of action everywhere, abroad as well as at home.

There remains for consideration the *inter-regional* aspect of position. Two states, Great Britain and France, possess territories in all five regions—European, American, Asiatic, Australasian, and African. Others, including Italy and Soviet Russia, hold lands in two regions. To this category the United States belongs, at least nominally, so long as it still retains the Philippines. It follows, therefore, that, the territory of these nations being located in several regions, their national policies will be affected by inter-regional conditions wherever they have possessions, and their policy will have an imperial as well as a purely regional phase.¹

Of course, even in the case of such states, the political conditions existing in the regions in which their territorial bases are situated will have first importance, so far as national policy is concerned. Nevertheless, for Great Britain and Soviet Russia, because their Asiatic possessions are of such vast extent and of such great value as well, political conditions within the Asiatic region must influence their national policies only a little less than do those in Europe. For France, by contrast, although her Asiatic possessions are considerable, it is the African portion of her empire which constitutes the greater consideration, so far as national policy is concerned. As for Italy, her overseas territories² are mainly limited to the African continent and occupy portions of that continent

¹ The Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Norway, and Denmark belong to the group of smaller states which have important colonial possessions.

² Libya, Eritrea, Somaliland, Ethiopia, and the Sporades Islands, including Rhodes.

so near to Europe as to be a detail in her regional, rather than her inter-regional, policy.

Viewed either from the regional or from the inter-regional standpoint, too, the contrast between the position of the United States and that of every other nation of the globe is at once striking and illuminating. The regional position of this country gives it complete immunity from all those concerns and dangers which dominate and dictate the national policies of every European or Asiatic state. And the fact that, aside from the Philippines, it has no inter-regional territorial holdings, leaves it uncommitted in Europe, in Asia, or in Africa, so far as its own vital interests are directly concerned. Thus it has no dangers to guard against at home and no important exposed possessions to protect abroad. Accordingly, whatever dangers threaten it, if there actually be such, have their origin at a distance.

Yet such is the world position of the United States, and so great a share of "the world that matters" lies within its own frontiers, that its national policy must be a matter of concern alike for European and for Asiatic nations. Thus, while American policy can and does remain largely detached, no great or small nation of Europe or Asia can afford to ignore an American policy, which, although it may be determined by purely domestic and regional considerations, frequently has almost incalculable repercussions abroad.

A nation's geographic position, whether regional, inter-regional, or world, must be taken, then, as a basic factor of national policy. Its full significance, however, can be understood only when viewed in relation to the economic, demographic, and strategic circumstances to be detailed in the three chapters which follow.

Chapter IV

THE ECONOMIC FACTOR

SECOND among the basic factors of national policy (page 43) is the economic, the primary elements of which, land and people, must be considered respectively from the point of view of production and of numbers. As the geographic factor (pages 43-60) is largely a question of position, the economic is almost exclusively a matter of self-sufficiency¹ and population pressure.

States, by reason of the types of their production, fall naturally into three groups, the *agrarian*, the *industrial*, and the *balanced*.²

¹ The term "self-sufficiency" is used in this book as a relative, not an absolute, term. Obviously no modern nation can be entirely self-contained. Nevertheless self-sufficiency in the essential raw materials necessary to war industries remains an ideal. Under conditions of modern warfare the higher the degree of self-containment the stronger the defense position of a nation will be. It is for this reason that the Great Powers, even the most self-sufficient among them, are developing substitutes and accumulating reserves of materials they cannot produce at home, as an insurance against the time when their normal sources of foreign supplies may be denied them.

² For general comparative studies of the raw material and industrial situation of states, see: American Academy of Political and Social Science, "Raw Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations," *The Annals*, Vol. CXII, March, 1924; Bain, H. F., *Ores and Industry in the Far East*, 1933; Bowman, Isaiah, *The New World*, 1928, 4th ed.; Delaisi, Francis, *Les Deux Europes; Europe Industrielle et Europe Agricole*, 1929; Emeny, Brooks, *The Strategy of Raw Materials: A Study of America in Peace and War*, 1936; Gini, C., *Report on Certain Aspects of the Raw Materials Problem*,

To the first group, the *agrarian*, belong those nations which are capable of feeding themselves and also of producing an exportable surplus of one or more kinds—foodstuffs, raw materials, minerals—but which, by reason of their lack of resources in coal and iron in exploitable quantities and combination, and by reason, also, of their distance from such resources on foreign territory, are unable to support any considerable national industry. All the states in South America and those in continental Asia, as well as most of the smaller European countries, belong to this category of agrarian states.

To the second group, the *industrial*, belong those states which, although they have created great industrial establishments through the possession of coal and iron or the ready availability of those resources in neighboring countries, are largely dependent upon foreign sources of essential raw materials and in certain cases are also unable to produce at home sufficient foodstuffs to feed their populations. Of the Great Powers, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, and of the smaller states, Poland and Belgium, belong to the industrial group of states.¹

The third group, the *balanced*, includes those states which are advantageously situated in respect to the needs both of their people and of their industry, being, on the one hand, able to feed their population and also, on the other, to maintain their industries chiefly from the resources of their own territory. Of the Great Powers and Empires of the world, only three, the United States,

League of Nations, 1922; Leith, C. K., *World Minerals and World Politics*, 1931; Lippincott, I., *Economic Resources and Industries of the World*, 1929; United States Bureau of Mines, *Mineral Raw Materials: Survey of Commerce and Sources in Major Industrial Countries*, 1937; Zimmermann, E. W., *World Resources and Industries*, 1933.

¹ See map and charts on pages 65, 70-71, 75, 80-81, and 85.

the Soviet Union, and the British Empire, can lay indubitable claim to membership in the balanced group.

It will be noted at once that no purely agrarian country takes rank as a Great Power, and the reason for this is obvious. Today, war has become largely a question of machine power,¹ and as a consequence, states incapable of developing considerable national industries are also incapable of playing the role of a Great Power.²

¹ The important relation of the industrial and economic development of a state to its strength in war is clearly defined in the report of Sub-Committee A of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, of which the following statement of the basic factors of national power is directly pertinent (League of Nations, C739. M278. 1926 IX No. 16 CPD 28 p. 12 *et seq.*; italics, however, by authors):

"A complete list of the factors which come into operation in modern war would have to include *all the factors of the national life in time of peace.*

"It is, however, necessary to determine the *factors which are of main importance in war and on which consequently the strength of a country in war time essentially depends.*

"These fundamental factors are as follows in the case of any country at war:

"(1) The quantity, quality, and the degree of preparation for war of the land, sea, and air forces in existence at the opening of the war or formed in the course of the war; also the armament, equipment, and upkeep of those forces;

"(2) The number, composition, and distribution of its inhabitants, taking into account the resources in men that might be obtained from overseas territories, and also the resources in men that would, on the contrary, have to be kept in those territories;

"(3) *The extent to which it is self-supporting (for instance, as regards fuel, foodstuffs, raw material, and manufactured goods), and the extent to which, as a result of its means of transport and the freedom of its communications, especially its communications by sea, and of its financial strength, it can obtain the commodities of every kind in which it is deficient from abroad;*

"(4) The geographical situation, the configuration of its territory, and the development of its system of means of communication of every kind, which may enable or prevent it from rapidly moving and supplying its forces;

"(5) Fixed defensive systems of the mother country and colonies (fortifications, naval and air bases, naval stations, etc.);

"(6) The time which is at its disposal to prepare and bring its forces into operation or to allow of outside help reaching the country without danger of invasion, due to: either the natural protection afforded it by the sea or strong frontiers; or its peacetime armaments . . . *or the measures which it has been able to adopt in order to expedite the mobilization of at least a part of its resources;*

"(7) *The capacity of the country to produce or import war materials in war time (ships, aircraft, war material of every kind);*

"(8) The internal and external political situation."

² Eckel, E. C., *Coal, Iron, and War*, 1930; Emeny, Brooks, *The Strategy of Raw Materials; A Study of America in Peace and War*, 1936; Interparliamentary Union, *What Would be the Character of a New War?*, 1931; Thomas, Ivor, *Coal in the New Era*, 1934.

It is, moreover, this absence of considerable industrial establishments which explains the relative political insignificance of all states belonging to the predominantly agrarian group. So far from being self-sufficient, therefore, these states are manifestly dependent upon the industrial establishments of other countries, alike in peace and in war.

The situation of the second group of states, those which are the possessors of relatively considerable industries but are dependent upon foreign sources for foodstuffs and for many of the essentials of industry, is, from the standpoint of self-sufficiency in war, equally significant. Thus Germany and Great Britain are to a large but unequal degree dependent upon the outside world for the food to sustain their populations. In addition, while both are rich in coal, both are poor alike in iron and in most of the other raw materials and minerals necessary to their industries.

Italy, Japan, and France are largely self-supporting in the matter of food, although on the basis of widely varying standards of living. In this respect, therefore, their situation is considerably better than that of Germany and of Great Britain, which are normally dependent upon foreign sources of supply for roughly twenty-five per cent and fifty per cent of their foodstuffs. But Italy is almost wholly deficient, and Japan, too, is relatively poor, in resources of coal and iron, while France, although extremely rich in iron, has not sufficient coal reserves to support its national industry. And all three share the limitations of Great Britain and Germany in the matter of most raw materials and essential minerals.

Only the United States and the Soviet Union actually possess, in their homeland territory, both the resources

in foodstuffs requisite to support their populations and the reserves in motive power and resources in raw materials and minerals necessary to support their industries on present or prospective scales of output. Between these two Great Powers, however, there is an important difference, due to the fact that the United States already has developed a national industry commensurate with national needs, while Russian industrialization has not as yet attained ultimate capacity.

A clear distinction must also be noted in the matter of the extent of the industrial establishments of the seven Great Powers, for the size of a nation's industry has today become the indication of its potential strength in war.¹ While for Great Britain, Germany, and France industrial production suffices for national needs and would be adequate to support national defense in time of war, and while the industrial output of Italy, Japan, and Russia is important though insufficient for domestic needs, the national capacity of any one of those six powers is relatively inconsiderable in comparison with that of the United States. In fact, American domestic production and consumption of industrial products each constitutes approximately forty per cent of the aggregate of the entire world.

In considering Great Britain, however, it is necessary to emphasize the difference between the situation of the United Kingdom and that of the British Empire as a whole.² Although in the matter of foodstuffs and raw materials Great Britain suffers from much the same poverty as Germany, her greatest industrial rival in Europe,

¹ Emeny, Brooks, *The Strategy of Raw Materials; A Study of America in Peace and War*, 1936, see also chart, page 75.

² Boycott, A. G., *Elements of Imperial Defense*, 1931; Cole, Captain D. H., *Imperial Military Geography*, 1930, 6th ed.


the situation of the British Empire is quite otherwise. Like the United States and the Soviet Union, the British Empire is largely self-sufficient in all respects and also, unlike the Soviet Union, is already the possessor of a great industrial establishment. On the other hand, while the territories of the United States and of the Soviet Union are compact, those of the British Empire are scattered about the Seven Seas.

Viewed from the standpoint of self-sufficiency, it is plain, then, that the three groups of states, agrarian, industrial, and balanced, are on a very unequal footing in time of emergency. Only the United States and the Soviet Union, within their homeland areas, are capable, the first actually, the second potentially, of feeding their populations and also of supporting their industries with only a small measure of dependence upon the outside world. Much the same measure of self-sufficiency is possessed by the British Empire, with the difference, however, that the accessibility of imperial resources for the United Kingdom, which is the seat of the industrial wealth and power of the Empire, is subject in time of peace to the control of price as affected by transportation costs, and in time of war is contingent upon the maintenance of command of the sea lanes of communication.

The control of the seas by enemy fleets would carry small threat to the Soviet Union and little or none to the United States, so far as national life or national industry is concerned; but for Great Britain, with only six months of foodstuffs normally available from domestic production and with practically all the necessities of industry save coal lacking in sufficient quantities, blockade would spell starvation, paralysis, and therefore surrender in war. For Germany, which feeds its population for nine

HE EXPORTS LARGER THAN TWO PERCENT OF THE TOTAL APPARENT CONSUMPTION OF THE SEVEN POWERS.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE



70

months of the year, the effect of blockade would be less immediate in this respect but equally fatal in all else.

The weakness of the British and German situations was plainly revealed during the World War.¹ When the submarine campaign reached its highest point of effectiveness, Great Britain was within hailing distance of starvation and surrender. And it was the British blockade that, by closing all German doors opening on the outer world, eventually compelled a German surrender dictated by undernourishment of the population and by complete exhaustion of stocks of many essential raw materials.

- The Italian situation is much worse than either the German or the British in the matter of minerals and of raw materials alike, for coal is lacking, together with most of the other essential commodities. Thus, while in a pinch Italy might feed herself, under the pressure of a blockade her industry would collapse almost immediately.² Even the relatively mild embargoes enforced upon her during the Ethiopian crisis from November of 1935 to June of 1936 dealt a severe blow to her industrial life only moderately concealed by the expansion of war industries and the falsification of trade statistics.

As for the French colonial empire, although a valuable source of a limited number of raw materials, it contributes relatively little to national self-sufficiency. Economically, however, it is an important outlet for French

¹ Baker, C. W., *Government Control and Operation of Industry in Great Britain and the United States During the World War*, 1921; Beveridge, Sir W. H., *British Food Control*, 1928; Delbrück, Clemens von, *Die Wirtschaftliche Mobilmachung in Deutschland*, 1924; Goebel, O. H., *Deutsche Rohstoffwirtschaft im Weltkrieg*, 1930; Guichard, Louis, *The Naval Blockade*, 1930; Salter, Sir Arthur, *Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in International Administration*, 1921; Smith, G. O., *The Strategy of Minerals*, 1919; Surface, F. M., *The Grain Trade During the World War*, 1928.

² See Chapter XIV.

industrial production; and on the military side, it forms an important reservoir of man power. This latter circumstance, moreover, invests French colonial lines of communication with much the same importance as the British.¹

In the matter of self-sufficiency, therefore, France, while better off than Great Britain, Germany, Italy, or even Japan, is far inferior to the United States, the British Empire, or the Soviet Union. Completely blockaded by land and sea, France could hold out for a considerable time, but in the end, while her supplies of food, iron, and even coal might suffice, her shortage of other supplies would ultimately prove decisive.

The vulnerability of Great Britain, the fact that it is a matter of life or death for her to keep open her sea lanes, has, for Germany, Italy, and even measurably for France as well, a profound significance in the field of national policy. The lack of self-sufficiency imposes upon Great Britain the necessity of possessing naval supremacy in European waters, a supremacy which she is financially able and intends to support, as is evidenced by her four-year \$7,500,000,000 armament program inaugurated in February of 1937. This naval supremacy, coupled with the British position alike on the North Sea and in the Mediterranean, permits the British to forbid all sea approach to Germany and to Italy, and also to the Mediterranean and Channel coasts of France. In addition, it permits them to cripple at will the communications between France and her North African colonies, whence come the bulk of her overseas military contingents.

Since Germany and Italy are wholly, and France to a considerable degree, dependent upon the outside world,

¹ See Chapter XII.

and particularly upon transoceanic lands, for necessary minerals and raw materials, and since, also, it lies within the power of the British fleet to prevent or gravely to hamper communication with these foreign sources of supply, it follows that German, Italian, and French national policies will necessarily be shaped in such fashion as to avoid conflict with the British. It was the failure of Germany, in 1914, to adhere to this traditional course that insured German defeat in the World War.

It must be noted, however, that the vulnerability of Great Britain to blockade by submarine or to air attack, accounts for her continued anxiety over French, Belgian, and Dutch security in so far as any threat by Germany to their Channel and North Sea coast lines is concerned. Similarly in the Mediterranean, the British are extremely sensitive to any menace to the "life line" of Empire. In fact, the recent increase of Italian air and naval power contributed as much to the inauguration of Britain's vast armament program as the challenging revival of German militarism under Hitler.

The situation of Japan in the matter of self-sufficiency is, in the main, comparable with that of Great Britain. Although Japan is still largely self-supporting in food-stuffs, the rapid growth of her population threatens to widen the margin of her dependence upon the outside world, while within her island kingdom she is to an even greater extent than Great Britain without the necessary raw materials and minerals essential to industry.¹ For her, as for Italy or Germany, therefore, a blockade

¹ Bain, H. F., *Ores and Industry in the Far East*, 1933, rev. ed.; Causton, E. E. N., *Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan*, 1936; Hindmarsh, Albert E., *The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy*, 1936; Orchard, J. E., *Japan's Economic Position*, 1930; Penrose, E. F., *Food Supply and Raw Materials in Japan*, 1930.

would be fatal, as, of course, it would be for Great Britain far more promptly.

Unlike all of the European states save the Soviet Union, however, Japan finds herself adjacent to lands easily accessible and provided with many of the raw materials which she lacks, together with precious resources in foodstuffs. Therefore, while Japan suffers from most if not all of the limitations of Germany and Italy in the matter of self-sufficiency, she can remedy her lack considerably, provided she both dominates the seas separating her from China and controls the Chinese provinces north of the Great Wall. Thus naval supremacy in the waters of eastern Asia is as vital for Japan as similar supremacy in European waters is for Great Britain.¹


So far the question of self-sufficiency has been considered chiefly from the standpoint of war, where its significance must be obvious. The fact that all states, large and small, give clear proof of their recognition that conflict is always possible, also explains the concern of every country to be economically self-sufficient in the largest measure possible. Equally illuminating is the resolution of certain Great Powers, today hopelessly dependent upon the outside world for the necessities of national life and industry, to escape from their present condition of inferiority; for it is manifest that in the next great war, as in the last, victory will in all human probability belong, not to the side which counts the biggest battalions, as in the Napoleonic era, but to the coalition that possesses the greatest economic resources.²

Looking now to the implications of the economic factor in times of peace, it must be recognized at once that

¹ See Chapter XIX.

² Eckel, E. C., *Coal, Iron, and War*, 1930; Inter-Parliamentary Union, *What Would be the Character of a New War?*, 1931.

EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES OF ALL SOURCES OF SUPPLY TO CONSUMPTION



in recent years, at least, these implications have become well-nigh identical with those in time of war. During the postwar period, and particularly after the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, those states possessing the largest degree of self-sufficiency, and therefore the major share of the world's raw material supplies, have progressively adopted policies of trade restriction greatly limiting thereby the availability of their resources to the "Have-not" group.¹ As a consequence, the situation of the less fortunate has inevitably and progressively worsened.

The less richly endowed states, notably Germany, Italy, and Japan, can obviously purchase abroad the raw materials which they lack at home, only as they are also able to sell abroad the goods which they produce or to accumulate foreign exchange through such invisible means as tourist expenditures, emigrant remittances, and foreign investments and services. On the other hand the more favorably situated powers, Great Britain, the United States, and France, have individually and at times collectively since the war adopted trade, finance, and immigration policies which were bound inevitably to result in an undermining of the security of the economic structures of the less favored states. The fact that Great Britain has abandoned free trade and the further fact that the United States has shut out foreign immigration and still maintains for the most part her tariff barriers, while

¹ Greaves, H. R. G., *Raw Materials and International Control*, 1936; Hawtrey, R. G., *Economic Aspects of Sovereignty*, 1930; International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, *The State and Economic Life*, 1934; League of Nations, *Report and Proceedings of the World Economic Conference*, 1927; Patterson, E. M., *The World's Economic Dilemma*, 1930; Rawles, W. P., *The Nationality of Commercial Control of World Minerals*, 1933; Simpson, Kemper, *Introduction to World Economics*, 1934; Varga, E., *The Great Crisis and Its Political Consequences*, 1935; Wallace, B. B., and Edminster, L. R., *International Control of Raw Materials*, 1930.

the Soviet Union has undertaken a vast program of industrialization, have produced alarming repercussions, not only in Germany, Italy, and Japan, but also among smaller countries similarly situated. And the results for France, if less considerable, have been hardly pleasant.

What the consequences of this contemporary phenomenon of economic nationalism may be, can best be indicated by examination of the situations of the several Great Powers individually.

The United States, possessing as it does the richest and most extensive domestic market in the world, as a result of the size of its population, the extent of its consuming power, and the high degree of its self-sufficiency in industrial raw materials, finds itself confronted largely with a problem of distribution.¹ It can feed its population, it can largely supply its industry, it possesses surpluses in many things which other states require in sufficient quantity to enable it by trade to fill the gaps in national production. Thus it was perhaps only natural that, possessing self-sufficiency to the extent it does, the United States should have been the nation to give the first signal for the start of the present march toward autarky.²

The example set by the United States was followed, not only by the British Isles, but also by the Dominions of

¹ Auld, G. P., *Rebuilding Trade by Tariff Bargaining*, 1936; Crowther, Samuel, *America Self-Contained*, 1933; Donham, W. B., *Business Adrift*, 1931; Foreign Policy Association and World Peace Foundation, *America Must Choose*, by Wallace, H. A., *World Affairs Pamphlets* No. 3, 1934; Foreman, Clark, *The New Internationalism*, 1934; Roorbach, G. B., *Problems in Foreign Trade*, 1933; Sayre, F. B., *America Must Act*, 1936; Smith, J. G., *Economic Planning and the Tariff*, 1934.

² The word "autarky," meaning "self-sufficiency," is from the Greek *autarkia*, while "autarchy," meaning "absolute sovereignty," is from the Greek *autarchia*. The roots are different: *ark-*, "suffice," and *arch-*, "rule." But as the two English words "autarky" and "autarchy" are pronounced alike, they have been confused, and "autarky" is written "autarchy" by most authors.


RAW MATERIAL MONOPOLY OF THE POWERS

ILLUSTRATING THE DOMINANT POSITION OF THE BRITISH-AMERICAN GROUP

EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE OUTPUT OF TOTAL WORLD PRODUCTION



UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED PERCENTAGES ARE YEARLY AVERAGES FOR 1923-29 INCLUSIVE (EXCEPT RUSSIA 1929-32)



the British Empire generally. Thus, where the United States raised its tariffs, Great Britain not only abandoned free trade but established by the Ottawa Agreements a system of imperial preference.¹ In this fashion, the British strove to establish within their empire the same kind of economic unit, based upon a similar measure of economic self-sufficiency, which the United States already constituted.

In the case of the Soviet Union, much the same experiment was adopted under circumstances which were very different. The objective of the Soviet Union was to establish a balance between its agriculture and its industry and thus to attain complete self-sufficiency and thereby political as well as economic independence. And once more, as in the case of the United States and of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the physical circumstances of the Soviet Union are adequate to insure the success of the experiment; Russia is capable of a high degree of self-sufficiency.

In all three instances, moreover, it is evident that the basic conditions are substantially the same on the economic side. Each state possesses a relatively large population and actual wealth alike in minerals, foodstuffs, and other raw materials. Geographically and politically, the circumstances of the United States and of the Soviet Union are more advantageous than those of the British Commonwealth, since the territories of the former are compact, while that of the latter is scattered, and since the whole area of the United States and the whole area

¹ Cole, G. D. H., *British Trade and Industry*, 1932; Foreign Policy Association, "Ottawa Conference," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VIII, No. 21, 1932; Imperial Economic Conference, *Report of the Conference*, 1932; Jones, Joseph M., *Tariff Retaliation*, 1934; Tindal, Noel, *The Economics of National Independence and the Facts of International Trade*, 1935; Tryon, G. C., *A Short History of Imperial Preference*, 1931.

of the Soviet Union are each under a single government, while that of the British Commonwealth is divided among self-governing Dominions. Nevertheless, in theory at least, self-sufficiency is possible to a very large degree in the cases of all three.

As to France, her situation is far less satisfactory, although her colonial empire is vast in extent and rich in certain of the resources which she lacks. In the matter of foodstuffs France is self-supporting, while her colonies constitute, together with the homeland area, a market sufficient to support the larger part of the present national industrial establishment. But in many of the essential raw materials her empire is singularly lacking, and her dependence for them upon foreign sources, particularly British and American, remains highly important.

However, so long as French policy rigidly avoids conflict with the British and American powers—and with them there is no clash in vital interests—French access to the raw materials and minerals which are lacking within her empire is assured. Her position is strengthened, furthermore, by the fact that she possesses sufficient resources to produce an adequate supply of many of the industrial commodities in demand abroad, thus enabling her to purchase what she needs in foreign markets. Accordingly, the French Empire stands fourth among the political units of the world in degree of self-sufficiency alike in peace and in war, so long as relations with Great Britain, and to a lesser extent with the United States, are satisfactory.

To the United States, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and the French Empire, then, the extent of their economic self-sufficiency dictates a static national policy. Within their present territorial limits, these

powers have reserves and resources sufficient to insure prosperity in peace, while in war they possess or can normally obtain the essentials of modern combat in adequate quantities. The primary concern of national policy in each case must therefore be to conserve what is already possessed.

The situation of the other three Great Powers is utterly different. As to Germany, the size of her domestic population and the relative poverty of her territory in most of the essentials of industry compel her to expand her foreign markets if she is to continue her double purpose, the maintenance of her armament position as well as of a high standard of living.¹ To do this she possesses the requisite industrial plant, but her capacity to produce at home and also to sell abroad is obviously conditioned upon her access both to those reserves in raw materials and to those markets which are mainly controlled by the more fortunate Great Powers.² Deprived of these, she must either abandon her purpose to maintain her prestige and power or else face the unhappy prospect of a steady decline in the standards of living in the masses of her people.

In Italy and Japan, the situation has been aggravated by the growing effect of population pressure, which has begun to make itself felt in Germany as well. Population pressure, of course, is determined primarily neither by the size nor by the density of population, but by the relation existing between these and national productivity. The situation will manifestly be affected also by

¹ Angell, J. W., *The Recovery of Germany*, 1932; Michels, R. K., *Cartels, Combines and Trusts in Post-War Germany*, 1928; Schacher, Gerhard, *Central Europe and the Western World*, 1936; Simpson, Kemper, *Introduction to World Economics*, 1934; Sombart, Werner, ed., *Volk und Raum*, 1928.

² Douglass, P. F., *The Economic Dilemma of Politics*, 1932.

the rate of the annual increase in numbers of people in relation to the expansion in production.¹ The fact that Great Britain and Germany are far more densely populated than the United States or Russia is not, in itself, significant. But when, as in the case of Germany at least temporarily, and of Japan and Italy permanently, population has passed the saturation point, regard being had to the capacity of the territories of each country to maintain the present standard of living, then the effect upon national policy of this condition of density must be immediate and far-reaching. For each country will, as at least one solution of the problem, seek lands abroad on which to establish its surplus population, and in order to retain that surplus as an element of national power it will also strive to include those lands within its own empire.

Exactly the same results will be discoverable, but in an even greater degree, when, the population of a state having actually reached or passed the point of saturation, every year sees a further increase due to a surplus of births over deaths. The rate of natural increase, too, will have a direct influence upon the energy with which the national policy pursues the primary objective of acquiring lands suitable for colonization. In this circumstance it is possible, for example, to discover an explanation for the familiar insistence on the part of

¹ For books dealing with the broad aspects of the problem of population pressure see: Carr-Saunders, A. M., *World Population. Past Growth and Present Trends*, 1936; Crocker, W. R., *The Japanese Population Problem, The Coming Crisis*, 1931; Dennerly, Étienne, *Asia's Teeming Millions*, 1931; Dublin, L. I., ed., *Population Problems*, 1926; East, E. M., *Mankind at the Crossroads*, 1923; Gini, Corrado, et al., *Population*, 1930; International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems, 2d Assembly, *Problems of Population*, 1932; Pitt-Rivers, G. H. L. F., ed., *Problems of Population*, 1932; Roberts, S. H., *Population Problems of the Pacific*, 1927; Thompson, W. S., *Danger Spots in World Population*, 1929; Uyeda, Teijiro, *The Future of Japanese Population*, 1933.

various Italian and German statesmen upon a redivision of the earth's surface.

For France, Soviet Russia, and the United States, by contrast, neither density of population nor rate of natural increase has importance in relation to national policy. France not only has a low density and a practically stationary population in her homeland area, but also possesses vast colonial territories capable of absorbing any present or future surplus. The situation of Russia and the United States is even more favorable, because, although each has a growing population, nevertheless its density of population is low and the point of saturation for its territory is still far removed. Great Britain, too, although her density of population is high, still finds a certain outlet for her surplus in her Dominions. In addition, the rate of increase of population in Great Britain is on the decline, due among other factors to voluntary but not less effective exercise of birth control. As a consequence, for her the population problem is becoming less acute.

The desire to acquire markets and to possess new lands rich in natural resources, to insure the prosperity of larger populations at home quite as much as to obtain territories abroad suitable for colonization, was one of the compelling motives of national policy in the case of certain of the Great Powers of Europe in the closing quarter of the nineteenth century, and in fact to the very eve of the World War itself. And this motive has again been revealed in the case of Japan in Manchuria, where the underlying cause is discoverable in a deliberate attempt to counteract the effect of population pressure. The population of Japan has already passed the point of saturation, while the rate of annual increase is still rela-

tively very high indeed. Hence, as a substitute for acquiring lands upon which to establish her surplus population, Japan has undertaken to control territories whose markets and resources appear in her eyes sufficient to make it possible for her to maintain her great and growing population at home. Germany's demands for the return of her lost colonies and her declared ambitions for expansion to the East, particularly in the Russian Ukraine, are likewise based quite as much upon the need of markets and of raw materials as upon the need of a larger area for her population.

LAND UTILIZATION AND POPULATION PRESSURE OF THE SEVEN
GREAT POWERS, IN 1937

| | <i>United States</i> | <i>*Germany</i> | <i>Great Britain</i> | <i>France</i> | <i>Russia</i> | <i>*Italy</i> | <i>Japan</i> |
|---|----------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|
| Total area in square miles..... | 3,088,519 | 180,972 | 94,400 | 212,700 | 8,244,000 | 119,700 | 147,600 |
| Per cent of arable and pasture land..... | 42.0 | 63.4 | 80.0 | 67.0 | 30.0 | 73.5 | 18.9 |
| Per cent of total area cultivated..... | 18.8 | 59.0 | 31.0 | 46.6 | 15.0 | 68.6 | 15.5 |
| Millions of population (000,000 omitted)... | 128 | 67 | 45 | 42 | 170 | 44 | 70 |
| Population per square mile of arable land. | 102 | 587 | 596 | 294 | 68 | 500 | 2,130 |
| Average annual increase in population..... | 756,000 | 336,000 | 17,000 | 55,000 | 3,000,000 | 423,000 | 908,000 |

*In June, 1939, the area of Germany was about 245,400 sq. miles, and of Italy about 130,400; and their millions of population were 83 instead of 67, and 45 instead of 44.

Density and the rate of increase of the population, as these produce population pressure, must therefore profoundly affect the national policy of Great Powers. They will drive the nations subjected to such pressure to seek changes in the territorial status quo of the world

and thus bring them into collision with the states whose interest lies in maintaining the status quo both of their own territories and of those of other states.

Within limits, too, population pressure operating in smaller states will produce disturbing consequences. But the weakness of these countries deprives their discontent of importance save as it constitutes a temptation to the Great Powers to intervene in their political affairs. On the other hand, the existence of misery and social unrest in the smaller states contributes to disturb the general regional situation, as events in the Danubian Basin in Europe have plainly demonstrated.

The relation between the development of explosive nationalistic movements in Italy, Germany, and Japan, and the economic circumstances of these states, has found too little recognition as yet in the United States and Great Britain. Thus Fascism has been explained in terms of the personality of Mussolini and the national characteristics of the Italian people. In the same manner, National Socialism has been ascribed to the personality of Hitler and to the consequences of a Punic peace for Germany. And the Japanese seizure of Manchuria has been explained as a relapse to old-fashioned imperialism due to the temporary ascendancy of the military element in Japan.

Despite the habit of ascribing Italian events to the ambition of the Duce and the delight of the Italian people in drama, the fact cannot be blinked that if the Italian possessions in Africa are not successfully developed, Italy faces a choice between drastic reduction of population by birth control and passive acceptance of a declining standard of living. Such a reduction of population would plainly foreshadow a progressive decline

in Italian political importance, while a falling standard of living would threaten eventual, if not immediate, social upheaval.

It is equally evident that although the coming into maturity of the "war baby" generation in Germany and the wide-spread practice of birth control brought the birth rate, for a time, to a par with that of France and thus greatly reduced the annual increment to population,¹ the effect of population pressure continues to be felt. In the east, too, the unchecked birth rate of the Poles is having present effect and forecasts future results far from attractive to the cause of Germanism in the Vistula and Baltic regions.

The double effect, upon German material existence, of the world-wide depression and of the Jewish boycott provoked by the Hitler Revolution has, moreover, served to emphasize to all Germans the weakness of their economic situation. Together, these two events, depression and boycott, have had the character of a partial blockade and the results have been the same, because, being unable to sell enough abroad, Germany has been unable to purchase in necessary quantities the raw materials she requires.

In Japan, population pressure is far more seriously felt than in Germany or as yet even in Italy. And, of course, relatively the same poverty in foodstuffs and raw materials exists; for although, like Italy, Japan still feeds itself, the limit of possibility has about been reached and the level of subsistence is comparatively low.

¹ In 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, and 1937 the birth and death rates per 1,000 in Germany and France stood as follows:

| | <i>Birth Rate</i> | | | | | <i>Death Rate</i> | | | | |
|-------------|-------------------|------|------|------|------|-------------------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 |
| Germany ... | 14.7 | 18.0 | 18.9 | 19.0 | 18.8 | 11.2 | 10.9 | 11.8 | 11.8 | 11.7 |
| France..... | 16.2 | 16.1 | 15.3 | 15.0 | 14.7 | 15.8 | 15.1 | 15.7 | 15.3 | 15.0 |

The situation of the "Have-not" powers as to self-sufficiency and population pressure is acute; and neither the Japanese conquest of Manchuria and Eastern China nor the Italian conquest of Ethiopia has given assurance of permanent relief. Moreover, the fact that National Socialist Germany, by 1938, had not translated its promise of expansion into action, gave small assurance to the status quo states that Hitler would not attempt in the future to emulate the Japanese and Italian examples of removing existing restraints by force. Nor did the world have long to wait; for by March 13 Austria had been incorporated into the Reich, to be joined the following September by the Sudetenland, and the following March by most of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.

The far-reaching nature of the implications of the economic factor of national policy must therefore be evident, for these must determine whether the national policy of a state is to be static or dynamic.

Chapter V

THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR

THIRD among the basic factors of national policy (page 43) is the demographic, which is constituted by the people of a state considered from the two aspects of numbers and ethnic circumstances. Another aspect, that of race, is likewise to be noted.¹ There is, however, no considerable state whose population is predominantly black, while the differences between the yellow and white races, as these affect national policy, have their origin in varying levels of political and economic attainment rather than in any fundamental inequality in capacity for development due to racial characteristics.²

In recent years there has developed a considerable

¹ For general descriptive studies of the character and history of the various racial groups, see: Bean, R. B., *The Races of Man: Differentiation and Dispersal of Man*, 1932; Dixon, Roland, *The Racial History of Man*, 1923; Duncan, H. G., *Race and Population Problems*, 1929; Haddon, A. C., *The Races of Man and Their Distribution*, 1925; Huntington, E., *The Character of Races*, 1924; Reuter, E. B., *Race Mixture*, 1931; Taylor, T. G., *Environment and Race*, 1927. For discussions of race as a political factor, both national and international, see: Finot, Jean, *Race Prejudice*, 1924; Garth, T. R., *Race Psychology*, 1930; Gregory, J. W., *Race as a Political Factor*, 1931; Remington, W. E., *World States of the Machine Age*, 1932; Wrench, G. T., *The Causes of War and Peace*, 1926.

² For general books on the racial basis of civilization, see: Cornéjo, M. H., *The Balance of the Continents*, 1932; Muret, Maurice, *The Twilight of the White Races*, 1926; Spengler, Oswald, *The Decline of the West*, 1926-28, 2 vols.

literature devoted to the discussion of the question of future collision between different racial groups.¹ In its relation to contemporary international relations, however, this question has immediate importance only in the case of the Japanese. Discrimination between the yellow and white races in the immigration laws of the United States, Canada, and Australia has unquestionably been responsible for a state of mind which finds expression, to a degree at least, in Japanese policy. Yet even here the Japanese feeling is national rather than racial and as such is analogous to the ethnic passions of Central Europe.

The rise of the National Socialists to power in Germany has been accompanied by an outbreak of persecution of the Jewish minority² which has been justified by appeal to racial considerations. Actually, however, the Aryan and Nordic myths,³ so solemnly paraded in Germany today, are without real foundation and find credence only among the followers of Hitler. Nor is it necessary to attach greater importance to the legends of the "yellow peril," which is equally imaginary and

¹ See: Chidell, Fleetwood, *Australia—White or Yellow*, 1926; Duboscq, André, *La Pacifique et la Rencontre des Races*, 1929; Gregory, J. W., *The Menace of Colour*, 1925; Hall, J. W., *The Revolt of Asia: The End of the White Man's World Dominance*, 1927; Kohn, Hans, *Orient and Occident*, 1934; Miller, H. A., *Races, Nations and Classes*, 1924; Muntz, E. E., *Race Contact*, 1927; Pitt-Rivers, G. H. L. F., *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*, 1927; Shiel, M. P., *The Yellow Peril*, 1929; Stoddard, Lothrop, *The Rising Tide of Color*, 1920; Thwaite, Daniel, *The Seething African Pot*, 1936; Woolf, L. S., *Imperialism and Civilization*, 1928.

² The persecution of Jewish minorities is by no means limited to Germany, having been prevalent in Eastern Europe particularly in Poland and Rumania. See: Levinger, Rabbi L. J., *Anti-Semitism, Yesterday and Tomorrow*, 1936; Lowenthal, Marvin, *The Jews of Germany*, 1936; Mathews, Basil J., *The Jew and the World Ferment*, 1935.

³ The outstanding classic on the inequality of races was written by J. A. de Gobineau (*The Inequality of Human Races*, 1915). Madison Grant (*The Passing of the Great Race*, 1921) and Lothrop Stoddard (*The Rising Tide of Color*, 1920) are the principal American protagonists of the doctrine. As to the literature on criticisms of various theories of racial superiority, see: Hankins, F. H., *The Racial Basis of Civilization: A Critique of the Nordic Doctrine*, 1931; Hertz, F. O., *Race and Civilization*, 1928; Josey, C. C., *Race and National Solidarity*, 1923; Radin, Paul, *The Racial Myth*, 1934.

similarly unimportant save as a means of sowing prejudice and arousing passions which, however unpleasant in their immediate consequences, have little permanent importance.

As to the first aspect of the demographic factor, that of *numbers*, two elements, size of population and degree of development in production technique, must be considered. Thus, to be a Great Power it is evident that a nation must possess a relatively large population and that its people must have achieved a high degree of efficiency in industrial output.

France and Italy, for example, each containing approximately forty-two millions of inhabitants and having developed national industries to a relatively high degree of efficiency, count as Great Powers, whereas China and Brazil, with four hundred fifty millions and forty millions respectively, despite their great numbers, are internationally of little significance because of the low stage of their industrial development. Again, while both the Soviet Union and the United States are reckoned as Great Powers, the superiority of the former in numbers constitutes no counterbalance to the superiority of the American population in technological skill, as well as the corresponding superiority in industrial development.

In yet another respect, the implication of size in the matter of the population of nations is noteworthy. Primary importance attaches only to the population of that portion of a state which may be defined as its territorial base, that is, as the seat of its government and the principal center of its wealth. Thus, while the total population of the British Empire approximates four hundred fifty millions and that of the French is above one

hundred millions, it is the forty-five millions of Great Britain and the forty-two millions of the French homeland area that constitute the decisive element in establishing each as a Great Power.

























Again, while the white populations of the British Dominions can and will contribute materially to imperial defense, as was demonstrated in the World War, the situation of the sixty-seven millions in Germany in 1937, concentrated as they were upon the homeland territory of the Reich, gave these millions a war value far in excess of that of the substantially equal number of white British subjects scattered about the Seven Seas.

Finally, for nations whose territories and populations are scattered, there must be a diversity and even a conflict of interests among the various parts, resulting in trade restrictions through the raising of tariff barriers, and in a limitation upon the freedom of international policy, particularly of the homeland. Thus in the British Empire, for example, the burden of imperial defense is unequally shared between the Dominions and the United Kingdom, and inter-imperial trade is adversely affected by the tariff walls which the Dominions maintain against the mother country and against one another. In the United States, by contrast, a compact national territory insures an equal division of the costs of national defense and, what is even more important, a common market for all sections of the country.

Finally, the inter-regional position of the British Empire, as contrasted with the regional location of the United States, deprives British imperial policy of the unity which is possessed by the American. The distance of Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Canada from Europe gives their peoples far different points of

GREAT POWERS AND THEIR COLONIAL EMPIRES

ALL AREA-MAPS AND POPULATION-BLOCKS ARE DRAWN TO SAME SCALE FOR PURPOSES OF COMPARISON

| AREA FIGURES IN THOUSANDS OF SQUARE MILES | | POPULATION FIGURES IN MILLIONS | |
|---|---|---|---|
| HOMELAND | COLONIES | HOMELAND | COLONIES |
| UNITED STATES  3086 | 1026 OUTLYING TERRITORIES AND PHILIPPINES  | 126  | 15  |
| JAPAN  147 | 618 MARCHANDISE INCLUDED  | 70  | 60  |
| RUSSIA  8244 | NONE | 170  | |
| GREAT BRITAIN  94 | 12097 DOMINIONS AND COLONIES INCLUDED  | 45  | 455  |
| GERMANY  101 | NONE (LOST 1919 VERSAILLES TREATY 1919) | 67  | (LOST - 12) |
| ITALY  120 | 1400 ETHIOPIA INCLUDED  | 44  | 15  |
| FRANCE  215 | 4563  | 42  | 66  |

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See the footnote on page 17.

view in respect to Europe, for example, than proximity to the Continent imposes upon the inhabitants of the British Isles.

In the United States it is true that there are shades of difference between the views of the Atlantic Seaboard and of the Middle and Far West concerning Europe, and likewise between the Eastern and the Western interest in Asiatic affairs; yet, in the main, community of national public opinion imposes community of action in American policy. On the contrary, British policy must always represent a necessary compromise between the conflicting interests and opinions of the European, American, African, and Australasian fractions of the Empire.

The second important aspect of the demographic factor is that of the *ethnic make-up* of nations. Thus for Germany and for her Continental neighbors the dispersal of the German-speaking populations of the Continent has an even more compelling importance than the dispersal of the English about the Seven Seas has for Great Britain. In fact, ethnic circumstances in Central and Eastern Europe have political importance at least as great as the economic.¹

The reason is simple. On the one hand, so inextricably intermingled are the several nationalities dwelling in Central Europe that it is impossible to draw political frontiers without creating ethnic minorities; and on the other hand, to such heights has the passion of ethnic nationalism been raised in postwar Europe that compromise between the quarreling nationalities has so far been impossible, and economic prostration has accompanied ethnic conflict.

¹ See: Friedman, Samuel, *Le Problème des Minorités Ethniques*, 1927; Junghann, Otto, *National Minorities in Europe*, 1932; Lessing, O. E., ed., *Minorities and Boundaries*, 1931; Trampler, Kurt, *Die Krise des Nationalstaates*, 1932.

Of the ethnic minorities in Europe early in 1938, the German were the most considerable. By virtue of the Peace of Paris,¹ the ten millions of German-speaking people who formerly constituted the ruling fraction of the Austrian Empire had been dispersed, seven millions transferred to the Austrian Republic and more than three millions to the new Czechoslovakian state, although all, at the end of the war, sought union with the Germans of the Reich. There are also German minorities of considerable size in the borderlands of Poland and France and in the succession states of the western part of Russia.

Similar and even harsher terms were imposed upon the Magyars,² since a third of the Hungarians were scattered among the Czechs, the Rumanians, and the Yugoslavs. In the same fashion, too, the Bulgarians of Macedonia were handed over to Greece and Yugoslavia.³ Central and southeastern Europe were thus Balkanized, and in the new Balkans all the old feuds of the original have been reproduced on an even larger scale.


As a consequence, the desire of the Germans, the Hungarians, and the Bulgarians to recover their lost provinces and unhappy minorities became a dominating circumstance in the national policies of all three. In Germany, the erection of the Polish Corridor, which not only created a German minority but also shattered

¹ Feinberg, Nathan, *La Question des Minorités à la Conférence de la Paix*, 1929; Foreign Policy Association, "Protection of Minorities in Europe," *Information Service*, Vol. II, No. 19, 1926; Ladas, S. P., *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, 1932; Rouček, J. S., *The Working of the Minorities System Under the League of Nations*, 1929; Stone, Julius, *International Guarantees of Minority Rights*, 1932.

² Apponyi, Albert, Gróf, *et al.*, *Justice for Hungary*, 1928; Buday, László, *Dismembered Hungary*, 1923; Seton-Watson, R. W., *Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers*, 1934.

³ Reiss, R. A., *The Comitadji Question in Southern Serbia*, 1924; Strupp, Karl, *La Situation Juridique des Macédoniens en Yougoslavie*, 1930.

THE GERMANS OF CENTRAL EUROPE



territorial unity as well, has produced one of the most acute postwar problems in Europe.

In all of these questions of nationality, too, it must be perceived that it is the test of language which applies. Of course it is true that the German, French, and Italian elements in the population of Switzerland all claim a common Swiss nationality. In the same way, the Flemings and Walloons of Belgium both count themselves as Belgian. Nevertheless, despite these and other relatively unimportant exceptions, the presence of linguistic minorities within the frontiers of a state usually constitutes an obstacle to domestic political unity and always a danger of partition following unsuccessful war.

Again, the effect of the presence, just across the frontiers of a state, of minorities speaking the same tongue as its own people usually resembles that of population pressure, since it inspires the government and people of such a state with the hope of expanding their boundaries to include these minorities, thereby to achieve ethnic unity. Thus the aspiration of France in the prewar era to recover the French-speaking districts of German Alsace-Lorraine, and that of Italy to liberate the Latin populations of Trieste and the Trentino, directly influenced French and Italian national policies. And today the irredentist ambitions of Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria have similar effects.

The fact that European ethnic circumstances find no parallel in America or, for that matter, in the various parts of the British Commonwealth having white populations, has always served to blind the English-speaking publics to the importance and the reality of this question of nationality in Europe. The British-American group of nations habitually identify the irredentist aspirations

of European states as no more than ambitions to acquire new markets, fresh sources of raw materials, and wider lands for colonization or for the enhancement of power and prestige.

To assign economic or purely imperialistic causes for policies which have their origin in ethnic circumstances is, however, to err fatally. And the same must also be said of the not less familiar British-American interpretation which explains in terms of mere militarism the European differences due to these same circumstances of nationality. For although economic, strategic, and political considerations are usually present, it is the ethnic consideration which invests these irredentist aspirations with a moral value in the eyes of peoples that cherish them, wholly distinct from the material considerations.

The importance of the demographic factor in its relation to the national policy of states must be clearly realized. As the population of a state is homogenous or mixed, the national policy of that state will be free from or will be dominated by dangers threatening both the unity of its domestic political life and the security of its title to its territories. Again, as the political frontiers of a state differ from or coincide with the ethnic, the national policy of that state will be with or without an irredentist aspect, and therefore in this respect dynamic or static.

In Europe, too, because quarrels between nationalities have endured for centuries and have been marked by many tragic episodes, their psychological consequences and therefore their influence upon national policies cannot be ignored. Thus, even present possession of ethnic unity and territorial satiety cannot serve fully to dissipate the moral effects of fears which have their origin in

the memory of past partitions or mutilations. And these fears take the form of continuing and anxious concern for national security.

That is why, in France and Poland, for example, although the former has recovered Alsace-Lorraine and the latter has regained national unity and independence, the recollection of recent events continues to exercise a profound influence upon national policy. In the same fashion, for the German people in 1937, the spectacle of the alien possession of lands which before 1919 were their own, and the further sight of millions of people who were German by tongue but were denied the exercise of the right of self-determination, constituted evidence of an injustice at once indefensible and intolerable.

In its European phase, at least, German national policy was therefore dominated by the purpose of bringing about a unification of the German nationality by combining in one state the seventy-five millions of Teutons of Central Europe. But the fact that such union would make the new Germany the most powerful state on the Continent led the French, the Italians, and the British to undertake the preservation of the status quo; the French by guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the Slav states, the Italians by defending the independence of Austria, and the British by inaugurating an armament program to give them a predominance on the sea and in the air beyond the challenge of German expansionist ambitions.

However irrational and incomprehensible these ethnic rivalries may appear in the eyes of English-speaking peoples, and however unfortunate their influence upon European peace and international order, they are a dominating circumstance in Europe today. In fact, they are

the reefs upon which many of the postwar peace programs have been wrecked.

The significance of the demographic factor must therefore be plain. Upon the question of size of population and the degree of development of that population in the technique of production will depend the ability of a state to play the role of a Great Power; and the ethnic make-up of its population, together with that of adjoining states, will go far to determine whether its policy is to be dynamic or static; for lack of ethnic unity operates like absence of economic self-sufficiency and presence of population pressure.

Chapter VI

THE STRATEGIC FACTOR

IN the preceding chapters, three basic factors of national policy have been defined—the geographic, the economic, and the demographic. The relation of these to national defense has also been indicated, in so far as each may enhance or diminish the effectiveness of national power. There remain to be considered certain aspects of the problem of security which, though intimately related to these three factors, have special *strategic* significance. Of these, physical geography and armament, viewed in relation to the defensive and offensive position of states, are the most important.

The physical geography of a state from the standpoint of its strategic position has two aspects. The first concerns the character of its boundaries as determined by the ratio between land and sea. The second relates to the presence or absence of natural protective barriers. In addition, of course, distance from potential enemies and size of national territory are contributing factors to the geography of defense. Aside from these circumstances, however, a nation's land-and-sea posi-

tion, and the situation of its territory as to natural barriers against attack, form the basic details of its security problem.

Broadly speaking, two types of land-and-sea position are distinguishable according to the *insular* or *continental* character of the territory of the state. In the former the navy will naturally be the first line of defense, under ordinary circumstances, whereas in the latter the military will play a predominant role, except for the landlocked state where the army will be the exclusive instrument of war.

Of those countries typifying the *insular* position, the British Isles, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Japan proper, Cuba, and the Philippines are the principal examples. Although the problems of security of these states and dominions necessarily vary according to regional circumstances, all are related to the common basic factor of insularity, a situation resulting in peculiar vulnerability to blockade and dependence upon sea-borne traffic for provision of materials not produced at home.

As to the *continental* states, these may be distinguished by the land and sea ratios of their boundaries. The most extreme type, of course, is the landlocked state whose access to the sea is provided only through the territory of its neighbors. Switzerland, Austria,¹ Hungary, Czechoslovakia,¹ Luxemburg, Bolivia, Paraguay, Tibet, and Afghanistan are illustrative of this situation. Poland, too, would be considered landlocked, were it not for the artificially created Corridor which cuts East Prussia from Germany. Ethiopia, prior to the Italian conquest, was likewise a landlocked state, a situation which made its defense peculiarly difficult.


¹ Before the annexation to Germany.

INSULAR



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See the footnote on page 17.

CONTINENTAL

KEY: LAND TYPE




KEY: NATURAL BARRIERS




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CONTINENTAL



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EUROPE IN AFRICA



As to countries having both land and sea frontiers, three broad classifications are observable. The first applies to those states, the greater proportion of whose boundaries border the territories of their neighbors. Germany, Russia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Belgium are outstanding examples. To the second, or *peninsular*, group, belong such nations as Italy, Greece, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and India, the greater part of whose frontiers border the sea. The third, or *balanced*, type of land-and-sea position includes the United States, Canada, the coastal states of Latin America, France, and the Netherlands. The situation of France, Canada, and the United States, moreover, offers an example of frontiers facing upon two seas, an important strategic consideration. To this category may also be added such lesser countries as Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia. Russia, too, enjoys an interoceanic position, though her principal harbors both in the east and in the west do not possess direct access to the open seas.¹

Obviously free access to the open sea can assume great strategic significance from the standpoint of blockade in war. For although a landlocked state will naturally be at the mercy of its neighbors, the same situation likewise applies to a nation endowed with only indirect or obstructed access to the ocean highways. In the case of Italy, for instance, it is obvious that the strategic weakness of her position lies in the fact that the Italian road to the open sea is obstructed on the west at Gibraltar and on the east at Suez, both of which are in British

¹ By "direct" access to the sea is meant the possession of territories fronting the open sea and endowed with ice-free harbors; while "indirect" access, as used in the text, means the possession of harbors upon enclosed waters whose outlets to the open sea are controlled by another state.

hands.¹ As for the Germans, their way to the Atlantic is obstructed by the British Isles. In the same fashion Russia finds its outlet through the Baltic controlled by Germany, its road to the Mediterranean commanded by Turkey, and its free access to the Pacific prevented by Japan.

The last, and most complicated, form of frontier position is that to be found in the combination of insular and continental situations. This applies, naturally, to the colony-holding nations and may be described loosely as the *disconnected* type. A study of the colonial maps (pages 55, 122, and 387), will reveal the fact that, including their possessions, Norway and Denmark enjoy two, and the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Japan, and the United States at least three kinds of land-and-sea position. The British Empire, moreover, shows a combination of all types of geographic situations.

Before discussing the strategic relationship of armaments to physical geography, consideration should be given to natural defensive barriers. The first point to be emphasized in this regard is the importance of *mobility* to naval and military strategy.

Land power did not achieve superiority of defense against sea power until the development of modern transport technique. It was, in fact, the greater mobility of sea power that made possible much of the colonial expansion of former days. Today, any nation in which road and railway transportation have become highly developed can, by virtue of ease of mobility on land,

¹ It is interesting to note that Italian appreciation of this strategic weakness led her expressly to stipulate in her prewar treaty of alliance with Germany and Austria that its provisions would be inoperative if the Central Powers engaged in war with Great Britain. Now that Italy has gained more confidence in her war strength the Italian intention to break the strangle hold of Britain derives from the same reasons as motivated German purposes in the construction of her prewar navy.

outmaneuver in the strategy of defense the attack of slower-moving naval units.

One of the most revealing modern instances of the superiority of land defense was the Dardanelles campaign in the World War, where the combined naval power of the Allied command failed to overcome the weaker but more mobile defensive forces of Turkish land power. The Italian conquest of Ethiopia, too, confirms the importance of mobility on land. Had it not been for the fact that modern transport was almost entirely lacking in the dominions of the Negus, and that the Italians had not only modern transport but also the additional advantage of bases of operations in Eritrea and Somaliland, the outcome might have proved quite different.

It is apparent, therefore, that whereas in former days the sea was the great highway of conquest, today it functions primarily as a barrier to attack for those nations which have achieved mobility on land through the development of modern transport. It is for this reason that a nation enjoying an insular position may be considered the most secure, particularly if, in response to its natural situation, it has developed naval power as the first line of defense.

The British Isles¹ and Japan² proper are of course the classic examples of island position. Their defense problem, however, has become dangerously complex because, with the abandonment of their natural security through colonial adventures across the seas, they are now paying the price, strategically speaking, of spreading themselves thin.³ It is important to note in this connection the advantageous situation of the United States.⁴ Although

¹ See map in Chapter XIII, page 263.

³ See map in Chapter XVIII, page 387.

² See map in Chapter XXI, page 410.

⁴ See map in Chapter XIX, page 470.

geographically this country forms a single continental unit, strategically it functions as an island, because of the natural security of its land frontiers and the fact that its Pacific and Atlantic coasts are joined by the Panama Canal, making the navy the primary weapon of defense against attack upon either coast.

A second item of strategic significance is the factor of *distance*, whether applied to land or to sea. It is obvious that the Americas enjoy a higher degree of security in this regard than any other region of the world. Not only are they farthest removed by vast stretches of ocean from world centers of disturbance in Europe and Asia, but the size of the land areas of the most powerful American states give natural protective advantages to be compared only with those of Russia and China.

From the military point of view the conquest of a small nation by a powerful neighbor appears relatively simple. The conquest of vast continental areas, however, such as the United States, Brazil, or Canada, or the two great Asiatic units of Russia and China, presents an entirely different problem. In like manner, the scattered portions of the British Empire enjoy a high degree of security because the conquest of the whole by any one enemy power would be impossible to achieve. The vulnerability of the Empire, however, lies in the fact that the center of its power, which is Great Britain, has neither the benefit of vastness of land area nor the natural protection afforded by distance from regional centers of disturbance.

It should be noted in this connection that the development of modern aviation has had a profound effect upon the security problem not only of Great Britain but also of Japan. For although these two states enjoy the natu-

ral protective advantages of an insular position they lie so near to the territories of potential continental enemies as to make difficult any adequate defense against attack by aircraft—the new instrument of destruction which transcends the inhibiting elements to which navies and armies are naturally subject.

Of the remaining kinds of protective barriers, more intimately related to physical geography, deserts, mountains, snow and ice, swamps, and forests are most effective. Each of these plays its own peculiar strategic role according to the circumstances of the nation concerned.

The most startling examples of natural protection are some of those possessed by the Soviet Union, most of whose southern boundary is in mountain and desert areas, and whose northern border is virtually impenetrable by virtue of ice fields and swamps.¹ In the northeastern and northwestern portions, too, forests and swamps predominate. The defense value of the Pripet Marshes was well illustrated on the western Russian front during the World War by the concern of the invading German armies to avoid them. Only in the relatively small frontier regions of central European Russia and the maritime provinces bordering Manchukuo is the Soviet Union seriously vulnerable.

The importance of forests and mountains as natural barriers is likewise seen in Latin America. With few exceptions the frontiers of the South American countries are protected against land attack. The great tropical forest regions of Brazil, which overlap into the territories of her neighbors, and the high and tortuous mountain ranges of the Andes, following as they do the entire length of the west coast of South America,

¹ See map in Chapter XV, pages 324-325.

together contribute to this vast system of natural fortifications.

On the continent of Asia, the protective importance of mountains, deserts, and plateaus is best illustrated in the cases of Tibet and the northern border of India. In the latter country, only on the northwest frontier in the region of the Khyber Pass is there vulnerability to land attack. Similarly in Europe, Switzerland has enjoyed a high degree of security by virtue of her mountainous territory; and this despite the fact that she has been for centuries in the vortex of armed conflict.

Natural barriers to attack, therefore, play an important strategic role, a fact most eloquently illustrated by attempts made to compensate for their absence. The Great Wall of China, completed in 215 B.C. with a total length of 1500 miles, is the greatest man-made defense barrier of history. Its modern counterpart is the Maginot line,¹ constructed in France since the World War, which runs from the Swiss border to the North Sea, forming a virtually impenetrable series of interconnected fortifications. Germany, too, after her reoccupation of the Rhineland and unilateral repudiation of the "demilitarized zones" clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, in 1936, has been quickly constructing protective works along the exposed portions of her French and Polish frontiers.²

Of the various forms of artificial barriers to attack, however, armaments are by far the most important; but their character will depend upon the geographic circumstances of the nation concerned.

As the territorial base of a state is insular or continental, that fact will exercise primary influence upon

¹ See map in Chapter XII, page 242.

² See map in Chapter XI, page 200.

the nature of its armament needs; for just as an insular situation bestows a measure of immunity from invasion by military forces, and proportionately increases the dangers of blockade or attack by hostile navies, so does a continental position cause the military menace to predominate. No insular state, however, can ignore the military branch, which must obviously form its second line of defense. Similarly, continental states will have some regard for naval considerations, excepting those whose territories are landlocked. Generally speaking, therefore, armament policies follow a logical pattern according to a nation's geographic situation.

* Although armaments will naturally be adapted to physical environment, their size and extent must depend upon the political circumstances of the region in which a state lies. It is obvious, of course, that in the Americas national military and naval establishments need seldom exceed the demands of domestic police power, with the exception of the United States, whose world position gives it extraordinary defense obligations. In Europe, on the other hand, where regional political circumstances are such as to hold constantly in jeopardy the security of nations, even the smallest states are forced to bear a disproportionate burden of armaments.

Thus, whereas Mexico with a population of 16,000,000 maintains armed forces to the number of about 84,000, Czechoslovakia, with a slightly smaller number of people, had an army of 2,600,000, including reserves. Likewise Brazil and Italy, which have approximately the same number of inhabitants, provide for armed forces numbering 300,000 and 7,800,000 respectively, including reserves. Even Bulgaria and Hungary, whose populations are about equal respectively to those of Peru and

Colombia, have ten times the number of men under arms. Switzerland, too, which like Bolivia enjoys the natural protection of mountain barriers, maintains an army twelve times the size of the Bolivian army, although her population is only one and a quarter times that of Bolivia.¹

It is apparent, therefore, that physical environment will largely determine the type of armaments employed by a state. The size of the armed forces, moreover, may be taken as a measure of the political instability of the region to which a nation belongs. In the case of the Great Powers the additional detail of their inter-regional concerns will apply in the determination of their armament needs.

An interesting example of inter-regional strategic circumstances in relation to armaments is that offered by Japan. Although her territorial base is insular she also possesses large and vitally important lands having a continental situation, on the Asiatic mainland. In addition, therefore, to the maintenance of a navy, the logical first line of defense of an island nation, an equal or greater portion of Japanese economic wealth is applied to land armaments for the defense of her continental interests.² The political circumstances of Asia are such, moreover, that Japanese security involves both regional and inter-regional dangers. For not only does Japan face the double challenge of Chinese and Russian opposition to her encroachments upon the Asiatic mainland, but she is presented with the additional task of assuring herself a commanding naval position in Far Eastern waters

¹ The above estimates of armed forces are based on statistics given in the *Armaments Year Book* of the League of Nations, and other official sources.

² The armament budget for 1937-38 as approved by the Japanese Diet was apportioned as follows: army, 704,000,000 yen; navy, 658,000,000 yen.

against possible opposition by European and American powers.¹

The strategic problem of Great Britain is even more complicated. The possession of a vast empire, scattered in all parts of the world, necessitates a command of at least European and Australasian waters as an assurance against blockade or attack upon the British Isles, or the cutting of communications between the Dominions and colonies of the mother country. The rise of Italian naval strength in the Mediterranean and that of Japan in the Far East brings the British face to face, too, with one of the most serious naval problems of their history. For not only must a "two-power standard" navy be maintained in European waters, but the Italian threat to the lifeline of empire through the Mediterranean makes probable the necessity of supporting a vast fleet based on Singapore.

From the military point of view, too, the British position is difficult. Although the security of the British Isles can be fairly well guaranteed through the maintenance of a small army as a second line of defense, Britain has to consider the additional obligations of the military defense of her Asiatic and African possessions as well as the possible contingency of war on the European continent.

Russia, by contrast, her regional and inter-regional situation being continental, can with utmost safety continue largely to ignore the naval branch of national defense and concentrate her attention upon the military. The strategic problem of Russian land defense, however, recalls in certain respects both the British and the Ameri-

¹ Japan ended her treaty agreement to keep her naval strength within the ratio of 3 to 5 as compared with the British or the American navy, and withdrew from the London Naval Conference on January 15, 1936, claiming her right to naval parity.

can problem of the "divided fleet." To the Russian army the Trans-Siberian railroad is of as great strategic importance as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal are to the British and American navies. In each case, moreover, the dangers to territorial security arise solely from Europe and from Asia. And just as a navy second to none appears to British or American eyes indispensable to interoceanic security, so is a vast military establishment the first bulwark of Russian defense of her European and Asiatic extremities, the naval branch having but secondary importance.

Germany, too, offers a somewhat similar situation of a divided front, though on a much smaller geographic scale. Her territory being centrally located in Europe, the Reich must reckon against danger of attack on two if not three fronts: from the areas beyond the Vistula, the Danube, and the Rhine. Germany's command of the Baltic Sea, and her natural desire to circumvent the dangers of British blockade in time of war, impose also extensive naval considerations. The fatal mistake of prewar Germany, however, was her attempt to transcend the natural limitations of her continental position by challenging British naval supremacy. By such a course her strategic position was really weakened, because it not only resulted in British determination to meet the challenge, but also deprived the military, Germany's first line of defense, of considerable material support diverted to naval construction.

In France and Italy today a similar diversion in armaments is taking place. As these countries are on the borders of the continent, land defense is virtually restricted to but one frontier in each case. The Alps, moreover, provide Italy with a natural barrier to attack, the lack

of which on France's eastern front has only recently been compensated for through the construction of the Maginot line. Were it possible, therefore, for these two continental states to concentrate their defense program solely upon military preparation, their strategic situation would be much less complex than it actually is. The possession of colonial domains, however, and the added detail of necessity for command of sea communications, imposes upon both alike the burdens of naval construction.

In the Italian case the colonial question is less serious, inasmuch as Italy's possessions, with the possible exception of Ethiopia, are important neither as sources of man power nor as producers of raw materials. The ability, however, of either the French or the British navy to cut Italy's communications with the outside world through the Mediterranean, places upon her a strategic threat beyond the forbearance of a Great Power to ignore.

The French naval position today, though not dissimilar to that of Italy, is more secure by virtue of her cordial relations with Great Britain. So long as the British are either friendly or neutral, the naval power of France will enable her not only to maintain contact with her distant colonies but also to assure the relatively safe transportation of the additional man power available in her North African possessions and indispensable for the counterbalancing of superior German forces.

The situation of the United States by contrast is unique; for, although the American position is continental, the conditions which exist within its region invest it with the immunity of insularity. In addition, since the United States is not keeping permanently any

important possessions beyond its own region (the independence of the Philippines having been assured), it is freed from the necessity of maintaining large military forces abroad. And, whereas for Great Britain and Japan the naval branch of national defense is of primary importance and the military also a vital necessity, for the United States the army has practically no significance as an instrument of national policy and the navy has value solely as a barrier against attack originating transoceanically and directed at the American territorial base itself, or against its sea lines of communication.

Of the seven Great Powers, therefore, it is apparent that only in the case of the United States do geographic position and regional circumstances give an assurance of complete territorial security. In the pages which follow, the strategic factor in its bearing upon the national policies of all the Great Powers, will be examined in detail.

Chapter VII

INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY

NEXT in order of natural sequence, after the discussion of the factors of national policy, must come a consideration of the instruments by which states undertake to carry out their policies. In theory, the most important of these instruments may be divided into four classes: economic, financial, political, and military; but a fifth instrument of policy, one upon which the success of the other four largely depends, is propaganda.

The *economic* means of pursuing national policy are many and varied. The most familiar is, of course, the tariff. By imposing duties upon goods and raw materials originating abroad, states frequently undertake to insure for themselves a monopolistic exploitation of their domestic markets. The double, though mistaken, objective of this undertaking is to achieve the fullest measure of prosperity in time of peace and the largest measure of national self-sufficiency alike in peace and in war.

Before the World War and for more than a decade thereafter, Great Britain followed a policy of free trade,

which for her was traditional. It had become traditional because, on the one hand, Great Britain had experienced the Industrial Revolution far in advance of other countries and thus acquired a long lead in the field of industrialization, and, on the other hand, her abandonment of all attempts to feed her growing population mainly from the agricultural production of her own homeland territory enabled her to accept the production of agrarian states in return for her manufactures.¹ In addition, her surplus production of coal and her ownership of the great bulk of the world's shipping provided her with further resources which, in the aggregate, enabled her not only to trade abroad advantageously but also to occupy the situation of a creditor nation, by virtue of her practice of investing abroad, annually, the difference between what she paid and what she earned.

All the other considerable states, on the contrary, by the imposition of duties upon foreign manufactures, adopted policies originally directed chiefly at Great Britain, and designed to develop national industries of their own.² Again, for obvious reasons, no considerable state followed the example of the British in sacrificing its agriculture. All sought to protect their agrarian production against foreign competition by the same resort to tariffs, when this seemed necessary.

Even before the onset of the World War, however, the United States and Germany had reached and passed

¹ Clapham, J. H., *An Economic History of Modern Britain*, 1931-32; Cunningham, William, *The Rise and Decline of the Free Trade Movement*, 1912; Derry, Kingston, *Outlines of English Economic History*, 1932; Hirst, F. W., *From Adam Smith to Philip Snowden*, 1925.

² Boggs, T. H., *The International Trade Balance*, 1923; Culbertson, W. S., *International Economic Policies; A Survey of the Economics of Diplomacy*, 1925; Lippincott, Isaac, *The Development of Modern World Trade*, 1936; Paranaguá, O., *Tariff Policy*, 1935; Taussig, F. W., and White, H. D., *Some Aspects of the Tariff Question; An Examination of the Development of American Industries Under Protection*, 1931, 3d enlarged ed.; Williams, B. H., *Economic Foreign Policy of the United States*, 1929.

Great Britain in the field of industry; and Germany, before the war, and the United States, in the postwar period, began to invade the British domestic market with their manufactures, while the British situation in the world markets became less and less satisfactory. As a consequence, by the close of the first decade after the great conflict, the British were forced to follow the example of the other Great Powers in protecting their domestic markets, and to seek surer outlets for their manufactures by arranging preferential tariffs with their self-governing Dominions.¹

Free trade thus disappeared from the world, and all states, by similar means, undertook to protect their home markets, while also engaging in a bitter struggle with one another for foreign trade. In this struggle, the combatants inevitably had recourse to quotas and contingents, which were devices designed to force those states from which they bought largely to buy a proportionate amount of their own products. At the same time, every state instinctively sought to reduce its foreign purchases and thus to defend its currency and also to preserve its domestic market for exclusive national exploitation.²

¹ Amery, Rt. Hon. L. S., *Empire and Prosperity*, 1931; Beaverbrook, W. M. A., Baron, *My Case for Empire Free Trade*, 1930; Beveridge, Sir W. H., ed., *Tariffs; The Case Examined*, 1931; Findlay, R. M., *Britain under Protection*, 1934; McCurdy, C. A., *Empire Free Trade*, 1930; Ramsay, Alexander, *The Economics of Safe-guarding*, 1930; Richardson, J. H., *British Economic Foreign Policy*, 1936; Sarkar, Benoy K., *Imperial Preference vis-à-vis World Economy*, 1934; Williams, H. G., *Through Tariffs to Prosperity*, 1931, 2d ed.

² Donham, W. B., *Business Adrift*, 1931; Ellinger, Barnard, *Credit and International Trade*, 1934; Hodgson, J. G., *Economic Nationalism*, 1933; Jones, J. M., *Tariff Retaliation*, 1934; Morrison-Bell, Sir Clive, *Tariff Walls; A European Crusade*, 1930; Patterson, E. M., *The World's Economic Dilemma*, 1930; Rogers, J. H., *America Weighs Her Gold*, 1931; Salter, Sir Arthur, *Recovery, The Second Effort*, 1932; Salter, J. A., *World Trade and Its Future*, 1936; Simpson, Kemper, *Introduction to World Economics*, 1934; Haberler, Gottfried, *The Theory of International Trade*, 1936.

In addition, certain groups of citizens, more or less without governmental sanction or encouragement, undertook to strike at countries whose policies were repugnant to them, by means of boycotts. The Chinese employed this means first against the British and then against the Japanese,¹ while the Jews, all over the world, had recourse to it against Germany. Since it was possible, in all instances, for prospective purchasers to obtain elsewhere the things which they required, the result was disastrous for the nation against which the boycott was declared.

Again, in certain cases, such, for example, as those of Bolivia and Paraguay at the time of the Chaco War, and of Italy in the Ethiopian conflict, the Great Powers undertook, by declaring an embargo on war materials, to compel warring states to make peace. And the employment of an embargo as a peaceful means of exerting coercion upon states which were guilty of aggression was widely discussed. Thus the embargo, like the boycott, was established as a means of pursuing national policy, and also was considered as a means of preserving international order.²

It must be evident, however, that while all of these economic means of pursuing national policy are nominally peaceful, in effect they can be only less disastrous than the methods of war. Nor is it less clear, how unequally severe is the operation of these means in the case

¹ Hyde, Charles C., "The Boycott in Foreign Affairs," *American Journal of International Law*, 1933, Vol. 27, pp. 1-10; Remer, C. F., and Palmer, W. B., *A Study of Chinese Boycotts with Special Reference to Their Economic Effectiveness*, 1933.

² Bourquin, Maurice, ed., *Collective Security*, 1936; Clark, Evans, ed., *Boycotts and Peace*, 1932; Geneva Research Center, "Sanctions and Security; an Analysis of the French and American Views," *Geneva Special Studies*, Vol. III, No. 2, 1932; Holland, Sir Thomas H., *The Mineral Sanction as an Aid to International Security*, 1935; Rowan-Robinson, H., *Sanctions Begone!*, 1936; Royal Institute of International Affairs, *International Sanctions*, 1938; Wright, Quincy, ed., *Neutrality and Collective Security*, 1936.

of various Great Powers. Upon those states whose poverty in foodstuffs or raw materials compels them to buy largely abroad, and to pay for such purchases by the sale of their own manufactures, services, or labor, the effect of the progressive reduction of the foreign demand for their exports is to insure, in the end, a reduction in the national standard of living—a reduction from which there is no escape by peaceful means if nations so situated are left to their own devices.

By contrast, although the great states which are self-sufficient—the United States in large measure, the British Empire at least in theory, the Soviet Union potentially—must suffer from the general reduction of international trade, their discomforts can be largely counterbalanced by a new adjustment in the matter of domestic distribution. Even if it be true (as is today both asserted and denied) that these fortunate states cannot preserve their existing standards of living under present circumstances, none of them, at least, is confronted by the prospect of a catastrophic drop such as faces Germany, Italy, and Japan.

The *financial* instrument of national policy has several aspects, one of which closely resembles in its operation the economic instrument. By reducing the value of national currency in relation to gold, states can, temporarily at least, reduce the costs of domestic production and thereby enjoy advantages in the foreign market. Ultimately, of course, progressive reduction leads to excessive inflation and to eventual domestic catastrophe, but if currency manipulation be skillfully employed and wisely restricted, it can at least bestow temporary advantages, which in their effects are analogous to a similar employment of tariffs.

In the end, all nations are usually driven to adopt a like policy in the matter of currency manipulation, as has been well proved since the years of the onset of the Great Depression. Such policies merely serve to restore the original balance, though at the heavy price of inflationary dangers.

What is clear about a subject which is even today still largely unexplored, is that states can, if they choose, by debasing and manipulating their currencies, gain temporary advantage in the foreign markets and thereby, to that extent, promote national prosperity at the expense of other countries. Currency manipulation must therefore be reckoned an instrument of national policy, although its employment is dangerous and may also bring disaster to other states.¹

In a similar fashion, states may seek to promote national prosperity by the payment of subsidies to shipping or bounties to certain industries. The effect of these largesses is to enable national shipping to compete on advantageous terms with the merchant marine of foreign countries, and to enable national industries to resort to dumping, which is the sale abroad of domestic products below the price charged at home or even below the actual cost of production. This last device is commonly and significantly described as "cutthroat competition."²

Another and more familiar form of employment of the financial instrument of policy should be noted, of which

¹ Cassel, Gustav, *The Downfall of the Gold Standard*, 1936; Copeland, M. T., *International Raw Commodity Prices and the Devaluation of the Dollar*, 1934; Einzig, Paul, *World Finance, 1914-1935*, 1935; Einzig, Paul, *The Sterling-Dollar-Franc Tangle*, 1933; Geneva Research Center, "Problem of World Economic Conference," *Geneva Special Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1933; Gregory, T. E. G., *The Gold Standard and Its Future*, 1932; Harris, S. E., *Exchange Depreciation*, 1936; McIver, D. T., *Debased Currency and the London Monetary Conference*, 1933; Rowland, S. W., *Depreciation Reconsidered*, 1933; Stamp, Sir J. C., *The Financial Aftermath of War*, 1932.

² Viner, Jacob, *Dumping: A Problem in International Trade*, 1923.

several different types are distinguishable.¹ For example, a state having made public and private loans to backward countries may interfere in their internal affairs either to protect these investments or for the more subtle purpose of obtaining concessions, either economic or strategic. Such has been in considerable part the history of the imperialist expansion of the Great Powers as exemplified by the establishment of British hegemony in the Near and Middle East, of domination by the United States in Central America and the Caribbean lands, and of Japanese control of Manchuria and northern China.

A second and even more calculated application of money power is the use of loans or outright subsidies of one state to another to obtain political or military advantages. Of this type, France has supplied outstanding examples in her loans to Czarist Russia before the World War and to her allies of the Little Entente and to Poland since the war²—loans that not only strengthened her

¹ The literature existing upon various aspects of financial imperialism is extremely large. Among the more important, the following may be noted for reference: Barnes, H. E., *World Politics in Modern Civilization*, 1930; Bau, M. J., *The Foreign Relations of China*, 1922; Bérard, Victor, *British Imperialism and Commercial Supremacy*, 1906; Carter, J. F., *Conquest: America's Painless Imperialism*, 1928; Earle, E. M., *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism*, 1923; Feis, Herbert, *Europe the World's Banker, 1870-1914*, 1930; Hoskins, H. L., *European Imperialism in Africa*, 1930; Jones, C. L., *Caribbean Backgrounds and Prospects*, 1931; Madden, John T., Nadler, Marcus, and Sauvain, Harry C., *America's Experience as a Creditor Nation*, 1937; Moon, P. T., *Imperialism and World Politics*, 1926; Motherwell, Hiram, *The Imperial Dollar*, 1929; Nearing, Scott, and Freeman, Joseph, *Dollar Diplomacy*, 1925; Owen, D. E., *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Far East*, 1929; Peffer, N., *The White Man's Dilemma*, 1927; Robinson, G. B., *Monetary Mischief*, 1935; Rohde, Hans, *Der Kampf um Asien*, 1924-26, 2 vols.; Staley, Eugene, *War and the Private Investor*, 1935; Viallate, A., *Economic Imperialism and International Relations During the Past Fifty Years*, 1923; Winkler, Max, *Investments of United States Capital in Latin America*, 1929; Woolf, L. S., *Imperialism and Civilization*, 1928; Young, C. W., *Japan's Special Position in Manchuria*, 1931.

² Feis, Herbert, *Europe the World's Banker, 1870-1914*, 1930; Langer, W. L., *European Alliances and Alignments*, 1931; Mowat, R. B., *The Concert of Europe*, 1931; Perquel, Jules, *Les Vicissitudes des Placements Français à l'Étranger*, 1929; White, H. D., *The French International Accounts, 1880-1913*, 1933.

political alliances but also enabled her allies to make military preparations of important advantage to her in case of war.

In the third place, money power can be used as a direct means of coercion.¹ Thus the French, by refusing to carry out the terms of loans to Austria in 1931, forced that state to abandon its program of tariff union with Germany. And a similar refusal to make loans to Germany in the same year, unless repaid by political concessions, defeated all Anglo-American efforts to salvage the finances of the Reich. By bestowing or refusing loans, then, states can serve their national policies. On the economic side, too, the British have always exacted material advantages where they have extended monetary favors, with the result that those who have borrowed in London have bought chiefly in the British market. The experience of Argentina is a familiar case in point.²

Finally, states whose nationals have lent largely to another country on short term, can, either directly by pressure for repayment or indirectly by precipitating a war scare, gravely compromise the financial situation of that country, by thus forcing a rapid liquidation and repatriation of these loans and a consequent strain upon solvency. France, before the onset of her present financial difficulties, was charged with such a course, directed successfully against the United States, Germany, and Great Britain. Thus, money power can be employed to serve national policy either to shake the financial stability of a state or, by the threat of accomplishing this

¹ Einzig, Paul, *Behind the Scenes of International Finance*, 1931; same author, *Finance and Politics*, 1932; Myers, M. G., *Paris as a Financial Center*, 1936; Schuman, F. L., *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic*, 1931.

² McCrea, R. C., et al., *International Competition in the Trade of Argentina*, 1931.

end, to compel that state to modify its own national policy.¹

It is apparent, therefore, that the financial instrument of national policy, like the economic, is not only important, but is available to none but the more fortunate powers. As the economic instrument is uniquely at the service of the relatively self-sufficient nation, so the financial instrument is within the reach of but a few states which by reason of their national prosperity have been able to accumulate the necessary resources in capital for foreign lending.

Ruthlessly and efficiently employed, moreover, money power in peace can be as effective as man power in war and can produce a catastrophe in a rival nation as complete as that produced by the economic instrument—and produce it far more quickly. Thus, in both cases, the distinction between peaceful and military instruments of national policy is less striking than is commonly believed and, in the contemporary age, is becoming ever more inconsiderable.

In respect of the *political* instrument of national policy, it is apparent that this may be employed either to prepare for war or to preserve peace. Diplomacy, which constitutes one of the political resources, has in the past been used as often to arrange the circumstances of future conflict as to assist in the perpetuation of peace. Today, however, diplomacy has largely lost its importance in international relations, partly because of the progressive march of people to political power, and of the resulting growth of the system of international conference.

¹ Coste, Pierre, *La Lutte pour la Suprémie Financière*, 1932; Einzig, Paul, *Behind the Scenes of International Finance*, 1931; same author, *The Fight for Financial Supremacy*, 1931; Madden, J. T., and Nadler, Marcus, *The International Money Markets*, 1935.

These developments,¹ together with the revolution in the means of communication and transport, have created a situation in which it is the prime ministers, foreign ministers, and secretaries of state who negotiate, and negotiate directly, while the ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary have been reduced to the status of messenger boys who communicate statements which they are customarily permitted to decode but seldom to draft. When London can communicate with Washington by telephone and by wireless, and the British prime minister can reach Berlin, Paris, or Geneva in a few hours by airplane, the mission of the diplomat has obviously been restricted to narrow limits.

As late as the period just preceding the World War, French diplomacy, by reason of the ability of its ambassadors alike in Berlin, London, Rome, and Washington, rendered its country great services, while by contrast the course of the German government at home deprived its representatives abroad of all possibility of serving the Fatherland similarly, even had they been of the caliber of the French, which they obviously were not.² In the postwar period, however, all the Great Powers have followed the example of Germany rather than of France, and conducted their international relations, in important instances, directly, rather than through diplomats.

Aside from the field of diplomacy, the political instrument of national policy is employed in several ways. Thus, recognition or non-recognition of newly established governments may be used to exact concessions or

¹ Cambon, J. M., *The Diplomatist*, 1931; Demiashkevich, Michael, *Shackled Diplomacy*, 1934; Redlich, M. D. de, *International Law as a Substitute for Diplomacy*, 1929; Reinsch, P. S., *Secret Diplomacy*, 1922; Satow, Sir Ernest M., *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 1932, 3d ed. rev., 2 vols.; Toynbee, A. J., *The World After the Peace Conference*, 1925; Young, George, *Diplomacy Old and New*, 1921.

² Charles-Roux, François, *Trois Ambassades Françaises à la Veille de la Guerre*, 1928.

to overthrow a regime inimical to national interests. In the Americas, refusal by the United States to recognize revolutionary governments in certain of the smaller countries has in many instances been an effective means of exerting decisive influence upon the internal affairs of such states.¹ On the other hand, the policy initially pursued by most countries in refusing to recognize the Soviet regime eventually collapsed, thus demonstrating the ineffectiveness of this practice when applied to a Great Power. Nor does the refusal to grant *de jure* recognition to Manchukuo or to Ethiopian annexation give promise of proving more efficacious in the case of Japan and Italy.

More important, however, is the use of the political instrument of national policy through the medium of *alliances*, both general and merely defensive, and of that less tangible form of international partnership which is termed an *entente*. Through the medium of such agreements, states pool their military resources in advance of wars which they believe imminent, and co-ordinate their international action and harmonize their national policies in international conferences and elsewhere. All these alliances and understandings, however general in terms, are in fact directed at other nations in whose purposes the allies discover a menace to themselves. The Rome-Berlin Axis established in 1936 and the Franco-British Alliance which crystallized in the following year, have brought into being the postwar counterpart of the prewar balance-of-power system.

¹ Geneva Research Center, "Duties of Non-Recognition in Practice, 1775-1934," *Geneva Special Studies*, Vol. V, No. 4, 1934; Hervey, J. G., *The Legal Effects of Recognition in International Law*, 1928; Hill, Chesney, *Recent Policies of Non-Recognition*, 1933; Jaffe, L. L., *Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations, in Particular of the Recognition of Foreign Powers*, 1933; Graham, M. W., *The League of Nations and the Recognition of States*, 1933.

The Great Powers, too, have not only made such alliances with one another but also have contracted similar engagements with the lesser states. Thus, in the postwar period, France made alliances with Poland and the three nations of the Little Entente, while Italy entered into somewhat less precise arrangements with Austria and Hungary. And, apart from community in impending dangers, the cement which served to bind these bargains was, for the allies of France, the power of money, and for those of Italy, the inducements of concessions in trade.

Nominally such associations are organized in the name of peace; actually, however, they are invariably made with an eye to war and usually, if by no means always, contain military clauses. Obviously, the hope of the formal allies or of the partners on a limited scale is that the collective force represented by the alliance or entente will discourage challenge; but victory in war is as clearly an objective as the perpetuation of a peace, which the very fact of the alliance discloses to be precarious.¹

We are now to consider the *military* means for pursuing national policy.² It is true that, technically, by the terms of the Kellogg Pact, or Pact of Paris, war has been outlawed and recourse to it pronounced illegal. In point of fact, however, the rapid expansion of armaments following the ratification of that Pact,

¹ Armstrong, H. F., *Europe Between Wars?*, 1934; Balla, V. de, *The New Balance of Power in Europe*, 1932; Langer, W. L., *European Alliances and Alignments*, 1931.

² Carter, J. F., *Man Is War*, 1926; Dawson, W. H., *The Future of Empire; the World Price of Peace*, 1930; Fuller, J. F. C., *War and Western Civilization 1832-1932*, 1932; Maurice, Sir Frederick, *Governments and War*, 1926; Nickerson, Hoffman, *Can We Limit War?*, 1934; Porritt, Arthur, ed., *The Causes of War*, 1932; Shotwell, J. T., *War as an Instrument of National Policy*, 1929; Sturzo, Luigi, *The International Community and the Right of War*, 1930.

indulged' in by all nations, great and small alike, has clearly demonstrated how little practical importance nations have attached to their formal and solemn pledges.

Thus, as the Japanese action in Manchuria and China, and the Italian in Ethiopia demonstrated, states which have ratified the Kellogg Pact may refrain from declaring war formally, but otherwise proceed as before. Moreover, even in signing and ratifying that Pact, the Great Powers in several instances hedged their acceptance about with reservations which took back with one hand, unobtrusively, what with ostentation had been relinquished by the other.

In the light of the objectives of the national policies of various states, it is manifest that war still remains not merely one means but the only effective means of pursuing national policy to its logical end. And all states recognize this fact and expose their convictions by the preparations they make in the field of armaments, both military and naval—preparations which in 1937–1939 were being pursued on a larger scale than ever before in the history of mankind. .

Hence, as long as one group of nations holds to the dynamic conception and another to the static—that is to say, while one set of powers are resolved to extend their frontiers and another to defend their present territories—all the various so-called peaceful means of pursuing national policy, which have been here indicated, must in the end prove inadequate. To abolish war, it would first be necessary to reconcile the conflicting national policies of states, and in this direction nothing has been accomplished and very little attempted in the postwar world, because the doctrine of absolute sovereignty,

which is the foundation principle of the nation states system, squarely blocks the road.

It is, of course, necessary to distinguish clearly between preventable and inevitable wars. The Spanish-American War, for example, was clearly a preventable war, because the issues at stake were not vital; in fact, that conflict was very nearly avoided, as it could and should have been. On the contrary, the war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, which in 1914 was the signal for general conflict, was, like the Italian Wars of Unification in the nineteenth century, inevitable, because the Southern Slavs were resolved to achieve unity and the masters of the Dual Monarchy were resolved to preserve their existing empire intact. Postponement, to be sure, was possible, but for Austria such postponement would have insured the further growth of a deadly peril.

Precisely in the same fashion, the programs of Italian Fascism, German National Socialism, and Japanese Imperialism point directly to future wars, because each of these programs is wholly unrealizable save by resort to force, and all three peoples have committed themselves unreservedly to these national programs and policies. To persuade these peoples to renounce their national policies it would be necessary to convince them that their objectives were unattainable even by war, or that their ends were to be reached by some other available means, or, finally, that even if their goals were to be realized by war, the ultimate consequence of the conflict would be so ruinous as to leave them in a still more disadvantageous situation than before.

In practice, however, such persuasion is impossible. By the beginning of 1938, for example, there was ob-

viously no possibility of demonstrating to upwards of seventy-five millions of Germans that a condition of ethnic unity, which less than twenty-five millions of Poles achieved after a century of partition, and which thirty-odd millions of Italians realized in the last century, in the face of obstacles which, in both instances, seemed insuperable, was permanently beyond German strength. Similarly it is difficult to imagine that the Italian and Japanese peoples will be persuaded that the seas which geography has naturally given to their command should not be utilized for the purpose of achieving, by conquest or other imperialist means, the advantages which economic necessity dictates.

There remains the final argument that war has become so destructive today that there can be no victors and that the combatants are foredoomed to share in a common and unlimited disaster. But it is at least true that for the Poles, the Czechs, the Southern Slavs, and the Rumanians, the war of 1914-1918 was very far from an unrelieved disaster, since it won them independence, or ethnic unity, or both blessings at once. Even for France, which recovered its lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine and a far more defensible frontier, and for Italy, which redeemed its lost brethren of Trieste and the Trentino and carried its boundaries to the summits of the Julian Alps, the World War, despite all of its incidental destruction, was not without material profit.

Along with the economic, financial, political, and military instruments of policy, *propaganda* holds a rank of equal significance. In recent years, with the enormous growth of literacy throughout the world and the development of educational mediums such as the modern newspaper, radio, advertising, and cinema, this instru-

ment has attained an importance, in national and international political life, difficult to exaggerate.¹

Nevertheless, it is essential to note that, in time of peace, propaganda is mainly effective as a means of consolidating domestic support behind governments and of enlisting public approval of their policies. By its use, also, statesmen have been able to counteract at home the demoralizing effects of that world opinion of which so much was expected in the immediate postwar period as a means of exerting moral force against national policies inimical to the maintenance of international peace.

Thanks to modern propaganda technique, the Mussolinis and the Hitlers have it within their power to arouse popular enthusiasm and exploit popular passions to suit their own purposes. As a weapon of diplomacy in the hands of dictators, therefore, propaganda has become a most effective instrument, particularly when used to gain domestic support of policies counter to the national interests of the slower-moving, less supple democracies. The amazing rapidity with which Fascist

¹ Literature on propaganda and national psychology is extremely large. Among the more recent books of interest the following may be noted for students who wish to pursue further this interesting though intangible aspect of international relations: Arnold, Thurman W., *The Symbols of Government*, 1935; Ascoli, Max, *Intelligence in Politics*, 1936; Ashton, E. B., *The Fascist: His State and His Mind*, 1937; Brady, Robert A., *The Structure and Spirit of Fascism*, 1937; Burns, C. Delisle, *Challenge to Democracy*, 1935; Catlin, George E. G., *Preface to Action*, 1934; Childs, Harwood L., ed., *Propaganda and Dictatorship*, 1936; Childs, Harwood L., *A Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion*, 1934; Doob, Leonard W., *Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique*, 1935; Drabovitch, W., *Fragilité de la Liberté et Séduction des Dictatures*, 1934; Ford, Guy S., *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, 1935; Huxley, Julian, *If I Were Dictator*, 1934; Irwin, Will, *Propaganda and the News*, 1936; Joad, C. E. M., *Liberty Today*, 1934; Lasswell, Harold D. and others, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities*, 1935; Lasswell, Harold D., *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, 1935; same author, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, 1936; Lengyel, Emil, *Millions of Dictators*, 1936; Marriott, Sir John A. R., *Dictatorship and Democracy*, 1935; Parmelee, Maurice, *Bolshevism, Fascism and the Liberal-Democratic State*, 1934; Riegel, O. W., *Mobilizing for Chaos*, 1934; Robinson, Daniel S., *Political Ethics*, 1935; Varley, Kirton, *Gospel of Fascism in Five Parts*, 1934; Woolf, Leonard S., *Quack, Quack!*, 1935.

and Nazi public opinion can be changed upon any particular line of policy gives to their diplomacy an almost overwhelming advantage.

In time of peace the influence of the propaganda of a nation beyond its frontiers has, it is true, been relatively slight. For not only do such means eventually awaken counter-measures abroad, but they also immediately excite the domestic suspicions of the peoples of foreign nations subjected to them. The efforts of National Socialism to sell its program abroad have had as little real effect as the similar purposes of Democracy to undermine the morale of Nazi supporters.

* Only in cases where the collapse of the social structure of a nation is imminent can the deathblow apparently be dealt by the onslaught of foreign propaganda. Such was undoubtedly the case at the close of the World War, when the doctrines of Democracy of Woodrow Wilson completely undermined the moral fiber of German imperialist purposes.

That propaganda has enormous value, both domestic and foreign, as an instrument of national policy in time of conflict, events of the World War amply prove. Not only were the various national publics held together through its medium during long and dreary years of suffering and privation, but in many cases the initial intention of certain peoples to maintain neutrality was eventually undermined. Thus there can be no doubt that the well-directed British educational campaign in America contributed as much as any other factor to our eventual entry into the war.

But with propaganda, as with other so-called peaceful instruments of policy, our concern lies primarily in appraising its value as a possible substitute for arms

and therefore for war. From this standpoint it is manifest that propaganda, which may perhaps be termed the "psychological" instrument of policy, is as inadequate under present world circumstances as the economic, the financial, or the political.

It is certain that, in time of peace, the superior material resources and therefore disproportionate means of the static powers will bestow upon them commensurate advantage in respect of all the instruments of policy. In fact, if the existing disparity in the fortune of nations long endures, even the ultimate instrument of war may be forced from the hands of the dynamic powers; for an ever-increasing inferiority in material resources must, in an age in which Vulcan has replaced Mars as the god of war, carry with it the certainty of defeat on the battlefield where the armies of the future will be mechanized.

Chapter VIII

FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS— SUMMARY

THE foregoing chapters together constitute a statement of the foundations of international relations in the contemporary world. Since they must also serve as the basis of the later discussions of this study it is essential to re-assemble and briefly restate the facts set forth in them.

Important beyond all else is the fact that the world of today is organized in accordance with the nation states system and therefore in conformity with the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the individual state; for that doctrine precludes the creation of a universally accepted and effectively enforced system of public international law, of a world court of competent and conceded jurisdiction, and, finally, of an international police.

To this fact was due the international anarchy which existed in the prewar era and has continued throughout the postwar period; for in the absence of law, courts, and police, force necessarily constitutes the ultimate means by which states seek their ends. These ends, moreover, are sought by national policies which are the sys-

tems of strategy employed by states to maintain or acquire security, prosperity, and national unity.

As there are sixty-odd sovereign states in the world and their national policies are not only frequently at variance but also often in direct collision, controversy is the characteristic detail of international relations. And when controversies have their origin in questions affecting national honor, title to territory, or provisions of municipal¹ law, the doctrine of absolute sovereignty bars the way to ready settlement by arbitration.

In theory, nations under such circumstances have no other choice save threat of, or resort to, force. In practice, however, inasmuch as nations differ widely as to size, population, and resources, and therefore in strength, only the strongest are actually able to pursue their national policies uncompromisingly. Such states constitute the Great Powers, which at present are seven in number. Inevitably, then, in a world without law the role of the Great Powers is predominant.

Even among the various Great Powers, however, there exists a primary distinction which exercises a decisive influence in determining the character of their foreign policies. Thus, while the objectives of national policy are always security, prosperity, and unity, the Great Powers are divided into those who possess and those who seek to possess. Accordingly, the controlling purpose of the former must be to defend advantages already acquired, and of the latter to acquire similar advantages. The national policies of the first group will therefore be static, and those of the second group, dynamic.

¹ "Of or pertaining to the internal or governmental affairs of a state, kingdom or nation;—used chiefly in the phrase *municipal law*." (*Webster's New International Dictionary*, 2d ed.)

Whether the policy of a state is static or dynamic will necessarily depend upon its physical circumstances from which are derived the basic factors of that policy, the geographic, the economic, the demographic, and the strategic. In a word, the key to the policy of a state must be sought in the position of its land, the extent and nature of its material resources, and the economic, military, and ethnic circumstances of its people.

Although force is the ultimate instrument of policy, there are others, especially the economic, the financial, and the political. Like the military, however, these are generally employed by one nation to enable it to profit at the expense of others. Even in time of peace, therefore, relations between states are primarily competitive and not co-operative. But in such competition all the advantage lies with the static powers, for it is because their economic, financial, and political circumstances are satisfactory that their policies are static.

To pursue its national policies successfully, a dynamic power has no other choice but an appeal to force. To build a bridge between the static and dynamic powers and thus to establish a condition of actual peace, it would be necessary to bring about some compromise between the rights of the former and the claims of the latter; for, in the matter of world peace, as in all else in human relations, real partnership must be founded upon community of interest.

In the absence of any such compromise, partnership between the static and dynamic powers would obviously amount to a combination of the Haves and the Have-nots which would keep the former forever rich and the latter eternally poor. Such a bargain being clearly out of the question, the only alternative is an alliance of the

Haves to impose the status quo upon the Have-nots permanently by means of their superior strength. But here again, the partnership of the Haves would be possible only on the basis of parity.

Today, however, it is self-evident that there is no possibility of real partnership between such static and dynamic peoples as the British and the German, or the French and the Italian, or the American and the Japanese. Hence the bases of a universal association to preserve peace do not exist. It is equally clear that the British behind the Channel and the Americans beyond the Atlantic are exposed to no such perils as the French at the Rhine and the Russians along the Amur. Hence the basis is lacking also for an alliance of the static powers to defend the status quo.

In theory that status quo, since it rests upon existing treaties, constitutes the public international law of the world. In practice, however, Germany, Japan, and Italy refuse to recognize or respect that law, because it is the foundation of the present inequality between their material circumstances and those of Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States. By contrast, France, the Soviet Union, and many smaller states refuse consent to a revision of that law, because of the sacrifices revision would impose upon them. The United States and Great Britain refuse to make sacrifices to satisfy Japan, Germany, or Italy, and the United States also declines to assume direct responsibilities for French or Russian security.

The peace programs of the postwar period have originated with the English-speaking nations. They have been based on the assumption that the desire for peace of all peoples, those of static and dynamic powers alike,

is so dominating as, in itself, to constitute a parity of interest and therefore a basis of partnership for all of the Great Powers. Actually, however, while all peoples with equal sincerity desire to avoid war, all are primarily concerned either with the retention of advantages they possess or with the acquisition of those they lack.

As a consequence, the French and their allies have sought to amend the proposed peace programs to provide security for the status quo, while the Germans, the Japanese, and the Italians have rejected these programs because they would erect obstacles to the revision of that status quo.

The student of international relations must therefore be on his guard against confusing any program of peace which has yet been suggested, with genuine Internationalism. All the various forms of international co-operation that have ever been proposed have been designed to conform with the national interests of the proponent states. Genuine Internationalism, by contrast, would envisage the modification of the national policies of all nations to conform to some mutually accepted new status, not only territorial but also economic and military as well. The static powers would have to surrender some part of their present disproportionate advantages; the dynamic would be compelled to forego the most extravagant of their claims.

Obviously the notion that Great Powers could today be persuaded to consent to such curtailment of sovereign rights is Utopian. But not less impractical is the assumption that any viable system of international co-operation can be established upon the basis of the present inequalities in the physical circumstances of the

Great Powers, accentuated as these are by the economic policies and practices of the static countries.

Actually it is not because peoples are wise or stupid, educated or illiterate, good or bad, that their national policies are static or dynamic. Nor is it because their skins are white or yellow, or their language English, French, German, Japanese, or Italian. Even forms of government, whether democratic, fascist, or communist, have little to do with the question, although they may dictate the spirit in which national policies are pursued. Navalism, militarism, imperialism, these are only convenient indictments nations hurl back and forth at each other. But in fact if the Frenchman and the German changed places, they would exchange policies. And in the same way, in British or American circumstances the Frenchman would adopt the naval policies of the English-speaking powers; while in French circumstances the British and Americans would employ the military system of France.

What counts is whether peoples live on islands or continents; whether their countries are situated in Europe, Asia, or America; whether they have natural resources to supply their industry and food supplies to feed their populations. If their title to these advantages is undisputed, they will also have security. Otherwise they will seek that security. A decent measure of prosperity, a reasonable degree of security, and in addition a fair measure of ethnic unity, these things together constitute the irreducible minimum of an acceptable national existence and therefore the sole basis for a real association between nations to insure peace.

To know the physical circumstances of a state is therefore to understand its national policy. To know the

extent of its resources is to perceive the strength which it can mobilize to support that policy. To persuade a people to change its policy it is necessary to modify the circumstances which are responsible for that policy. To compel a state to abandon its policy it is necessary to muster a force decisively superior to the force of that state. These simple facts constitute the foundations of international relations and they have always to be considered in the light of the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the individual state.

PART TWO

REGIONAL AND WORLD POLITICS

Chapter IX

PREWAR EUROPE¹

THE next step in this study of international relations must be an examination in some detail of the circumstances of each of the Great Powers in respect to security and prosperity. Since five of the seven Great Powers have their political capitals in Europe, that continent is the natural starting place for such an examination. But first it is necessary to consider the European Region as a whole and to contrast the Europe of tradition and of today, that is, prewar and postwar Europe.

Prewar Europe was organized under the nation states system and, within itself, constituted a Great-Power World. Such, too, had been its political circumstances from the Thirty Years War to the World War. In theory, therefore, by reason of the universal acceptance of the

¹ In the study of prewar European politics, the student should have available for general reference the following: Birnie, Arthur, *Economic History of Europe, 1760-1930*, 1930; Dickinson, G. Lowes, *The International Anarchy, 1904-1914*, 1926; Fisher, H. A. L., *History of Europe*, 1936; Hayes, C. J. H., *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, 1924, 2 vols.; Mowat, R. B., *The European States System; A Study of International Relations*, 1935, 2nd enl. ed.; same author, *European Diplomacy, 1815-1914*, 1922; same author, *Contemporary Europe and Overseas, 1898-1920*, 1931; Phillimore, Sir W. G. F., *Three Centuries of Peace Treaties*, 1919; Pribram, A. F., *England and the International Policy of the European Great Powers, 1871-1914*, 1931; Satow, Sir E. M., *International Congresses*, 1920.

dogma of absolute sovereignty, Europe had existed in a condition of anarchy, because it had no established system of public international law and no form of central authority. In practice, however, this state of anarchy had been measurably mitigated by the gradual evolution of at least one guiding principle, that of the balance of power, and the development of a rudimentary form of authority, that of the Concert of Europe.

The principle of the balance of power had begun to take form as far back as the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) following the Thirty Years War. It had found clear expression in the Peace of Utrecht (1713) after the War of the Spanish Succession, and it had been the dominating factor in the Settlement of the Congress of Vienna (1815) after the Napoleonic Wars. Three times, therefore, after general Continental conflicts, European statesmanship had sought to establish a system of order on the basis of a common political doctrine.

The doctrine of the balance of power was taught by the bitter lessons Europe had learned in its struggles with Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte. The sum of these lessons was that the possession of disproportionate strength by any single power must inevitably tempt its rulers to seek Continental hegemony and thus to disturb the peace and threaten the liberty of all Europe.

But after the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1712), which was the final bid of Louis XIV for European hegemony, the victorious coalition was unable to give full application of the doctrine of the balance of power; for, although beaten, Louis was not helpless. On the contrary, his army was still in existence and his capital had not been captured by his foes. Consequently, while France was compelled to surrender many of her claims to

regions adjacent to her own frontiers, she still remained far and away the most powerful state in Europe. Thus both the opportunity and the temptation to renew the old struggle for supremacy survived the defeat and disappearance of Louis the Grand.

A century later, however, the triumph of the new coalition was complete, Paris had fallen into the hands of the victors, Napoleon was on Elba, and the military strength of France was, for the moment, completely broken. Thus the sovereigns and statesmen of a successful alliance were able, as they were also resolved, so to reorganize Europe as to make it impossible for any future master of France, whether Bourbon, Revolutionary, or Bonapartist, to renew the old struggle for Continental hegemony.

To accomplish this end, it was obviously necessary to abolish the long-continued disparity in population between France and the other Great Powers of Europe. Unlike their successors a century later, however, the victors of 1815 did not attempt to achieve their purpose by mutilating the frontiers of their recent antagonist. On the contrary, in the first Treaty of Paris (May, 1814), which preceded Waterloo, and in the second (November, 1815), which followed it, they conceded to France the frontiers of 1789.¹ Thus, after twenty years of conflict,

¹ It is important in this connection to distinguish between the above treaties of Paris and the Congress of Vienna. The first were instruments for concluding the state of war existing between France and the Alliance, and for settling the problem of French frontiers. The Congress of Vienna, on the other hand, was assembled (September, 1814 to July, 1815) for the purpose of reconstructing the states system of Europe. Its object was defined in No. 1 of the Separate and Secret Articles of the first Peace of Paris as follows: "The disposal of the territories given up by His Most Christian Majesty, . . . and the relations from whence a real and permanent Balance of Power in Europe is to be derived, shall be regulated at the Congress upon the principles determined upon by the Allied Powers among themselves." (See Lockhart, J. G., *The Peace Makers, 1814-1815*, 1932).

France herself remained with no material territorial diminution.

But the victors did strip France of all of the conquests of the Revolution and of the Empire, and these territories, together with the possessions of the King of Saxony and other monarchs who had joined their fortunes to those of the Great Emperor, constituted the material out of which the statesmen of Vienna constructed their new system. In thus proceeding to destroy the traditional French superiority on the Continent, the Congress of Vienna, however, left France herself with no mutilated frontiers and no "lost provinces," a fact which counted incalculably in assuring permanence to their work.

In accordance with the doctrine of the balance of power, therefore, the Congress of Vienna bestowed upon Prussia the Rhineland, Westphalia, and the larger part of the kingdom of Saxony; upon Austria, Lombardy and Venetia; upon Russia, Finland and all of ethnic Poland save Galicia, Posen, and West Prussia. In addition, two of the smaller states in the pathway of French invasion were similarly strengthened. Thus Holland received Belgium, and Savoy obtained Genoa and Sardinia. As for the British, since they had no desire to hold Continental territory aside from Gibraltar, they took their share of the booty in the form of Malta and the Ionian Islands in European waters and of overseas lands, of which Cape Colony was the most considerable.

When the Congress of Vienna had completed its labors, therefore, the political situation on the Continent of Europe had been completely transformed. While the France of 1815 was still the France of 1789, Russia, Prussia, and Austria had been greatly expanded and were

now individually far more nearly a match for their old foe than ever before. Again, as the Congress of Vienna, by dividing the spoils of victory evenly among the three victorious Continental powers, had also sought to preserve the balance among them, something like a state of balance actually existed among all of the European Great Powers of the time.

This system of Vienna not only survived the brief challenge of the Hundred Days but, with minor modifications, endured right down to the eve of the World War. During this period of nearly a hundred years, the unification of Italy was accomplished and the German Empire was established under the leadership of Prussia. But on the territorial side the changes were relatively slight. France acquired Nice and Savoy (1860), and lost Alsace-Lorraine (1871); Austria was forced to surrender Lombardy (1859) and Venice (1866), but was permitted to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878); Prussia took Alsace-Lorraine in the name of the new German Empire; and, finally, Russian frontiers in Europe remained virtually unchanged.

Meantime, with the unification of Italy (1859-1870) and the creation of the German Empire (1866-1871), France had irrevocably lost her old primacy. Russia, Germany, and Austria now surpassed her in population, and Italy was rapidly approaching parity in numbers. On the other hand, Russian increase in population was vastly greater than German, and the ability of any single Great Power to play the role which had for two centuries before Waterloo been French, was still lacking.

In one respect, the situation changed just before the outbreak of the World War. Again, as in the years before the French Revolution, Europe was divided into

rival alliances: Germany, Austria, and Italy were united in the Triple Alliance, and Russia, France, and Great Britain in the Triple Entente.¹ But the balance between the two combinations appeared too nearly equal to tempt either to run the risks of a conflict which would now inevitably be general.


Beneath the surface, however, this state of balance was crumbling fatally. Under the influence of the centrifugal pull of nationality, the various subject peoples of the Hapsburg Monarchy were beginning to look beyond national boundaries to ethnic unities; and in the case of the Southern Slavs, at least, these aspirations found strong support in St. Petersburg. The two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, moreover, not only crystallized the resolution of the Serbs to repeat the achievement of Savoy, but also fired the ambition of the Rumanians to make the Regat² the instrument of unification of still another Latin people.

Subliminally, therefore, the balance of power in Europe was again threatened. If the Hapsburg Monarchy were resolved into its ethnic factors, then Germany was satisfied that she would find herself isolated between hostile Russia and irreconcilable France. To preserve the balance of power, Germany therefore undertook to protect the unity of the Dual Monarchy; and thereby, in the famous phrase of Napoleon III, she allied herself to a corpse, and in July, 1914, it was, in the bitter

¹ Among the important books dealing specifically with the history of the above alliances, the following may be noted: Coolidge, A. C., *Origins of the Triple Alliance*, 1926, 2d ed.; Gooch, G. P., *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919*, 1923; Lanessan, J. L. de, *Histoire de l'Entente Cordiale Franco-Anglaise*, 1916; Langer, W. L., *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, 1931; Michon, Georges, *The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1891-1917*, 1929.

² The Rumanian word *Regat*, meaning "kingdom," is used especially to mean prewar Rumania.

PREWAR EUROPEAN ALLIANCES



words of Bülow, the dead hand which held the helm.¹

What it is essential to perceive, however, is that as late as the onset of the World War the doctrine of the balance of power still exercised a profound influence upon European policy. In fact, it was to preserve the traditional balance established by the Congress of Vienna, that the German Empire took up arms in 1914.

Prewar Europe, moreover, had not only a doctrine but also a system of authority, and that was the Concert of Europe. Incomplete and shadowy as this system was, it did avail to prevent any general war between Waterloo and the Marne. At the root of this system lay the second of the guiding principles of Old Europe, the doctrine of Great-Power authority. Individually the Great Powers were to be equal; collectively theirs was the duty and right to keep order on the Continent. That was the law and the gospel of prewar Europe.

This system of the Concert of Europe had taken form during the last stages of the struggle against Napoleon, when the sovereigns and statesmen of the allied Great Powers were necessarily in close touch with one another. This habit of collaboration was immensely strengthened by the Congress of Vienna, and it persisted after the various treaties of peace had been ratified and applied;² for after Vienna, as after Paris a century later, many questions remained still unsettled.

In the seven years after the Congress of Vienna there were, accordingly, a succession of international conferences, of which the final meeting was that of Verona

¹ Bülow, B., Fürst von, *Memoirs*, 1931-32, 4 vols.; Wedel, O. H., *Austro-German Diplomatic Relations, 1908-1914*, 1932.

² Cresson, W. P., *The Holy Alliance; the European Background of the Monroe Doctrine*, 1922; same author, *Diplomatic Portraits: Europe and the Monroe Doctrine One Hundred Years Ago*, 1923.

in 1822.¹ Meantime, by 1818 France had been readmitted to the circle of the Great Powers on an equal footing. In fact, even in the Congress of Vienna, Talleyrand had reconquered for the recently vanquished foe a position which contrasts strikingly with that of the German position in the case of the Paris Conference of 1919. In these various conferences (of 1818, 1820, 1822), too, the representatives of the Great Powers undertook to administer the affairs of Europe by virtue of the authority which their collective strength bestowed upon them.

With the death of Castlereagh and the coming of Canning (1822), Great Britain, setting an example which the United States followed a century later, withdrew from the Continent and left it to the other four Great Powers to preserve order. Nevertheless, the Belgian Revolution of 1830, raising as it did, momentarily at least, the question of the permanence of the system of Vienna and therefore of the balance of power, was the occasion for a Conference of London.² In that conference, too, the five Great Powers both established the Belgian state and recognized and insured Greek independence.

Even as late as 1852, when the question of Schleswig-Holstein threatened to produce war, the five Great Powers, with Sweden, joined in a Treaty of London to

¹ Three congresses were held during this period. The first of them, Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), was notable for the fact that France was again admitted as a member of the Concert of Europe. The second, Troppau (1820), was called to consider the crisis in Europe arising from the revolutions in the kingdoms of Naples and Spain. And at the third and last, Verona (1822), at which Great Britain was represented only by an observer, a French army was ordered to pass beyond the Pyrenees for the purpose of suppressing the Spanish revolution. It was this latter act of interference with the aspirations of a people to settle their own internal affairs that gave impetus to the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine the following year.

² Treaty of London, November 15, 1831. The problem of the status of Belgium was not definitely settled until the second treaty of London, April 19, 1839, in which Holland finally recognized the independence of Belgium and the latter country was declared to "form an Independent and perpetually Neutral State."

regulate the succession to the Danish throne. Two years later, however, when the Crimean War ushered in the long series of conflicts between Great Powers which lasted until 1871, the Concert of Europe necessarily dissolved, and a quarter of a century of Continental anarchy followed as a consequence.¹

After the Franco-Prussian War, however, all the Great Powers of the Continent were similarly exhausted by the several wars in which they had engaged. Hence, when the Russo-Turkish War threatened to precipitate a new—and this time a general—conflict, Bismarck had little difficulty in persuading all of the Great Powers to agree to attend a new international conference like those which had taken place in the years after Waterloo.

The Congress of Berlin (June 13–July 13, 1878), which was the consequence of the intervention of the Iron Chancellor, not merely revived the old system of the Concert of Europe, but imparted to it a vitality which endured for nearly four decades after 1878.² The means by which the Congress of Berlin resolved the difficulties having their origin in the Eastern Question require at least a passing glance, for they are as significant examples of traditional European statesmanship as the decisions of the Congress of Vienna itself.

¹ Although the Concert of Europe went into eclipse during this period and was not restored to vigor until the Congress of Berlin in 1878, an interesting recognition of its importance to the maintenance of European peace is contained in Protocol No. 23 of the Congress of Paris, 1856, which reads as follows: "The Plenipotentiaries do not hesitate to express, in the name of their Governments, the wish that States between which any serious misunderstanding may arise, should before appealing to Arms, have recourse, as far as circumstances might allow, to the Good Office of a friendly power." Although this protocol, when invoked by the British, both in 1866 and in 1870, did not prevent the Austro-Prussian and the Franco-Prussian wars, respectively, it has remained nevertheless an important pronouncement of the principle of the Concert of Powers and has now become a part of public international law in the form of Article XII of the Covenant of the League.

² Mowat, R. B., *The Concert of Europe*, 1931.

In 1878 the objective was to prevent a war visibly impending by reason of the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878), which Russia had imposed upon Turkey.¹ These terms, designed to give the Czar control of the Straits (the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus), were equally unacceptable to London and to Vienna; and Disraeli had sent a British fleet through the Dardanelles and called Indian troops to Malta. His dramatic gestures had thus brought Europe to the very edge of conflict.

The crisis was resolved by a series of compromises and territorial adjustments. Russia was forced to abandon the Treaty of San Stefano but was permitted to annex Kars and Batum in Asia and the portion of Bessarabia she had been forced to cede after the Crimean War. Much, but not all, of the territory she had undertaken to bestow upon her protégé Bulgaria was granted to this small state, but Thrace and Macedonia, with their considerable Christian populations, were restored to the bloodstained hands of the Turks because the rivalries of the Great Powers in these regions were irreconcilable. Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece were also permitted to annex considerable areas of Turkish territory.

Of the other Great Powers, Austria was permitted to occupy the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina as solace for her still recent surrender of Venetia and Lombardy. France was invited to occupy Tunisia as consolation for the even more recent loss of Alsace-Lorraine. As for Great Britain, her prime minister, Disraeli, brought back Cyprus in his pocket. Italy, in her turn, had to be contented with the recognition of her accession to the status of a Great Power, bestowed by her in-

¹ Holland, T. E., *European Concert in the Eastern Question*, 1885.

clusion among the conferees. For Germany, Bismarck acquired the prestige incident to formal recognition that Berlin had replaced Paris as the center of European power.

The price of this quaintly termed "Peace with Honor" was necessarily paid by the weaker nations—by Turkey, first of all, which had to consent to territorial cessions both in Europe and in Asia. The Balkan states, however, paid their full share. Thus despite the services rendered to the Czar at Plevna by the Rumanian army, Rumania was forced to cede her Bessarabian lands to Russia. Bulgaria, in turn, was compelled to reimburse Rumania by surrendering the Dobrudja to her. As for the Serbs, the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina raised a barrier to their aspiration for national unity, while Austrian garrisons in the Sanjak of Novi Bazar separated Serbia from Montenegro.

At this price, however, war between Great Powers was avoided and Europe was assured of another generation of peace. The Eastern Question was not settled, to be sure.¹ On the contrary, in Serajevo, the capital of the Bosnian province which the Congress of Berlin had handed over to Austria, the signal fire for the World War would one day be lighted. Nevertheless, as the statesmen of the Congress of Vienna could claim for their handiwork the credit for forty years of European tranquillity, those of Berlin could claim for theirs the similar credit for a new pause which lasted from 1878 to 1914.

After the Congress of Berlin, too, the habit of collaboration persisted. In 1881 a Conference of Berlin was

¹ Durham, M. E., *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle*, 1920; Earle, E. M., *Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway*, 1923; Miller, W., *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801-1927*, 1927.

convoked to regulate the still unaccomplished decisions of the Conference three years before. Again in December of 1884, a third Berlin Conference was convened to arrange the diplomatic and legal basis for the partition of Africa among the colonial powers and to settle the difficult question of the international status of the Congo Basin. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the Conference of Algeciras (1906) for the moment preserved European peace by its resolution of the Moroccan crisis.¹ In 1911, however, the Turco-Italian War disclosed the growing weakness of the Concert, and its utter impotence was revealed when the Balkan states, despite the warning of the Great Powers, suddenly attacked Turkey in 1912 and by their own arms abolished the servitudes imposed upon them by the Congress of Berlin.²

Nevertheless, as late as the winter of 1913, a Council of Ambassadors successfully liquidated the disputes between Russia and Austria growing out of the First and Second Balkan Wars. The Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) was, therefore, a further monument to the efficacy of the system of the Concert. But, like the Treaty of London in 1852, which preceded the Crimean War by but three years, it proved only the preface to conflict. And this time the struggle became general.

The reason for the failure of Sir Edward Grey, when in July, 1914, he undertook once more to invoke the old

¹ Dickinson, G. L., *The International Anarchy, 1904-1914*, 1926; Stuart, G. H., *French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo, 1898-1914*, 1921.

² In addition to the above conferences of European Powers, the World Conferences of The Hague of 1899 and 1907, which resulted in the establishment of an International Tribunal of Arbitration and in the codification of certain principles of the Laws of War, and the London Naval Conference of 1908, which drew up the famous Declaration of London defining the rights of neutrals in trade and contraband, should be mentioned. Although these agreements were virtually abrogated as a result of the World War, they represent an outstanding example of international co-operative effort during the prewar era for the solution of world problems.

machinery of the Concert of Europe, to prevent a clash between Great Powers, was simple and must today be unmistakable. For Austria, the situation which had resulted from the Balkan Wars had become intolerable. The purpose of the Serbs, now victorious in two wars, to unite the Southern Slavs of the whole Danubian area, thus stripping the Dual Monarchy of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, was undisguised and its menace was evident. And behind Serbian purpose was Russian encouragement.

Serbian purpose, moreover, was matched by Rumanian, and accordingly Transylvania, the Banat, and Bukovina were similarly in jeopardy. In Bohemia and Moravia, too, the Czechs were stirred both by Pan-Slav sympathies and by separatist ambitions.¹ Thus Vienna seized upon the assassinations of Serajevo as a justification for a war of self-preservation, and rejected the appeals of Sir Edward Grey to come to conference as Russia had come in 1878 and France in 1906. Berlin, too, paralyzed by the fear of losing its single sure ally, saw its fate linked with that of Austria, and, at least until the eleventh hour had passed unseized, permitted itself to be dragged after Vienna.

With the outbreak of the World War, too, the Concert of Europe was inevitably abolished, while the disintegration of the Hapsburg Monarchy automatically destroyed the balance of power in Europe. As a consequence, long after the Paris Conference had issued the formal death certificate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, European statesmanship continued to repeat in mournful approbation Palacky's famous phrase—"if Austria did not exist it would be necessary to invent it."

¹ Jászi, Oszkár, *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy*, 1929.

Chapter X

POSTWAR EUROPE¹

WILSON's Fourteen Points and his later speeches² which together became the basis of the Armistice, proposed the principle of self-determination, and the project for

¹ In the study of the Peace Settlement and of postwar European politics, the student should have available for general reference, the following:

Peace Settlement—Baker, R. S., *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlements*, 1922, 3 vols.; Beer, G. L., *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference*, 1923; Haskins, C. H., and Lord, R. H., *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, 1920; Howard-Ellis, Charles, *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, 1928; Nicolson, H. G., *Peace-making*, 1919, 1933; Scott, J. B., ed., *Preliminary History of the Armistice*, 1924; Temperley, H. W., ed., *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, 1920-24, 6 vols.

Postwar European Politics—Benns, F. Lee, *Europe Since 1914*, 1936; Bogardus, J. F., *Europe, a Geographical Survey*, 1934; Burns, C. D., 1918-1928; *A Short History of the World*, 1928; Colc, G. D. H., and Cole, Margaret, *The Intelligent Man's Review of Europe Today*, 1933; Dutt, R. Palme, *World Politics 1918-1936*, 1936; Fisher, H. A. L., *History of Europe*, Vol. III, 1935; Jackson, J. Hampden, *Europe Since the War, 1918-1936*, 1936; Langsam, W. C., *The World Since 1914*, 1933; Muir, Ramsay, *Political Consequences of the Great War*, 1930; Munro, William Bennett, *Major Changes in the Government of Europe Since 1930*, 1936; Ogg, F. A., *European Governments and Politics*, 1934, rev. ed.; Slosson, P. W., *Twentieth Century Europe*, 1927; Sontag, Raymond J., *European Diplomatic History 1871-1932*, 1933; Spencer, Henry Russell, *Government and Politics Abroad*, 1936; Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs*, annual; Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., ed. *Documents on International Affairs*, annual since 1930.

In addition to the above, the following secondary sources should prove useful for articles on special topics, references to which will be found in the collected indexes of each: *American Journal of International Law*; *Current History*; *Foreign Policy Reports*; *International Conciliation*; World Peace Foundation Publications.

² See the address of President Wilson to Congress, January 8, 1918, and his Mount Vernon address of July 4, 1914. (For text of essential portions, see Appendix B.)

a League of Nations. Each of these proposals was revolutionary because it undertook to substitute for one of the oldest traditions of modern Europe a theory, American by adoption but as yet without practical test.

Thus the principle of self-determination envisaged the substitution for the doctrine of the balance of power, which asserted the supreme right of Europe collectively to security, of a system by which the rights of the individual peoples were proclaimed to be absolute.¹ Plebiscite was to decide the question of allegiance, even where the result might be to place in the hands of a single nationality power as disproportionate as that which had belonged to the France of Louis XIV and Napoleon.

Justice to Woodrow Wilson, the author of the Fourteen Points, must, however, compel recognition of the fact that when he uttered his famous prescriptions the European situation was far different from that which he discovered when the Paris Peace Conference convened. And to the Europe which existed on the Fourth of July, 1918, the principle of self-determination might perhaps have been applied without grave difficulties, for, even when the President spoke at Mount Vernon, the Central Powers were still undefeated, the Hapsburg Monarchy as yet was intact, and the possibility of its utter disintegration had not fully dawned upon Europe. What Wilson had in mind was to avoid the creation of other Alsace-Lorraines. During half a century the blunder of 1871 had poisoned the atmosphere of Europe. Not even the most ardent German champion of the Treaty of Frankfort could deny that the will of the population of the Reichsland to remain French had been unanimous or

¹ Mattern, Johannes, *The Employment of the Plebiscite in the Determination of Sovereignty*, 1920; Wambaugh, Sarah, *Plebiscites Since the World War*, 1933; Wittmann, Ernő, *Past and Future of the Right of National Self-Determination*, 1920.

that the refusal to permit these populations to determine their own allegiance had, in the end, been one of the potent factors in producing the World War.

Nor was Wilson less mindful of the evil consequences for Europe of the extinction of Polish independence, of the denial to the Balkan peoples of the right of each to be free and united, and, finally, of the failure of Italy to achieve complete unification in 1860, 1866, and 1870, which was witnessed by the irredentist sentiment in respect of Trieste and the Trentino, that had brought Italy into the war on the side of the Allies. And it was to remedy the old evils and to prevent the creation of new, that the American President fashioned his constitution for a reformed Europe.

When, however, between the Armistice and the assembling of the Paris Peace Conference, the Hapsburg Monarchy broke up, the Hungarians renouncing the old association with the Austrians, and the Czechs proclaiming their independence, the principle of self-determination acquired new and portentous implications. In fact, the traditional problem of the balance of power reappeared, in a new setting to be sure, but with all its old significance.

To apply the principle of self-determination to the Austria of July, 1918—which was also the Austria of July, 1914—would have involved no more than the transfer of the border provinces of the two halves of the Dual Monarchy to the Rumanians, the Serbs, and the Italians, besides the transfer of Galicia to the new Poland. But there would still have remained a central core made up of Austria proper, Hungary, and Bohemia, counting more than thirty millions of inhabitants about equally divided among Germans, Magyars, and Slavs.

When, however, these three nationalities of the old Dual Monarchy separated in November, 1918, the situation became far different. In Austria and Bohemia—to which of course Moravia and Austrian Silesia were joined—there were at least ten millions of people who were German by speech, and in Bohemia three millions of these Germans were intermingled with six millions of Slavs, constituting a large minority, which for three centuries had been the dominant nationality.

For these ten millions of German Austrians, now that the old monarchy had collapsed, there was no other tolerable solution of the new problem save union with the sixty millions of Germans of the Reich. Such unity had been prevented in the past by two accidents of history: the Reformation and the rivalry of the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns. But now both dynasties were gone and the religious issue had lost its centrifugal influence. *Anschluss* was thus the wish of the Austrian Germans, and from Vienna the victorious Allies were promptly put on notice that these ten millions of Germans claimed for themselves the benefits of Wilson's principle of self-determination. They claimed them as a matter of right, moreover, because the President's proposals had been the basis of the Armistice and thus of the terms upon which all of the Central Powers had surrendered.

A plebiscite in what remained of the Austrian half of the old Hapsburg Monarchy in January, 1919, when the Paris Conference assembled, would have insured a solid majority for union with the German Republic, since the Teutonic element outnumbered the Slavic in the ratio of ten to seven. But to transfer seventeen millions of people and upwards of sixty thousand square miles of territory to Germany would enable the nation which had been

defeated in the war to emerge victorious from the Peace Conference.

In place of the old Germany of sixty-five millions of people and slightly more than two hundred thousand square miles, there would now be a new Germany of nearly eighty millions of inhabitants and close to two hundred and fifty thousand square miles, even when France had recovered Alsace-Lorraine and Poland had regained Posen. By contrast, postwar France would still count only forty millions of people and but little more than two hundred and ten thousand square miles, while United Italy would count the same number of inhabitants and an area barely half as great as the German.

If, however, the Teutonic and Slavic populations of Austria and Bohemia were separated and the ten millions of the former transferred to Germany and the seven millions of the latter combined in a separate and independent state, on the one hand postwar Germany would still be larger in area and population than the prewar Empire, while on the other, the new Czech state, almost completely surrounded by German territory and without natural frontiers, would be politically and economically no more than a satellite.

For the European powers which, after four years of desperate and doubtful battle, had seen victory fall to their cause by only the narrowest of margins, both of these solutions were equally impossible. Nor is there anything to suggest that Woodrow Wilson, himself, ever urged upon Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando, his associates of the Big Four, any such integral application of his principle of self-determination.

On the contrary, the Paris Conference condemned the seven millions of German-speaking people of Austria to

an independence which was unsought, unwelcome, and later destined to prove economically if not politically impracticable. As for the three million Germans of Bohemia, they were transferred to the control of the Czechs, henceforth to constitute the most considerable but by no means the only minority in a state which, in fact, was to have no ethnic majority.

From the very outset, therefore, the application of the principle of self-determination universally on the European Continent proved politically impossible. But while denying the benefits of this dogma to the most powerful of all the European nationalities, the statesmen of Paris proceeded at the same time to extend its blessings to most other peoples. Thus among the Great Powers the French and the Italians profited materially, while of the smaller states the Rumanians, the Southern Slavs, the Czechs, and the Poles benefited enormously.

The victors of 1918 carried their inconsistency also one step further, for they broke completely with the precedent of their predecessors of 1815. Whereas the Congress of Vienna had left the France of 1789 intact, the Peace of the Conference of Paris mutilated the Germany of 1914 ruthlessly, chiefly to the advantage of the Poles. Such mutilation, however, was justified morally by citation of the unquestioned fact that the majority in the eastern provinces actually taken from the Reich was, even on the basis of German statistics, clearly Slavic.

Obviously, however, the statesmen of Paris could not have it both ways and preserve even the smallest semblance of concern for consistency or of regard for justice. To deny the ten millions of Germans of Austria the benefits which application of the principle of self-determination would insure and then in the name of that principle

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THE POWERS AND THE SUCCESSION STATES



to tear Germany's eastern frontiers to pieces and in addition to destroy German territorial unity by the creation of the Polish Corridor, was to present the beaten but still powerful German people with a moral issue of incalculable proportions.

To the natural and justified resentment provoked by the territorial decisions of Paris there were added other and not less exacerbating circumstances. Of these the impossible reparations claims, the unilateral disarmament requirements, and the notorious "Guilt" clause¹ were the most considerable. As a consequence of the sum of these decisions, the victors of 1919 failed to make a viable peace with their vanquished foe.

Nevertheless, when these victors had completed their labors and a new system was established upon the European continent, the German people still remained the most powerful single ethnic group and next to the Russian the most numerous. By 1934 there were not less than seventy-five millions of German-speaking people dwelling in the center of Europe and constituting a compact mass. And in the hearts of these millions the desire for ethnic unity survived.

Surviving also, however, was the threat to Europe collectively and to the individual states about the circle of German frontiers immanent in this German longing for unity. French security in Alsace-Lorraine and Italian in Trieste and the Upper Adige, Polish access to the sea through the Corridor, and the very existence of Czechoslovakia were thus conditioned, henceforth, upon the

¹ The English translation of the German text of Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty reads as follows:

"The Allied and Associated governments declare and Germany recognizes that Germany and its allies are responsible as originators for all losses and damages which the Allied and Associated governments and their nationals have sustained in consequence of the war imposed upon them by the attack of Germany and her allies."

preservation of the status quo of the Paris Conference. And when the National Socialist Revolution of March, 1933, overthrew the German Republic and brought to power a dictator who openly proclaimed his purpose to join to his new Third Reich the German populations of the old Austria, which had been his birthplace, and at the same time asserted Germany's right to rearm, the old problem of the balance of power in Europe was clearly posed once more.

At that moment, too, the resemblance between the European condition of 1933 and that of 1792 also awakened further apprehension alike in Paris, in Rome, and in London. When the wars of the French Revolution began, France was surrounded at her frontiers by small states and principalities incapable of resistance and even ready to welcome the invader. And to this situation must be ascribed, in no small part, the early victories in Belgium, the Rhineland, and Northern Italy, which were together to supply the springboard of the great Napoleonic adventure that led to Berlin, Vienna, Madrid and, eventually, to Moscow.

In 1933, likewise, all of Central Europe from the southern frontiers of the Reich to the shores of the Aegean presented a spectacle of political incoherence aggravated by ethnic feuds and economic prostration.¹ Was it not then to be feared, if not actually to be expected, that the armies of a rearmed Germany would find in Vienna, Budapest, and Sofia the same welcome which had greeted those of the French Revolution in Brussels, Mainz, and Milan? And out of the debris of the Hapsburg Monarchy was it not conceivable that

¹ Buell, R. L., ed., *New Governments in Europe*, 1934; Macartney, C. A., *National States and National Minorities*, 1934; Zurcher, A. J., *The Experiment with Democracy in Central Europe*, 1933.

the new German dictator might be able to construct a Mittel-europa comparable with that system which the great French Emperor had erected upon the ruins of the Holy Roman Empire?

The principle of self-determination, then, had brought no solution to the traditional problem of Europe. It had not even been tried, in the case of the most serious of all questions, namely, the German, because it would have opened the floodgates and left Europe without protection against new inundations like the old. But it is at least arguable that had the statesmen of Paris dealt with Germany as those of Vienna had done with France, even though Austro-German union were prohibited as Franco-Belgian had been prevented a century before, solid peace might have been re-established and Germany might have ended by accepting as definitive the separate existence of the Austrian population of the Danubian Republic, as France had accepted that of the Walloons of the Belgian kingdom.

Such speculations, however, need have no place here, for what concerns us is simply the fact that viable peace was not made with Germany, and that after the overthrow of the German Republic and the arrival of Adolf Hitler, the principle of self-determination, which had been the battle cry of the Allies of the World War, became the war cry of the former foe, in the postwar era.

Simultaneously, too, the doctrine of the balance of power, which had been anathema to the American President, became the guiding dogma of America's associates in the World War. Since tolerable peace was not made with the German people at Paris, and they eventually committed their destinies to a dictator who proclaimed his purpose to achieve German unity by force, National

Socialist Germany henceforth assumed in the eyes of its neighbors that position which Bourbon and Bonapartist France had once occupied in the eyes of all European states. And for such a menace, Europe, during three centuries, had been able to evolve no answer save coalition.

The proposal to substitute a League of Nations for the old Concert of Europe was also, in its turn, revolutionary, because it envisaged transferring the control of the Continental affairs of the Old World from the hands of the Great Powers of the European region to an international council in which all of the nations of the world would speak with authority. Thus, after centuries during which Europe had dominated the fortunes of the world, it was now itself to come under world control.¹

But to substitute the League of Nations for the old Concert of Europe, in so far as the administration of Old World affairs was concerned, was possible only upon one of two assumptions: first, that a peace could be made at Paris satisfactory to victor and vanquished alike; second, failing such a settlement, that the non-Continental Great Powers—and in practice this meant the United States and Great Britain—would be ready to employ their military, naval, and financial resources to preserve order on the mainland of Europe. In a word, a state of peace had to be established either by common consent or by competent authority backed by adequate means.

Neither assumption, however, was justified by the event. And the explanation must be sought first in the circumstances of the Great Powers and secondly in the history of the several experiments in peace.

¹ Toynbee, A. J., *The World After the Peace Conference*, 1925.

Chapter XI

GERMANY

Two decades after the World War Germany was, despite defeat in war and unilateral disarmament in peace, potentially the first of the five Great Powers of the European region. In numbers, her population far exceeded that of France, Italy, or Great Britain. In the field of industry her superiority over Russia was great enough, in effect, to counterbalance Slav numbers. As a consequence, in 1939, as at all times since the Settlement of Paris, the question of peace or war in the Old World turned upon the ultimate direction German national policy would take.¹ Germany, therefore, is obviously the nation to be studied first in a survey of the Great Powers of Europe.

¹ The following books dealing with the general aspects of postwar German politics will prove useful for reference: Clark, R. T., *The Fall of the German Republic*, 1935; Dawson, W. H., *Germany under the Peace Treaty*, 1933; Hitler, Adolf, *Mein Kampf* (unauthorized edition), 1939; Hoetzsch, Otto, *Germany's Domestic and Foreign Policies*, 1929; Koch-Weser, E. F. L., *Germany in the Post-War World*, 1930; Kühlmann, Richard von, *Thoughts on Germany*, 1932; Lichtenberger, Henri, *The Third Reich*, 1937; Luehr, Elmer, *The New German Republic*, 1929; Mowat, R. B., *Europe in Crisis: The Political Drama in Western Europe*, 1936; Rosenberg, Arthur, *The Birth of the German Republic*, 1931; same author, *History of the German Republic 1918-1930*, 1936; Schuman, Frederick L., *The Nazi Dictatorship*, 1935; Snyder, Louis L., *From Bismarck to Hitler*, 1935.

In the examination of her national policy it is obvious that consideration must be given to the geographic, economic, demographic, and strategic aspects of the German situation;¹ for upon these turn the questions of security, prosperity, and ethnic unity, the major objectives of her national policies.

Geographically, the German situation is the simplest in that, alone among the Great Powers of Europe, her territory is completely restricted to that Continent. Her central location, moreover, gives rise to a problem of security as old as history; for now, as always, the position of the Germans brings them into collision with the Latin in the West and the Slav in the East.²

In its contemporary form that struggle reverts to the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) on the Rhine and to the three Partitions of Poland on the Vistula.³ Beyond these events, too, the Franco-German dispute goes back to the Treaty of Verdun which in the ninth century established the frontiers of the original German Reich at the Meuse.⁴ Polish-Prussian conflict, in its turn, goes back to the thirteenth and fourteenth century adventures of the Teutonic Knights.

¹ Diesel, Eugen, *Germany and the Germans*, 1931.

² "Germany's central position in the heart of Europe is chiefly responsible for the disastrous reverses which have been so frequent in her history. They have balked her progress at every step, nipped every growing bud, doomed every hopeful development to a tragic ending. No one ever recognized this more clearly than did Bismarck himself. He saw that owing to her central position Germany might at any moment be endangered and overwhelmed by powerful coalitions, and the thought cost him many sleepless nights. The *cauchemar des coalitions* with which a Russian diplomat once teased the Prince was anything but an imaginary nightmare. It was his clear realization, based on history and experience, of the fact that a terrible danger continually hung over Germany's head. Viewed in this light, the foreign policy of the great chancellor, which sometimes seemed so complicated, becomes astonishingly clear and lucid." (Article by Richard von Kühlmann, Council on Foreign Relations, *Permanent Bases of Foreign Policy*, 1931, pp. 63-64.)

³ Poland was partitioned in 1772, 1791, and 1793 by Germany, Russia, and Austria.

⁴ Haller, Johannes, *France and Germany, the History of One Thousand Years*, 1932.

At the outbreak of the World War Germany was fortunately situated on both frontiers. The Congress of Vienna a century before, by finally extinguishing Polish independence, had given Prussia the control of the lower Vistula. From Thorn north to the Baltic the Germans had doubled this natural line of defense by the fortresses of Danzig, Graudenz, and Thorn. In the gap between the lower Vistula and the upper Oder they had constructed the fortress of Posen. From Breslau to the Austrian frontier the Oder covered Germany, while Cracow, in the hands of an ally, Austria-Hungary, anchored that line.

Relying upon the strength of this eastern system of defense, Germany in 1914 had sent all but a handful of her army to the western front. Nor had her judgment been mistaken, for the Russian invasion was broken at Tannenberg in the fourth week of the war (August 26, 1914), even before it reached the Vistula. In the south, too, Cracow had never been seriously menaced, and after the victory of the Dunajec in May, 1915, the Russian "steam roller" disappeared behind the Niemen and the Pripet marshes.

In the west the Treaty of Frankfort (1871) had bestowed similar strategic advantages upon the Germans. At Metz and Thionville, they commanded and covered the Moselle; at Strasbourg and Molsheim, the Rhine. Alsace, too, was further protected by the Vosges, and a French attempt to penetrate between Strasbourg and Metz had been broken in the great victory of Morhange-Sarrebourg in August, 1914. Thereafter the German defense system in the west was never seriously challenged, although American troops were within range of the outer forts of Metz at the moment of the Armistice.

The strength of her frontiers alike in the east and in the west had bestowed upon Germany the priceless advantage of the offensive in August, 1914. As a consequence, she was able to undertake her great turning movement through Belgium, prescribed by the famous Schlieffen Plan. Although by the narrowest margin victory escaped her in the Battle of the Marne, Germany was able to fight on French and Belgian soil to the end of the war. Thus the early successes due to the natural strength of her western frontier spared her the horrors of invasion and the consequent devastation incident to modern warfare.

East and west alike, however, the Treaty of Versailles stripped the Germans of all of the advantages of their position in 1914. In the west, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France cost them Metz-Thionville and Strasbourg-Molsheim. It also opened to the French their old avenues of invasion down the Moselle to the Rhineland, into the Palatinate by the left bank of the Rhine, and into South Germany by the right. When, also, the French presently constructed their Maginot line of steel and concrete between the Rhine and the Moselle,¹ the Germans were faced with the fact that another war with France, unlike the last, would begin on German soil.

Finally, although the French were unsuccessful in their efforts to gain permanent occupation of the whole of the left bank of the Rhine from Alsace to the Netherlands, they were able to write into the Treaty of Versailles provisions creating a demilitarized zone west of that river, imposing the demolition of the existing fortifications on both of its banks, and forbidding their

¹ See map in Chapter XII, pp. 242-243.

reconstruction.¹ Strategically, therefore, Germany was thrown back east of the Rhine, and her territories to the west were certain to become the No Man's Land of the next conflict.

In the east, the transformation was equally complete and disastrous, for the restoration of Poland deprived Germany both of the lower Vistula and of the fortress of Posen. The fortifications of Danzig were dismantled, and the city and its suburbs erected into a Free State; Graudenz and Thorn passed to Poland; Posen, which had covered Berlin from Slav invasion, now protected Warsaw from German attack; and the Polish frontiers were advanced to within a hundred miles of the German capital at Berlin. Finally, while Breslau was left to Germany, Upper Silesia and Cracow passed to Poland.

Thus Germany was thrown back behind the Oder in the east, as she had been thrust back behind the Rhine in the west, East Prussia was cut off from the Reich by the Polish Corridor, and all Germany beyond the Oder was exposed to invasion upon the declaration of war. Last of all, an alliance between Poland and France,² and a similar partnership between France and Czechoslovakia³ soon suggested that the next war, unlike the last, would be a war on three fronts. For not only had the Austrian ally vanished, but also a new foe had risen in the south, and strategically this was hardest of all the blows struck against German security by the Paris Settlement.

Bismarck had once observed that the possessor of Bohemia held the two keys to Germany. And now these keys had been placed in the hands of a new Czecho-

¹ Articles 42, 43 and 180 of the Treaty of Versailles; also see Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-23, 1925.

² Signed on February 19, 1921.

³ Signed on January 25, 1924.

slovak state which promptly allied itself with France. From the Bohemian plateau Czech armies, borrowing the passes which had been famous in the wars of Frederick the Great,¹ could arrive in the Silesian plain and, joining hands with the Poles above or below Breslau, open for them a safe passage of the Oder and a clear road to Berlin. In the same way, moving west along the valley of the Main, they could join hands with the French at Frankfort, opening for them the passage of the Rhine and isolating South Germany from North.

Finally, Czech troops descending the Elbe could reach Leipzig and Dresden, which were unfortified, and beyond them penetrate to the very heart of Germany, following the roads employed by Tilly and Wallenstein in the Thirty Years War. Berlin had thus become a frontier town and an equally vulnerable target for Polish and for Czech aircraft, which could easily be reinforced by French.

Given the new strategic situation of Germany, it was evident that her security could be assured only as she was allowed to maintain a military establishment of no inconsiderable dimensions.² Such the Peace Treaty denied her, however, and instead she was permitted a professional army of but 100,000 with which to oppose French, Polish, Czech, and Belgian trained forces together totaling over a million. And while the reserves of her prospective opponents exceeded six millions, she was forbidden to train any. Finally, while the material of Germany's diminutive army was rigidly limited,³ France strained the resources of her industry and finances in the equipment of her forces and those of her allies.

¹ Seven Years War between Austria and Prussia, 1756-1763.

² Rohde, Hans, *Franco-German Factors of Power*, 1932.

³ Articles 160-180 of the Treaty of Versailles.

By 1932, when the Disarmament Conference assembled in Geneva, it was not to be doubted that actually, if illegally, Germany had armed far beyond the limits prescribed by the Treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless the fact remained that the victorious nations, so far as lay within their power, had abolished German security and thereafter striven to keep her helpless. What she demanded as a matter of right, she had attained only by evasion. Nor, in her strategic position, did her demand for military parity with France¹ go beyond the limits of what was reasonable.

Since the Germans are a military people, they had become acutely and even morbidly aware of their weakness as dictated by the Treaty of Versailles. The lessons of national history emphasized the significance of their present frontiers. The experiences of millions in the still recent war illustrated the meaning of invasion assured by the exiguity of their effectives. Continued denial of the demand for equality in means of self-defense, therefore, inevitably seemed the expression of a deliberate purpose to keep the German people forever helpless politically by holding over their heads the continuing menace of invasion. And on that issue Germany, in the autumn of 1933, quit the League of Nations.

In response to the desires of the German people, their Republic in its last years had resorted to the policy of secret rearmament. Hitler, in the Third Reich, simply continued that policy, but at a greater speed and with less secrecy. When Brown Shirts and Black Shirts marched everywhere and workers shouldered their spades to parade in formation, all Europe saw and under-

¹ For text of German Arms Equality Memorandum, see *New York Times*, September 7, 1932; also Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *International Conciliation*, No. 285, December, 1932.

stood. Then in March, 1935, Hitler announced publicly the death of the disarmament clause of the Versailles Treaty, and for the first time since the war Germany openly displayed her military might.

Having achieved a high degree of armed strength, Germany's next move was to seize the opportunity for the reinforcement of her frontier position. On March 7, 1936, while the European world was distracted by Mussolini's African adventure and the French position was weakened by internal political dissensions, German troops reoccupied the Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Pacts of Locarno. This well-timed stroke produced conflicting repercussions, as French and British counsels were then divided over collective responsibilities against Italy. Thus the remilitarization and fortification of the German frontiers in both the east and the west was safely inaugurated at a time when Europe and the collective system were helpless to oppose this last step in German assertion of full sovereign rights over the territory of the Fatherland.

Despite the intensity of her rearmament program, however, Germany could not surpass the combined strength of her numerous and wealthy neighbors, nor could any amount of refortification restore the prewar advantages of her frontier position. True it was that revival of power in Germany, which ended the danger of a preventive war against her, left her free once more to do as she desired on her own soil. But the array of military, economic, and financial strength possessed by states openly coalescing to forestall possible German aggression, appeared insurmountable. Furthermore, the effort to put industry and agriculture on a war basis through the Four-Year Plan, introduced in the fall of

1936, did not promise to bring the war power of the regimented German people up to that of the combined strength of the neighboring states ready to oppose them.

In the summer of 1937, then, Germany found herself militarily secure against unprovoked attack, so long as her expansionist talk at home was not converted into violent action abroad. How did she stand in the matter of prosperity, or economic well-being, the second objective of her national policies? What was her situation in respect to economic self-sufficiency, foreign trade, and population pressure, the three determining factors?

For Germany there could, of course, be no question of self-sufficiency on the American scale. Much less was there any possibility of autarky through the Four-Year Plan, despite the vain boasts of the extreme Nazis, and the "cannon instead of butter" slogan of Herman Göring, who had replaced Hjalmar Schacht in 1936 as the economic dictator of the Third Reich. At most she could hardly produce at home and sell abroad enough to acquire the foodstuffs and raw materials necessary for national life and industrial activity.¹

¹ For a recent brief analysis of the economic position of Germany, see: Foreign Policy Association, "The German Economic Dilemma," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1937; and for general studies, see: Angell, J. W., *The Recovery of Germany*, 1932; Brady, R. A., *The Rationalization Movement in German Industry*, 1933; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The Present Economic State of Germany," *International Conciliation* No. 279, 1932; Douglass, P. F., *The Economic Dilemma of Politics*, 1932; Einzig, Paul, *Germany's Default: The Economics of Hitlerism*, 1934; Ellis, Howard S., *German Monetary Theory, 1905-1933*, 1934; Foreign Policy Association, "Economic Structure of the Third Reich," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. X, No. 15, 1934; "German Trade Drive in Southeastern Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 17, 1936; "Germany's Trend Toward Economic Isolation," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. X, No. 18, 1934; "Germany's Controlled Economy," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIV, No. 24, 1939; Harris, C. R. S., *Germany's Foreign Indebtedness*, 1935; Rawlins, E. C. Donaldson, *Economic Conditions in Germany to March, 1936*, 1936; Reichskredit Gesellschaft, "Germany's Economic Situation at the Turn of 1938-1939"; Schmidt, C. T., *German Business Cycles*, 1934; Simpson, Kemper, *Introduction to World Economics*, 1934; Trivanto-vitch, Vaso, *Economic Development of Germany under National Socialism*, 1937.

Here, too, Germany suffered severely through the Peace Treaty. The enforced return of Alsace-Lorraine to France deprived her of the enormous reserves of iron which had been one of the foundations of her great industrial development after 1871. Actually, it had been the marriage of the coal of the Ruhr with the iron of Lorraine which had enabled the Germany of William II to outdistance the Great Britain of Edward VII in the field of heavy industry.

With the return of Lorraine to France, therefore, Germany was left disastrously crippled. Coal she still possessed in exportable quantities, but the cession of Upper Silesia to Poland cost her the Polish market and in addition forced her to face Polish competition in other European markets. In the same fashion the temporary transfer of the Saar mines to French ownership, until their return to Germany by the overwhelming plebiscite of January, 1935,¹ long deprived her of the chance to exchange coal for French iron.

Impressive, too, was German poverty in all of the essential raw materials of industry save coal. Iron ore, petroleum, copper, lead, cotton, rubber, manganese, nickel, wool, and tin, all had wholly or in large part to be purchased abroad. And of raw materials to sell, Germany had only coal, potash, and nitrates. As to coal, the competition was sharp and the market contracting. As to potash, with the loss of Alsace she had lost her prewar monopoly, and French postwar competition was keen. Finally, for nitrates the market was narrow and overflowed.

There remained the great resources of chemicals and machinery. But the war had also broken German chem-


¹ Over 90 per cent of the registered vote favored return to the German Reich.

GERMANY




NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOODSTUFFS, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, AND RAW MATERIALS

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND NET IMPORTS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES OF
AVERAGE NATIONAL CONSUMPTION (1925-29)

— GREAT ESSENTIALS —



CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS



■ PRODUCTION
▨ NET IMPORTS
● EXPORTABLE SURPLUS

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ical monopoly by forcing her to part with her patent rights and by compelling other countries, deprived of German supplies during the war years, to develop their own manufactures. In machinery, too, postwar competition was keen, and by reason of political events the Russian market, by all odds the most important, became severely restricted.

In the field of foodstuffs, the Treaty of Paris had wrought further havoc in a situation already weak. In Alsace-Lorraine and Posen, the Reich had lost to France and Poland two of her most productive areas. Still able to raise 80 per cent of her food, postwar Germany nevertheless found herself short in fats, the want of which had been disastrous during the war. Coffee, tobacco, and many other things were similarly lacking. Finally, in stripping Germany of all of her colonies, the victors had deprived her of a precious if relatively small source of tropical oils and fruits and a growing tariff-free market for German products.

With the spread of economic nationalism, moreover, the inherent weakness of the German situation became more and more apparent. That weakness, too, was aggravated by the Jewish boycott, which although in itself a slight affair, in the depths of the Great Depression came near to constituting the last straw. Since, in 1937, world trade had revived in little besides raw materials and manufactured products for armaments and munitions, foreign observers agreed in comparing the situation in the Reich to that which had prevailed as a consequence of the blockade during the World War.

Intact the German industrial machine still was. German technical skill, organization, and science were undiminished. The ship was seaworthy but the sea itself

had gone dry and German prosperity visibly waited on the turn of the tide. And in this period of crisis, Germany for the first time disclosed clear evidence of population pressure, revealed by an unmistakable decline in the national standard of living.

In this respect, German statistics were illuminating. In 1910 the total population, living on an area of 212,000 square miles, had been 65,000,000. About twenty-five years later, despite the war, it had increased by two million, although the area had diminished by 30,000 square miles. In the forty years between 1871 and 1911 German numbers had expanded by not less than 25,000,000. That increase, almost exclusively urban, had been based not upon the expansion in the productivity of German soil, but upon the growth of German foreign trade. And now, under the influence of economic nationalism, that trade was drying up. At home the mouths remained to be fed, but abroad the work of the hands was unsalable in sufficient quantities.

By the German people both lack of security and loss of prosperity were charged to the character of the Treaty of Versailles. In their minds, their miseries and misfortunes had originated in the deliberate design of their conquerors, first to strip them of their well-being and then to keep them forever helpless and hapless. As they saw it, therefore, the German Revolution of 1933 was a rebellion against the consequences of the Peace Treaty. Actually, however, it was an instinctive uprising against, not a territorial, but an economic status quo, which was only in small part due to the decisions of Versailles.

Nations as well as armies advance or retreat on their stomachs. Before the war Germany had followed the

British example of abandoning agricultural self-sufficiency for greater industrial development and so became then, as she is today, the only Great Power which in emergency cannot feed itself or maintain intact communications with foreign sources of supply. It was for this reason that the food blockade maintained by the British fleet forced Germany into the Armistice and then its continuance for six months after the end of the war starved Germany into accepting the Versailles Treaty.

After the war the high tariff movement led by France and the United States, well-fed nations, greatly restricted Germany's sale of the products of her labor, thereby reducing her to part-time work. Germany asked for work relief in the form of lowered tariffs, but American and British loans provided direct relief instead, so that Germany did not go hungry. Then when the first chill blast of the Great Depression stopped foreign loans and froze foreign credits, and the new series of trade barriers, led by the American Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930, combined to reduce Germany's work and relief at the same time, the German people forsook the blessings of democracy for Nazi dictatorship.

Hitler carried out his promises by repudiating every remaining provision of the Versailles treaty regulating the internal administration of Germany. Of territorial issues, except for intermittent flurries over Memel and Danzig,¹ the return of the lost African colonies dominated official Nazi revisionist efforts in 1933-1937. Colonies have been demanded in the name of International Justice, as a source of raw materials, as markets for German goods, as an outlet for German colonists, and as a

¹ Foreign Policy Association, "The Nazification of Danzig," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 6, 1936.

means of disproving the charge made at Versailles that the Germans were unfit for colonial responsibilities.¹

Meanwhile, the strain of economic nationalism had brought Germany closer to the time when she must either expand, explode, or trade. Some vague offers of financial aid—relief without work—in return for promises not to expand, had been made by France and Britain, to which the German press replied that Germany would not give up its “political freedom” for a “mess of pottage.” By the summer of 1937, however, it was evident that the well-fed nations were preparing for an armistice in the world economic war, with some promise of alleviating Germany’s plight.

The suppression of the Polish Corridor, the return of Upper Silesia, even the union of the Reich and the Austrian Republic would not have provided considerable supplies of the essential raw materials which were lacking or the additional markets that were needed. Not even the return of the colonies, so passionately demanded, could do that.² It was not lost provinces but lost markets which were the secret of Germany’s contemporary desperation, and for this Austrian *Anschluss* was of as

¹ Herr von Ribbentrop, speaking at the Leipzig Fair on March 1, 1937, said: “Germany claims a fundamental right to colonial possessions just as every nation in the world, even the smallest, has this right. She therefore repudiates all arguments which deny this right to her . . . the question of raw materials, i.e. the necessity for Germany to possess territories where she can develop sources of raw materials by means of her own German currency and from which she can buy raw materials for the supply of the German industries and pay for them in her own currency. Today it is true that Germany has access to the world’s sources of raw materials, but only if she pays for them in foreign currency, of which we have not a sufficient quantity.”


² Herr von Ribbentrop, in advocating the return of German colonies when speaking at the Leipzig Fair, March 1, 1937, said: “Quite apart from the fact that every colony in itself must in case of war be considered lost for Germany, the recently signed naval agreement between Germany and Great Britain is certainly the best and most practical proof against such contentions. I remind you in this connection of the German Chancellor’s declaration that the possession of colonies would not imply any change in the German naval demands.”

GERMAN TERRITORIAL LOSSES IN THE WORLD WAR

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little avail as Jewish pogroms, hot or cold. But of one fact there could be no question: by 1938 Germany was even less prosperous than she was secure, and, on both counts, her national policy was therefore dynamic.

There remains the question of unity.¹ Back of the principle of self-determination, there had existed in Wilson's mind the purpose to avoid the errors of the Treaty of Frankfort in making that of Versailles. How had it worked out? By the Treaty of Versailles something more than six and a half millions of people, ten per cent of her total population, had been taken from Germany. Of these, four millions had gone to Poland, a million and three quarters to France, and the balance had been distributed to Denmark, Belgium, and Lithuania. Germany's loss in 1919 was thus four times as great as that of France in 1871.

Of the six and a half millions thus lost, however, not less than two and a half were Polish and another one and a half were the Alsatian and French survivors and descendants of those who had protested against German annexation after the Franco-Prussian War. In addition, the population of Schleswig had by plebiscite voted overwhelmingly for reunion with Denmark. By 1938, too, there remained of the one and a half millions of Germans who had been assigned to Poland in 1919 only about three hundred and fifty thousand living in the midst of twelve times as many Poles, the rest having taken the road to exile.

Actually, therefore, by 1938 the question of ethnic unity, for Germany, posed by the Settlement of Paris, came down to the issue of the three hundred and fifty

¹ For an ethnic map illustrating the distribution of the Germans in Europe, see Chapter V, pages 108-109.

thousand Germans living in the Danzig Free State. Beyond that was the problem of security for two and a quarter millions more living beyond the Polish Corridor in East Prussia under German sovereignty. But here the issue was territorial and strategic rather than ethnic, for to suppress the Corridor and to recover Danzig as well, would liberate no more than half a million Germans at the price of re-establishing a Polish minority of far greater size. In fact, apart from the three hundred and fifty thousand Germans of Danzig, whose sentiment was for return to the Fatherland though their pocketbooks depended largely on Poland, there was nowhere, east or west, on the Vistula or on the Rhine, a German minority in the true sense of the word, whose existence was to be charged against the Treaty of Versailles.¹

By contrast, to the south, in the Austrian half of the old Hapsburg Monarchy there were now ten and a half millions of Germans—seven millions in Austria and three and a half in Czechoslovakia. These constituted the real German minority, and to join them to the Reich was the true problem of national and ethnic unity. But these ten millions had not been German subjects before 1914 nor had they, after 1919, been separated from the Reich as a consequence of the Treaty of Versailles. At most, that treaty had forbidden their union with the German Republic.

What, then, was the real situation of Germany early in the year 1938? From a prewar situation of great

¹ Although by their Nonaggression Pact signed January 26, 1934, Poland and Germany agreed to a temporary truce, the problem of the Corridor still remained unsettled and therefore dangerous. (For the text of the German-Polish Declaration see Appendix J.) The following books dealing with various aspects of the question may be used for reference: Donald, Sir Robert, *The Polish Corridor and the Consequences*, 1929; Hamel, J. A. van, *Danzig and the Polish Problem*, 1933; Foreign Policy Association, "German-Polish Disputes: Danzig, the Polish Corridor and East Prussia," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. IX, No. 9, 1933; Martel, René, *The Eastern Frontiers of Germany*, 1930; Smogorzewski, Casimir, *Poland, Germany and the Corridor*, 1930.

strength she had sunk into a fifteen-year period of military weakness unparalleled by that of any Great Power in modern times. During that time the primary goal of Germany, seeking security, was to rid herself of the unilateral disarmament imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and to abolish the demilitarized zones. Those objectives were to be realized, however, only with the arrival of the Third Reich. By 1938, rearmament and remilitarization of all borders, backed by superiority of numbers and of industrial development, assured Germany of security east and west. Her naval strength, too, was sufficient to control the Baltic and to repel any possible invasion from the North Sea.¹ Her southern front, furthermore, was covered by the Alps of Switzerland and Austria. The probability of any country or coalition of countries either attacking or invading her territory was thus greatly diminished unless Germany took the offensive. In short, German strength had been sufficiently restored to be respected, provided it were not used as an open threat to her neighbors.

To recover Alsace-Lorraine and to achieve a new partition of Poland, the sole means by which she could recover her old strategic position of 1914, was beyond immediate German military resources. British commitments still covered France, and the French alliance protected Poland and Czechoslovakia. Beyond the Vistula and the Niemen, moreover, a new and formidable Soviet Russia, allied to France, was rising, openly resolved to defend the status quo in the east against German attack.

¹ The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, limited the strength of the German navy to 35 per cent of that of Great Britain in surface ships and 45 per cent in submarines. The British, in signing this pact, gave a fatal blow to the Stresa Front erected in April of 1935 by France, Italy, and Great Britain as an answer to German rearmament.

The Russian position was further fortified by the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Czechoslovakia, signed in 1935, which was made contingent upon the operation of the Franco-Soviet Security Pact signed in the same year.

For the present, therefore, the limit of the possible in security for Germany, alike on her eastern and western frontiers, was continued rearmament and reconstruction of her frontier fortifications. The strategic importance of political arrangements guaranteeing Germany's western frontier had been recognized by Stresemann in his acceptance of the Locarno Pacts of 1925. Hitler likewise sought the maintenance of the western territorial status quo.¹ Even the reoccupation of the Rhineland he declared to be neither territorial aggression nor a preparation for attack upon France; rather it was the German bolting of the back door so as to insure eventual freedom of action on the eastern front.

In addition, by a nonaggression pact² with Poland, the Reich succeeded in establishing a ten-year truce which was to remain in effect at least until 1943. Finally the Saar³ had been returned to Germany (page 208), and agitation over the small losses of Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium and of Schleswig to Denmark had subsided.

¹ See Hitler's speeches of October 14, 1933, January 30, 1934, and January 30, 1937. In the latter address, the Fuehrer made the following statement: "As to France, Germany has repeatedly and solemnly declared—and I desire to reiterate it here—that between Germany and France there are no humanly conceivable points of dispute and there can be none. The German Government has also assured Belgium and Holland that it is prepared to recognize and guarantee the inviolability of their territories. . . ." (*New York Times*, January 31, 1937.) Also, reference should be made to Foreign Policy Association, "Origins of the Locarno Crisis," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 7, 1936.

² For text of the German-Polish Declaration, see Appendix J.

³ The final plan for the settlement of the Saar question, approved by the Council of the League, provided for the plebiscite of January 13, 1935. For text of the Franco-German agreement, of December 3, 1934, see *New York Times* of December 6, 1934.

What, then, was left of the Versailles Treaty against which the German people rebelled?¹ The armies of occupation were gone, reparations² and unilateral disarmament were dead, and the question of the Polish Corridor had been adjourned on German proposal for several years. That this last question might reappear when Germany was prepared to meet it, was not to be denied. The truce with Poland was a truce of necessity and not of reconciliation. But at least it constituted a recognition by Germany that the restoration of Poland was a permanent fact. The notion of the "season state" had disappeared. A new partition had become impossible. What remained was at most a boundary dispute.

Security, therefore, had been temporarily assured by the restoration of German armaments; if by security is meant the ability of a nation to strike back effectively under duress. There remained, however, the question of prosperity. How was it to be recovered under the triple burden of an armaments race, the collapse of German foreign credit, and the continuance of trade barriers?

So far as prosperity might be served by the recovery of old colonies or by the acquisition of new, the road was evidently blocked. Nor was the prospect much brighter of any reversal of the contemporary decision of all peoples, equally dominated by the spirit of economic nationalism, to seek domestic self-sufficiency at the cost of international trade. Here also the way was barred.

¹ A proclamation by Chancellor Hitler September 9, 1936, said: "Our greatest achievement is that we have broken the last shackles of Versailles and re-established our supremacy in the Rhineland."

² Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The Final Settlement of the Reparations Problems Growing Out of the World War," *International Conciliation*, No. 262, September, 1930; Heinecke, Gunther-Erfrid, *No More Reparations*, 1932; McFadyen, Sir Andrew, *Reparation Reviewed*, 1930; Schacht, Hjalmar, *The End of Reparations*, 1931.

In only one direction did there appear a way, and that way led to ethnic unity as well as to economic well-being. It was not an unknown pathway, for already in the prewar days Germany had heard with enthusiasm the slogan "Berlin-to-Bagdad." That dream, like so many others, had died with the war, but not until after German arms had, for a brief moment, opened this avenue of empire from end to end. Before the war, too, the necessity of maintaining the Hapsburg ally had put official restraint on the ambitions of the Pan-Germans. But now Hapsburg dynasty and empire had alike vanished and, at least in 1918, the ten millions of Germans of Austria had sought union with the Reich.

In southeastward expansion, also, there was clear promise of prosperity, for in the Danubian Basin the agrarian states of Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Rumania were natural markets for German manufactures, while in the Reich their foodstuffs and raw materials would find ready sale. An economic Mittel-europa extending from Hamburg to Istanbul would unmistakably have the possibility of becoming a relatively self-sufficient and materially prosperous unit. Here, too, was a region undeveloped, possessing beyond the Danube and the Drava resources as yet not even fully explored.

In that vast Danubian Basin political chaos and ethnic feuds continued. French policy operating through the Little Entente, and Italian policy working similarly through Hungary, Austria, and Bulgaria, had prevented all progress. But France, able to provide money but not markets, and Italy, lacking money and having but a restricted market to offer, had similarly failed to establish a new system of order to replace that of the vanished Austro-Hungarian Empire. Only Germany could offer

the markets and repay in manufactures necessary to all these countries.

To include the ten millions of Germans of Austria and Czechoslovakia within the Third Reich would be to restore in large part the historic German Empire—"The Holy Roman Empire"—the memory of which had never disappeared from the German mind. It would bestow upon the most powerful of all European peoples the blessing of ethnic unity now enjoyed by nearly all other peoples, great and small. For such an empire, having within its frontiers not less than seventy-five millions of Germans, the question of security could hardly arise.

The keys to Vienna, moreover, were the keys to the gateway of the Near East. To the realization of this grandiose conception, union with Austria—*Anschluss* (page 225)—was the first step. Even before the National Socialist revolution the Republic of Brüning, under the coercion of the rising tide of nationalism, had sought to begin that first step by establishing an Austro-German Tariff Union, the agreement of which was made public on March 28, 1931. The attempt had been blocked by French money which had compelled Austrian abandonment of the project, a policy which was immediately upheld by the advisory opinion of the French-controlled World Court. In that campaign Italy had stood with France.¹

Three years later, following the arrival of Hitler, another more drastic step was taken. The organization of an Austrian Nazi movement under the auspices of the Third Reich culminated in the July *Putsch* of 1934, in

¹ American Foundation, *The World Court's Advisory Opinion on the Austro-German Customs Union Case*, 1931; Argus, pseud., *The Economic Aspect of the Austro-German Customs Union*, 1931; Bitterman, M., *Austria and the Customs Union*, 1931; Einzig, Paul, *Behind the Scenes of International Finance*, 1931; Kleinwächter, F. F. G., *Self-Determination for Austria*, 1929.

which the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered.¹ This second bid for Austro-German union was, like the first, promptly defeated, in this instance through the hasty mobilization of Italian troops at the Brenner Pass.

Thenceforth Austria was to become the center of the Berlin-Rome axis. It was the policy of Dr. Schuschnigg, the successor of Dollfuss, to assure Austrian survival through playing one side against the other in Italo-German machination.² With the dismissal of Prince Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor, in June, 1936, and the dissolution of his Italian-subsidized troops, the Heimwehr, in the following October, and with the signing of the Austro-German agreement of July, 1936, and German recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia two weeks later, Austrian independence and the Rome-Berlin front were given a new though tenuous extension of life.

Three times within a quarter of a century, therefore, under the Empire, the Republic, and the National Socialist Dictatorship, German policy had with consistency turned to the southeast. National strategy had thus identified the Danubian front as the single point at which it might be possible to break through the circle within which Germany is restricted to circumstances incommensurate not only with her aspirations but with her necessities as well. Since, however, Europe saw in the German purpose the disclosure of an historic threat to the balance of power, and identified in the German program in the Danubian Basin the prospectus of a new hegemony, contemporary Austria and, with her,

¹ Gregory, J. D., *Dollfuss and His Times*, 1935.

² Schacher, Gerhard, *Central Europe and the Western World*, 1936; Foreign Policy Association, "Austria Establishes a Fascist State," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XI, No. 15, 1935.

ANSCHLUSS



Czechoslovakia¹ promised to become what Belgium had been in the far-off days of French greatness, the "cock-pit" of Europe.²

German national policy, then, eighteen years after the Paris Peace Conference, was dynamic. The German people had overthrown a republican regime which, in their minds, was a symbol of defeat in war and of humiliation in peace, as the French, for the same reason, had dismissed the Bourbons fifteen years after Waterloo.

To understand German national policy, as indeed to comprehend that of any great people, it is essential to grasp the psychological factor. Otherwise that policy, viewed in the abstract, frequently appears inexplicable and even irrational. In the German situation this psychological factor is of dominating importance, for by 1933, when the National Socialist revolution intervened, the German problem had become pathological even more than political.³

During the four years of the World War, the Germans had been completely isolated from the world and insulated from the public opinion of the Allied nations. At the close of the war, although exhausted and defeated, they had identified in the intervention of Woodrow Wilson and in the language of his Fourteen Points and his

¹ Krofta, Kamil, *Czechoslovakia and the Crisis of Collective Security*, 1936; Moravec, Colonel Emanuel, *The Strategic Importance of Czechoslovakia for Western Europe*, 1936; Papousek, Jaroslav, *Czechoslovakia, Soviet Russia and Germany*, 1936.

² Armstrong, H. F., *Europe Between Wars?*, 1934; Balla, V. de, *The New Balance of Power in Europe*, 1932; Foreign Policy Association, "The Dangerous Year," by R. L. Buell, *Foreign Policy Pamphlets*, No. 2, 1936; and "Chaos or Reconstruction," same author, *Foreign Policy Pamphlets*, No. 3, 1937; Simonds, F. H., *Can Europe Keep the Peace?*, 1934, rev. ed.; Sforza, Count Carlo, *Europe and Europeans*, 1936.

³ Armstrong, H. F., *Hitler's Reich*, 1933; Lichtenberger, Henri, *The Third Reich*, 1937; Moore, W. G., *France and Germany; A Study of National Character and Opinion*, 1932; Roberts, Stephen H., *The House That Hitler Built*, 1938; Schuman, F. L., *The Nazi Dictatorship*, 1935; Shuster, G. N., *The Germans; an Inquiry and an Estimate*, 1932; Spengler, Oswald, *The Hour of Decision*, 1934.

later pronouncements¹ the promise both of reasonable peace terms and of rapid reconciliation with their recent foes. And at the moment of the Armistice, the German people were utterly unaware of the judgment their enemies had passed alike upon their mentality and upon their morals during their isolation.

When, however, the barriers were at last lifted, they suddenly discovered themselves to be counted a guilty people and commonly described as "Huns" and "Boches." At the Paris Conference they were denied any semblance of the treatment accorded to France at the Congress of Vienna. Instead, they were summoned to Versailles like criminals and there sentenced without ever having been permitted the ordinary justice of their day in court.²

In the Treaty of Versailles, too, the German people discovered no equitable or fair fulfillment of the promise of Wilson's proposals. On the contrary, while professing the idealism of a New World, the Allies had reverted to the Roman example to make another Punic Peace. The reparations clauses of the treaty condemned the Germans to the condition of a tribute-paying nation. The provisions which imposed perpetual unilateral disarmament reduced them to the circumstances of a defenseless people. The territorial decisions definitely shattered their unity.

Germania delenda est—that, for the German people, was the meaning of the Treaty of Versailles, and against its terms they rebelled as Germans. Revision became henceforth the fixed, enduring, immutable purpose of the nation and the policy of the successive Governments. But since a disarmed and occupied Reich was too weak to

¹ Wilson's great principle of the self-determination of peoples, and of government resting on the consent of the governed, was set forth in many addresses.

² Schiff, Victor, *The Germans at Versailles*, 1930.

challenge the "*Diktat*" of Versailles directly, these Governments resorted to indirection.

When, however, the Cuno Cabinet undertook to evade the reparations payments, France occupied the Ruhr.¹ When the Brüning Government endeavored to circumvent the prohibition of the *Anschluss* by framing an Austro-German Tariff Union Pact, French financial coercion swiftly brought Vienna to its knees and Berlin to terms. When the National Socialist Revolution swept Hitler to power in January of 1933 his demand for equality in the means of self-defense was repulsed as that of Brüning and of von Papen had been before.

The occupation of the Ruhr had wrecked the German middle class by precipitating the period of inflation, and prepared the way for the Hitler Revolution. The French financial coercion of Austria set in motion the stream of events which produced the financial crash of 1931 in the Reich and made the revolution inevitable. But the revolution itself resulted in the moral isolation of the Reich and exposed it instantly to the peril of a war of prevention precipitated by France and her allies.

In 1925 the Germans had, with grave misgivings, followed Stresemann to Geneva. Because the League was the child of the Paris Conference, and because also it had sanctioned the partition of Silesia despite the results of the plebiscite, the Germans had suspected it as the Trojan Horse of Allied diplomatic strategy. But to Geneva they came, prepared to make League action in the matter of treaty revision the test of its sincerity, the measure of its idealistic nature. And when even the right to self-defense was denied, the German people followed Hitler out of the League, disillusioned and disgusted.

¹ January, 1923, to August, 1925.

Meanwhile the circumstances of the National Socialist Revolution, the persecution of the Jews, the revival by the "Nazis" of the most preposterous of the territorial pretensions of the Pan-Germans of the prewar era, the renewal by new voices of the most absurd of the old bellicosities of Potsdam, though they could present no problem to the alienist, threw European statesmen into a panic. Actually these manifestations were no more than the symptoms of violence inseparable from the delusion of persecution. But they armed France and her allies with obvious justification for denying to Hitler what, with dubious warrant, they had refused to Stresemann and Brüning.

Yet to refuse again could only serve to fortify the sense of injustice and feed the delusion of persecution which was the foundation of the appeal of the Fuehrer.¹ And while it was easy to explain that condition of collective madness which now existed in the Reich and no more difficult to fix the responsibility for it upon the well-fed nations, France, Great Britain, and the United States, who were both the authors of the Versailles Treaty and the instigators of economic nationalism, it was difficult for those nations to know how to deal with a mad and rearmed people.

For eighteen years, moreover, sixty millions of people had, across their mutilated frontiers and in the midst of inflation, financial disaster, and economic depression, continued to repeat the single word "revision." It had become the be-all and the end-all of popular appraisal of national policy. Such, then, was the psychological factor. And to ignore it is to reduce the German problem

¹ Hitler, Adolf, *My Battle*, 1937. *Führer*, the German word for "Leader" (or *Reichsführer*, for "Realm Leader"), is the title popularly bestowed on Hitler. The equivalent English spelling is Fuehrer.

to limits which render it at once academic and unintelligible.¹

For, to understand the national policy of a Great Power, it is necessary to see into the soul of its people. Deep in the German soul has been the corroding sense of wrongs remediable only by the force of German arms and constituting in themselves the enduring evidence of the relentless purpose of the victors of Versailles.

But this persecution complex, while clearly aggravated by the Versailles Treaty and postwar events, actually is as old as the German people and derives from their geographical position, a circumstance which Hitler has used as the driving force behind the Pan-German dream. Situated in the heart of Europe, Germany is surrounded by more countries than any other Great Power.

In this regard, however, it is important to note that the German peoples, in their historical search for security, have frequently committed the grave error of moving in several directions at once, thus dissipating, sometimes fatally, their own power and undermining their strategic position by driving their neighbors into a united front against them. Previous to the World War, though European concerns remained paramount, Germany's policies produced not only an opposing coalition on the Continent of Europe, but her bid for sea power, for the protection of recently acquired colonies, resulted in the alignment of the British Empire against her.

¹ Banse, Ewald, *Germany Prepares for War*, 1934; Foreign Policy Association, "Revision of the Versailles Treaty," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. V, No. 8, 1929; Foreign Policy Association, "Aims of Hitler's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XI, No. 7, 1935; Foreign Policy Association, "Origins of the Locarno Crisis," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 7, 1936; Heiden, Konrad, *A History of National Socialism*, 1934; Henri, Ernst, *Hitler Over Russia?*, 1936; Hoover, C. B., *Germany Enters the Third Reich*, 1933; Huddleston, Sisley, *War Unless—*, 1933; King, Joseph, *The German Revolution; Its Meaning and Menace*, 1933; Stowe, Leland, *Nazi Means War*, 1934.

Since the rise of Hitler a repetition of a similarly disastrous line of policy appears to be in the making. Having already commenced to overreach herself for the domination of Europe in preparation of imperialistic expansion beyond, Germany has created, under British leadership, the nucleus of a new encirclement of powers which it was her initial purpose to circumvent.

The fundamental principle of German foreign policy continues to reside, therefore, in the necessity of preventing the permanent formation of any overwhelming coalition against her. It was such a coalition that post-war Republican Germany was forced to endure. It was such a coalition that Nazi Germany rose to destroy. The ultimate success of the modern Reich in this regard the future alone can tell, though the circumstances of the present and the immediate past have much to reveal.

For a continuation of the account of Germany, see pages 693ff.

Chapter XII

FRANCE

IF Germany, even in defeat, was still potentially the first among European powers, France in victory was at least temporarily restored to her traditional primacy on the Continent; for when the British and American armies had been demobilized and the German army dissolved, French military superiority was, for the immediate present and in fact as long as the Treaty of Versailles lived, beyond possible challenge.

The power of France, moreover, constituted the decisive factor in European history throughout the decade and a half following the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. The terms of that treaty were such that German recovery was contingent upon their revision, and all revision was impossible without French consent. Responsibility for the nature of the terms was shared by British and American statesmen with the French; but the British and American nations surrendered control of French action in the matter of the application of these terms when they withdrew their armies from the Continent.

Influence upon French policy was similarly lost when the United States Senate declined to ratify the proposed Treaty of Guarantee by which Britain and America were to assure the future security of France against German aggression. That treaty had been proffered to Clemenceau by Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George, in the names of their respective nations, in return for Clemenceau's consent to waive the French claim to permanent occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. When the United States had refused that pledge, therefore, German recovery took on in the eyes of all Frenchmen the color of a threat to the very existence of France.

To the understanding of French policy,¹ moreover, two facts are essential. In the first place, French authority among the Great Powers of Europe is traditional. In the second place, French territorial unification antedated that of all other Continental Powers. And if French power was never fully restored after Waterloo, French prestige enjoyed a brilliant Indian summer during the Third Empire. Nor did the disasters of 1814 and 1815 bring any real impairment of French unity.

The rise of Germany, however, at one blow swept away French influence in Europe and shattered French national unity. The consequences of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, moreover, were enduring; for what had been taken from France seemed in the eyes of her people not territory but a portion of her living flesh. And while the

¹ The following books dealing with the general aspects of French national policy will prove useful for reference: Council on Foreign Relations, *Permanent Bases of Foreign Policy*, Chapter on "France" by Jules Cambon, 1931; Gooch, G. P., *Franco-German Relations, 1871-1914*, 1923; Recouly, Raymond, *De Bismarck à Poincaré*, 1932; Schuman, F. L., *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic*, 1931; Soltau, R. H., *French Parties and Politics, 1871-1930*, 1930; same author, *French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, 1931; Tilley, Arthur, *Modern France*, 1923; Vaucher, Paul, *Post-War France*, 1934; Werth, Alexander, *France in Ferment*, 1935; same author, *Which Way France?*, 1937.

wound to the body was eventually healed by the restoration of the lost provinces in 1918, the injury to the spirit has never yet been undone.

Actually from the day in 1681 when Strasbourg opened its gates to Louis XIV, down to the making of the Treaty of Frankfort in 1871, the eastern frontiers of France had endured substantially unchanged. Lorraine had come peacefully into French possession in 1766; but Metz, Toul, and Verdun, the keys of that province, had already been French since 1552. Together with the rest of France, the people of Alsace and Lorraine had lived the great epic of the French Revolution and the Empire. Two centuries of common association, moreover, had established a unity of spirit to which the people of the annexed districts testified eloquently if fruitlessly in their protest against separation from France.

During the years between the Franco-Prussian War and the World War, the Third Republic had created a French colonial empire second only to the British.¹ In those years, too, the French people had definitely renounced all their traditional ambitions in Europe. Only the recovery of Metz and Strasbourg remained a fixed hope, and even that hope grew fainter year by year as Germany waxed ever more powerful. And when the victory of 1918 restored the historic unity, no other European territorial aspiration survived.

It is true that Marshal Foch, backed by Poincaré, President of the Republic, clamored for the permanent occupation of the left bank of the Rhine, but neither asked for the extension of French political frontiers to

¹ Roberts, S. H., *History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925*, 1929, 2 vols.; Lyautey, Pierre, *L'Organisation de l'Empire Colonial Français*, 1931; Maurois, André, *Lyautey*, 1931; Southworth, Constant, *The French Colonial Adventure*, 1931; Worsfold, W. B., *France in Tunis and Algeria*, 1930.

that limit. Clemenceau also accepted for France a plebiscite to determine the ultimate possession of the Saar Basin. As for the four millions of people of French speech in Belgium and Switzerland, neither Hainaut nor the Pays de Vaud constituted a French irredenta. .

After 1918, then, France again had unity. She also possessed the basic elements of prosperity. Of all the Great Powers of Europe the most nearly self-contained, with the exception of Russia and the British Empire, she was able on her homeland territory to feed her forty-two millions. Though her coal reserves were inadequate, half the iron of Europe was within her frontiers. In an era when barriers to international trade were rising on every hand, this relatively high degree of self-sufficiency was an economic as well as a military asset. Moreover, as a creditor nation, she was confronted by no such problem as faced Germany and Italy in the purchase of those essential raw materials that all three lacked.¹

Again, the French population dependent on these resources for their livelihood was relatively small, and, what is more important, relatively stable. Indeed, in comparison with the neighboring powers, France was underpopulated. Whereas nearly forty millions of English and Welsh lived on little more than fifty thousand square miles of territory, the forty-two millions of France occupied two hundred and twelve thousand. By contrast sixty-five millions of Germans were confined in no more than one hundred and eighty thousand, and forty-two millions of Italians in less than one hundred and twenty thousand square miles of land area.


¹ Einzig, Paul, *The Sterling-Dollar-Franc Tangle*, 1933; same author, *France's Crisis*, 1934; Haig, R. M., *The Public Finances of Post-War France*, 1929; Myers, Margaret G., *Paris as a Financial Center*, 1936; Ogburn, W. F., and Jaffé, William, *The Economic Development of Post-War France*, 1929.

FRANCE




NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOODSTUFFS, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, AND RAW MATERIALS

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND NET IMPORTS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES OF
AVERAGE NATIONAL CONSUMPTION (1925-29)

— GREAT ESSENTIALS —



CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS



■ PRODUCTION
▨ NET IMPORTS
● EXPORTABLE SURPLUS

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Furthermore, while German population annually increased by a third of a million, and Italian by nearly half a million, the French population stood substantially still. Finally, in the French North African colonies, particularly in Morocco, opportunity beckoned to the adventurous and there was still a new frontier to be made good.

The colonial aspect of the French situation will be discussed elsewhere.¹ Here, however, it is necessary to consider it in its relation to the European problem. Thus viewed, it is clear that the possession of a vast colonial empire assured to the French not only a reservoir of recruitment² but also, in a period when economic nationalism was closing the doors of the world to German industry and Italian labor, a constant, if limited market, manifestly destined to grow and not contract with the passing of time.³ And it also bestowed upon French shipping a steady employment in transporting manufactures in one direction and raw materials in the other.⁴

In another respect France was peculiarly fortunate. While unemployment was a chronic postwar problem in Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, it was largely absent in France. When German unemployed numbered more than six million, British three million, and Italian more than one and a half million, despite vast Fascist relief programs, the French *chomeurs* hardly exceeded three hundred and fifty thousand. In the good years there had crowded into France nearly three million immigrants—

¹ See Chapter XXIII.

² Davis, S. C., *Reservoirs of Man*, 1934.

³ In 1932 about 25 per cent of France's total foreign trade was with her colonies and protectorates.

⁴ Ferdinand-Lop, S., *Les Ressources du Domaine Colonial de la France*, 1924; Macstraeci, Noël, *L'Empire Colonial Français Contemporain*, 1931.

Italians, Polish, Spanish, and Belgian.¹ When the depression came, these foreign laborers were largely repatriated and became problems in unemployment, not for France, but for the countries of their origin. Thus France was spared a social problem which in various forms and degrees confronted all three of her neighbors.

In the light of all of these circumstances, security was naturally the dominating concern of French national policy, since economic prosperity had been largely attained. But the problem of security presented two very different aspects, the first constituted by the ordinary problems of national defense determined by geographical circumstances,² and the second by the policies of the neighbors of France considered in the light of history and of their resources to pursue these policies.

As to the geographic aspect of security, the situation is simply told. With the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, France regained Strasbourg and Metz. From the Swiss frontier half way to the Belgian, the Rhine now covered her eastern boundary. Between the Rhine and the old frontiers west of the Moselle a new system of fortifications, the Maginot line, presently closed the routes of invasion by which the elder Moltke's conquering hosts had marched to victory at Gravelotte and Sedan in 1870. The extension of this line through Flanders to the Eng-

¹ Lambert, Charles, *La France et les Étrangers*, 1927.

² "The geographical position of a nation, indeed, is the principal factor conditioning its foreign policy—the principal reason why it must have a foreign policy at all. . . .

"France, like England, has sought through the centuries to realize her destiny; but, while England by reason of her special situation has put her trust in a preponderant naval power, France, whose frontiers to the north and to the east were open to invasion, has put her trust in military power. And so these two powers, whose behavior at first glance seems to have been so different, in reality obey the same instinct: both look for security, each in the manner dictated by its geographical position." (Articles by Jules Cambon, Council on Foreign Relations, *Permanent Bases of Foreign Policy*, 1931, pp. 1-2, 4.)

lish Channel and a similar line of Belgian defenses reaching from Luxemburg to the North Sea would, it was hoped, close the gap through which the Kaiser's troops had poured in 1914. Behind the old frontier, also, were the fortress cities of Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort, which had survived German assault throughout the World War.

To man their fortresses, and to defend the open frontier toward Belgium, the French maintained an army whose numbers were fixed by French appreciation of national necessity unrestricted by treaty limitations, and whose equipment had been fashioned in the light of the still recent lessons of the World War.

Up to 1936, since German military forces were necessarily concentrated behind the Rhine, even though in numbers and equipment these always indubitably surpassed the restricted limits of the Treaty of Versailles, French armies were assured of the ability to enter German territory and to seize the important coal mines of the Saar Basin at the outbreak of hostilities. When Hitler ordered the Reichswehr back into the neutralized zone, the Maginot line had already been completed. Thus France was constantly assured of security on the north and east, facing Germany.

Nor was she less fortunately situated on the Italian frontier. There the Alps, reinforced by a new system of fortifications, constituted an impregnable barrier, which could be held by small forces if France were compelled to fight Germany and Italy simultaneously. In the Mediterranean, too, France had decisive naval superiority over Italy, a fact of utmost importance because, in case of war, large French forces would have to be moved from Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco to the Continent. Thus

in 1937 France had present security on land and sea, against Italy as well as Germany.

In addition, she had many armed allies:¹ Yugoslavia, ready to attack Italy in the east if Italian armies undertook an offensive against France in the west;² Czechoslovakia, watching Germany from the Bohemian plateau; Rumania, prepared to hold both Hungary and Bulgaria in check if either undertook to assail the allies of France in the rear, at the behest of Italy. Although Belgium had renounced her military alliance with France in 1936, she was busy constructing a new line of forts on her German frontier and could at least be depended upon to defend her own national territory, as she had striven to do in 1914.

With Poland, a military alliance had long existed,³ and it had been renewed in 1934. To be sure, the Poles had in the same year executed a nonaggression pact with Germany,⁴ and Polish policy seemed often obscure and even unfriendly. Her rulers apparently feared that too close an alliance with France would antagonize her powerful and threatening neighbor, Germany. Under the stimulus of German rearmament, France made renewed efforts to strengthen the treaty bonds with her eastern ally during 1935-36, apparently with some success. Beyond Poland, however, the Soviet Union was again rising to European importance, and Moscow and Paris had re-


¹ Balla, V. de, *The New Balance of Power in Europe*, 1932; Foreign Policy Association, "Political Realignments in Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. IX, No. 5, 1933.

² The Yugoslav-Italian Five-Year Pact of March 25, 1937 provided (Article I) that "the signatories bind themselves . . . to refrain from any act in support of an aggressor should either be attacked by a third power"; Article VI, furthermore, stated that "this agreement does not conflict with either signatory's existing international obligations." Legally, therefore, Yugoslavia would still be free to attack Italy if the latter became an aggressor against France. See *New York Times*, March 26, 1937.

³ Smogorzewski, Casimir, *La Politique Polonoise de la France*, 1926.

⁴ For text see Appendix J.

FRANCE AND HER ALLIES



cently renewed the old association of Russia with France and, in addition, the Soviet Union had entered the League of Nations.¹ Roused by German prospectuses of Ukrainian conquests at their expense, the Russians had broken the old bonds of Rapallo² with Berlin and thrown all their weight on the French side. This rapprochement reached its consummation when in May, 1935, a defensive alliance obviously aimed at Germany but not supplemented by the usual military convention, was concluded between the two nations.

Last of all there was Great Britain, bound by the pacts of Locarno to defend the status quo of the Treaty of Versailles in so far as French and Belgian frontiers were concerned.³ The commitment had been made reluctantly, it had been accepted by the British people without enthusiasm, it was a constant cause of anxiety and even of acute apprehension. Nevertheless, it existed and, at important times, British statesmen had reaffirmed its validity.⁴ Nor was it less evident that, however great the British irritation with French policy and however general the eagerness to keep out of another European conflict, British concern for the inviolability of Belgian territory endured, and the prospect of a German advance to the coast of Flanders would once more insure British intervention, as it had in 1914. Indeed, the advent and growth of air power had so increased the vulnerability of England to attack from this region that Stanley Bald-

¹ Foreign Policy Association, "The Soviet Union as a European Power," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. IX, No. 11, 1933.

² The Treaty of Rapallo, signed in April, 1922. Its chief provisions were: a mutual renunciation of reparations; a resumption of consular and diplomatic relations; mutual applications of the "most favored nation" principle; and a mutual facilitation of trade.

³ See Chapter XXVI.

⁴ Speech of Baldwin delivered July 19, 1934, in the House of Commons. Speech of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden at Leamington, November 20, 1936.

win as Prime Minister had declared that the Rhine now constituted the true frontier of the British Isles.

Thus reviewed, the various elements which together made up the sum of French security in the postwar period seem impressive. Wherein, then, lay the cause of French apprehension? What further measure of security was to be attained by France within the limits of what might be considered humanly possible? This question goes to the very heart of the whole situation. To answer it is, moreover, to explain French national policy from the Armistice to the present hour.

Prudently speaking, France's demand for security beyond that measure which geographical situation, her own national resources, and her alliances bestowed upon her, was based upon the fact that there existed sixty-seven millions of Germans and but forty-two millions of French. This obvious disparity in numbers was further increased by an even greater disparity between French and German industrial development. In machine power¹ even more than in man power, French inferiority was so manifest that there was no question of German victory in a new Franco-German conflict, if France stood alone.

If, in advance of the establishment of French security, Germany were to be permitted to rearm beyond the limits of the Treaty of Versailles and to unite with Austria, what assurance could there be that France and her allies would not be overwhelmed before Great Britain, faithful to the pledge of Locarno, could muster the forces necessary to restore the balance? In the World War, France had been compelled to carry the bulk of the burden for two years while Great Britain was arming, and the battle had been fought on French soil.

¹ See Self-Sufficiency Chart, Chapter IV, page 75.

What France sought, then, for herself, for her allies, for all countries, was the collective guarantee, by the nations of the world, of the security of each individual state. The machinery was at hand. The League of Nations was in existence. The peace treaties of the Paris Conference constituted the new public law of Europe. The League had been expressly designed to enforce the law. All that was lacking to the League was the means. Adequate means, too, could be supplied only when Great Britain and the United States should join their resources to those of France to act through the League in the name alike of the law and of world peace.

In the meantime, without French consent no part of the Treaty of Versailles could be revised. Since Great Britain and the United States were obviously if unequally interested in seeing that treaty amended, their concern for French security should at least be equal to their interest in German recovery. The League of Nations at which Clemenceau had scoffed had now, thanks to Briand, become the ultimate instrument of French policy.

That policy, moreover, was crystal clear. The French objective was security, the instrument was the League of Nations, the strategy consisted in holding Germany to the letter of the law which was the Treaty of Versailles, until Great Britain and the United States, who had forced the League upon France, were prepared to invest it with the authority which its founder had designed it should have. Nor was it less obvious, after the Manchurian and Ethiopian episodes, at least, that without authority backed by power Geneva was helpless.

After the Treaty of Versailles was made, however, the British and American people had changed their minds about its terms. They had judged them to be too harsh

and had identified in them the promise of later German resentment and reprisal. In addition, the British had promptly found the reparations payments injurious to their own commercial interests, as the Americans later found them disastrous for their investments in the Reich. But when Germany, inspired by obvious Franco-British coolness, undertook to resist reparations payments, the French occupied the Ruhr.¹ And when, later, relying upon British and American investments in the Reich to insure British and American restraint of France, Germany had announced a tariff union with Austria, France had defeated the American attempt to save the German banking structure by the Hoover moratorium and had brought Austria to her knees by financial coercion.²

The third German rebellion against the Treaty of Versailles, disclosed in the demand for military parity with France, met a similar uncompromising resistance.³ Once more British and American statesmen, convinced of the essential reasonableness of German demands and alarmed by the prospects of violence that resistance to these demands forecast, sought compromise through French concession. And again they were met by the unvarying French response that concessions to Germany must be balanced by guarantees to France. As a result, Germany quit the League, the prestige of Geneva received another blow, and the European crisis became visibly more acute.

¹ Stegemann, Hermann, *The Struggle for the Rhine*, 1927; Tuohy, Ferdinand, *Occupied, 1918-1930*, 1931.

² Einzig, Paul, *Finance and Politics*, 1932; Salter, Sir Arthur, *Recovery, The Second Effort*, 1932.

³ See Chapter XXIX; also Foreign Policy Association, "The Disarmament Crisis," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. IX, No. 17, 1933; Dulles, A. W., "Germany and the Crisis in Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1934.

Obviously, however, while French security would be enormously fortified by a British and American guarantee, extended through the machinery of the League, British and American safety would be correspondingly impaired. As a consequence, in both countries the idea of transforming the League into a superstate and underwriting its authority with British and American resources in men and money seemed preposterous. But in France it seemed not less preposterous that Great Britain and the United States should demand of France that she allow Germany to rearm while refusing to give France solid guarantees not only of her own security but also of the entire European edifice.¹

The French saw the problem of Europe as integral. They were satisfied that if Germany were allowed to rearm she would one day be able to realize unity with Austria by force. Thereafter, Czechoslovakia would be helpless, almost encircled by German territory and having a large German minority.² Afterwards Bucharest and Belgrade would be brought to heel. How, then, could Poland hope to retain the Corridor? Once treaty revision were accepted in principle, there would be no going backward; the old tragedy of 1866 and 1870 would be repeated.

When the Hitler Revolution arrived, the British and American peoples saw in it the justification of their worst fears and the confirmation of their constant forecast. French insistence upon the letter of the law of

¹ Potter, P. B., "Sanctions and Security; An Analysis of the French and American Views," *Geneva Special Studies*, Vol. III, No. 2, 1932; Selsam, J. Paul, *The Attempts to Form an Anglo-French Alliance, 1910-1924*, 1936; Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., and Longemann, F. E., *Information on the Problem of Security, 1917-1926*, 1927; Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., *Disarmament and Security Since Locarno*, 1932.

² Krofta, Kamil, *Czechoslovakia and the Crisis of Collective Security*, 1936; Moravec, Colonel Emanuel, *The Strategic Importance of Czechoslovakia for Western Europe*, 1936; Schacher, Gerhard, *Central Europe and the Western World*, 1936.

Versailles had led to German upheaval. But the French perceived in what had happened the ultimate proof of their contention that the Germans were always what Tacitus had described them to be nearly two thousand years earlier. In the extravagant violence of the Nazi prospectus of the Third Reich they identified the voice of the authentic German. And what they had refused to the Republic of Stresemann they were under no temptation to bestow upon the Third Reich of Hitler.

In French eyes, moreover, British and American pretensions were compromised by their performances. At the Paris Conference, Wilson and Lloyd George had persuaded Clemenceau to renounce the French claim to garrison the left bank of the Rhine forever. In return, in the name of their respective countries, they had pledged him the ratification of a Treaty of Guarantee. But the American Senate had repudiated the promise of the American President, and as the British promise had been contingent upon the American, both, therefore, fell together.

Five years later, Great Britain had made the Locarno Pact. But that was too late and too little. France had already been forced to negotiate her alliances with Poland and the Little Entente. The Rhine was only one of the rivers of controversy in Europe; and for a people living in the Continent, there was no safety in one corner when there was danger of conflagration in another.

At times the British and even the Americans had imagined that France could be coerced. But that was to forget the French tradition of authority. The original French Republic had successfully defied all Europe in defense of its rights. And postwar France had a great army, many allies, a diplomatic ascendancy in Geneva and in Europe which were unrivaled assets. When, too, Poin-

caré had restored the franc, the financial weapon was a resource chiefly of French diplomacy.

Ironically enough, the French had ended by taking Woodrow Wilson at his word, long after his fellow countrymen had repudiated that word. The American President had said he would make a peace of justice. The French accepted as such the treaty which he had imposed upon them. He had created machinery to restrain nations seeking to violate that treaty. The French accepted that machinery and asked only that it be made stronger. Wilson and Lloyd George had forced the Treaty of Versailles upon the French; they had never liked it, but they had agreed to it on the precise assurance that Great Britain and the United States would help enforce it against Germany; and now both were trying to revise it in the interests of Germany.¹

In law and in logic, the French position was impregnable. And back of law and logic was force. In British and American eyes, however, French policy seemed so shortsighted and suicidal that both London and Washington continued to expect that French Liberalism would conquer French Nationalism; but in fact it never did. From Clemenceau to Laval, France never budged an inch. In moments of crisis, Herriot spoke the language of Tardieu. For all Frenchmen of the Left and of the Right, there was only one question, and that was France; only one enemy, and that was Germany; only one policy, and that was security.

To understand French policy it is necessary to consider French psychology.² In Germany, as is well

¹ Schoonmaker, E. D., *Our Genial Enemy, France*, 1932; Tardieu, André, *France and America*, 1927.

² Carroll, E. M., *French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914*, 1931; Hayes, C. J. H., *France: A Nation of Patriots*, 1930; Hill, Helen, "The Spirit of Modern France,"

known, it is the Treaty of Versailles which is responsible for the existence of a national delusion of persecution. In France it is the Treaty of Frankfort which explains a state of mind otherwise unintelligible, for by that treaty Germany destroyed French unity. Even more, during the World War German statesmanship frequently and openly proclaimed German war aims to include the annexation of the Briey District and further "rectifications" of the French frontier which would add Belfort and Verdun to the lost cities of 1871. Finally, to the still unforgotten rigors of the invasion of 1870 there were added the tragic memories of the devastations of 1914.

Victory in 1918, therefore, had meant but one thing to the French mind—could, in fact, mean but one thing—and that was security. Not approximate, relative, reasonable security, but *absolute* security. On that question the mood of France was the mood of the French poilu at Verdun. Petain's immortal phrase "They shall not pass" was the watchword of the French national sentiment from the Armistice onward. And that phrase was addressed to the Briton and the American as well as to the German.

Unless France yielded, both Britain and the United States saw that there could be no peace or order in Europe. What they failed to see with equal clarity was that without at least British guarantees there would be no essential French concessions. For in the French mind, concessions unaccompanied by precise British guarantees would prove only the preface to a third invasion and a

World Affairs Pamphlets, No. 5, Foreign Policy Association and World Peace Foundation, 1934; Lichtenberger, Henri, *Relations between France and Germany*, 1923; Madariaga, Salvador de, *Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards*, 1931, rev. ed.; Moore, W. G., *France and Germany*, 1932; Sieburg, Friedrich, *Who Are These French?*, 1932; Siegfried, André, *France: A Study in Nationality*, 1930.

second mutilation of French unity. Clemenceau, Millerand, Briand, Poincaré and their successors passed through the Quai d'Orsay in swift succession; but each in turn repeated the same phrase: "Security comes first." Always the France of the Treaty of Frankfort faced the Germany of the Treaty of Versailles.

There were, it is true, moments of pause in this policy. One of these was the "Truce of Locarno," but even then French concessions had to be prefaced by British commitments. Again, after Laval became foreign minister in 1934, there was a brief period in which French diplomacy adopted a more conciliatory tone. For the first time since the Armistice, the Quai d'Orsay seemed genuinely anxious to avoid any action that might further arouse German suspicion and enmity. In the summer of 1935 the Laval cabinet even considered the momentous step of abandoning the French system of armed alliances in favor of direct rapprochement with the Reich. But the time for an effective policy of conciliation had passed. The Hitler government was firmly in the saddle and openly committed to aggressive purposes. The treaty revision that the Germans had asked for during fifteen years they were now determined to effect themselves. The period of Laval,¹ then, could be only an interlude of deceptive calm before a further outbreak of Franco-German enmity.

The French policy of repression was at last bearing the fruit which the English had long predicted. It had, as they foresaw, ultimately failed to afford France the security she sought, for its effect was to perpetuate restrictions on the national life of a proud and powerful people which that people felt to be intolerable and to which

¹ November, 1934, to January, 1936.

it would continue to submit, therefore, only under some such compelling threat as that of financial ruin or the coercion of overwhelming military force. France had used both of these weapons from time to time to uphold the letter of the law of Versailles. After 1931, however, the full onset of the economic depression had so undermined her international financial position that she was unable to exert any considerable political pressure through her influence as a creditor nation. The depression also weakened her internally by creating widespread discontent and a growing gulf between the Right and Left parties that for a time threatened civil war.

Thus, when the culminating crisis in the fight against revision came in the spring of 1936, France was forced to yield to her ancient enemy. At that time the Hitler government, taking advantage of France's weakened internal position and European distraction over the Ethiopian crisis, renounced the remaining military restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles through the reoccupation and militarization of the Rhineland and the open development of a large conscript army.

The financial weapon was no longer at hand to meet this new threat to French security, and the Sarraut government which had succeeded that of Laval,¹ lacking British support at the time, was unable to take the risks, domestic and international, involved in an attempt to uphold the treaty by force. In the absence of the necessary means with which to implement its policy, therefore, the French position against any treaty revision, however sound in law and logic, became in actuality untenable.

¹ The Laval government fell on January 22, 1936, the Sarraut government succeeding on January 24 with Flandin as foreign minister.

With the Versailles Treaty thus openly flouted, the League of Nations and the collective system bankrupt, and the Anglo-French Entente tottering, France, by the middle of 1936, saw most of the important bulwarks of her postwar security system rapidly crumbling away. Faced on the one hand with an insurgent and rapidly rearming Germany and a still unsatiated Italy, and on the other with a dangerous internal social and economic situation, it was apparent that only the most heroic efforts could restore to the French people the prerequisites of peace at home and abroad.

On May 3, 1936, the general elections were held, furnishing the Popular Front (the union of Socialist, Radical Socialist, and Communist parties) with a most impressive majority. This victory of the Left, which gave the Premiership to the Socialist leader, Léon Blum,¹ was generally interpreted as a mass protest, first, against the Laval tradition in foreign policy, which had been anti-British, and had precipitated the breakdown of the collective system during the Italo-Ethiopian conflict; and, second, against the domestic circumstances of continued deflation and unemployment. Additional factors were, of course, the Stavisky scandal, in which the Loyalists among other political leaders of the Center and Right had been involved, and the rising opposition to domestic Fascist tendencies exemplified in such groups as the Croix de Feu.

But the incidents of an election frequently prove to be the forgotten causes following the event. For, whereas immediate internal economic retrenchment and external consolidation of forces to meet the German menace seemed paramount from the beginning, it was

¹ Fraser, Geoffrey, and Natanson, Thadée, *Léon Blum, Man and Statesman*, 1938.

not until 1939 that a decisive crystallization of French policy at home and abroad made an all too belated appearance. The history, therefore, of the three intervening years following the coming into power of the first Blum government is important to the student of international politics, primarily for its relation to the eclipse of the power of France in Europe. For the French part of that history, see pages 714ff.

Chapter XIII

GREAT BRITAIN

UPON the British mind, the World War exerted an influence whose effects were still discoverable in British policy two decades after the conflict.¹ As Wellington had said of Waterloo, "the thing had been run to a fine point." In 1917 the ominous upward curve in submarine sinkings had seemed the certain preface to a surrender dictated by starvation. As late as April, 1918, the British army had been fighting with its back to the wall in Flanders. It was not until August 8, Ludendorff's "blackest day of all," that the tide changed.

Not even the dramatic suddenness of that change, however, could remove the enduring psychological consequences of the strain and agony of the four terrible years. Furthermore, the realization that the insular position of Britain could no longer serve as a bulwark against Continental attack by sea or air was to have a profound influence upon future British strategy.²

¹ Hirst, F. W., *The Consequences of the War to Great Britain*, 1934.

² This new factor in the problem of British security was clearly expressed by Sir Austen Chamberlain, as follows: "The development of aeronautics has further impaired our insular security and has given fresh force to the secular principle of British

Not even the surrender of the German battle fleet, the limitation of the German army to a strength little above that of the "Old Contemptibles" at Mons, or the fact that the bulk of the German colonies were on the way to becoming good British mandates, could compensate for the shock of Britain's war experiences. Although the victory was by no means the least considerable of the many that the British had won in their long history of strife on the Continent, its cost had been the most formidable. Instinctively, therefore, they turned toward what was for them the greatest possible gain of victory—enduring peace and the enjoyment of the material profits of trade and commerce.


Peace had long been the supreme objective of British Continental policy. Of the things which in the main dictate national policies, security and prosperity, only the first was for the British Empire a European problem of primary importance; and both security and prosperity, in their European phase, turned upon peace. Since the real affair of the British was imperial, and trade was the lifeblood of empire, peace in Europe, as elsewhere, was essential to British prosperity.

The fact that a killing in an obscure Balkan city had not merely interrupted the business of empire but actually placed the very existence of England in jeopardy

policy that the independence of the Low Countries is a British interest, that their frontiers are in fact our frontiers, their independence the condition of our independence, their safety inseparable from our own. . . . Here, at any rate, we find a permanent basis of British policy, recognized and reaffirmed by the guarantee we have given in the Treaty of Locarno to the frontiers of Germany and her neighbors on the west." (Council on Foreign Relations, *Permanent Bases of Foreign Policy*, 1931, pp. 34-35.) See also Acworth, Captain Bernard, *The Restoration of England's Sea Power*, 1935; Chaput, Rolland A., *Disarmament in British Foreign Policy*, 1935; Colc, D. H., *Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence*, 1930; Griffin, Jonathan, *Britain's Air Policy*, 1935; Richmond, Admiral Sir H. W., *Imperial Defence and Capture at Sea in War*, 1932; Rowan-Robinson, H., *Security? A Study of our Military Position*, 1935; Turner, C. C., *Britain's Air Peril*, 1933.

GREAT BRITAIN

STRATEGIC NAVAL POSITION



was at once incredible and final evidence of mistakes in policy which must not be repeated. The part of British instinct which was imperial and that which was insular imposed the same conclusion. The British people at the close of their terrible war years demanded of their government not merely that it should get them out of the present Continental mess but also that it should keep them out of all future Continental follies. And the Dominions, whose sacrifices had been only less considerable than those of the mother country, were not less insistent that they should not have to come again as before.

Discussion of the broader aspects of Imperial Policy belongs to another chapter; but here at least passing notice must be taken of the importance of the Dominions. Although Great Britain ranks next to Germany in industrial development, her domestic poverty in all essential raw materials save coal and iron renders her dependent upon the British Empire for these. To maintain the security of imperial communications is therefore the primary concern of national policy. Hence British insistence upon the two-power naval standard in Europe, which, until recent years, has carried with it undoubted supremacy in the Mediterranean, through which runs the chief highway both to India and to Australia. The new development of Italian naval and air power astride this sea has now called into serious question Britain's ability to dominate these waters,¹ despite her preponderant warship strength. She has, therefore, begun to enlarge the harbor facilities along an alternative route to the East around Africa, which could be used if she were denied passage of the Mediterranean.

¹ Slocombe, George, *The Dangerous Sea*, 1937.

Of equal significance, also, is the political influence exerted by the Dominions upon British policy.¹ While the prestige of Great Britain in European councils is immeasurably enhanced when backed by the united Commonwealth, yet insistence by the Dominions that the mother country assume no new responsibilities on the Continent enormously accentuates British desire for permanent peace; for it is by no means beyond the limit of possibility that if events like those of 1914 should again expose the British Empire to the hazards of a European war, refusal of the Dominions to repeat the services and sacrifices of the World War might lead to the parting of the ties that bind them to Great Britain. Canada's failure to offer its full support to the mother country in the dispute with Italy over Ethiopia emphasized this possibility.²

Since the Armistice, therefore, peace has been the primary objective of British policy in Europe, as it has constituted the single sufficing prescription alike for the security of the British Isles and for the survival of the British Empire. If peace could be established on a permanent basis, British policy in the Old World could safely be limited to retention of naval supremacy in European waters and possession of the further strength necessary to police the vital lines of communication with the Empire.

As to the nature of the peace to be made with Germany, Castlereagh and Wellington had shown the way

¹ Toynbee, A. J., *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations Since the Peace Settlement*, 1928. (For further discussion of this problem, see Chapter XXIII.)


² In taking office on November 2, 1935, the new Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, said: "The Canadian government . . . desires to make it clear that it does not recognize any commitment binding Canada to adopt military sanctions [against Italy], and that no such commitment could be made without the proper approval of the Canadian parliament."

GREAT BRITAIN




NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOODSTUFFS, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, AND RAW MATERIALS

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND NET IMPORTS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES OF
AVERAGE NATIONAL CONSUMPTION (1925-29)

— GREAT ESSENTIALS —



CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS



■ PRODUCTION
▨ NET IMPORTS
● EXPORTABLE SURPLUS

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a century before.¹ Thus, at the close of the World War, the first consideration of Lloyd George and Balfour was to see to it that Germany's power to renew the challenge of 1914 was abolished; next, Germany had to be made to pay for her war; but, finally, extreme care had also to be taken to curb the ambition of France. To that end, the balance of power was to be restored on the Continent, as it had been re-established after the Napoleonic downfall.

Balance of power on the Continent was the tradition of British policy. It was, in fact, the oldest and soundest tradition.² The business of British statesmanship was to see that parity existed not only among the Great Powers individually but also between any two coalitions into which these powers might divide, in order that the danger of any pursuit of hegemony by an individual state should be abolished.³ Substantially that situation of balance, which was the surest and cheapest method of providing security, had existed from Waterloo to the decade before the Marne. As a consequence, Great Britain had been able to travel the pathways of empire with only occasional backward glances at Europe.

After 1900, however, the rise of Germany to disproportionate power and the disclosure by German leaders of disruptive tendencies, and primarily of a purpose to

¹ Webster, C. K., *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815*, 1931.

² Edwards, William, *British Foreign Policy from 1815 to 1933*, 1934; Flournoy, F. R., *Parliament and War*, 1927; Fuller, J. F. C., *Imperial Defence, 1588-1914*, 1926; Muir, Ramsay, *A Short History of the British Commonwealth*, 1922-23, 2 vols.; Pargiter, R. B., and Eady, H. G., *The Army and Sea Power*, 1927; Seton-Watson, R. W., *Britain in Europe*, 1937; Ward, Sir A. W., and Gooch, G. P., eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, 1922-23, 3 vols.

³ The traditional British policy of balance of power was succinctly expressed by Sir Austen Chamberlain as follows: "All our greatest wars have been fought to prevent one great military power dominating Europe, and at the same time dominating the coasts of the Channel and the ports of the Low Countries." (Speech before the House of Commons, March 24, 1925.)

challenge British supremacy upon the sea, had forced the British to quit the "Splendid Isolation" of the Victorian Age for the Triple Entente of the Edwardian Era.¹ And that change eventually had involved them in war. Now that war was over, however, and German challenge to British naval supremacy abolished, it was time to go back to the old system which in the very nature of things necessitated the establishment of something like a state of balance between Germany and France.

Obviously, such a state of balance could not be restored over night. First came the problem of making peace. Nevertheless the strategy of the balance of power could be employed at Paris,² for the entrance of the United States into the European equation had placed Great Britain in the fortunate position of being able to act between France and America. In the main, that would mean standing with Wilson against Clemenceau. On most questions, the Wilsonian formula coincided admirably with British interest and judgment. There was, too, in the immediate postwar England, a marked conviction that co-operation in a common struggle in 1918 had abolished the last resentments surviving from the conflict of 1776.

Against the rising clamor of the French press for possession of the left bank of the Rhine and the demands of Foch for permanent military occupation of that barrier, Wilson and his doctrine of self-determination presented Lloyd George with a potent ally and with a convenient principle. By contrast, on the two questions of the free-

¹ Kantorowicz, H. U., *The Spirit of British Policy and the Myth of the Encirclement of Germany*, 1932; Pribram, A. F., *England and the International Policy of the European Great Powers, 1871-1914*, 1931; Schmitt, B. E., *England and Germany*, 1918; Woodward, E. L., *Great Britain and the German Navy*, 1935; Wolff, Theodore, *The Eve of 1914*, 1936.

² Fabre-Luce, Alfred, *La Crise des Alliances*, 1922; Vrieslander, Wismann, *Lloyd George*, 1923.

dom of the seas and of the reparations to be demanded of the Germans, Clemenceau could be counted upon to stand with Great Britain and against the United States. For the time being, at least, the strategy of the balance of power was therefore applicable to the Paris situation in which the United States and France were to be the dominating and opposed powers. By means of the American support, Germany could be saved. Later, even if the United States ultimately retired from Europe, the British position between France and Germany would be commanding.

At the Paris Peace Conference, events on the whole moved according to British calculation. The French ambitions in the matter of the Rhine were blocked. The American ideas about the freedom of the seas and reparations were put aside. In return for the French concession as to the Rhine, however, Wilson and Lloyd George were compelled, in the names of their respective countries, to pledge Clemenceau a Treaty of Guarantee assuring to France British and American aid in case of German aggression. And since the objective of France at the Rhine was security and not territory, Clemenceau was temporarily able to silence the opposition both of Foch and of Poincaré.

In the matter of reparations, the problem was more intricate. Lloyd George had gone to the people before the Paris Conference pledging himself to make Germany pay. French sentiment on the same question was dictated by the still unreconstructed devastated area. Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau might therefore be compelled to insert in the treaty provisions which the British prime minister, at least, perceived were impossible; for already in British circles the truth was just beginning to

be whispered, not only that it was beyond German capacity to pay the costs of the war, but also that it was contrary to British interest to compel her to make the effort.¹

To escape that danger, Lloyd George proposed to leave it to a Commission to decide the sum which Germany was to pay, and, meantime, to satisfy British and French public opinion by writing into the treaty the most drastic regulations covering the manner in which Germany should be made to pay and the penalties which were to be exacted of her if she attempted evasion. His calculation was that, in the Reparations Commission, Great Britain and the United States would have the controlling influence and could make the sums to be exacted correspond with reason and therefore divest these punitive provisions of all relevance.² Since the United States and Great Britain were to be the guarantors of French security, moreover, their authority over French policy would be inevitable.

Thus, by the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, Lloyd George, with the aid of Wilson, saved the Rhineland for Germany. He was less successful in the east, because Wilson stood with the French for Poland. Lloyd George, however, was interested not merely in saving Germany territorially but also in insuring her economic recovery. It was to British interest, to European advantage, to world profit, that the great German people should be brought back into normal economic and financial life, and international trade, as soon and as completely as possible. It was, moreover, the single

¹ Keynes, J. M., *Economic Consequences of the Peace*, 1920.

² Baruch, B. M., *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty*, 1920; Lloyd George, David, *The Truth about Reparations and War Debts*, 1932; Noble, George B., *Policies and Opinions at Paris*, 1919, 1935.

prescription for peace, because only a prosperous Germany could be a contented nation.

British policy at Paris, then, was sane, at least enlightened in its selfishness, and it was in the main successful. But it had necessarily given two hazards to fortune. Unless the United States now stood by the bargain of Wilson in the matter of French security and also joined the British in reducing reparations figures from astronomical to reasonable proportions, what had been accomplished would be of no lasting importance. And that was the case because if Great Britain and the United States should go back on the security pledge, and if the United States should absent itself from the Reparations Commission, the French would have a grievance of unmistakable authenticity and, in addition, a power for destruction of almost limitless extent.

When, therefore, the United States Senate did reject the Treaty of Versailles and repudiate the double pledge of Wilson and Lloyd George to Clemenceau in the matter of French security, the British were confronted by the fact that provisions written into the treaty to compel German payment could be employed to accomplish German ruin. The absence of any American member in the Reparations Commission placed control in French hands. The primary objective of British policy was still to accomplish German recovery, both for material considerations and to re-establish the balance of power. But as long as French security remained doubtful, prevention of that recovery was sure to be the controlling purpose of French policy.

In simple terms, the Treaty of Versailles had lodged in French hands the power to postpone or even to pre-

vent German recovery by insistence that reparation defaults which were inevitable should be punished by the infliction of penalties which were legal. And from this impasse there was no peaceful escape; for the British public opinion, reinforced by that of the Dominions, was unanimously opposed to assuming single-handed responsibilities which might have been tolerable if shared with the United States.

Whatever the British Government may have conjectured, the mass of the British people did not believe that France was either sufficiently unwise or strong enough to undertake a new occupation of German territory contrary to American wish and in the face of determined British opposition. On the contrary, there still lingered in British minds the convenient conviction that the war had weakened France to the point where authority rested with Great Britain. On all counts, too, a fresh invasion of Germany seemed so contrary to reason and even to sanity as to be beyond the realms of possibility.

Unfortunately for British calculations, however, British military resources were no longer adequate to restrain France if she did decide to march. In addition, British public opinion was not ready to sanction naval coercion of the French. On the military side, Great Britain, like the United States, had demobilized her forces. Since the German army had also been forcibly disbanded, French military supremacy on the Continent was beyond British challenge. And the withdrawal of the United States from Europe had eliminated the one nation whose support could enable Great Britain to employ her old strategy of the balance of power against France.

In Europe, no possible ally was left. Russia had fallen away to Bolshevism, and in 1920 the defeat of the Red armies before Warsaw as a result of French military intervention had raised French prestige to almost unimaginable heights. In place of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were the Succession States, ready, like Poland, to cast their lot in with France in return for the protection of French arms. Italy was sinking to the impotence which preceded the Fascist Revolution. Germany was out of the calculation. Last of all, Belgium was looking to Paris, not to London.

It was France and not Great Britain, therefore, which could play the balance of power game. She could choose between two policies: either she might associate herself with Great Britain in a policy of salvaging Germany, or she might draw to herself the smaller states which had replaced the old Great Powers, for the purpose of coercing Germany. So far from being isolated, if she turned her back on the old Entente Cordiale, her military supremacy would be reinforced by a diplomatic ascendancy at Geneva, assured to her by the support of the representatives of the states which were her military allies.

When the British declined to meet the French views on security, the French turned to the double task of creating a new political system to control the Continent and of exploiting the Treaty of Versailles to postpone German recovery. As a consequence, in due course, French armies occupied the Ruhr, and thereafter, when the inflation which resulted from attempted German resistance produced in the Reich economic and financial disaster more severe than that of the war itself, the complete bankruptcy of British policy was exposed. The

power of France to prevent German recovery could no longer be questioned, once the British had suffered the occupation of the Ruhr to proceed without an ultimatum.

Postwar British policy then falls naturally into five periods.¹ The first extends from the Paris Conference to the close of the London Conference of 1924 which made the Dawes Plan. Its culminating detail was the French occupation of the Ruhr.² The second phase lasts from 1924 to the Labor victory of 1929. Its dominating feature was the Pact of Locarno.³ The third phase extends from 1929 to the final collapse of the Disarmament Conference, and its distinguishing feature is the German Revolution, with its bloody aftermath both in the Reich and in the Austrian Republic in the summer of 1934. The fourth phase, characterized by German rearmament and Italy's Mediterranean challenge, culminated with the Munich settlement September 30, 1938. Finally in the fifth or post-Munich period, British rearmament being well under way,⁴ a complete reversal of policy took place, with the abandonment of "appeasement" and the substitution of a "stop Hitler" movement or "Peace Front" under British leadership.

¹ Chamberlain, Sir Austen, *Peace in Our Time*, 1928; Sipple, C. E., *British Foreign Policy Since the World War*, 1932; Toynbee, A. J., ed., *Survey of International Affairs*, annual; Willert, Sir Arthur, *Aspects of British Foreign Policy*, 1928.

² D'Abernon, E. V., Viscount, *The Diary of an Ambassador*, 1929-1931, 3 vols.

³ See Chapter XXVI.

⁴ On February 16, 1937, His Majesty's government announced in the House of Commons the 5-year armament program at a total cost of \$7,500,000,000. As a result of the defeat at Munich the rearmament program of Britain was practically doubled, estimated expenditures for the 5-year period 1937-1942 coming to above \$12,000,000,000. See also Foreign Policy Association, "The Future of Naval Limitation," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 14, 1936; Foreign Policy Association, "The End of Naval Disarmament," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XI, No. 17, 1935; Foreign Policy Association, "The Rising Tide of Armament," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 23, 1937; Rowan-Robinson, Major General Henry, *Imperial Defence*, 1938.

During the first phase, the British resisted the French demands for security and the French ended by marching into the Ruhr. In the second phase, the British met French demands partially, consenting to guarantee the status quo in the Rhineland against aggression coming either from France or from Germany. Germany, for her part, formally renounced all design to recover Alsace-Lorraine, and on that basis was welcomed into the League of Nations. During the following years a Concert of Europe was established; and Stresemann, Chamberlain, and Briand, acting for Germany, Great Britain, and France respectively, led in the organization of European peace from Geneva and through the League.

These latter were the years of recovery and of relative tranquillity, but the Truce of Locarno was broken by British Labor when it came to power in 1929. Already British public opinion was becoming restive over the apparent subordination of Great Britain to France and the corresponding penalizing of the British taxpayer to the profit of the French. The success of Briand at Geneva had bestowed upon France an ascendancy which was not too pleasing to British pride; and in addition French demands on the British seemed limitless. In the Labor calculation, therefore, the time had come to get back to the traditional policy of the balance of power. The true role of Great Britain was not to play the part of a "shining second" to France, but that of an impartial arbiter between France and Germany. In a word, British Labor demanded that Great Britain should henceforth occupy the center of the "teeter" and not always sit heavily on the French end.

Labor's return to power, therefore, was marked by a rude attack by Philip Snowden upon a French Finance

Minister at the Hague.¹ With that attack, too, Europe recognized at once that the Truce of Locarno had come to an end. What followed constitutes the third stage in British postwar policy and lasts to the definitive failure of the Disarmament Conference in the summer of 1934, when the British Parliament was put on notice by the British ministry that the moment for rearmament had arrived.²

The decisive events in this third period are the actions of the French: first, in the London Naval Conference; second, in the matter of the Austro-German tariff union; and, finally, in the Disarmament Conference. In the Naval Conference of 1930, the French blocked the way to any Five-Power treaty whatsoever and made even a Three-Power agreement conditional, by insisting that they should have a naval strength which upset all the Anglo-American-Japanese figures.

French action at the London Naval Conference, however, was only a demonstration. There France struck back directly at the Labor Government which had broken the Truce of Locarno, and thus deprived Ramsay MacDonald of the prestige of a successful conference. That conference, moreover, did not touch the main question, which for the British was always peace through German recovery. When, however, the Germans, counting on the lapse in Anglo-French association, undertook to make a tariff union with Austria, the

¹ Andreades, A. M., *Philip Snowden*, 1930; Maddox, W. P., *Foreign Relations in British Labour Politics*, 1934.

² In a speech before the House of Commons on July 19, 1934, Mr. Baldwin said: "... because of our commitments under the Covenant of the League and the Locarno treaty, the many symptoms of unrest in Europe and elsewhere and the failure of other governments to follow our example by comparable reductions, we have for some time felt that the time has come when the possibility of keeping our armaments at the present level must be reconsidered in the absence of comparable reductions by other powers." *New York Times*, July 20, 1934.

French struck swiftly and fatally. Employing financial coercion, they forced Vienna to its knees, and, using their political weapon, they procured from the World Court a decision pronouncing the tariff union illegal. Finally, by their pressure upon Austria they forced Germany publicly and under conditions of extreme humiliation to abandon the Austrian project.

The financial dislocations in Vienna, moreover, proved to be the starting point for the great banking crisis of the summer of 1931 in Germany. When this crisis became acute, President Hoover, on British urging and German appeal, made his proposal for a moratorium. By this time, too, British and American investors had risked billions in the Reich.¹ But since there was no reference to French rights and interests in the Hoover proposal, the French held it up until whatever usefulness it might have had, had disappeared. Consequently the German crisis continued and presently extended to England, and the British were forced off the gold standard.² Since London was the financial center of the world, the downfall of its power signalized the tottering of world finance and an accelerated descent into the depths of a general economic depression.

Last of all, in February, 1932, a despairing Republican regime came from Berlin to Geneva asking of the Disarmament Conference recognition of the German right to equality with France in armaments. Already the

¹ By the end of July, 1931, Americans had invested some \$2,257,000,000 in Germany; English investments amounted to about \$855,000,000. (*Economist*, Sup., "Reparations and War Debts," January 23, 1932.)

² Salter, Sir Arthur, *Recovery, the Second Effort*, 1932; Richardson, John Henry, *British Economic Foreign Policy*, 1936; Foreign Policy Association, "Britain's Economic Recovery: Policies of the National Government," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XI, No. 11, 1935; Foreign Policy Association, "Britain's Economic Recovery: Prospects for Prosperity," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XI, No. 12, 1935.

shadow of Hitler loomed large on the horizon and the fate of the German Republic seemed to turn on success at Geneva. But even before the Conference assembled, Tardieu announced that nothing could be done in the direction of German parity until French security was assured. Thereafter the Conference fell to deadlock and Germany to revolution. For the British were still not ready to meet French views on the question of security.

Domestic economic conditions in Germany had reached such a crisis by 1934 that the Reich had taken on the aspect of a nation blockaded as it had been during the war. Default on private and public debts had ruined German credit. Moreover, open German rearmament had proved the signal for a general race in arms, which spread over the Continent and produced repercussions even in Asia and the United States.

Meanwhile, the fourth period of British postwar policy had begun. The first reaction of the National Government to the potential threat of German rearmament was a continuation of the isolationist policy of the preceding Labor Government. It is true that Britain joined with France and Italy at the Stresa Conference in April, 1935, to denounce Nazi rearmament and the threat to European peace implicit therein, but two months after this declaration she independently came to terms with the Third Reich in the Anglo-German naval treaty.¹ By this agreement England gave open recognition to the illegal German rearmament in return

¹ This agreement, effected by an exchange of notes, published June 18, 1935, provides that total German naval tonnage shall never exceed 35 per cent of that of the British Commonwealth. This percentage is also accepted "in principle" as applying to the various categories of vessels individually, with the exception of submarines. German submarine tonnage may equal 45 per cent of the British, but "in the event of a situation which in their opinion makes it necessary," the German government may increase this tonnage to equal that of the British Commonwealth.

for the assurance that it should never constitute a threat to British naval supremacy. To the French this bilateral treaty seemed both a stupid and a perfidious betrayal of the "Stresa front" in the face of a common enemy. Once more the British had allowed Germany to drive a wedge between the two powers that, united, could insure the peace and stability of Europe. But the British at this time had no intention of undertaking the involved and onerous duties of policing the Continent in the interests of the status quo.

Four months later the British Government had completely reversed its position. A general election was imminent. During the summer, in a "peace plebiscite," eleven million British had voted to support the League, and six million of them had declared themselves in favor of military sanctions, if necessary, to uphold the Covenant. Faced with Italy's attack on Ethiopia, Downing Street saw itself forced by public opinion to adopt an aggressive pro-League policy in an attempt to thwart Italian expansion.

When the French, however, were asked to act in concert against their newly acquired ally, Italy, in the interests of a few obscure African tribes, they were found to have suddenly lost all their former enthusiasm for League principles. Not only was Britain's chief confederate an unwilling one, but her armed forces seemed likely to prove inadequate if the effort to coerce Mussolini should end in military conflict. Even the attempt at economic sanctions, therefore, was half-hearted, and in the end Italy emerged completely successful with enhanced power and prestige. And just in the measure that Italian prestige had risen on the Continent, so that of England had sunk to a new low.

Stung by failure and humiliation, the British resigned the League to its apparent doom and bent all their energies toward remedying the weakness which they saw at the root of their recent frustration, the inadequacy of their armed forces. They seemed determined that whatever future policy they adopted, they would be supplied with the means to make it effective. With the increase in the Italian and German menace, moreover, Anglo-French relations noticeably improved, resulting finally in an entente as close as at any earlier time.

Nineteen years after the Armistice, therefore, Great Britain had failed to establish peace in Europe, and the Reich remained a dissatisfied and aggressive power. For the student of international affairs, nothing in postwar history can be more interesting or more illuminating than the Anglo-French battle of policy, fought over the prostrate body of Germany, and its ultimate results; for in this conflict, triangular at least in its implications, there is presented an accurate picture of postwar Europe.

Looking backward, it seems clear that the British policy of conciliating Germany and aiding in her industrial recovery was sound. If selfish interests dictated the desire to see the Reich re-established both economically and politically, nevertheless British interests coincided with those of most of the rest of the world. Lasting peace in Europe was impossible unless there was a prosperous and contented Reich. French policy, therefore, was bound in the end to produce despair and create a condition of collective madness which would make the German people a peril for the whole of Europe; and all that has happened since 1933 has confirmed the British forecast in this respect.

British postwar policy in Europe, however, failed completely to accomplish its purpose. That failure was due, first, to the war, which destroyed the old system of order in Europe, and, secondly, to the refusal of the United States to remain a participant in European affairs. The war eliminated the European powers, other than Great Britain and France, from immediate reckoning. In their place it raised up a number of lesser states whose collective power was great and whose common interests were identical with those of France. Finally the departure of the United States left Great Britain isolated in the face of France, which possessed a supreme army and was supported militarily and diplomatically by the smaller states.

If, however, the policy pursued by France after 1919 was responsible for the fall of the German Republic and the triumph of violence in the Reich, this policy—or impolicy—had its origin in a French desperation not less dominating than the German. The events of the Franco-Prussian War and the World War had combined to establish in French minds the conviction that the existence of France must always be in jeopardy if the two nations were left to face each other alone. Instinctively, therefore, the French people identified German recovery, unaccompanied by British guarantees of French security, as a deadly threat to their country and to themselves.

The British people, however, saw the effects of French policy plainly. They also saw with utmost clarity the possible consequences for themselves of new involvement in Continental affairs. They did, it is true, permit their government to make the Pact of Locarno in 1925; but they promptly discovered that this pact was not enough to satisfy the French, who were determined

that the British should guarantee, not merely the French frontiers at the Rhine, but a system of order in Europe.

In this respect, however, the French thesis likewise appeared to be sound; for if Germany were left free to absorb Austria, crush Poland, and rescue the German minority of Czechoslovakia through partitioning that country, there would not be peace in Europe, but war. Both the Poles and the Czechs would resist, and to conquer them the Germans would have to create a military establishment which would enable them to dominate the Continent even if the British stood with the French at the Rhine. The fact that the British and French armies, even with that of Russia, had not sufficed to defeat Germany in the World War, made this clear.

Because the British were an insular people they saw Europe only as far as their own immediate security was involved, and therefore their concern did not pass the Rhine. The French, as a Continental people, saw Europe as a whole. They were aware that although the World War had begun in an obscure corner of the Balkans it had swiftly spread over most of the Continent between the Urals and the Pyrenees. When, however, they sought to persuade the British to extend the commitment of Locarno to cover the Continent, the British, far from consenting, instinctively sought to limit rather than to extend the responsibilities imposed by Chamberlain's pledge. And that instinctive drawing back, which found expression in the victory of the Labor Party in 1929, was disastrous for the German Republic.

In the earlier postwar years, British public opinion had been profoundly affected by the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, and in particular by his League of Nations program. Like the Americans, the British were vague

rather than realistic in their conceptions of the League. They saw all nations uniting to make peace, but they were very far from agreeing that Great Britain should take any general responsibility for enforcing that peace. And the realization that, in the business of keeping the peace, the British fleet would be expected to play a decisive part and that this obligation foreshadowed possible collision with the United States, was not slow in arriving or slight in its effects upon British policy.

As a consequence, the French attempt to turn the League into an instrument for the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles, and the parallel effort to establish a collective guarantee for the security of all member nations, disclosed in the Geneva Protocol of 1924, promptly awakened British suspicion and insured Parliamentary rejection of that proposal. At Geneva, British policy was paradoxical, since it sought at the same time to strengthen the League morally and to weaken the practical effect of the sections of the Covenant prescribing coercion by all states in the case of aggression by one.

When Austen Chamberlain told the League Assembly that in addition to the Geneva association of nations there was an older if smaller society, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and that if compelled to choose between the two he would select the latter, he only repeated the authentic voice of Great Britain. As an instrument of conciliation, the British endorsed Geneva; as a means of coercion controlled by other hands than British, they shrank from it.

On only one occasion did the British actually espouse the principle of collective security, and that was when their own interests and ideals were directly threatened

by an armed aggressor in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. Then they actively led a movement in the League to bring Italy to terms by means of an economic boycott. This time, however, it was the French who held out for a policy of conciliation rather than coercion, for their interests were only remotely affected.

In this instance, then, a reversal in situations had brought about a reversal of policies. But in the main course of European events, Britain never felt herself deeply enough involved to give a general guarantee of assistance in case of territorial aggression. As a consequence of this equivocal attitude, British influence in the League was weakened, for France could always rally the European neutrals as well as her own allies to the doctrine of collective responsibility.

At Geneva, as in European councils elsewhere, Great Britain was therefore usually isolated, commonly impotent, and generally unpopular. Among the British people, the League steadily lost in popular favor and confidence as it came increasingly to be identified as an instrument of French policy rather than a means of international accommodation. And, since the British lacked both the material and the moral resources to pursue national policy successfully to its goal, which was European peace, they were, for the greater part of the period, compelled to let French policy prevail.

In 1937, then, as at all times since the Armistice, British public opinion was inclined to resist all proposals of direct involvement in European disputes, as long as vital British interests were not immediately threatened.¹ On the other hand, the excesses and vio-

¹ In a speech at Leamington on November 20, 1936, Foreign Minister Eden said, "... nations cannot be expected to incur automatic military obligations, save for areas where their vital interests are concerned."

lence of the German Revolution had largely silenced British sympathy for Germany. More recently the imperialist ambitions of a rearmed Reich in Europe and of Italy in the Mediterranean had come to alarm the British mind. Though still unconvinced of the wisdom of French Continental policy in the past, illusion no longer existed concerning the importance of France as the ally of Britain.

Rearmament on the sea and in the air was the first British reaction to the rise of German nationalism and the fall of the Disarmament Conference. Beyond that, British policy would follow the once derided but always familiar Asquithian prescription of "wait and see."

But although Great Britain still remained firm in her resolution to make no further commitments on the Continent and to that extent was indifferent to the fate of Austria, the Succession States, and Poland, nevertheless the murder of Dollfuss led to a formal joint declaration with Italy and France endorsing Austrian independence.¹ British concern for the Rhineland frontiers of France and Belgium also increased, and presently found expression in Stanley Baldwin's phrase describing the Rhine as the British military frontier. It was made clear, as it had not been made in 1914, that in case of German aggression in the west, Britain would stand at the side of France.

Unmistakably, then, conviction of the existence of a new German menace had developed in the British mind. At the end of nearly two decades of uninterrupted pursuit of security through peace, Great Britain saw that she might presently be compelled to seek that security by the sole alternative method, the traditional method of Continental coalition and of increased armaments.

¹ Statement of Sir John Simon in the House of Commons, July 26, 1934.

Thus, while it is never possible to forecast why or when the British will make up their minds, it can always be calculated in advance that certain Continental circumstances will invariably produce the same well-defined British repercussions. Failure to realize that fact was perhaps the most considerable of all of the many German blunders in July, 1914, and not the least of those of the period twenty years later. The expansion of German air forces and Italian naval strength reawakened the same British apprehensions that had been aroused by the growth of the German fleet between 1905 and 1914, and in February, 1937, provoked the commencement of a program of expansion in British arms without parallel in history.

For the later developments of 1937-1939 in Great Britain, see pages 721ff.

Chapter XIV

ITALY

OF the Great Powers of Europe, Italy was the last to arrive¹ and still remains the least in material resources. Italian unification preceded the founding of the German empire, but Prussia was a Great Power while Italy was still a "geographical expression." Today, moreover, although Italian population exceeds the French numerically, the inferiority of Italy in material circumstances robs her numbers of equal value. And although Italy has large African possessions²—Libya, Eritrea, Somaliland, and Ethiopia—none of them, with the possible exception of the last-named, has any considerable economic worth.³

As an outlet for Italy's human surplus, moreover, the equatorial deserts and mountain regions of her African

¹ Croce, Benedetto, *A History of Italy, 1871-1915*, 1929; Marriott, Sir J. A. R., *The Makers of Modern Italy*, 1931; Whyte, A. J. B., *The Political Life and Letters of Cavour, 1848-1861*, 1930.

² Booth, C. D., and Bridge, Isabelle, *Italy's Aegean Possessions*, 1928; Clark, Grover, *A Place in the Sun*, 1936; Tittoni, T., *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy*, 1914; Villari, Luigi, *The Expansion of Italy*, 1930.

³ The Mediterranean island possessions of Italy are the Sporades, including Rhodes. Sardinia, Sicily, and many other Mediterranean islands, including Pantelleria, are parts of the kingdom.

possessions are no more attractive to colonists now than they were in the past. And whereas Ethiopia may prove to have limited mineral resources and still more limited areas for white colonization, the economic development of this inhospitable region of the world gives promise of being a financially disastrous undertaking. Except for the fact, therefore, that Italy's colonial possessions may prove an important additional source of man power in war, they promise to be both an economic and a strategic liability. In effect, Italy remains essentially a Continental state with the Mediterranean as the center of her sphere of action.


Even within the European region, Italy had little real influence before the war, notwithstanding her membership in the Triple Alliance. Her refusal to march with her Austro-German allies in 1914, however, was for them a great disappointment and for France an inestimable advantage, since troops which would otherwise have been held in the Alps fought at the Battle of the Marne. Again, Italian entrance into the war on the Allied side, in 1915, was ultimately responsible for the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.¹ Nevertheless, at the Paris Conference the Italian role was inconspicuous and Italian claims were treated cavalierly by Clemenceau and Lloyd George, and contemptuously by Woodrow Wilson.²

Resentment aroused by this treatment at Paris was, moreover, one of the causes of the domestic revolution which established the Fascist regime in control of Italy and placed Italian fortunes in the capable hands of Benito

¹ Cruttwell, C. R. M. F., *A History of the Great War, 1914-1918*, 1934; McEntee, Girard L., *Italy's Part in Winning the World War*, 1934.

² Lémonon, E., *L'Italie d'après Guerre, 1914-1921*, 1922; Lord Riddell and others, *The Treaty of Versailles and After*, 1935; Villari, Luigi, *The Awakening of Italy*, 1924.

IMPERIAL ITALY



Mussolini.¹ But even the coming of the Duce² did not immediately improve the Italian situation in European councils. On the contrary, during the Locarno years, in which Great Britain, France, and Germany, through Chamberlain, Briand, and Stresemann, co-operated at Geneva, Italy was isolated and ignored.

With the rupture of the Truce of Locarno and the rise of National Socialism in Germany, however, the Italian situation was transformed. The fresh outbreak of hostility between France and Germany and the increasing economic and diplomatic penetration by Germany to the southeast, constituting a growing threat of a Nazi Mittel-europa, bestowed upon Italian support an evident value, alike for the Germans and for the French. Thus, almost overnight, Rome acquired an importance in European affairs which it had not held previously since the far-off days of the medieval Papacy. Thrust for the moment into the balance-of-power position abdicated by an isolationist Great Britain, Mussolini, in Ethiopia and in Spain, exploited his opportunity for blackmail tactics, against the time when overwhelming rearmament would reinstate the British in their accustomed place in Europe. This opportunism is significant, too, because it supplies a key to the problem of Italian policy generally.³

¹ The following books dealing with the background and history of Italian Fascism will be useful for reference: Ashton, E. B., *The Fascist: His State and His Mind*, 1937; Goad, H. E., *The Making of the Corporate State*, 1932; Finer, Herman, *Mussolini's Italy*, 1935; Florinsky, Michael T., *Fascism and National Socialism*, 1936; King, Bolton, *Fascism in Italy*, 1931; Lussu, Emilio, *Enter Mussolini*, 1936; Munro, I. S., *Through Fascism to World Power; a History of the Revolution in Italy*, 1933; Pitigliani, Fausto, *The Italian Corporative State*, 1933; Salvemini, Gaetano, *The Fascist Dictatorship in Italy*, 1927; Schneider, H. W., *Making the Fascist State*, 1928; Schneider, H. W., and Clough, S. B., *Making Fascists*, 1929; Spencer, H. R., *Government and Politics of Italy*, 1932.

² Duce, the Italian word for "Leader," is the title popularly bestowed on Mussolini.

³ Benoist, Charles, *La Question Méditerranéenne*, 1928; Cippico, Antonio, Conte, *Italy, the Central Problem of the Mediterranean*, 1926; Currey, M. I., *Italian Foreign Policy*,

Looking backward, it is evident that, alone of the contemporary Great Powers, Italy has risen to her present rank only partly by her own efforts. The Congress of Vienna, in bestowing Sardinia and Genoa on the Savoy kingdom as a means of blocking the French pathway to the plains of northern Italy, created a state sufficiently strong to dream of liberating and uniting the whole peninsula. War between France and Austria in 1859 made possible the next long step toward Italian unity, while the Seven Weeks War between Prussia and Austria brought about the addition of Venetia in 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 made possible the occupation of Rome. Finally, the World War enabled Italy to complete her unification by the redemption of Trieste and the Trentino.

In all these various struggles, the role of Italy was subordinate and her rewards were due in no small part to the arms of other powers. This is not to say that Italian contribution was not in proportion to Italian resources or to seek to minimize the brilliance and gallantry of the Risorgimento. On the contrary, it is merely to emphasize the fact that Italian strength was limited and Italian statesmanship was therefore bound, in the very nature of things, to exploit European discord to Italian profit. Singlehanded, Italy was not a match for Austria-Hungary or for France, and as a consequence, aspiration had always to wait upon opportunity.

The course pursued by Italian statesmanship in the opening stage of the World War is therefore typical.

1918-1932, 1932; Foreign Policy Association, "Italian Foreign and Colonial Policy," *Information Service*, Vol. III, No. 1, 1927; Migot, Robert, and Gusthal, Comte, *La Guerre est Là*, 1932; Salvemini, Gaetano, *Mussolini Diplomate*, 1932; Slocombe, George, *The Dangerous Sea*, 1937.

With the issues at stake between the two contending coalitions, Italy was not directly concerned. To fight as the ally of Germany against the British was out of the question, given the Italian geographical situation.¹ Her neutrality, however, might have been secured by the Central Powers in return for Austrian cession of Trieste and the Trentino (*Italia Irredenta*).² When Vienna, despite the urgings of Berlin, declined to pay that price, Italy joined the Allies.

The tradition of Italian national policy, then, is opportunist and its direction is constantly changing and unpredictable. Since Italian strength, moreover, is unequal to that of Germany, France, or Great Britain, the principal opponents to her expansionist dreams on the Continent or around the Mediterranean, her ambitions can be fulfilled only during periods of confusion when the relationships of these powers are conflicting and their attention distracted from Italian purposes.

Concerning the Italian problem of security, it is evident that in so far as land frontiers are concerned the geographical position of Italy is more favorable than that of any other Great Power of Europe. The Alps, extending in a broad half-circle from Ventimiglia on the French frontier to Fiume on the Yugoslav, constitute a formidable rampart. They are, moreover, covered on the north from the St. Bernard Pass to the Stelvio Pass by Switzerland, and from the Stelvio to the Karawanken by Germany, the Axis partner of Italy. Since, too, for all practical purposes, the Franco-Italian frontier from Mont Blanc to Menton is practically impassable,

¹ To the Treaty of Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy was attached a Declaration by Italy that the alliance could not "in any case be regarded as being directed against England."

² Bülow, B., Fürst von, *Memoirs*, 1931-32, 4 vols.

ble for invading armies, and, in addition, French policy has no purpose fundamentally inimical to Italy, the frontier in the west, like that on the north, enjoys a high degree of security.

On the east, however, the weak point in the Italian protective armor has been the quarrel with Yugoslavia. The creation of this state, containing fourteen million South Slavs, was as grave a check to Italian ambitions¹ as the renascence of Poland was to German prospects. In its origin this quarrel dates back to the Paris Conference, where Italy on the strength of the "secret treaties" made with her allies, claimed Dalmatia.² The bitterness provoked by the denial of these claims at the Conference table was heightened with D'Annunzio's seizure of Fiume in defiance of Europe. The treatment of the Slav minority of nearly a half million within Italian frontiers further exacerbated Yugoslav feelings, whereas Italian resentment was similarly aroused by Yugoslav claims to Fiume, Trieste, and Gorizia.

The postwar years were, therefore, marked by a long series of incidents which disturbed the relations of the two Adriatic states and at times even threatened the tranquillity of Europe. Italian action was always limited, too, by the knowledge that, whereas Yugoslavia was too weak to undertake a war singlehanded, any opponent of Italy would find a ready ally beyond the Adriatic. When, following the triumph of Fascism, relations between Paris and Rome became more strained, an alliance between Yugoslavia and France was concluded,³ confronting Italy thereby with the possibility

¹ Adriacus (*pseud.*), *From Trieste to Valona*, 1919; MacDonald, J. N., *A Political Escapade*, 1921; Woodhouse, E. J., and Woodhouse, C. G., *Italy and the Yugoslavs*, 1920.

² Articles 5, 6, and 7, Treaty of London, April 26, 1915.

³ The Franco-Yugoslav Alliance was signed November 11, 1927.

of a war on two fronts if she came to grips with either of her northern neighbors.

It was largely in the hope of finding some solution for the Italo-Yugoslav quarrel that the French foreign minister, Louis Barthou, invited King Alexander to visit France in October, 1934. But when monarch and minister both perished at an assassin's hand in Marseille, the promise of adjustment was dissipated for an indefinite time. Not until the signing of a five-year pact of friendship and nonaggression between Belgrade and Rome in March of 1937, was Italy able to fill the breach in her otherwise well-nigh impregnable frontier.

Actually, then, Italy has succeeded where France failed. She has reached her natural frontier at the Alps, whereas the French have been unable to acquire theirs at the Rhine. Again, although the dissolution of the Yugoslav monarchy and the establishment of an independent Croatia would doubtless be of advantage to the Italians, no extension of their land frontiers could give them greater security than they now possess, and in this respect the contrast between their situation and that of the Germans was, up to 1938, impressive.

On the sea and in the air, on the other hand, the Italian situation is less satisfactory. Dependent upon the outside world for her raw materials, which must be imported by sea, Italy is confronted with the fact that the approach to her shores is commanded both by British naval bases at Gibraltar, Malta, and Aden, and by French bases at Toulon, Corsica, and Bizerta.¹ And

¹ "Ours is a vital problem that involves our very existence and our future, a future of peace, tranquillity, and work for a population of 42 million souls, which will number 50 million in another fifteen years. Can this population live and prosper in a territory half the size of that of Spain and Germany and lacking raw materials and natural resources to meet its vital needs, pent up in a closed sea beyond which its commerce

all of her great cities, Turin, Milan, Genoa, Florence, Rome, Naples, and Palermo, are within easy range of French air attack, while Trieste, Venice, and Bologna are similarly exposed to Yugoslav attack from the air.

Territorial security for Italy is therefore a question of ships, aircraft, and strategic holdings.¹ Naval parity with Great Britain is beyond Italian financial resources, but Italy has been able to establish two definite threats to British trade lines. The fortifications in Sicily and Pantelleria have made Malta highly vulnerable, establishing a strangle hold in the middle of the Mediterranean controlled by Italy. And the British strangle hold at the south end of the Red Sea, based on the port of Aden and the island of Perim, has been somewhat counterbalanced by Italian military developments in connection with the Ethiopian conquest. Although Italian national policy may grudgingly accept the necessity, therefore, of avoiding war with Great Britain, the British, despite their superior navy and finances, would be in danger of some disastrous defeats before they could finally overcome Italy.

Even to arm up to the level of France at sea would be possible for Italy only if France consented both to Italian parity and to a limitation of naval strength fixed at a low level; for the limitation imposed by Italian financial resources makes success in open competition out of the question. As long as France refuses such

lies, a sea the outlets of which are owned by other nations, while yet others control the means of access—the Caudine Forks of her liberty, safety, and means of livelihood—and while all the nations of the world are raising barriers against the development of trade, the movement of capital, and emigration, denationalizing whoever crosses their frontiers to enter, I do not say their own homes, but even their protectorates and colonies?" (Article by Dino Grandi, "The Foreign Policy of the Duce," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1934, p. 566.)

¹ Slocombe, George, *The Dangerous Sea*, 1937; *Editorial Research Reports*, "Anglo-Italian Rivalry in the Mediterranean," Vol. 1, No. 14, 1937.

parity, Italian inferiority is inescapable. But also as long as Germany threatens France, Italian friendship is essential.

In the air, the Italians possess approximate parity with the French; but, unfortunately for them, the advantages of geography all lie with France. Of the larger French cities, only Nice, Marseille, and Lyon are especially vulnerable to Italian air raids, while all Italian cities are exposed to French air attacks, particularly in the highly industrialized regions of the north, around Turin, Genoa, and Milan.

Against attacks by land, then, Italy does possess security, but on the sea and in the air her safety is open to grave doubt. If Italy were content not to expand further, she would need to fear only one other country, expansionist Germany, which since *Anschluss* with Austria, could threaten both Upper Adige and Fiume. If Italy, however, must continue her conquests, she thereby places her security in jeopardy. Nor does the present Berlin-Rome axis of international movement release Italian concern from the long-term menace of Germany.

Turning to the question of national unity, it is evident that no ethnic problem, such as confronts the Germans, faces the Italians. Aside from a handful of Italians in the Swiss canton of Ticino, there is no Italian minority on the mainland of Europe; and although the inhabitants of Corsica speak Italian, they are as French in sentiment as were the Alsatians before 1871. In fact, by 1937 Italy had not only attained but passed her ethnic limits. In the upper Adige, she held a quarter of a million Germans,¹ and in the hinterland of Trieste half a

¹ Reut-Nicolussi, E., *Tyrol Under the Axe of Italian Fascism*, 1930.

million Slavs.¹ There is, then, no Italian irredenta left in Europe, for with the World War the unification of Italy on the Continent was completed. But along the northern coast of Africa there are more Italians than French in the French territories of Algeria and Tunisia, and more Italians than English in Egypt. In 1937 these minorities in Africa were not at the moment a burning question, but the fact that their presence provides sufficient tinder for a possible future conflagration can be neither disputed nor ignored.

On the economic side, Italy is the weakest of all the Great Powers.² Like France, to be sure, she is largely able to feed her population, but unlike France she has only a limited supply of iron, and unlike Germany she is without coal. In addition, she is completely destitute of most of the other essential raw materials of industry. To supply her own national industrial establishment she has to draw heavily upon the outside world, and to pay for her imports she has neither great resources in raw materials nor the capacity to export machinery or chemicals, as Germany does, although her exports of various products have been considerable.

Before the war, Italy was able to maintain a balance in her economy largely by the export of labor, for her prolific population is her greatest natural resource. Every year hundreds of thousands of her people left home for the United States, South America, and France.³

¹ Jaquin, Pierre, *La Question des Minorités entre l'Italie et la Yougoslavie*, 1929.

² Einzig, Paul, *The Economic Foundations of Fascism*, 1933; Foreign Policy Association, "The Economic Situation in Italy: The Corporative System," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. X, No. 23, 1935; Foreign Policy Association, *Foreign Policy Reports*, "The Economic Situation in Italy: Italy in the World Crisis," Vol. X, No. 24, 1935; McGuire, C. E., *Italy's International Economic Position*, 1926.


³ Davic, Maurice Rea, *World Immigration with Special Reference to the United States*, 1936; Foerster, R. F., *The Italian Emigration of Our Times*, 1919.

ITALY




NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOODSTUFFS, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, AND RAW MATERIALS

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND NET IMPORTS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES OF
AVERAGE NATIONAL CONSUMPTION (1925-29)

— GREAT ESSENTIALS —



CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS



■ PRODUCTION
▨ NET IMPORTS
● EXPORTABLE SURPLUS

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The larger part of these emigrants settled abroad, although a fraction returned each year in the slack periods. Many, however, continued to remit a portion of their earnings, and thus supplied their mother country with considerable resources in foreign exchange.

Even before the war, however, the United States, by its immigration laws, began shutting out Italians like all other aliens. In South America and France, too, the postwar depression led to a similar course. Thus, just as Germany after 1933 could not sell her manufactures, Italy presently found herself unable to dispose of her surplus labor.¹ But reduction in the foreign markets brought with it no corresponding diminution of the domestic requirements, and since economic self-sufficiency was impossible, Italian necessity had outrun Italian resources.

At that point population pressure began to assume dangerous proportions, because on an area only a little more than half as large as that of France and far less productive, Italy presently was supporting a larger number of people. And whereas the French population was nearly stationary, the Italian was increasing nearly half a million annually and emigration no longer served as a safety valve. To expand or to suffocate² was the Italian alternative, if the increase in population were not artificially restricted.

Restriction, however, which for France was possible, because she had already attained her desired situation in Europe and in addition had secured a vast empire beyond the seas, in the Italian case could only mean acceptance of the present narrow territorial limits, and

¹ Woog, Claude, *La Politique d'Emigration de l'Italie*, 1931.

² Guyot, Georges, *L'Italie devant le Problème Colonial*, 1927; Villari, Luigi, *The Expansion of Italy*, 1930.

in effect the eventual surrender of the rank of a Great Power. Among the smaller powers, Poland and Spain already surpassed Italy both in extent of their territories and in the wealth of their resources, and their populations were steadily growing. For Italy, therefore, acceptance of a policy of artificial limitation of population would impose renunciation of the single means by which she could hope to escape from a territorial status quo which insured a progressive decline in international importance.

France, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia have laid the foundations of a future as promising materially as the present, in their lands beyond the European region. Within the European region, Germany has persistently sought to attain ethnic unity which carries with it economic implications that are unmistakable. For France, the future is visibly in Africa, for Russia in Asia, for Great Britain all around the Seven Seas, and, last of all, for Germany in eastern Europe. But where does the Italian future lie? With the rise of Fascism, Italy presented to the world the spectacle of an amazing paradox. The poorest of the Great Powers, she was dominated not only by the most ambitious of national policies but also by the most determined of national dictators. Since Napoleon, no state had possessed a master of the capacity and quality of Benito Mussolini; and for his country he dreamed of a population of sixty millions and a place in the sun assured by the force of these numbers.

To support such a population, Italy would need more land, and to acquire land she would have to despoil a present possessor. Obviously, however, it was beyond Italian power to seize British or French territory, and it

was beyond British or French purpose voluntarily to surrender land. Moreover, the dream of territorial compensations in the colonial field, which Italy had cherished at the Paris Conference, had been roughly shattered. To be sure, her prewar bargains, the "secret treaties" of which so much was once heard, had marked with Italian color the southern half of Asia Minor above the Gulf of Adalia. But Kemal Pasha in revitalizing Turkey had demolished that hope.

In central and southeastern Europe, too, the Italian road was blocked. In the Danubian Basin, French guarantees covered the nations of the Little Entente, prior to German dominance in those areas. In the Balkan region Mussolini's first adventure at Corfu had disclosed to him that the greatest obstacle to Italian expansion in the Mediterranean was the British fleet, which, in that region, stood ready to block any territorial change. Only when the British allowed their navy to become weaker than usual did Italy venture to invade Ethiopia. That invasion, however, reawakened the British with a jolt, spurring them to begin building a fleet able, if necessary, to block further Italian conquests.

When the triumphs of Hitler and National Socialism in Germany in 1933-1937 were visibly carrying Europe from a postwar period to a prewar era, the situation for Italy was like that which had existed in 1914 and 1915, when she was in a position to bargain both with the Central Powers and with the Allies. It was also like the situations of 1859, of 1866, and of 1870 as well, when Italy made continuous steps toward achieving her unity by using the disturbances and preoccupations of the Powers to her own advantage.

On the Continent after 1933 two conflicting purposes appeared squarely in shock: the status quo policy of France, supported by Poland, the Little Entente, and more recently by Soviet Russia, and the revisionist policy advocated by Germany and, on her own independent course, by mutilated and irreconcilable Hungary. On the side lines, too, was Great Britain, equally disturbed by the spectacle of a rearmed Reich and the rise of Italian power in the Mediterranean. British policy, moreover, though isolationist in theory, was becoming by 1937 inextricably involved in European commitments, thanks to the rearmament program which was restoring to Britain more diplomatic prestige.

What, then, was the natural and immediate objective of Italian policy in this confused and incoherent situation? Obviously, to prevent a German union with Austria, which would bring the military frontier of the Reich to the Brenner Pass and the hinterland of Trieste and not impossibly might also prove the preface to the construction of a Mittel-europa which would automatically put a term to Italian influence in Europe. So far, Italian policy was manifestly on all fours with French. And that fact had been demonstrated as far back as 1931, when Brüning had tried to achieve an Austro-German tariff union, and again in the Italian mobilization after the murder of Dollfuss in July, 1934.

On the other hand, Italian interest dictated the destruction of French political influence in the Danubian area by the dissolution of the Little Entente and the substitution therefor of a combination directed from Rome. And as German advance was to be blocked only by the maintenance of Austrian independence, Italian combination in the Danubian area could simi-

larly be based only upon Austria and Hungary.¹ As Italy backed France against Germany in the matter of Austro-German tariff union, moreover, she had also stood with Germany, even before the coming of Hitler, against French plans for reconstruction in the Danubian region.

In the matter of disarmament, Italy had supported Germany against France, expecting that parity between these two would give to the Italian army the balance of power on the Continent.² When Germany rearmed to the French level instead of France disarming to the German, Italian expectations were realized, and so she was able to defy the British by her Ethiopian expedition and to ignore at the beginning of 1937 a new British-Italian naval agreement even when it was being made. All former talk by Italy and Great Britain about the value of naval limitation was lost in the world's frantic armament race which had already achieved the war footing of 1916. Finally in regard to the League of Nations,³ Italy delivered in the Ethiopian war a

¹ In March of 1934, Italy concluded the so-called Rome Protocols with Austria and Hungary which guaranteed not only political solidarity and consultation on all common interests between the three parties, but also certain trade agreements. Although the trade benefits derived from the Rome agreement were largely destroyed as a result of Italy's Ethiopian campaign, the provisions of the 1934 Protocols were again reasserted in March, 1936, and sanctioned by Germany in the Austro-German Pact of July 11, 1936.

² Concerning the function of Italy in the balance of power in Europe the following paragraph taken from an article by Dino Grandi ("The Foreign Policy of the Duce," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1934, p. 561) is of interest:

"This function is dictated to Italy by her geographical position and her Mediterranean interests. With her natural frontiers, Italy has no dreams of continental conquests; but she must be safe in the continent to which she is attached and on the seas that surround her. This security can only be guaranteed by the equilibrium of European forces. Italy's freedom is compromised the moment this balance is disturbed. Thus Italy cannot be other than adverse to the formation of military alliances, political blocs, and closed systems. . . ."

³ Foreign Policy Association, "The League and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XI, No. 18, 1935; Reale, Egidio, *La Politique Fasciste et la Société des Nations*, 1932; Silvio, Trentin, *Le Fascismo à Genève*, 1932.

paralyzing blow which was to be followed soon by the equally devastating circumstances of the Spanish conflict.¹

In the place of the League, Italy on the morrow of Hitler's triumph had advocated the restoration of the Concert of Europe, limited to Great Britain, France, Germany, and herself, because in such a *partie-carrée* with the smaller allies of France excluded, Italian influence would always be considerable, and in the matter of armaments Rome might count upon the support of both Great Britain and Germany, where French military or naval strength was in question. Always, too, in such a combination, French assistance against Germany seemed certain, where the fate of Austria was involved.

In June, 1934, the first meeting between the Duce and the Fuehrer, held at Venice, ended in stormy disagreement. Immediately Nazi "intervention" increased in Austria, culminating in the bloody revolt of July 25th and the murder of Mussolini's protégé, Chancellor Dollfuss. And so the Italian dictator abandoned for a time his program of German-Italian co-operation.

Convinced, then, not of the impossibility of eventual German-Italian association, but at least of the present irreconcilability of his own program with that of Hitler, Mussolini moved rapidly toward a combination with France based upon the necessity of opposing a united front to a common peril. This Franco-Italian rapprochement appeared complete in January, 1935, when Laval visited Italy to sign the Rome

¹ Foreign Policy Association, "The Dangerous Year," by R. L. Buell, *Foreign Policy Pamphlets*, No. 2, 1936; and "Chaos or Reconstruction," same author, *Foreign Policy Pamphlets*, No. 3, 1937.

Pact,¹ and it stood up in the Stresa Conference in April and through the summer of preparations for the Ethiopian war. But under pressure from Great Britain and the other League states for sanctions, Franco-Italian unity collapsed,² and in 1936 it became apparent that Italy was again opposing France and collaborating with Germany, both in Spain and in the Danubian Basin.

Mussolini's method has been, then, a return to the national strategy of maneuver, now called a blackmail policy, which is in accordance with the tradition of Cavour. Although Italian policy, intricate, involved, ever shifting in its immediate objective, is manifestly beyond the resources of a democracy, it is fully within those of a state whose action is completely dictated by a single mind, particularly by a mind as acute and agile as that of Mussolini. But it must be clearly apparent that such a policy has nothing in common with the

¹ The Rome Pact, signed in Rome by M. Laval and Signor Mussolini on January 7, 1935, was an agreement whereby France met Italy's principal demands in Africa in return for concessions by Italy in central and eastern Europe.

The published summary recorded: (1) Intention of both to consult together in case of a new threat to Austrian independence; (2) Agreement on necessity of a multilateral understanding in which Germany, Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia would undertake to respect their mutual frontiers and abstain from meddling in each other's internal affairs; (3) Franco-Italian opposition to unilateral treaty revision, especially German rearmament; (4) French cession to Italy of 44,500 square miles bordering on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and a strip of French Somaliland giving Eritrea outlet to the Gulf of Aden, and recognizing Italian sovereignty over the island of Doumerah in the Red Sea; (5) The granting to Italy of a share in the ownership and management of the Addis Ababa - Jibuti Railway in Ethiopia; (6) Continuation, for 30 years, of old concessions to the 100,000 Italians living in the French protectorate of Tunisia, and the granting of some new long-term concessions.

It is thought that France gave Italy a free hand in Ethiopia and agreed to press Great Britain and the League to do the same. The Rome Pact was hailed in both countries as a major contribution to European peace.

² In his Milan speech of November 1, 1936, Mussolini, in commenting on Franco-Italian relations, said: "After seventeen years of polemics, recrimination, and misunderstanding of problems left in suspense, accords with France were reached in January, 1935. . . . But sanctions came along. . . . And it is quite evident that as long as the French government maintains toward us an attitude of waiting and reserve we cannot but do the same toward her."

ideas and ideals which had been professed by all the world in the immediate postwar years.

On the contrary, Italian policy, as it has progressively disclosed itself, is *Realpolitik* in its least disguised form. It is a deliberate and calculated pursuit of power and prestige by the exploitation of the divisions existing between other powers. Beyond these immediate objectives, too, lies the larger possibility that, as Italy has acquired Milan, Venice, Rome, and Trieste as a consequence of wars between other powers, similar conflict may in the future bring equally shining prizes. The very essence of Italian policy, then, is the prevention of the establishment of a system of ordered and permanent peace.

While the Italian national policy is dynamic, like the German, nevertheless the distinction between the two is significant, for it opens new vistas—or, more exactly, revives old—in the field of international relations.

At bottom, the German challenge to the existing order constitutes a revolt against a system of inequality imposed as a consequence of military defeat. The rights which Germany demands, those of self-defense and of self-determination, are only rights which all other great peoples possess and have exercised. It is largely the implications of German policy, as they threaten the interests of France, Britain, Russia, and others, that explain the resistance to the purposes of Germany in the modification of her strategic position.

Contemporary Italy, by contrast, possesses the largest measure of physical security national frontiers can conceivably bestow. Again, unlike the Germans in 1937, who saw, just beyond their frontiers, not less than ten

millions of people who spoke their language and had expressed their desire to be united with the Reich, the Italians can discover no ethnic minority. They have, in fact, not only achieved but overpassed their ethnic limits.

Actually, then, what is the explanation for the Italian intransigence? No Treaty of Versailles of as recent date as 1919 inspires contemporary revolt. No Treaty of Frankfort of ancient date but enduring memory explains their unrest. In fact, every treaty of peace Italy has signed, during the past three quarters of a century, has expanded her frontiers and increased her prestige. Yet she is today manifestly in rebellion against the status quo. Why?

Italy is in rebellion because she is hungry. The well-fed nations have refused both her labor and her goods by raising immigration and tariff bars. The result has been a threat to her standard of living and a growing dissatisfaction at home. The increase in population pressure was bound to result in explosion either within Italy or without. The Ethiopian war of 1935-1936 was the first manifestation of the force of circumstances; and the invasion of Spain by "volunteers" in 1936-1939 was the second. This turning of internal pressure into foreign wars, however, is a costly process and in the end only adds to domestic difficulties. Actually, then, the problem of Fascist Italy is that of material security against the peril within and not of military security against aggression from without.

The economic policies of the well-fed nations have brought slow starvation and a cloud of impending disaster to those nations less fortunately situated. Thus, in a period of nominal peace, Italy has been subjected

in reality to the experiences hitherto the lot only of cities blockaded and besieged in war. In a very real sense, therefore, the Ethiopian and the Spanish enterprises represented not so much the departure of an invading host as the sortie of a beleaguered garrison.

Behind the dream of foreign conquest has lurked the fear of domestic upheaval. The people of Italy are hungry both psychologically and physically, and they are led under Fascism to feel strong enough to allay by force their hunger for glory and for bread. By organizing and regimenting the explosive forces of the nation to blow off through adventure abroad, Mussolini has thus postponed the day of explosive discontents at home. Since, too, his appraisal of the situation has prevented him from acting otherwise, Mussolini the conqueror is in reality Mussolini the captive.

From the very first the Duce has dismissed peace as the last and peculiar blessing of the fed and sated nations and has accepted war as the inescapable necessity of the less fortunate people. His angry retort to foreign critics that, for Italy, democracy and peace together promised a future worthy only of a nation of organ-grinders living amid the ruins of imperial Rome, was but a manifestation of the strain of diminishing well-being at home.

The actions of Italy, as of Germany and Japan, have thus served to disclose to the British and American nations that hungry peoples are blind to the charms of liberty and to the blessings of peace. To the satisfied nations it is becoming further evident that the postwar calculations of the League, based on an accurate appraisal of what another war would mean in disaster to the well-fed nations, have been reduced to futility. It has become evident, therefore, that under the strain of

material privation peoples instinctively turn from democracy to dictators. Nor is it less evident that these dictators, under the pressure of the same impulsion, must turn from peace to war if other means of national well-being are denied them. Mussolini as the captive of material necessities has acted for his own best interests when faced with the inescapable choice between domestic revolution and foreign conquest. Indeed, his action has made him the symbol of a new revolt against another inequality, that of hungry and well-fed nations trying to live side by side.

• The ideology of Fascism, therefore, has been patterned into a cloth to cover the naked realities of Italian necessity. In its international outlook Fascism starts with the assumption that the rights of peoples, territorial and otherwise, have their origin in force. French title to Tunisia, British to Malta, Yugoslav to Dalmatia—that is, to lands the possession of which Italy covets—have no other validity than the force which lies behind them.

Fascism does not approach the world with the claim that, because Italian territory today hardly suffices to contain and support Italian numbers and tomorrow must prove insufficient, Italy should be allotted new colonies or a fresh mandate. On the contrary, Fascism teaches the Italian people that the single means of escape from their present circumstances is force. As for the outside world, Fascism meets its proposals for a peace of stabilization with an uncompromising negative.

The alleged idealism of these proposals Fascism rejects with scorn. For it, they are no more than the disclosure of Hypocrisy endeavoring to masquerade as Virtue. And at this point Italian policy does revert to

Italian experience. Before she entered the World War on the Allied side in 1915, Italy made certain bargains with her prospective Allies. Territories and compensations were promised her, not only European, but also Asiatic and African. Dalmatia was one prospective prize, Libyan hinterlands another, Adalian Anatolia a third.

But at Paris the British and French partners produced American principles to justify them for the repudiation of their Italian bargain. The principle of self-determination which was invoked against Italian acquisition of Dalmatia was not, however, invoked to prevent France from obtaining a mandate for Syria, or Great Britain for German East Africa. If geographical circumstances and economic considerations dictated that Fiume, despite its ethnic character, should go to Yugoslavia, what then hindered the return of Malta to Italy or of Cyprus to Greece?

What Frederick the Great said about Maria Theresa in the time of the Partition of Poland—"She weeps but she takes her share"—the Italians say of the post-war idealism of the English-speaking peoples. The Fascists might perhaps be prepared to accept the principle of self-determination as applied to Italian aspirations, but only after it has also been applied to British possessions. Since it is not likely to be applied, however, they regard it as an instrument of policy, not an expression of spiritual elevation. If D'Annunzio's seizure of Fiume or Mussolini's occupation of Corfu was a crime, how, Fascism inquires, shall one defend the course of Theodore Roosevelt, who, in his own phrase, "took" Panama, or that of Woodrow Wilson in sending warships to Veracruz?

It is, in a word, the example and not the precept of the British and the Americans which the Italians accept. And with neither do they quarrel in principle. They believe that Italy was excessively mistreated at the Paris Peace Conference, particularly because, unlike Great Britain, France, Japan, and Belgium, she was denied a mandate. But they also believe that the cause of her misfortunes was primarily the ineptitude of the Liberal regime which they have abolished. Apart from that fact, too, they believe Italy can never expect better treatment save as Italian strength commands greater consideration. They continue to press a legal claim against France for unfulfilled promises, but they do not invoke any moral issue to support their claim.

Internationally the strong nation takes what it wants and keeps what it has taken; that is the Fascist philosophy in a nutshell. And because it expects that Italy will one day be as strong in body as it now is in spirit, Fascism raises no protest to what other nations have done in the past but only to what they now say about their deeds. In Fascist estimation, furthermore, the League of Nations was merely the product of American naiveté, which was skillfully exploited by the British and French as an instrument of their respective national policies.

"The Golden Age of Reason and Peace has now arrived," say the British from Malta, the French from Bizerta, the Americans from Panama.

"How fortunate to be able to afford the Gold Standard in morals!" Fascist Italy replies. "For ourselves, however, unhappily we have not yet been able to accumulate sufficient capital to indulge in that measure of virtue. Not being able to imitate your present pre-

tensions, therefore, we must be forgiven if we continue to model our policy upon your past performance."

That, simply, cynically, but clearly is the Fascist "Credo." In the contemporary Italian conception internationalism is the last resort of the valetudinarian; by contrast, nationalism, undisguised and uncompromising, is the inherent virtue of peoples that are young like the Italy of Benito Mussolini. As a matter of expediency Italy can temporarily work with Germany against France, Britain, and Russia; but a change in material interest will invariably bring a change in partners. Always it seeks profit by force; occasionally it must advocate peace to preserve its force; but such peace is not an end but a means.

See, next, pages 727ff.

Chapter XV

SOVIET RUSSIA

ANY attempt to draw a rigid distinction between European and Asiatic Russia must be largely without justification in fact. Not only does the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics extend in vast unbroken continuity from Archangel to Vladivostok and from the Crimea to Kamchatka, but also the size of its population and the development of its industries, transportation system, and military strength all make it an important factor alike in Europe and in Asia.

Strategically, the Soviet Union is vulnerable only at its eastern and western extremities, its northern borders being protected by ice-fields, swamps, tundra, and forest, and its vast southern boundary being composed largely of mountain and desert barriers. The additional factor of vastness of land area has also had a profound influence upon natural protection from invasion.

Before the war the vulnerability of Russia to attack from Europe was much more serious than today. Two great military powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, were immediate neighbors, and the lack of adequate

transport hopelessly curtailed the mobility of the armies of the Czar. Nor was Russia's industrial equipment sufficiently developed to sustain adequately alone any vast military undertaking.

Since the war the attention of the Soviet Union has been particularly concentrated upon the problem of overcoming the natural disabilities of geography along the western frontier. In the first place, the Soviet authorities have succeeded in concluding treaties of nonaggression with all the immediate neighbors of Russia to the west and south,¹ with the exception of Rumania,² thus creating the most extensive line of buffer states in the world. In addition, the Franco-Russian and Czechoslovakian-Russian alliances of 1935 further completed a protective ring against Russia's most dangerous enemy, Nazi Germany.

On the material side, too, the construction of railways and roads, the creation of a vast army and air force completely equipped with modern instruments of warfare, and, finally, the establishment of other industrial centers in the Urals and in the Kuznetsk area of central Siberia, besides the more vulnerable Donets Basin, have enhanced immeasurably the defense potentialities of the Soviet Union.

¹ The following are the countries with which the Soviet Union has signed treaties of nonaggression, given in order of the date of signature; Turkey, December 17, 1925, Germany, April 24, 1926; Afghanistan, August 31, 1926; Lithuania, September 28, 1926; Persia, October 1, 1927; Finland, January 21, 1932; Latvia, February 5, 1932; Estonia, May 4, 1932; Poland, July 25, 1932; France, November 29, 1932; France, May 2, 1935.

² With regard to Rumania it should be noted that in July of 1933 Russia signed a general Convention for the definition of aggression with Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania, and Turkey which provided the formula that any attack upon territory "actually occupied" by another state amounted to aggression. This, of course, was interpreted by Rumania as being a recognition of the annexation of Bessarabia, although the nonaggression features of this general Convention were not as strictly binding as the bilateral treaties mentioned in footnote 1 above.

In the Far East similar preparations have likewise been undertaken as a defense primarily against Japanese pretensions. Not only have military and air bases been established along the Manchukuoan border from Lake Baikal to the Pacific coast, but an important submarine base has been constructed at Vladivostok. The completion, moreover, of the double-track system on the Trans-Siberian railway and the construction of the BAM line as an alternative route from Taishet west of Lake Baikal to Komsomolsk in the Maritime provinces has reduced greatly the hazard of disaster through the cutting, by Japanese forces, of the Trans-Siberian road which lies close to the border of Manchukuo.

The Soviet Union offers, therefore, an interesting example of a nation whose strategic position has been greatly improved through overcoming by political and material means the disadvantages of its geographical position.

Although Russia's vast domain makes possible the attainment of a degree of economic self-sufficiency approximating that of the United States,¹ she lacks the further advantage that assured access to regional sources of raw materials bestows upon the latter country. Food, petroleum, and lumber she has in exportable quantities. Iron, steel, and coal she possesses in amounts adequate for domestic needs, while her cotton production seems destined to keep pace with her home demands. Gold, manganese, and platinum also constitute resources to balance her present imports of machinery.

Today, of course, the Soviet Union is notoriously in a process of transformation. From the largely agricul-

¹ American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, *Handbook of the Soviet Union*, 1936; Gubkin, I. M., *The Natural Wealth of the Soviet Union and Its Exploitation*, 1932; U. S. S. R. Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, "Nature and Natural Resources of the Soviet Far East," Council Papers No. 4, 1936; Wood, J. B., *Incredible Siberia*, 1928.

tural empire of the Romanovs¹ it has already expanded into one of the most considerable industrial countries of the world.² Although, in comparison with the American industry, the Russian is still small, yet the Soviet production of iron and steel is rapidly overtaking that of the other industrial nations and has already decisively outdistanced that of both Japan and Italy.

Measured by her own domestic requirements, however, Russia's progress toward complete industrialization still has far to go before she can even provide for the many necessities of farm and city required by her people. In fact, the distance still to be traversed before she can insure to her people even a decent standard of living is enormous.

It is easy, too, in the light of Red propaganda, to exaggerate not merely the present progress but also the future possibilities of Russian industrialization. Food-stuffs there are in quantities which, with modern farm machinery, can adequately supply the growing population.³ Iron and coal exist in many regions but rarely

¹ For general books on the political, social, and economic history of Czarist Russia, the student should refer to the following: Mavor, James, *An Economic History of Russia*, 1925, 2 vols.; Miller, M. S., *The Economic Development of Russia, 1905-1914*, 1926; Pares, Sir Bernard, *History of Russia*, 1930; Robinson, G. T., *Rural Russia Under the Old Regime*, 1932; Vernadsky, A. G., *A History of Russia*, 1929; same author, *Political and Diplomatic History of Russia*, 1936.

² Chamberlin, W. H., *Russia's Iron Age*, 1934; Dobb, M. H., and Stevens, H. C., *Russian Economic Development Since the Revolution*, 1928; Dobb, Gerhard, ed., *Red Economics*, 1932; Fischer, Louis, *Machines and Men in Russia*, 1932; Friedman, E. M., *Russia in Transition*, 1932; Hoover, C. B., *The Economic Life of Soviet Russia*, 1931; Hubbard, L. E., *Soviet Money and Finance*, 1936; Huppert, Hugo, *Men of Siberia*, 1935; Lawton, Lancelot, *An Economic History of Soviet Russia*, 1932; Mikhaylov, N., *Soviet Geography: The New Industrial and Economic Distribution of the U. S. S. R.*, 1935; Reddaway, W. B., *The Russian Financial System*, 1935; U. S. S. R. Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, "The Economic Development of the Soviet Far East," *Council Papers* No. 2, 1936.


³ Beauchamp, Joan, *Agriculture in Soviet Russia*, 1931; Goldstein, J. M., *The Agricultural Crisis*, 1935; Timoshenko, V. P., *Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem*, 1932.

RUSSIA




NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOODSTUFFS, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, AND RAW MATERIALS

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND NET IMPORTS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES OF
AVERAGE NATIONAL CONSUMPTION (1929-32)

— GREAT ESSENTIALS —



CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS



■ PRODUCTION
▨ NET IMPORTS
● EXPORTABLE SURPLUS

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in the same happy proximity as in the United States. No new Pittsburgh or Cleveland seems likely to rise beside the headwaters of the Yenisei or on the shores of Lake Baikal. Today the coal of the Kuznetsk Basin has to be moved fifteen hundred miles to meet the iron of the Urals at Magnitogorsk, although in the Donets Basin in Europe the corresponding distance is less.

Provided Russia is spared domestic upheaval or foreign interference, however, it is hard to set any limit to her possible expansion in numbers and power. More than 3,000,000 are annually added to the population of the Soviet Union, estimated at 170,000,000 in 1937, and that means a gain of 60,000,000 in a single generation. Of cultivable land there still remains a considerable area as yet unoccupied, although the "covered wagon" era is over in Russia as in the American Far West. However, of the whole Siberian area, which seems so imposing on the map, the larger portion is tundra and desert and therefore has proportionately limited exploitable value.

So far as one can see today, then, Russia will not immediately become a considerable or serious competitor in the world markets, although she will continue to be a large producer and exporter of certain raw materials.¹ Meantime, having determined to concentrate its energies upon industrialization rather than upon communizing the rest of the world,² the Soviet regime stands squarely for peace.

¹ Budish, J. M., and Shipman, S. S., *Soviet Foreign Trade: Menace or Promise*, 1931; Campbell, T. D., *Russia, Market or Menace?*, 1932; Conolly, Violet, *Soviet Trade from the Pacific to the Levant*, 1935; Luboff, Edouard, *Soviet Dumping*, 1931.

² Chamberlin, W. H., *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*, 2 vols. 1935; Eastman, Max, *The End of Socialism in Russia*, 1937; Fairburn, W. A., *The International Goal of Russian Communism*, 1931; Florinsky, M. T., *World Revolution and the U. S. S. R.*, 1933; Rosenberg, Arthur, *A History of Bolshevism*, 1934; Schachtman, Max, *Behind the Moscow Trial*, 1936; Trotsky, Leon, *The Third International after Lenin*, 1936; same author, *The Revolution Betrayed*, 1937.

But although the basis of Soviet national policy may be that of peace,¹ the potentialities of Russian power in war are such that her recent return to the councils of Europe, particularly following the overthrow of the German Republic, has profound significance. That such a return was bound, sooner or later, to take place was evident, in view of the size of the population and the extent of the resources of the great Slav state. Indeed, it had already been foreshadowed in the early sessions of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, during 1932, where the words of Litvinov attracted world-wide attention even if they failed to produce proportionate results.²

Nevertheless, in 1932 and even in 1933, when the German Revolution was just beginning to make itself felt, the Soviet Union was still separated from the western world by that barrier of mutual suspicion which the early stages of the Red Revolution had established. On the Russian side, this mistrust dated back to the numerous White offensives, inspired and financed by Allied governments,³ which had marked the first years of the

¹ "The object of the Soviet Government is to save the soil of the first proletarian state from the criminal folly of a new war. To this end the Soviet Union has struggled with the greatest determination and consistency for sixteen years. The defense of peace and of the neutrality of the Soviet Union against all attempts to drag it into the whirlwind of a world war is the central problem of Soviet foreign policy." (Radek, Karl, "The Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1934, p. 206.) For further discussion of this subject, see also: *The Soviet Union and the Cause of Peace*, International Publishers, 1936; Taracouzio, T. A., *The Soviet Union and International Law*, 1935.

² Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The U. S. S. R., and Disarmament," *International Conciliation*, No. 292, 1933; Foreign Policy Association, "The Soviet Union as a European Power," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. IX, No. 11, 1933; Litvinov, Maksim, *The Soviet's Fight for Disarmament*, 1932.


³ Bunyan, James, *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia, April-December, 1918*, 1936; Coates, W. P., and Zelda K., *Armed Intervention in Russia, 1918-1922*, 1935; Denikin, A. I., *The White Army*, 1930; Goode, W. T., *Is Intervention in Russia a Myth?* 1931; Graves, W. S., *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920*, 1931; Stewart, George, *The White Armies of Russia*, 1933.

RUSSIA




POTENTIAL NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOODSTUFFS, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, AND RAW MATERIALS

EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES OF ALL AVAILABLE DOMESTIC SOURCES
OF SUPPLY TO CONSUMPTION

— GREAT ESSENTIALS —



CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS



■ AVERAGE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION.
 ▨ NECESSARY NET IMPORTS.
 ● EXPORTABLE SURPLUS
 ■ ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES POTENTIALLY AVAILABLE FROM INCREASED DOMESTIC OUTPUT. (SUBSTITUTES, STOCK-PILING, AND SECONDARY RECOVERY NOT INCLUDED)
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Russian Revolution.¹ Even as late as 1932 there still lingered in the Russian mind the dominating suspicion that the capitalistic states were plotting a new attack calculated to abolish the threat for them always resident in the Red regime.

The western states likewise remained under the empire of fears born in 1917.² At the Peace Conference in 1919, when Bela Kun had briefly ruled at Budapest, Paris had foreseen Bolshevism sweeping over Central Europe at least to the Rhine. In 1920, the approach of the Red armies to Warsaw had produced new apprehension. Even when the defeat at the Vistula had broken the thrusting power of Bolshevism and the Treaty of Riga had stabilized, on the map, the consequences of that defeat, apprehension still endured.

After 1920, fear of a Russian military offensive disappeared, but it was replaced by the expectation of domestic disturbances engineered from Moscow. That new fear was based upon the obvious fact that the Kremlin was slow to recognize that for a long time to come the conceptions of the Third International and the expectations of a World Revolution must be put aside. As a result the agents of Moscow continued to work secretly if fruitlessly in many countries, and Red scares, in the main little justified, were frequent alike in Great Britain and even in the United States.

It was only gradually that, on the one hand, Stalin turned the attention of the Revolution inward and, on

¹ Bunyan, James, and Fisher, H. H., *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 1934; Chernov, Victor, *The Great Russian Revolution*, 1936; Florinsky, M. T., *The End of the Russian Empire*, 1931; Mavor, James, *An Economic History of Russia*, 1925, 2 vols.; Ross, E. A., *The Russian Soviet Republic, 1918-1922*, 1923; Trotsky, Leon, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, 1932, 3 vols.; Webb, Sidney, and Webb, Beatrice, *Soviet Communism*, 1936.

² Arnot, R. P., *Soviet Russia and Her Neighbors*, 1927; Fletcher, J. G., *Two Frontiers*, 1930.

the other, the western nations became less apprehensive of domestic disturbance due to Communistic activities. Whatever Lenin had believed¹—and the point was long debated—Stalin did see clearly that the Revolution, after 1920, had lost its expansive force and that, in the military jargon, the moment had come to “dig in” and to consolidate the gains already made, which amounted only to the capture of Russia itself.

When, therefore, Stalin had won his victory over Trotsky in 1928 and the Soviets had turned from a program of promoting revolution abroad to a plan for organizing a Marxian state at home, the chief obstacle to the resumption of normal intercourse between Russia and the outside world disappeared. The first and second Five-Year Plans,² moreover, excited the curiosity of western peoples, set in motion a column of tourists journeying to Moscow, and presently not only stimulated the hope of vast trade but actually produced a small trickle of commerce as well. Thus Russia ceased to be at once a mystery and a menace and became the best-publicized of all nations.³

In the English-speaking nations people argued, discussed, and described the Soviet experiment until

¹ Trotsky, Leon, *The Third International after Lenin*, 1936; same author, *The Real Situation in Russia*, 1928.

² Bratskus, Boris, *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, 1935; Chamberlin, W. H., *The Soviet Planned Economic Order*, 1931; Coates, W. P., and Zelds K., *The Second Five-Year Plan of Development of the U. S. S. R.*, 1934; Dobb, M. H., *Soviet Russia and the World*, 1932; Dobbert, Gerhard, ed., *Soviet Economics, a Symposium*, 1933; Knickerbocker, H. R., *The Red Trade Menace; Progress of the Soviet Five-Year Plan*, 1931.

³ Batsell, W. R., *Soviet Rule in Russia*, 1929; Chamberlin, W. H., *Soviet Russia*, 1931, rev. ed.; Duranty, Walter, *Duranty Reports Russia*, 1934; Eckardt, Hans von, *Russia*, 1932; Foreign Policy Association, “The Political Structure of the Soviet State,” *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 1 and 2, 1932; Gurian, Waldemar, *Bolshevism: Theory and Practice*, 1932; Harper, S. N., *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, 1929; same author, *Making Bolsheviks*, 1931; Maxwell, Bertram W., *The Soviet State*, 1934; Strong, Anna Louise, *The New Soviet Constitution: A Study of Social Democracy*, 1937.

familiarity robbed it of most of its sinister implications and curiosity almost everywhere conquered fear. Naturally the change was not complete. The threat to all western states inherent in the Soviet experiment, and the scare the Red Revolution in its earlier stages had given even the democracies of Great Britain, the United States, and France, were in the nature of things bound to have enduring consequences. Yet by 1934, when the Brown Peril of German reaction had captured the columns of the newspapers to the exclusion of the once familiar Red Revolution, the Soviet Union had escaped from its isolated eminence as the major peril to world order, and its entrance into the League of Nations was easily achieved.

Nor did the excesses of the anti-Trotsky blood purges of August, 1936, and January, 1937, destroy the confidence of Europe in the present stability and peaceful intentions of the Stalin regime. For although to the western mind the Soviet court procedure in the trial of its political prisoners appeared as exaggerated in melodrama as in cruelty, there was at least satisfaction in the knowledge that the left-wing Old Guard, the leaders of the Communist international revolutionary thought, were being put aside. With the disappearance of the followers of Trotsky, too, the seal to Stalin's policy of co-operation with the democratic capitalist powers of Europe against the Fascist opponents of Communism was set.

The constitution of 1936,¹ replacing that of 1923, served likewise to illustrate the change in policy taking place within the Soviet Union. One of the most revealing features of this remarkable document was the omis-

¹ Strong, Anna Louise, *The New Soviet Constitution: A Study of Social Democracy, 1937*.

sion of any reference to world revolution. In place of the Communist formula of compensation according to "need" there was substituted the Socialist principle "from each according to his capacity, to each according to his *work*."¹ In addition, whereas the constitution deprived all private individuals of ownership in the means of production, private property in "houses, household furnishings, articles of personal consumption and comfort, and savings accounts" was guaranteed.

Although the new constitution sought to guarantee individual rights and provided for democratic representation in the parliaments of the Union and of the member republics, through direct elections, the all-controlling function of the Communist party was not thereby reduced. Nor has this latter feature, which brings the control of the Soviet Union close to the political one-party concept of Fascism, indicated a change in Russian attitude toward the Fascist menace. For, in international relationships, similarity in trends of political systems is not necessarily productive of parallelism in foreign policy.

In these postwar years, frequent changes have taken place in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.² At Rapallo, in 1922, the Russians and the Germans, at that moment the two pariah peoples of the world, had made

¹ Foreign Policy Association, "The New Constitution of the U. S. S. R.," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1937.

² Besiedovskii, G. Z., *Revelations of a Soviet Diplomat*, 1931; Chamberlin, William Henry, *Collectivism: A False Utopia*, 1937; Davis, Kathryn W., *The Soviets at Geneva*, 1934; Dean, V. M., "Soviet Russia, 1917-1933," *World Affairs Pamphlets*, No. 2, Foreign Policy Association and World Peace Foundation, 1933; Dennis, A. L. P., *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia*, 1924; Fischer, Louis, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, 1930, 2 vols.; Foreign Policy Association, "Developments in Russia's Foreign Relations," *Information Service*, Vol. III, No. 10, 1927, and "The Soviet Union as a European Power," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. IX, No. 11, 1933; Harper, Samuel, ed., *The Soviet Union and World Problems*, 1935; Just, A. W., *The Red Army*, 1936; Scheffer, Paul, *Seven Years in Soviet Russia*, 1932.

a treaty whose immediate effects were enormous.¹ At that time, the Allied peoples were still dominated by their wartime emotions in respect to Germany and their even more recent feelings toward the Red Revolution in Russia. As a consequence, when at the Genoa Conference in 1922 Rathenau produced a pact between Moscow and Berlin, the conference collapsed, Lloyd George's political fortunes were fatally compromised, and the preface to the French occupation of the Ruhr was written.

In point of fact, however, while Rapallo made a tremendous sensation in the world, it had little lasting effect. The fact that Germany had thus undertaken to make a bargain with the Reds, the simple text of which was endowed with every sort of secret and sinister implication, damaged her case alike in the United States and in Great Britain and strengthened the hand of Poincaré correspondingly. Since Rapallo was followed by a period of close co-operation between German generals and the Red Army, many alarmist reports were launched. But three years after Rapallo, German policy abruptly changed cars.

The change followed Stresemann's decision to abandon the effort to evade the Treaty of Versailles, a course which had invited the disaster of a French invasion; to put aside the eastern orientation, which had outraged western public opinion; and to come to terms with all the wartime foes of the Reich, beginning with France. That decision, which found its expression in the accords of Locarno, made Geneva instead of Moscow the goal

¹ By the terms of the Rapallo Treaty the parties agreed: (1) that Germany give the Russian government *de jure* recognition, (2) that Germany free Russia from her Czarist debt obligations, and (3) that the two countries conclude commercial arrangements. While no military clauses as such were publicly announced, it was generally supposed at the time that some understanding for common defense existed.

of German policy, and progressively from 1925 to 1929, when Stresemann died, the ties between the Soviet Union and the German Republic were loosened. There was no actual break; on the contrary, right down to the Hitler uprising the commercial relations continued close; but the older idea of a Russo-German war of vengeance upon the western nations vanished.

With the arrival of the Hitler Revolution, however, the relations between Moscow and Berlin underwent a swift and far-reaching change. The reasons for the change were various. Hitler and his followers justified the severity and violence of their performances by the allegation that they were saving Germany from the real and immediate danger of a Communist upheaval. Germany, so the legend went, was on the very point of sinking into Bolshevist control, and the National Socialist Revolution which had saved it had also protected all the world from this calamity. On this assumption, too, the Nazis justified a persecution of the domestic Communists as vigorous as that directed at the Jews. But naturally Moscow resented a violence whose victims were those of its own political faith.

The offense to Moscow, however, was even more direct; for Hitler and his followers promptly proclaimed their purpose to supplement the suppression of Communism in the Reich by the invasion and partition of the Soviet Union itself. Thus the Ukraine was marked down as a field for German conquest and colonization, and the program outlined by the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which the victorious Germans had forced upon Red Russia early in 1918, was reaffirmed.

The result of such a performance was inevitable. In the face of a German danger which had been frankly

foreshadowed by the National Socialists themselves, the single resource left to the Soviet Union was to seek friends among peoples similarly threatened by National Socialist designs. Thus, in an odd fashion, history repeated itself. Forty years before, when William II dropped Bismarck, the Treaty of Russo-German Reinsurance awaited renewal. Bismarck had planned to renew it; but when he felt the treaty lapsed. As a consequence, St. Petersburg turned to Paris and in no long time made the Franco-Russian Treaty of Alliance which was to prove the first long step toward the Treaty of Versailles.¹ In 1933 still another change of regime in Germany had been followed by another shift in German attitude toward Russia. And once more the result was to bring Russia and France together.

At Geneva, during the sessions of the moribund Disarmament Conference in the spring of 1934, Litvinov no longer indicted all of the capitalistic nations for their common failure to make honest effort to bring about reduction of armaments. On the contrary, he significantly took up the French thesis that security must precede reduction of armaments, and that the completion of regional pacts and mutual agreements, constituting Eastern and Mediterranean Locarnos, must come before the settlement of the question of military parity for Germany. Thus the League and Europe were presently treated to the spectacle of Litvinov and Barthou reviving the tradition of co-operation established by Isvolsky and Poincaré which was so roundly condemned by the Bolsheviks in their earlier days.²

¹ Korf, Baron, S. A., *Russia's Foreign Relations During the Last Half Century*, 1922.

² At the orders of the Kremlin, moreover, the Communist party within France was commanded to support on all occasions proposals for increasing the French military budget. In the elections of June, 1936, the Communist party of France joined hands

France, to be sure, approached this new association slowly and with evident hesitation. None of the enthusiasm which had welcomed the old Russian alliance greeted the new. Nevertheless, at long last, the French turned to Moscow because government and people alike had finally abandoned all hope of effective British and American support or of solid British guarantee. Even in the face of the rising storm in Germany, Great Britain remained immovable in her resistance to new guarantees, although abandoning her support of the Reich in the attempt to secure military parity with France. And, after fifteen years, the French felt that they could wait no longer.

On the Soviet side, the attractions of the French association were obvious. Red Russia, like republican France and democratic Britain, desired only peace. The ultimate success of the great Communist experiment depended upon the maintenance of peace over a period of years. But not only was Germany now threatening a war of aggression in the West, but also Japan, in the East, was disclosing similar disturbing purposes. And the reports that Germany and Japan would join hands in a common program of Russian spoliation were at last confirmed by the Japanese-German Pact of November 25, 1936.¹

To insure French action at the Rhine in order to balance any German action at the Niemen had thus become the prerequisite of Soviet security. Nor was it less useful now for the Soviets to associate themselves with that League of Nations on which they had for nearly a decade

with its former enemies the Socialists and Radical Socialists in forming the Front Populaire which not only won the election but maintained the Blum government in power for the following year.

¹ For text of this Pact see Appendix N.

and a half poured out the vials of their wrath; for in the face of German and Japanese aggression, there would be assured the moral if not the material advantage incident to the pronouncement of Geneva against the guilty nations. At Geneva, too, there remained whatever was still left of the machinery designed to preserve world peace.

Peace was the dominating desire of Moscow as it was of London; for security, prosperity, unity, all would manifestly be called into question in case of war. Military defeat, too, would involve not merely territorial mutilation but possibly the collapse of the Communist experiment as well. Like France, therefore, the Soviet Union was dedicated to the gospel of the status quo. For the Kremlin, like the Quai d'Orsay, nourished no imperialistic aspirations. It had long ago accepted as definitive the frontiers of the Treaty of Riga which had liquidated the defeat in Poland.¹ It was now ready to make similar concession in regard to Bessarabia,² which had been transferred to Rumania after the World War.

Once Paris and Moscow had reached a preliminary basis of agreement,³ at least two of the nations of the Little Entente, Czechoslovakia⁴ and Rumania, hastened to give their approval. Even Turkey and Bulgaria did

¹ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The Soviet Security System," *International Conciliation*, No. 252, 1929.

² The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the U. S. S. R. and Rumania on June 9, 1934, was interpreted as *de facto* recognition of the annexation of Bessarabia.

³ The Franco-Soviet Pact of nonaggression was signed on November 29, 1932, and came into force on February 15 of the following year. On May 2, 1935, the Security Pact of Mutual Assistance, commonly termed the Franco-Russian alliance, was signed in Paris. For the text, see Appendix M.

⁴ The Security Pact providing for mutual assistance between Czechoslovakia and the U. S. S. R. was signed May 16, 1935.

not disguise their satisfaction. In Prague, in Sofia, and even in Bucharest, the effect of the evident return of Russia to European councils was a matter of more than passing interest for both historic and ethnic reasons. Pan-Slavism might be dead, but Pan-Germanism, which carried an obvious threat to all the smaller Slav states, was again threatening. And in Russian policy they detected, or at least dreamed, the evidence that once more Slav and Teuton were coming to grips as they had in the years preceding the World War.

The implications of the Russian move were not lost on Berlin. On the contrary, the memory of the consequences of the former lapse of Russo-German friendship was revived and the sense of German isolation heightened. The old mistake had been repeated and the old consequences were reappearing—that was what Berlin whispered when the German ambassador in Moscow resigned in protest over a policy which foreshadowed disaster. Germany was again becoming walled about by a circle of steel. To break this circle on the east, Hitler had purchased Polish passivity by a Treaty of Non-aggression in 1934, perpetuating the hated Corridor for another decade at least. But now, beyond Poland, Russia was taking a position of hostility.

Hitler had dreamed of friendship with Great Britain; his own book testified to that. But after the Nazi persecution of the Jews, the Liberals, and the Democrats, following the "cold" pogroms of March, 1933, and the even colder proscription of June, 1934, there was no longer left anything but horror of the Hitler regime among the majority of the British people.¹ In the same

¹ The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, was not indicative of a change in British sentiment toward the excesses of the Nazi regime.

fashion, the Fuehrer had dreamed of an Italian alliance, a purpose in which he was to be more successful with the realization of the Berlin-Rome axis in 1936. But in the democracies of Europe and America, with their eyes fixed upon the excesses of the German revolution, little enthusiasm was evinced for Hitler's vision of Nazi Germany, as the soldier of western civilization, leading a crusade against the "Red Peril" of Communism.

The return of Russia to European councils had further implications. It had been the disintegration of Austria and the disappearance of Russia which had led to the collapse of the balance of power and the vanishing of the Concert of Europe. These two things, taken together with the enforced disarmament of Germany, had bestowed upon France her new period of Continental hegemony. But they had not abolished the danger of the eventual dominance of a rearmed and restored Germany. Even with her smaller allies, France could hardly get rid of that peril permanently.

If Russia were back in her old place, however, and if in addition she returned as an ally of France, then, in a restored Concert of Europe, Germany could hope for little effective gain, and on the battlefield of the future she would still be outnumbered as she had been in 1914. Even with Italian aid, Germany could accomplish little in Councils in which France was assured of the backing of Soviet Russia. Nor was there any prospect that Great Britain would lend her support to either Fascist or National Socialist programs for revising the map of Europe by violence.

Meantime, the Soviet Union could push its program of industrialization which must every year make it more

formidable alike economically and militarily.¹ By the end of the century the rapidly increasing Russian population would probably exceed a quarter of a billion, while the German population increase was at a slower rate. Nor was it likely that even a Red régime in Russia would permit the extinction of the independence and ethnic unity of the smaller Slav peoples which dwelt in the pathway of German advance up the Elbe and down the Danube.

To the German mind, the World War, at least in the early days, had seemed primarily a struggle between Teuton and Slav. The fact that the English-speaking nations, as well as the Latin, had stood with Russia had been denounced as a betrayal of Europe for Asia, a championship of the barbarian against the civilized state. The result of the war had been the enormous decline of Germanism in Central Europe and a striking gain for Slavism. Now, in German eyes the old peril was arising in a new form and once more the Slav had been assured of French backing.

Fantastic as German interpretations of the Russian phenomenon seemed, it was nevertheless difficult to deny them a certain measure of basis in fact. The primary objective of Russian policy being peace, and national security, prosperity, and unity being for the Soviet Union conditioned upon Continental tranquillity based on the status quo, a collision between Soviet and German interests was inevitable. Since, in addition, the Franco-German quarrel had survived the war unmodified, a Franco-Russian alliance was similarly assured. To that alliance also the smaller states of Central Europe, men-

¹ Charques, R. D., *The Soviets and the Next War; the Present Case for Disarmament*, 1932; Just, A. W., *The Red Army*, 1936.

aced by German plans for Mittel-europa, were bound to turn. Against such a coalition there was available for Germany only an Italian partner, who in turn was sure to change sides whenever German friendship ceased to provide effective aid to Italy's expansionist policies.

National Socialist Germany, like Nationalist Germany before it, had calculated upon Russia as a free field for German expansion economically and territorially. It had counted upon the distrust and hatred of Communism in the western nations to insure it unrestrained freedom of action. The program sketched at Brest-Litovsk was to be fulfilled by Hitler after the interruption of two decades. Now, however, Germany saw Capitalistic France and Communistic Russia repeating the policies of the earlier regimes which were respectively Republican and Czarist.

Obviously, the return of Russia to the European field is of too recent date and the implications of that dramatic episode too complex and too numerous to permit of any appraisal of policy as clear and definite as is possible in the case of France or Great Britain. One thing, however, is certain. Precisely as long as evidence continues of the aggressive intentions of Germany against Communism and the security of Russian territory, Soviet policy must be anti-German. If, however, the aggressive intentions of Germany toward Russia should in the future be replaced by a sincere effort on the part of Hitler to restore the bases of a historic friendship, the duties of Rapallo might conceivably be recalled.¹

¹ In this connection it is perhaps prophetic to note the following quotation made in 1931 by Herr von Kühlmann, former foreign minister of Germany, in his book entitled *Thoughts on Germany*, p. 320: "A good understanding with Russia belongs to the oldest traditions of Prusso-German policy. Frederick the Great realized its importance and value. From the Wars of Liberation until 1866 and 1870 the Prusso-German successes were hardly conceivable without the implication of Russian

For the student of international relations there can be no more illuminating detail than that supplied by the development of Soviet national policy in the postwar period. In that time a great revolution has swept over the face of Russia, producing changes as vast and as far-reaching as those of the French upheaval of 1792. An imperial regime has been overthrown, its masters and servants scattered. A social as well as a political system has been abolished. A new order has replaced an old, and not one of the ancient landmarks has been left unmoved.

Twenty years after the historic moment, on the very eve of the World War, when Poincaré, President of the French Republic, took leave of the last of the Romanovs in St. Petersburg, shortly to become Petrograd and eventually Leningrad, the world was called upon to witness at Geneva a hardly less impressive demonstration of Franco-Russian solidarity by Barthou and Litvinov. And once more it was the perception of a common danger that united two governments, as divided in economic ideas and political ideals in 1934 as those which entered the World War as allies in August, 1914.

Less than a decade and a half after Clemenceau undertook to construct an impassable *cordon sanitaire* about Soviet frontiers to protect the whole world from the infection of Red doctrines proclaimed by Lenin, Doumergue and Stalin were paving the way for the erection not of a *cordon sanitaire* but of a *cordon militaire*, this time restraining not a Red Russia but a reactionary Germany

support. The Emperor William I on his deathbed urged his successors to keep on good terms with Russia. . . . The maintenance of a good understanding between Germany and Russia, within the limits that the current course of events may determine, may be described as the oldest and strongest tradition of Prusso-German policy. Any regime in Germany, however designated, will be disposed to continue that tradition."

within a wall of steel. What better illustration could there be of the fashion in which the policies of European countries, dictated by their basic interests, survive all the changes of regimes and of governments as they also survive the shock of new principles and new instrumentalities such as Woodrow Wilson set forth in his Fourteen Points and other pronouncements and established by his League of Nations?

When, moreover, in the midsummer of 1934, London gave its unequivocal endorsement of the proposal for an Eastern Locarno, designed to bind Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia as well as Germany to respect the status quo and to join in action against any power seeking to destroy it by violence, and when, in addition, the approval of Rome was also forthcoming, the extent of impending German isolation was made clear. Nor was the embarrassment of Berlin in rejecting that proposal lessened by the perception that the alternative might be a definitive Franco-Russian alliance sanctified by registration at Geneva as a pact of mutual assistance against aggression. Finally, in December of the same year the French Chamber of Deputies was told that Soviet armies would march if France were attacked, and at Geneva Litvinov and Laval agreed to make no new political engagements until Paris and Moscow had consulted.

With the coming into effect, moreover, of the Franco-Russian Pact of Mutual Assistance in May of 1935, the balance of power simultaneously, though briefly, returned to these two states. Nor did the German-Japanese anti-Communist front announced in November, 1936, and the contemporary establishment of the Berlin-Rome Axis, followed as they were by the rearmament program of Britain, leave any doubt as to Russian security, pro-

vided this revival of the Triple Entente were maintained. Russia's hopes in this regard, however, were to be short-lived. To the earlier misgivings aroused by the failure of the League and the Democratic Powers to maintain the collective system in China and Ethiopia and to stand firm upon the Spanish issue, were to be added the final blow of Munich and the disappearance of Czechoslovakia shortly thereafter.

During 1937 and 1938 it was Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Foreign Minister, who alone among the spokesmen of the Great Powers at Geneva called vainly to the members of the League to stand by the Covenant. But if this diplomatic sally of Moscow to maintain the status quo in Europe had been both brief and unsuccessful, the Soviet retreat following Munich was not complete, despite the displacement of Litvinov by Molotov as Foreign Minister in May, 1939. For whereas Stalin's speeches before the all-Union Congress in March revealed official distrust of the Democratic Front, British and French anxiety for the conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet alliance¹ attested to the fact that Russia still remained an all-important factor. Even the Soviet "purges" which during recent years had removed a large majority of the most capable military and industrial leaders, had not destroyed the potential power of Russia to play a deciding role in the rapidly shifting balance of the Powers in Europe.

Such then is the European aspect of Russian circumstances and policies. Her Far Eastern relations will be discussed in Chapters XX and XXIII.

¹ Negotiations for an Anglo-Soviet alliance, which opened on April 13, 1939, were still continuing in August of the same year. On August 12 military and naval staff conversations between France, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. commenced in Moscow. But twelve days later there came, on the other hand, announcement of the German-Russian treaty shown in Appendix V.

Chapter XVI

THE SMALLER STATES

To complete the European picture, it is necessary to consider briefly the situation of the lesser Continental countries,¹ for upon certain of these the World War bestowed an importance which was lacking throughout the preceding century. That importance had its origin, not merely in the military forces of Poland and the Little Entente, but also in the right of all the smaller states to speak and vote in the Assembly of the League of Nations, a right unprecedented in the past, when the lesser countries had been condemned to wait, powerless and justly apprehensive, upon the decisions of the Concert of Europe.¹

¹ English literature on the Smaller States of Europe is singularly limited. The following books, however, dealing either with specific countries or written as general surveys, will be useful for reference: Beard, C. A., and Radin, George, *The Balkan Pivot: Yugoslavia*, 1929; Cole, G. D. H., and Cole, Margaret, *The Intelligent Man's Review of Europe Today*, 1933; Durham, M. E., *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle*, 1920; Dyboski, Roman, *Outlines of Polish History*, 1931; Eckhart, Ferenc, *A Short History of the Hungarian People*, 1931; Macartney, C. A., *National States and National Minorities*, 1934; Machray, Robert, *Poland, 1914-1931*, 1932; Rouček, J. S., *Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems*, 1932; Schacher, Gerhard, *Central Europe and the Western World*, 1936; Seton-Watson, R. W., *Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers*, 1934; Vondracek, Felix John, *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1931*, 1937.

In postwar Europe the influence of the lesser states was by no means always equally important. On the contrary, where the interests of the Great Powers were concerned, the smaller were by choice or necessity frequently excluded from the debate. Where the question of the organization of peace was involved, particularly in the League of Nations, the voices of these smaller countries were, however, both audible and not without weight. But with the eclipse of the League, they have perforce turned toward regional pacts and treaties of alliance for consolidating their position so as to maintain through unity their diplomatic strength and independence.

Those nations which by their own decision or by special circumstances are largely removed from the field of serious controversy, are Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Relative insignificance also has excluded Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—four nations bordering Russia—from other than purely local concern.

Spain belonged to this same neutral class until, upon the outbreak of civil war there in 1936, the Great Powers aligned their own conflicting interests, political, economic, and strategic, with the opposing Spanish factions. The Spanish experience has clearly taught, moreover, that internal strife in any small state in Europe may become the cause for enlarging local dissensions into a general conflict between the Great Powers.

Portugal, the perpetual friend and ally of Britain gained but momentary importance through her strategic position in the transshipment of supplies to the belligerent forces in Spain. Turkey and Greece, completely reconciled following their bitter conflict of 1922, became leaders in the establishment of a peace and stability in

POSTWAR EUROPE


REVISIONIST AND STATUS QUO STATES



REVISIONIST



STATUS QUO



southeastern Europe not before enjoyed since the overthrow of Turkish rule. These three small states, therefore, are normally in the neutral class.

In reality, the smaller nations which have counted most since the war in European controversies are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Spain, Belgium, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Of these, Spain has achieved international prominence only since the outbreak of civil war in 1936, Austria and Czechoslovakia have disappeared within the maw of the revived Reich, and Yugoslavia and Rumania, the two survivors of the Little Entente, together with Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, were in July, 1939, trembling before the threat of Nazi power. Up to the final collapse of the League, however, Poland and the Little Entente together played a role equal in importance to that of the Great Powers; and Poland and Rumania may still prove to hold the balance between peace and war in Europe.

In a consideration of the postwar national policies of Poland and the Little Entente, it is evident that for them as for France security was the major objective. Poland has always faced the eventual if temporarily postponed purpose of Germany to recover Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and Upper Silesia. Czechoslovakia feared the resolution of the Reich to annex the German minorities in Bohemia and Moravia and the determination of the Hungarians to recapture their ethnic minorities in Slovakia. Yugoslavia, too, encountered Magyar irredentism in the Bachka, and Italian imperialism in Dalmatia. Finally, although Rumania had acquired implied recognition by Soviet Russia of her title to Bessarabia, Hungary remained unreconciled to the loss of Transylvania (Treaty of Trianon, 1919), as did Bulgaria to her forced

surrender of Silistria, or southern Dobrudja, under the treaty of Bucharest in 1913. To these concerns, moreover, were still to be added the fear of German purpose to dominate Rumania's economic and political life.

It follows naturally, therefore, that in the face of unmistakable perils, all four of these states of central and eastern Europe sought security both by armaments and by alliances.¹ Since, too, each had an identical concern for the preservation of the status quo of the Paris Conference, there was a community of interest between all four of these states and France. Among all three of the Danubian states, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, furthermore, there was the common basis for accord in the double threat of *Anschluss* or a Hapsburg restoration in Austria, and of Hungarian irredentism.

When, therefore, in 1919, following the rejection by the United States Senate of the Treaty of Versailles and the parallel failure of the Treaty of Guarantee to France, Great Britain declined to bestow her own guarantee upon French security, there remained for French statesmanship but one alternative means of establishing national safety. That method, begun in 1921, was the creation of alliances with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania—France binding herself to support with her arms and wealth the territorial integrity of each of her allies, and they in turn pledging themselves to support France with their armies if she were attacked.

The system of alliances thus created bestowed upon France not only transient security but temporary hegemony as well. In the face of a German attack at the

¹ Balla, V. de, *The New Balance of Power in Europe*, 1932; Foreign Policy Association, "Political Realignments in Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. IX, No. 5, 1933; Malynski, Emmanuel, Count, *Les Problèmes de l'Est et la Petite Entente*, 1931.

SMALL STATES OF EUROPE



Saar, she was assured of the prompt intervention of Polish armies in Silesia and Czech armies in Saxony. In the event of Italian support of a German offensive, French defense in the Maritime Alps would be supported by a Yugoslav offensive in the Julian Alps. Each of the allies, too, was assured of the double aid of French arms and French finance.

The price for France of such benefits as her Continental system assured her was, however, quite evident. She assumed responsibility for the permanence of the Polish Corridor and thereby compromised the chance of permanent reconciliation with Germany, assuming that such chance had ever existed. She undertook to guarantee the Yugoslav title to Dalmatia and therefore encountered continuing Italian resentment. Finally, she accepted responsibility alike for the independence of Austria, which constituted a further cause of quarrel with Germany, and for the permanence of the status quo of the Treaty of Trianon, which inevitably insured that Hungary would enter either the German or the Italian camp.

In effect, France therefore undertook the colossal task of guaranteeing the status quo upon the whole European Continent. In return, she acquired for herself military and diplomatic support insuring a position which had not been hers since the overthrow of Napoleon and had not been Germany's even after Sadowa and Sedan. Having undertaken that task, however, it was inevitable that France should appear in every international meeting, whether at Geneva or elsewhere, demanding that the military superiority which belonged to her through her alliances should not be compromised until the status quo, of which she alone among the Great Powers was

now the guarantor, should become the equal responsibility of all. And in that policy she was, of course, heartily supported by all of her allies.

On the other hand, France encountered British and American opposition, because both English-speaking nations were satisfied that world order was contingent upon a viable settlement with Germany and that such a settlement was obtainable only at the price of treaty revision in respect both of frontiers and of armaments at the expense of the allies of France. Italian resistance, too, was inevitable because Italy was equally incensed by the guarantee bestowed upon Yugoslav frontiers by France and by the predominant position in Europe insured to France by her alliances.

In the Danubian region France, Italy, and Germany thus stood opposed to one another. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, the allies of France, in 1921 united in the famous Little Entente, which was designed to preserve the status quo in Central Europe against all outside interference, whether German or Italian, and against Magyar purposes as well.¹ Thus allied, these states undertook to establish some economic system of order. But no such system was possible without Austrian and Hungarian participation and German and Italian approval, and both were unobtainable.

When, however, Germany undertook to achieve tariff union with Austria in 1931, not only France and the Little Entente but Italy as well rallied to oppose it. Finally, when Italy, in her turn, strove to establish a rival system in the Danubian region by understandings with Vienna and Budapest, through the Rome Protocols

¹ Codresco, Florin, *La Petite Entente*, 1930; Crane, J. O., *The Little Entente*, 1931; Machray, Robert, *The Little Entente*, 1930. For the 1933 Statute of the Little Entente, see Appendix H.

of 1934, she encountered the determined opposition of Bucharest, Prague, and Belgrade. Thus, on the one hand, the peace treaties had "Balkanized" Middle Europe from the Bavarian frontier to the Black Sea, and, on the other hand, the Great Powers henceforth acted in the new Balkans as they had in the old.

The triangular conflict in the Danubian region also insured that the economic and financial dislocations incident to the war and the treaties of peace would be enormously extended. For the material existence of the Austrians and the enjoyment of any degree of prosperity by the Hungarians depended upon the restoration of their old markets in the territories which had become Czech, Serb, and Rumanian, while tolerable existence for the states of the Little Entente was similarly contingent upon a return to old economic relations in the valley of the Danube.

To her allies, France could make loans and give military guarantees against the destruction of their territorial unity, but she could not offer them adequate markets for their agricultural and industrial surpluses. To Austria and Hungary, Italy could give similar military guarantees against aggression and a small though precious market, but she could not restore lost provinces, provide adequate loans, or supply sufficient commercial outlets. As for Germany, she alone could offer adequate markets, but her purpose to bring Austria within her frontiers constituted a threat of varying proportions for the Danubian states and a danger for Italy as well.

With the rise of Hitler, the fate of Austria came to be more and more in the balance. At the same time an open *détente* in Franco-Italian relations occurred, whereas ties between Rome on the one hand and Budapest and

Vienna on the other, were strengthened. Nevertheless, the Little Entente continued to block all aspirations of Italy to establish a Danubian bloc under her control, and Hungarian irredentism, supported by Italian influence, closed the door to the expansion of the Entente to include Hungary and Austria, and thus to the creation of a viable economic system on the ruins of the Hapsburg Monarchy.

After Hitler came to complete control in March, 1933, Mussolini, in conference with Ramsay MacDonald, launched from Rome a proposal for a renewal of the Concert of Europe to be constituted by Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy.¹ Instantly, however, that proposal aroused violent and effective protests from Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade, and Bucharest, for Poland and the nations of the Little Entente clearly perceived that in such a Concert they would be sacrificed to German and Italian ambitions; and despite the fact that France signed the treaty embodying this plan, it was never ratified.²

Shortly thereafter, Hitler, subordinating all else to his attempts to bring about a triumph of the National Socialists of Austria and thus to insure actual, if not legal, union between the Reich and the Republic, proposed a ten-year truce with Poland in 1934. Warsaw, having become angered by French hesitation in the matter of Mussolini's Four-Power Concert, and resenting French treatment of her greatest ally as a satellite, welcomed the proposal. But although the relations between Paris and Warsaw became visibly less intimate,

¹ Grandi, Dino, "The Foreign Policy of the Duce," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XII, No. 4, 1934; Foreign Policy Association, "Political Realalignments in Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. IX, No. 5, 1933.

² For text of the proposed Four-Power Treaty, see Appendix I.

the Franco-Polish alliance was not dissolved. And while the Hitler regime, on the surface at least, scored a diplomatic success over France at Warsaw, it paid a high price, measured by the perpetuation of the Corridor for another decade without any guarantee of Polish support of German purposes elsewhere.

When Hitler first came to power, Europe and the world had been seized by the greatest war scare of the postwar period, because, in the first weeks, there seemed a clear possibility that an alliance, including Germany and Italy among the Great Powers, and Austria and Hungary among the smaller, might be consummated and thereafter challenge the French system. When, however, Hitler chose to make his offensive against Austria rather than Poland, Mussolini was driven for a time to treat the Fuehrer as a prospective enemy rather than as a possible ally.

In the same fashion, at long last, the British having striven both within and without the League of Nations to bring about a peaceful revision of the territorial and military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in the hope of placating Germany, were finally forced, by the implications of rearmed violence on the part of the National Socialist regime, to abandon a course which had involved them in controversy with France, intermittently, ever since the Paris Conference of 1919. This belated *volte face* in British policy was soon disclosed both by the British approval of the Franco-Russian alliance and the strengthening of European regional pacts, and by the British rearmament program.

Sixteen years after the close of the Peace Conference, therefore, it was beyond question that the French policy of alliances which had resulted from the refusal of the

British and Americans to give their guarantees to France, although visibly weakening, was as yet unbroken. If Poland had made a truce with Germany, she had not at the same time abandoned the French alliance. The Soviet Union, moreover, had appeared on the European scene as an ally of France, and the Little Entente still maintained, along with French loyalty, its military predominance in the Danubian area.

The postwar relations of the Great Powers to the smaller states of Central and Eastern Europe were then, up to 1936, unmistakable. France, to insure her own security and to restrain Germany within the limits of the Treaty of Versailles, had joined to herself, by a system of military alliances, the nations of the Little Entente and Poland. To break up the French system and thus put an end to French Continental supremacy and French protection of Yugoslavia as well, Italy sought to press the question of territorial revision in the interests of Germany in the east, and of Hungary in the south. In addition, she had supported the project of parity in armaments for Germany as a means of reducing French military superiority. As for Germany, she accepted Italian aid, at the same time continuing to press by methods of indirection for union with Austria.

The strengthening of the Rome-Berlin axis through German-Italian co-operation in Spain had its repercussions in Central Europe early in 1937. Italy, long the mentor of Austria, did not wish her position to be interpreted as anti-German. Consequently, at a conference in Venice in April, Mussolini informed Chancellor Schuschnigg that Italy could not again come to the military assistance of Austria against Germany as she had at the time of the assassination of Dollfuss.

While there had been recurrent talk of restoring Archduke Otto of Hapsburg to the throne as a means of insuring Austria's independence, Mussolini made it plain that Italy would not countenance such a step. This was particularly pleasing to the Germans, who saw in a Hapsburg restoration an insurmountable barrier to their design of eventually incorporating Austria in the Third Reich.

After this a tendency toward collaboration with the Little Entente developed in Austria, at the suggestion of France, ever anxious to stabilize conditions in the Danube Basin. Premier Hodza of Czechoslovakia visited Vienna, offering Austria an escape from her anomalous economic position. Italy and Germany immediately vetoed the idea, however, it being their purpose to retain Austria as a pawn to guarantee their alliance and at the same time check the spread of French alliances in Central Europe.

Although Nazi agitation continued, it was kept within limits by Germany as a token of good faith toward Italy. With both Rome and Berlin preoccupied in Spain, the Austrian question was temporarily shelved, but by no means solved. In the meantime Chancellor Schuschnigg took every step to foster a spirit of Austrian nationalism. Italy had failed her. Germany had failed her despite the hopes placed in the Austro-German treaty signed in the summer of 1936.¹ While Germany and Italy suspected each other's motives in Austria, their patched-up agreement prevented Schuschnigg from playing one against the other as had been his policy.

Meanwhile, just as Hitlerian proposals for Ukrainian annexation had brought the Soviet Union back to the

¹ Germany agreed by the terms of the treaty to recognize and respect Austrian independence; Austria at the same time agreeing to recognize herself as a German state.

councils of Europe as a guarantor of the status quo in the east and south, so the National Socialist program of aerial armaments recalled the British to similar concern for the security of the frontiers of the Netherlands and Belgium in the west. In Belgium, too, the menace of Hitler had served to drive a reluctant Parliament to the appropriation of moneys necessary to restore the old forts of Liège and Namur, and to extend fortifications of the Maginot line north from the French border to Holland.

In March, 1936, Hitler had reoccupied the Rhineland zone, which was demilitarized both by the terms of the Versailles treaty and by the Locarno pact; and the Reich then constructed, opposite the French Maginot line, her own barrier of fortifications known as the "West Wall." These fortifications were for the purpose of stopping French aid to allies in eastern Europe through invasion of Germany's western front.

Furthermore, although the Rome Protocols of March, 1934,¹ by Italy, Hungary, and Austria were reaffirmed in March, 1936, at the close of the Ethiopian war, Italy was unable thereafter to take the same interest in Danubia as before. Because of the change for the worse which had taken place in French and British relations with Mussolini during and after the Ethiopian crisis, moreover, Italy could no longer risk mounting guard on the Brenner Pass to prevent Hitler from strengthening his position in Austria. Likewise, the economic and therefore the political influence of Italy in other countries of southeastern Europe had suffered greatly as a result of the application of economic sanctions by the League of Nations during the Ethiopian conquest.

¹ The Rome Protocols provided for collaboration of the foreign policies of the signatories as well as for an increase in their reciprocal trade.

Germany was quick to take advantage of the vacuum thus created by increasing her own trade in southeastern Europe. The trade treaties concluded by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, former Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, resulted in Germany becoming by the end of 1936 the largest customer in Yugoslavia, Greece, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, a position she continued, for the most part, to hold thereafter.

Meanwhile, German pressure on Austria increased, aided by the activities of Austrian Nazis themselves. The material circumstances of this unhappy country were unmistakably desperate. Only inclusion within the tariff limits of Germany or restoration of its fiscal unity with the portions of the old Hapsburg monarchy then constituting Hungary and Czechoslovakia, seemed calculated to give to Austria any hope of tolerable existence. Political obstacles, however, continued to bar the way to economic relief in either direction.

Following the visit of Mussolini to Hitler in September, 1937, it became clear that Chancellor Schuschnigg could no longer expect the support of Italy to counter German claims. With England and France obviously unwilling to risk war for the preservation of Austrian independence, *Anschluss* became only a question of time. With the German annexation of Austria (March, 1938), moreover, a new Europe came into being. For not only was Czechoslovakia placed at the mercy of German arms, but the territories of the Axis Powers were made contiguous, increasing many fold the strategic difficulties to the Western democracies in the defense of the status quo in Eastern Europe.¹

¹ Dean, V. M., *Europe in Retreat*, 1939; Fodor, M. W., *South of Hitler*, 1939; Gedye, G. E. R., *Betrayal in Central Europe*, 1939; Hutton, Graham, *Survey After Munich*, 1939.

Looking to the future, however, it appears likely that the more important of the Smaller States will continue to play a decided role in European affairs. Certainly this is true of Poland and Rumania, which together form a possible bulwark against Nazi advance to the east. In similar fashion, Turkey and Greece, because of their strategic geographic position, can contribute mightily to the ultimate turn of events by either excluding or harboring the fleets of the so-called "Peace Front."

Of these four states, Poland, which has a population of about 35,000,000 and a high birth rate, with an area larger than Italy and richer in resources of coal, iron, and foodstuffs, is the most important. Since its restoration to statehood, Poland has consistently laid claim to the rank of a great Power even to the extent of expressing colonial ambitions. Her army, moreover, is both well equipped and well trained, numbering in excess of 1,700,000, including reserves.

In many ways, Poland has been in the most difficult situation of any state with regard to her foreign policy. Determined to win recognition as a first-class power, she has been forced, because of her geographic position between Germany and the Soviet Union, to make commitments she would rather have avoided. The nonaggression pact with the Soviets in 1931¹ and the ten-year truce with Germany in 1934² gave the hope of assuring a period of security during which Poland might continue the completion of her national consolidation. Furthermore, by rejecting the proposals of an Eastern Locarno in 1934, so strongly urged at the time by France

¹ Foreign Policy Association, *Foreign Policy Reports*, "The Foreign Policy of Poland," Vol. XIV, No. 18, 1935; in 1934 this treaty was renewed until 1945.

² Abrogated unilaterally by Hitler April 28, 1939.

as well as Russia, Poland indicated her intentions of independence from French tutelage.

Such a policy, however, became impossible following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, which made it exceedingly difficult for the Poles to continue to play the role of a guarded neutrality while at the same time maintaining a balance of power between Russia and Germany. With the ever-present threat upon Danzig and Pomorze (the Corridor), which if realized would place the Polish lands in a geographic position similar to that of Czechoslovakia following *Anschluss*, a *volte-face* in Poland's traditional policy was imposed. For these reasons Poland accepted on April 6, 1939, the British offer for a treaty of guarantee, thus allying herself definitely to the Democratic Front, or "Peace Front."¹

By the middle of May, 1939, Poland's traditional role in the balance of power had become considerably modified. While refusing categorically to grant territorial concessions to the Reich under duress, she was still careful to leave open the door for negotiations. For the same reasons, moreover, her statesmen continued to avoid all commitments for a mutual guarantee with Russia, not only because of their distrust of the Soviets but more especially because of their desire not to become party to a direct encirclement of Germany.

Like Poland, Rumania is also both larger in area and richer in natural resources than Italy, although her population numbers only about 20,000,000. While Rumania is naturally less advanced industrially, an army of 1,500,000 troops, including reserves, makes it inevitable that she should play an important role in the balance-of-power game. The possession of the largest oil fields in

¹ Buell, R. L., *Poland: Key to Europe*, 1939.

Europe, moreover, makes her equally important both as an object of German conquest and as an ally of the opposing Democratic Front. While quite obviously, therefore, Rumanian independence rests upon the ability of France and Britain to keep her from the clutches of Hitler, geographic and political circumstances make especially difficult the achievement of this end. In addition to the German menace, both Hungary and Bulgaria have remained unreconciled, the former to the loss of Transylvania and the latter to the loss of Silistria.

On April 13, 1939, Rumania and Greece received the Franco-British offer of guarantee of territorial independence. Rumania's alliance with Poland as well as with France likewise stood. In addition she was on most friendly terms with Turkey and Greece, two of her three fellow members in the Balkan Entente;¹ while her relations with the third, Yugoslavia, though somewhat cooled, had not become definitely estranged. Since Turkey's acceptance, moreover, of the treaty of mutual guarantee with Britain, on May 12, which provided for the free passage of the British fleet through the Dardanelles, the way was paved for a more effective defense of Rumanian independence by the Western Democracies, and also for closer understanding with Russia.

Although it was impossible to judge, precisely, as to the eventual outcome of Rumania's policy with regard

¹ The Balkan Entente, which came into being under the Balkan Pact of February 9, 1934, after a series of regional conferences dating from 1930, is composed of Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Turkey. By the terms of the Pact (see Appendix K), pledges of mutual consultation and co-operation in their common concerns are assured, together with a guarantee of the security of their frontiers. Modeled somewhat along the lines of the League of Nations and the Little Entente, the Balkan Entente maintains a Secretariat in Constantinople and provides for an annual conference upon problems of mutual concern. See Foreign Policy Association, "Cross-Currents in Danubian Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIII, No. 9, 1937; Kerner, R. J., and Howard, H. N., *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente, 1930-1935*, 1936.

to the opposing forces of the Axis and the "Peace Front," the German thrust to the east had at least been stalled for a time. In this regard, both Turkey and Greece seemed destined to play a most important role.

It was apparent, therefore, that with the exception of Yugoslavia, the members of the Balkan Entente had gone far in committing themselves, in the spring of 1939, to a policy of common interest and solidarity in opposition to the pretensions of the Axis Powers. If, moreover, Fascist victory in Spain had for a time given basis for alarm as to the security of British interests in the west, at Gibraltar, the check to German and Italian ambitions in the east was equally effective. Nor was the Spanish danger entirely beyond the control of Britain. For while Fascist forces and Nazi war materials had been most effective in assuring Franco's victory in war, British financial power was equally important, and on British terms, in time of peace.

Of the remaining nations of eastern Europe more immediately concerned with the menace of the Axis, Yugoslavia is the most important.¹ Territorially as large as Italy, it is more richly endowed in minerals, having in addition a surplus in agricultural products and large forest reserves. With a population of 15,000,000, its armed forces rank only second to those of Rumania among the Balkan states. Since 1934, the year of the murder of King Alexander in Marseille, the foreign policy of Yugoslavia has considerably changed.

Formerly, it was to France and to her Little Entente allies, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, that Yugoslavia turned for security. With the rise of Hitler, however,

¹ Foreign Policy Association, "Cross-Currents in Danubian Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIII, No. 9, 1937.

and the coming of *Anschluss*, Premier Stoyadinovitch,¹ foreseeing danger in the combined aggressive purposes of the newly formed Axis, sought insurance for the future by a rapprochement with the Dictators. While this was obviously a policy of necessity, particularly following the Nazi absorption of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia and the later Fascist annexation of Albania, Yugoslavia lost thereby her independence of action, all aid from her former allies being cut off. Her position was further weakened, moreover, through renewed demands of Croatia for autonomy, under the threat of secession.

In the realignment of the Smaller States of Europe, therefore, Yugoslavia in the summer of 1939 appeared to be lost to the "Peace Front." This position, moreover, was equally applicable to Hungary.² For while the latter country had partially realized its irredentist purposes in Slovakia following Munich, and in Ruthenia at the time of the German occupancy of Prague,³ such aggrandizement had been achieved under Nazi auspices.

The Hungarian people, nevertheless, remained passionately devoted both to the maintenance of their independence and the achievement of the union of all Magyar peoples in Eastern Europe. Thus it is not without significance that when Hungary signed the Anti-Comintern or Anti-Communist Pact on February 24, 1939, as a gesture of friendship to the Axis Powers, she likewise dissolved by decree, on the same day, the Hungarian Nationalist Socialist party.

¹ On February 4, 1939, Premier Stoyadinovitch was succeeded in office by Dragisa Cvetkovitch.

² Macartney, C. A., *Hungary and Her Successes: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences*, 1937.

³ See maps, page 703 and facing 374.

Precisely as a viable peace on the Continent is out of question so long as the great German people stand unreconciled and uncompromising, so any system of order in the Danubian region is impossible so long as the Magyars continue to preserve a similar attitude. The least tolerable grievances of Hungary might be remedied by Rumanian and Serbian surrender of the solid blocs of Magyar populations in their frontier provinces. Until the realization of such hopes, it is natural that Hungary should turn to Nazi Germany as a fellow opponent of the status quo.

The position of Bulgaria in the Balkan Peninsula is in many respects similar to that of Hungary in the northern Danubian area. As a result of unsuccessful wars Bulgaria had lost territories to three of her neighbors, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Rumania. After fifteen years of border incidents and internal difficulties following the World War, Bulgaria gradually became more reconciled to her position, and improved relations with her Balkan neighbors culminated in the Treaty of Salonica, July 31, 1938, allowing Bulgaria to rearm. However, the later example of German and Hungarian success in obtaining frontier revision by unilateral action put the Bulgarian government under strong pressure from extremist elements at home.

The spread of Nazi influence and the increase of Hitler's power also raised a question as to the Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, which, while they have only a tactical importance in the European struggle for power, proved an important issue when England and France sought to draw the Soviet Union into an alliance against Hitler. The Soviet government demanded mutual guarantee of the independence of the


small Baltic states against Germany, with the right to decide when this guarantee should become effective.

The Baltic states resisted such demands because they would provide Russia with an excuse for interfering in their internal affairs, and leave them no freedom to decide upon the conditions of their own independence. This dispute, following the seizure of Memel from Lithuania by the Third Reich earlier in the year, marked the end of a comparatively peaceful period in the development of the Baltic area.

The small states of Europe, therefore, reached a point in 1939 where each was gradually being forced to choose between the two blocs of powers. The French system of alliances had crumbled, and the small nations, having watched the fate of Czechoslovakia, were fearful that, should they take sides against Nazi Germany, they might be divided up as that unfortunate republic had been. Their desperate attempts to remain neutral, and to have a voice in any settlement of European issues, continued through the first half of 1939. In July those still uncommitted were watching the outcome of the struggle between Germany and Poland before choosing finally with which side, Axis or "Peace Front" (Democratic Front), they would align themselves.

EUROPEAN ALIGNMENTS

MIDSUMMER 1939



Chapter XVII

THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN PEACE

It remains now to summarize briefly the results of the foregoing survey of the causes and character of the national policies of the Great Powers and lesser states of the European region. For it is self-evident that it is from the collective consequences of these policies that the problem of peace in contemporary Europe actually arises.

At the very outset, it was noted that during the three centuries preceding the World War the doctrine of the balance of power had exercised a controlling influence upon European statesmanship. In the same fashion, between Waterloo and the Marne, the Concert of Europe constituted the nearest approach to international authority in the Old World. At the Paris Conference and on the initiative of Woodrow Wilson, however, it was proposed to substitute the principle of self-determination for the balance of power, and the League of Nations for the Concert of Europe.

But when confronted by the consequences of the application of the principle of self-determination to the situation of the Germans, the statesmen of the Paris Confer-

ence reverted to the doctrine of the balance of power. They did this because to have permitted the seventy-five millions of German-speaking people of the former Hohenzollern and Hapsburg empires to unite would have established a state potentially as dangerous to European independence as the France of Louis XIV or of Napoleon Bonaparte.

In thus reverting to the doctrine of the balance of power, however, the statesmen of Paris fatally compromised their projected League of Nations. For at the bottom of the Wilsonian project was the double assumption that all peoples were prepared to pledge themselves to respect the frontiers of their neighbors and that each nation was ready to assume its share of the costs of restraining a country which violated this pledge. When, however, the German people, outraged by the terms of the Paris Settlement and identifying the denial of their right to the benefits of the principle of self-determination as a breach of faith, refused to accept as definitive the territorial decisions of the Treaty of Versailles and thus disclosed their purpose not to respect the frontiers of other countries, the first of the Wilsonian assumptions broke down. When, too, the United States and Great Britain, in turn, declined to lend their forces to protect the frontiers of nations menaced by German and other revisionary projects, the second collapsed as well.

Thenceforth, the European stage was dominated by the clash of rival policies. The Germans subordinated all else to the demand for treaty revision. The French set security above everything. The British sought profitable and inexpensive peace through an attempt to establish a balance of power between Germany and France. The Italians strove to profit alike in prestige and in more

material things by exploiting Franco-German disputes. The smaller states ranged themselves about the great, as their interests dictated.

Inescapably, therefore, the League of Nations, which had become the meeting place of the statesmen of Europe, also became the battleground of conflicting policies. Each nation sought to exploit the League machinery to serve its own policy, although Italy, finding the League itself an obstacle to her ambitions, carried on a campaign of sabotage against it.

When, however, Germany in despair and desperation flung herself into the arms of Hitler and thus accepted the National Socialist prescription of violence as the method to achieve treaty revision, Europe as a whole took alarm. After the murder of Dollfuss in July, 1934, Germany was surrounded by a circle of steel; Italy mounted guard at Vienna diplomatically, while Great Britain officially, though without success, urged the Reich to accept the Franco-Russian project for regional pacts in the form of an Eastern Locarno, which would have committed her further to the recognition of the territorial decisions of the Treaty of Versailles as immutable.

Confronted by the rise of another common peril, Europe therefore followed its traditional course. On the one hand, it moved instinctively toward coalition against the nation which was universally identified as constituting a danger to European liberty, and on the other it hastened to multiply its armaments and extend its fortifications. Differences between Paris and London were laid aside. The postwar animosities between Rome and Paris were softened for a time until Italy, incensed by Franco-British opposition to her Ethiopian and

Spanish adventures, renewed again her historical entente with Germany. Moscow, too, forgetting her quarrel with capitalistic countries, entered the League of Nations, and later joined herself in alliance with France and Czechoslovakia.

Nevertheless, the student of international affairs must perceive that, if for the moment adjourned, the major problem of peace in Europe remained intact and unsolved, and that it is still primarily the problem of finding a basis of adjustment between the right of the German people to unity and prosperity and the right of Europe to security.

The Germany of self-determination seemed at the Paris Conference a potential threat to European independence. The Germany of the Paris Settlement—that is, a Germany consonant with the principle of the balance of power—continued to appear in German eyes intolerable. Hitler's rise and German reversion to doctrines of violence have, therefore, resulted. In the early stages there was created a momentary union of Europe in opposition to German policy, a union too loose, however, to withstand the successive shocks of the rearmed Reich. Only by virtue of the aftermath of Munich has Europe again returned to the old pattern of military coalition in defense against the intended dominance of a single power.

Had Hitler chosen the method of peace instead of violence and threat, the Anglo-French ring might never have been created to counterbalance the German menace. Had Göring not repeated the blunder of Tirpitz, this time in aerial instead of naval armaments, Great Britain might have watched with outward protest but with inward satisfaction the division of Europe into

two systems of alliances. Had the National Socialists not proposed to seize the Ukraine, as the prewar rulers undertook to control at Constantinople, Soviet Russia might not have followed the example of Czarist Russia in striking hands with France. Thus the present European situation was quite literally "made in Germany."

Fundamentally, too, not only solution but even accommodation of the crisis which has endured in the European region ever since the close of the World War still waits upon the decision of the German people. Change of regime in the Reich, civil disorder involving the substitution of one form of dictatorship for another, restoration of the Throne or collapse to Communism, these by producing prostration and paralysis within the nation can compel Germany to accept another truce of exhaustion like that which followed the occupation of the Ruhr. But, as the recent past has demonstrated, domestic collapse cannot permanently abolish the purpose of the German people to establish in Central Europe an economic and political unit, vaguely recalling the Holy Roman Empire of the long past and more definitely the Mittel-europa of the World War.

Only co-ordination of policy among the European nations great and small, resulting in the creation of a system of political order and of economic prosperity in the Danubian region, could extinguish either the hope or the possibility of German success in this enterprise. Even such co-operation would be doomed to eventual failure unless the German people themselves ultimately became reconciled to their territorial circumstances. For while former events have demonstrated that European powers can unite to restrain a Reich which has become a common peril, European history demonstrates that

such coalitions are foredoomed to dissolution, once the immediate emergency which called them into existence has passed.

After 1815, there did survive among the nations which had overthrown Napoleon a sufficient degree of unity, dictated by common fear of France, to guarantee the permanence of the structure of Vienna during the first critical years. When that unity was destroyed following the Revolution of 1848, France was no longer strong enough to resume her struggle for Continental hegemony. After 1918, however, the successful coalition broke up almost at once, because victory had abolished for the time any further fear of Germany in the British Commonwealth or in the United States.

As a consequence of British-American policy, the League of Nations, unlike the Concert of Europe a century before, was unable to exercise authority, because it lacked force. In French eyes, however, German recovery was irreconcilable with French security, precisely as long as that security lacked at least British guarantee. To establish any basis of order in Europe between 1918 and 1935 the British and American nations had either to satisfy or to coerce France; for French power was, up to the rearmament of Germany, at all times adequate to prevent German recovery, as was demonstrated alike in the Ruhr in 1923 and in Vienna in 1931, at the time of the projected Austro-German tariff union. With the reoccupation of the Rhineland, however, in the spring of 1936, the impotence of France to act was startlingly evident to all.

The attempts of the English-speaking countries to promote the economic recovery of Germany without concern for French security, since the former was a vital

concern to them and the latter of less importance, only contributed to the eventual ruin of the Weimar Republic because it encouraged a resistance to France which, until the arrival of Hitler, was foredoomed to failure and brought economic ruin and political upheaval in its train.

The World War, the Paris Conference, and the postwar diplomacy have each in turn failed to accomplish any material transformation in the traditional political circumstances of the Old World. On the contrary, the doctrine of the balance of power still continues to be the sole means of assuring European independence, and a coalition of endangered states the only means of upholding that doctrine. Now, as in the past, however, while such a coalition may avail temporarily to restrain an aggressor, it cannot provide any permanent system of order. Such transitory truce as it furnishes is based upon force and guaranteed by armaments. As a consequence, any real or even apparent shift in the resources of force inevitably serves as an invitation to a new adventure.

Fundamentally, therefore, the political situation in the European region remains today what it has been for approximately three centuries. Now, as ever since the Thirty Years War, there is a tradition of unity, which invariably finds expression in coalition in the face of common danger. But there is no basis or capacity for the continuation of such co-operation beyond the period of actual danger. Thus, seemingly at least, a United States of Europe is still as far removed from actuality as it has been at any time since the nation states system took definitive form and European history assumed its familiar pattern.

In the foregoing chapters, moreover, emphasis has been laid upon the fact that while the political circumstances of the Old World have been little altered as a consequence of the World War and the postwar developments, the economic circumstances have been revolutionized. Wholly aside from the old issues which divided states, such as the questions of national security and ethnic unity, there have arisen economic problems, whose gravity has been accentuated by the Great Depression and the restricted economies which followed.

Thus, for at least two of the Great Powers of the European region, Germany and Italy, the absence of economic security and the operation of population pressure have dictated the adoption of dynamic policies envisaging the revision of the territorial status quo. And on the economic side these policies are in no sense the exclusive consequence of the nature of the Paris Settlement; for while Germany was defeated and diminished, Italy was victorious and expanded.

On the contrary, in both cases it is the lack of most of the essential raw materials of industry, the growing inadequacy of domestic food supplies, and finally world trade and currency restrictions which explain the expansionist policies of the two countries, quite as much as any hunger for power or for prestige. To buy abroad the foodstuffs and raw materials necessary to support national life and industry, these nations must sell their manufactures or their labor, and against both practices the more fortunate states have progressively closed their doors. The result is that both the German and the Italian people are confronted by the prospect of a growing disparity between their own standard of living and that of their neighbors.

Revision of the territorial decisions of the Paris Peace Conference to satisfy the strategic or ethnic claims of Germany and Italy would not bestow upon either country the requisite resources in raw materials and food-stuffs or the necessary additional markets. Both nations, therefore, have turned their attention toward the Danubian Basin and colonial ambitions as spheres of economic relief as well as political influence. But these developments have led to the collision of interests with the Powers whose policies are static.

If, then, the problem of peace in Europe is primarily one of finding a basis of adjustment between the right of the German people to unity and that of Europe to security, it manifestly is also, to an extent hardly secondary, a question of discovering some method of establishing equality in economic opportunity among the peoples of the Continent. For it must be self-evident that no great people will, without violent reaction, permanently endure such disparity in national well-being as under present circumstances exists in the case of the Germans and the Italians on the one hand and the British, French, and Russians on the other. But it is today equally unmistakable that none of the more fortunate powers is prepared to share its superior resources with the less fortunate nations.

In Asia, the Japanese people, in the same circumstances as the German and the Italian, have undertaken by violence in Manchuria and North China to escape from their economic handicaps. Within Europe, however, such escape is impossible because the doctrine of the balance of power, although invoked to support the territorial status quo, operates in an identical fashion to preserve the economic status quo. Were the Soviet

Union and the Balkans as helpless as is China, it is clear that German and Italian imperialists would, as they have long planned to do, repeat the achievement of the Japanese by making Eastern Europe, the Ukraine, and Anatolia their fields of expansion. After the Anglo-French guarantee of the independence of Poland and of three members of the Balkan Entente, it was hoped that these regions could be defended by armies sufficiently strong to discourage aggression, and by the naval power of the Democratic Front, which was still supreme.

The problem of peace in the European region, therefore, remains intact and it has its origin in the fact that, politically and economically, the interests of the Great Powers of the Old World are irreconcilable on any terms consonant with either the principles of national sovereignty or of the European balance of power. For any viable system of order that might be established would necessarily demand a sacrifice on the part of the more fortunate peoples or a surrender on the part of the less, both equally impossible alternatives under present circumstances.

Chapter XVIII

CHINA AND THE ASIATIC REGION¹

BETWEEN the European and Asiatic regions, the contrasts are striking. In the former, not less than five of the seven Great Powers of the world have their seats of administration and wealth; in the latter, but one, as is also the case in the American region. Again, while four of the five considerable European states are continental, Japan, the single Great Power which is exclusively

¹ In the study of the Asiatic Region, the student should have available for reference the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations, particularly *Problems of the Pacific*, 1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, published by the University of Chicago Press. The quarterly magazine, *Pacific Affairs*, edited by Owen Lattimore, and the fortnightly periodical published by the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, entitled *The Far Eastern Survey*, will also prove very useful. An indispensable reference book on the economic aspects of Asia is *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area*, by Field, F. V., ed. (New York, Doubleday Doran, 1934.) See also Hudson, G. F., *The Far East in World Politics*, 1937; "The Pacific Area and Its Problems," ed. by Donald R. Nugent and Reginald Bell, 1936; Steiger, G. N., *A History of the Far East*, 1936; Woodhead, H. G. W., ed., *China Year-Book*, 1937. In addition reference should be made to the *Foreign Policy Reports* (Foreign Policy Association), *Foreign Affairs* (Council on Foreign Relations), *International Conciliation* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and the publications of the World Peace Foundation. For general texts dealing with the history and international relations of the Far East see: Gowen, H. H., *Asia, A Short History from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, 1936, rev. ed.; Treat, P. J., *The Far East*, 1935, rev. ed.; Vinacke, H. M., *A History of the Far East in Modern Times*, 1936, rev. ed.; Morse, H. B., and MacNair, H. F., *Far Eastern International Relations*, 1931.

Asiatic, is insular. For all five of the Great Powers directly or indirectly concerned with the Asiatic region—Japan, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and the United States—the Asiatic mainland is, therefore, primarily a field of exploitation, and for the Soviet Union, alone, it is a land of extensive colonization as well.


As a consequence, whereas the European problem has its origin in the clash of national policies which are questions of life and death for all of the Continental states, since their security is directly at stake, the Asiatic problem arises from the collision of rival imperialisms, and only for Japan are the issues vital. Nevertheless, for Great Britain, since two thirds of the population of the British Empire lives between Aden and Singapore, and for the Soviet Union, three quarters of whose territory is located between the Urals and the Pacific, Asia is actually the field of largest importance so far as imperial policy is concerned.

By contrast, the interest of France is subordinate. Indo-China,¹ to be sure, is reckoned one of the most profitable as it is also one of the most considerable of French colonial possessions, but whereas British and Russian imperial interests are primarily Asiatic, the French imperial interests are mostly African. Thus the French people know that they are encamped rather than established in Asia and, like the Dutch in their far more valuable East Indies, they could not defend their colonies there against any serious challenge.

Last of all, the United States, unless forced to renounce the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, will by 1944

¹ Ennis, Thomas E., *French Policy and Developments in Indochina*, 1936; Thompson, Virginia M., *French Indo-China*, 1937.

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have no territorial stake in the Far East.¹ Its concern, up to the present, has been largely commercial, and its interest confined to the preservation of treaty rights which insured equal opportunity in the Chinese markets. This detachment has invested American policy in China with a different character from that of other states whose interests are based primarily on imperial concerns,² though the war there may greatly modify it.

In larger view, then, the Asiatic problem, at least in its present phase, has its chief origin, not in the direct clashes among the three imperial powers, Japan, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, growing out of their present territorial holdings, but in the collision of the rival interests of all the powers in China.³ And in fact the Far Eastern problem is actually the question of China.

For untold centuries China, which constitutes today the largest ethnic group in the world, with a population of about 400,000,000, has resisted invasion not so much

¹ Kirk, Grayson L., *Philippine Independence*, 1936; Malcolm, George A., *The Commonwealth of the Philippines*, 1936; Moncado, H. C., *America, the Philippines and the Orient*, 1932.

² American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, *Conflict in the Far East, 1931-1932*, 1932; Dennett, Tyler, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, 1922; Dulles, F. R., *America in the Pacific*, 1932; Field, F. V., *American Participation in the China Consortiums*, 1931; Howland, C. P., ed., *American Foreign Relations*, 1930; Karig, Walter, *Asia's Good Neighbor*, 1937.

³ American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, *Behind the Far Eastern Conflict*, 1933; Barnes, Joseph, ed., *Empire in the East*, 1934; Blakeslee, G. H., *The Pacific Area*, 1929; Chang, Peng-chun, *China at the Crossroads: The Chinese Situation in Perspective*, 1936; Ching-Wei, Wang, *China's Problems and Their Solution*, 1934; Clark, Grover, *The Great Wall Crumbles*, 1935; Foreign Policy Association, "The Dismemberment of China," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. X, No. 4, 1934; Golovin, N. N., *The Problem of the Pacific in the Twentieth Century*, 1922; Pollard, R. T., *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931*, 1933; Quigley, Harold S., and Blakeslee, George H., *The Far East: An International Survey*, 1938; Remer, C. F., and Palmer, W. B., *A Study of Chinese Boycotts with Special Reference to Their Economic Effectiveness*, 1933; Roosevelt, Nicholas, *The Restless Pacific*, 1928; Thompson, H. C., *The Case for China*, 1933; Whyte, Sir A. F., *China and the Foreign Powers*, 1928, rev.; Young, Carl Walter, *The International Relations of Manchuria*, 1929.

by arms as by absorption. The more recent historical examples of this process were offered by the Mongols (1270-1368) and the Manchus (1644-1912), who descended from the north beyond the Great Wall to conquer and control, only to disappear after a few centuries as rivers vanish in the ocean.¹

All Chinese history has been marked, moreover, by ever-recurring periods of strength and weakness. Periods in which internal anarchy has invited invasion have been succeeded by domestic resurgence following the disappearance of the invaders in the sea of Chinese numbers. So far as one may judge, the world during the past century has been witnessing one more of these epochs of weakness. In modern times, however, the role formerly played by the Mongols and Manchus beyond the Great Wall has been filled by the Western nations and more recently by Japan.

The most serious recent invasion of China was begun by the Japanese in 1937. In the preceding hundred years, China had already lost control of nearly two and a half million square miles of territory out of a total of about four and a half million once ruled by the Manchu emperors. Of the territories which were thus lost, France had taken possession of Indo-China,² and Britain had absorbed Upper Burma and Sikkim in addition to Hong Kong, and has maintained a dominant position in Tibet as well. In a similar manner Soviet Russia had gained control of Outer Mongolia and dominance in Chinese Turkistan; and the Manchuria of Czarist days had become the Manchukuo of Japan, to which there

¹ Latourette, K. S., *The Chinese, Their History and Culture*, 1934, 2 vols.; Williams, E. T., *A Short History of China*, 1928; Lin, Yu-t'ang, *My Country and My People*, 1935; Fitzgerald, C. P., *China: A Short Cultural History*, 1938.

² See map, page 387.

This is a detailed black and white map of China and its surrounding regions. The map shows the following features:

- Geographical Features:** The Pacific Ocean to the east, the Bay of Bengal to the south, and the Sea of Japan to the northeast. Major rivers like the Yangtze River (Yangtze) and the Yellow River (Hwangho) are depicted. The Great Wall is shown in the north.
- Political Regions:** Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria (divided into Manchukuo and Jehol), Szechwan, Yunnan, Kiangsu, and various other provinces.
- Cities:** Numerous cities are marked, including Peking, Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, and others.
- Scale:** A scale of miles is provided at the bottom right, ranging from 0 to 1000 miles.
- Preparation:** The map is prepared by Brooks Smyth, 1922.

likewise fell the possession of Korea (Chosen), Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadores, and Jehol.

China, early in 1937, was therefore primarily the eighteen provinces of China proper. Geographically, this nation of ever-changing frontiers offered a strange combination of strategic circumstances. Its former border lands, which were largely deserts, mountains, and plateaus, had constituted a double protecting ring of outlying territories. In the outer ring were Manchukuo, Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet, and Siam, all of which areas, with the exception of Siam, are now under Great Power dominance. The inner ring, which consists of French Indo-China, Hsikang, Kokonor, and Inner Mongolia, was still claimed to be an integral part of Chinese territory, except for French Indo-China.

The sea frontier of China, on the other hand, was entirely unprotected. The lack of a modern navy and the absence of adequate internal communications had rendered modern China helpless in the face of Western and Japanese aggression. Nor had past experience, gained from centuries of dealing with the invasion of land "barbarians," offered a safe precedent or guide to modern China in the proper methods of meeting a maritime onslaught of the Western "barbarians." The attempt to play one Western power against another had always ended in disaster, and the bankruptcy of this ancient policy was at no time more clearly illustrated than during the World War, when China was left to the tender mercies of westernized Japan.

Up to the war of 1937-1939, the Chinese had shown themselves destitute of the capacity for defending themselves. Instead of presenting a united front and a common resolution to oppose the foreigner, they had

habitually yielded and submitted, relying upon the double strategy of numbers which absorb and of intrigue which divides. The recent problem of the Far East derived therefore not only from the unhappy internal political, social, and economic circumstances which had prevailed in China, but also from the conflicting interests of the Great Powers in Asia.

Since the Treaty of Nanking (1842), which provided for the opening of five Chinese ports to foreign traders and the transfer of Hong Kong to British sovereignty, the encroachment of the imperialist powers has been a constant process. In 1858, by the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin, the Yangtze Valley was opened to merchant vessels, residence in Peking was granted to foreign diplomats, and merchants and missionaries were given free access to the interior of China.

During the next thirty years the process of gradually breaking down Chinese resistance to Western influence continued, along with the disintegration of the political and social forces within China itself. With the coming of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895, the process quickened. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki China granted independence to Korea and the annexation by Japan of Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula at the base of the Manchurian plain. Nor did the refusal of the Western Powers, particularly Russia, to permit the retention by Japan of the Liaotung Peninsula, accomplish more than the postponement of Japanese imperialist ambitions.

In 1895 Russia obtained from China the right to construct the Chinese Eastern Railway across northern Manchuria to Vladivostok; a privilege followed three years later by the Russian seizure of Liaotung, of which

Japan had but recently been deprived. During this period France likewise extended her frontiers in Indo-China across the Mekong, Britain received concessions for an enlargement of her Burma territory, and in 1897 Germany seized Tsingtao and received a ninety-nine year lease of the strategic harbor of Kiaochow, thus giving her control of the Shantung Peninsula.

It was through fear of the complete dismemberment of China that John Hay, American Secretary of State, declared the principle of the Open Door in 1899, extending equal opportunity in Chinese trade to all nations. The natural response, however, to this period of imperialist aggression was the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, leading to a further degradation of China's sovereign position.

With the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 (renewed in 1905, and again in 1911), Japan was in a position to reassert her strategic and economic claims in Manchuria without fear of interference from European naval powers. By the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth (September 5, 1905) which marked the close of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, Japan succeeded to Russia's rights in the Liaotung Peninsula and the southern half of the South Manchurian railroad, leaving the Russian sphere of influence to the north of Mukden. The paramount interests of Japan in Korea were likewise recognized, and Russia ceded to Japan the southern half of the island of Sakhalin as well. The annexation of Korea by Japan followed five years later, in 1910.

Two years before the outbreak of the World War the Manchu dynasty was overthrown¹ in China, largely through the instigation of Sun Yat-sen with the con-

¹ Reid, John Gilbert, *The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912*, 1935.

nivance of Yuan Shih-kai. The disunity of the Republican forces followed almost immediately, and the abdication of Dr. Sun, the provisional president, in favor of Yuan, was part of a futile attempt to restore unity. In 1916, the year of the death of Yuan, the Kuomintang, or Nationalist party, established an independent government in Canton, thus commencing the long period of political disintegration which was to continue for the next twenty years.

During the four years of war in Europe, Japan was left a free hand in the affairs of Asia. Nor did the entrance of China into the war in 1917 permit her soon to recover from the humiliation of the famous Twenty-one Demands¹ forced upon her by Japan two years previously. It was the failure of the Allied Powers at the Peace Conference to admit Chinese claims for the return of the German concession ports in Shantung, which had been seized by Japan during the war, that led to the refusal of both China and the United States to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.

The record of postwar China is one of the most tragic chapters of human history, to be compared only to the Wars of Religion in Europe. From all the chaos of a quarter of a century of civil strife, famine, plague, and social disintegration, however, there had by 1937 emerged unmistakable signs of national consciousness and unity which promised in the end to be the salvation

¹ Among the more important of the Twenty-one Demands the following of particular interest may be cited: (a) China was to consent to whatever agreement Germany and Japan might make regarding Shantung; (b) she was to consult Japan before granting concessions to foreigners in southern Manchuria and in eastern Mongolia; (c) her greatest iron and steel works were to be a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise; (d) she was not to lease any part of her coast to foreigners without Japan's consent; (e) she was to employ Japanese civil and military advisers; (f) she was to purchase half of her munitions from Japan; and (g) she was to grant important economic concessions and privileges to Japan.

of China in providing the Chinese people with an unprecedented spirit of resistance to Japanese aggression.

In retrospect it is now apparent that through the vicissitudes of this confusing drama, the growth and triumph of the Kuomintang or Nationalist party had been of the greatest historic importance.¹ After the death of Yuan Shih-kai in 1916, the final split between the northern and southern factions of the party occurred. For the next decade, commonly known as the "War Lord Era," Pekin (now Peiping) and Canton became the two principal capitals of the fast-disintegrating China, the former alone retaining foreign recognition.

From 1920 to 1926 the Pekin factions exhausted themselves over the internecine struggles of Chang Tso-lin, Wu Pei-fu, and Fung Yuh-siang, who, through mutual treachery, in succession became rulers of the Celestial City. During the same period in Canton, by contrast, the Kuomintang was completely reorganized along Communist Soviet lines, and its army was developed and equipped through Russian advice and financial aid.

In 1926, two years after the untimely death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Kuomintang, the triumphant northern march of the Cantonese armies commenced. By the end of 1928 most of the provinces of China from Canton to Mukden had been successively brought to terms, thanks to the genius of General Chiang Kai-shek, the principal commander of the Nationalist forces. Nor did the fact that disaffection almost immediately followed the establishment of the Nanking government in 1927, both between the right- and the left-wing elements of the Kuomintang, and between Peiping and

¹ Foreign Policy Association, "Ten Years of the Kuomintang," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VIII, No. 25, 1933.

Canton, detract from the amazing military feat of the Nationalist army.

With the Yangtze Valley under his command from Shanghai to Hankow, Chiang Kai-shek was in a position to commence the slow and painful process of the consolidation of his position and the reassertion of Nanking's sovereignty over dissident elements. For the next decade the Nanking government successively defeated the greater number of the Communist regimes scattered throughout China,¹ and won at least grudging fealty from all of China north to the Great Wall. In the later years, moreover, the gathering opposition of all Chinese factions to the imperialist ambitions of Japan contributed mightily to unification, so strikingly manifested since the commencement of Japanese armed intervention at Peiping and Tientsin in July of 1937.

But if superiority in arms and economic resources aided in the national triumph of the Kuomintang, the process was also accompanied by a change in the political outlook of the Chinese themselves. It is to the "Three Principles of the People"—Nationalism, Democracy, Livelihood—promulgated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, that one must turn for an understanding of the ideology of modern China.² By the first of these principles, Dr. Sun intended the freeing of China's soil from foreign control through the development of national consciousness and the creation of effective national power. The second principle pointed to the establishment of sovereignty in the people as a means for the attainment of democracy.

¹ Snow, Edgar, *Red Star Over China*, 1938; Yakhontoff, Victor A., *The Chinese Soviets*, 1934; Yorke, G. J., *China Changes*, 1935.

² Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony, *The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen*, 1937; Hu, Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*, 1934; Wu, Chih-fang, *Chinese Government and Politics*, 1935.

By Livelihood was meant a new social and economic order in China to be realized through the improvement of labor conditions and the guarantee of economic security to all the people.

The immediate realization of this program was naturally impossible, nor did Dr. Sun have any illusions as to the time element involved; it being quite clear to his mind that China had first to pass through a period of chaos and military dictatorship, from the leaven of which national unity would be eventually forged by force of arms. Following this unhappy period an era of tutelage would appear, devoted to the training of the masses in self-government, through education and the improvement of the national economy and standard of living. This second stage was to serve as a preparation for the attainment of the third and ultimate goal—a democratic social order.

Not one revolution in China's life, therefore, but many were to take place, both simultaneously and in succession. For inasmuch as the impact of the West had destroyed the ancient unity and social coherence of the Chinese, the new and resurrected China could be realized only through a change in all phases of its life, social, political, and economic.

Nor had China by 1937 fully passed the first stage of Dr. Sun's program. For although the official inauguration of the "New Life Movement" in 1935 announced the commencement of the era of "political tutelage," conditions of complete national unity envisioned in the first stage were not as yet assured. The abortive revolt of Canton against the authority and compromising foreign policy of Nanking in the spring of 1936, the seizure of Chiang Kai-shek the following December in

Sianfu, and the continued disaffection of remaining Communist centers in the interior and certain of the northern provinces within the Japanese sphere of influence, had all indicated the survival of disintegrating forces inherited from the civil-war period. It was, therefore, the Japanese invasion in the summer of 1937 which forced upon the Chinese the necessity of social and political cohesion as the sole means of national survival.

The contemporary problem of China, then, has taken its rise from the long-continued circumstance of political weakness. The additional factor of economic desirability has also played a significant role, for despite all the circumstances of political and economic anarchy, China is still conceived by the trading nations to constitute one of the most considerable of the few surviving fields for exploitation. Today, Africa has been apportioned among the several imperialisms, the United States has made good its Monroe Doctrine closing the Americas to further European annexations, and even Asia, except for Siam and the Chinese Republic up to the present war, has been divided among rival imperialist powers.

China was, therefore, the only considerable territory in Asia to remain open; and until very recent times there had existed a faith in the fabulous wealth of the Celestial Kingdom, surviving from remoter days of the Age of Discovery. It is true that, little by little, this faith has been largely dissipated. Anciently that wealth seemed to be expressed in gold and jewels; in our own time it was discovered in the promise of vast mineral resources suitable to the development of industry.

Today, however, the poverty of the Chinese people is proverbial; and scientific exploration has destroyed the conviction as to vast industrial resources. The fact that

China lacks large available reserves of high-grade iron, although relatively rich in coal, probably precludes the development of a national heavy industry commensurate with future needs. And this fact, in turn, would seem to close the door to all prospect that China will become a World Power. But although the resources of China have been demonstrated to be far inferior to early expectations, yet in certain industrial fields, in the manufacture of textiles, for example, she has demonstrated her potential capacity not only to satisfy her own domestic needs, but also to become a competitor in the world market.¹

In fact, within a time which is still recent, the world has been witnessing a striking phenomenon in the Far East. In the area which, in the imperialistic calculations of the West, there was to be found the ultimate and most considerable market for the products of European and American factories, the actual demand has been increasingly for foodstuffs and raw materials; and under the pressure of Chinese, Indian, and Japanese competition, the Western nations in the all-important field of textiles are in full retreat. Only in the case of the heavy industries, in the products of iron and steel, does the poverty of the East in basic raw materials seem to promise the existence of a continuing market for Western production.

In the postwar years, too, there is no mistaking the fact that in the West the old imperialistic ardor is cooling. If the American withdrawal from the Philippines is the most significant indication of the change, others

¹ Bain, H. F., *ores and Industry in the Far East*, 1933, rev. ed.; Condliffe, J. B., *China Today: Economic*, 1932; Cressey, G. B., *China's Geographic Foundations*, 1934; Field, F. V., *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area*, 1934; Vinacke, H. M., *Problems of Industrial Development in China*, 1926.

are not lacking. Everywhere, conquered peoples have disclosed an odd capacity to confound their masters. Today nations which sought to acquire wider markets by expanding their frontiers are finding their own domestic situation rendered difficult by the competition of their colonial possessions in the home market. Thus Philippine sugar and coconut oil have caused a revision in the program of American imperialism, and Indian textile competition has roused emotions not wholly dissimilar in Lancashire.¹

As far as Great Britain, the United States, and France are concerned, therefore, Asiatic policy is a question rather of preserving than of extending. British and French policies are thus static even in the matter of territory, while in the field of trade they are identical with American policies. Actually, only Russia and Japan today adhere still to the old conceptions of expanding imperialism. But even upon the Soviet Union, preoccupation over the realization of a vast program of Communist national economy temporarily imposes a static policy.

For the moment, therefore, all four of the Western Powers—Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia, and the United States—are agreed upon a common policy, which is to preserve the territorial integrity of China and the "Open Door" in opposition to Japanese pretensions. This purpose, despite convenient propaganda, has about it little idealism or even of respect for the sanctity of treaties. In America there may be a certain sentimental sympathy with the Chinese, but in all the European peoples that sympathy is generally lacking. Actually the

¹ Ray, Parimal, *India's Foreign Trade Since 1870*, 1934; Utley, F., *Lancashire and the Far East*, 1931.

same motives which explained British concern for the inviolability of Belgian territory and the sacredness of the treaty which established it, underlie the concern of the Western nations for Chinese independence. And these motives are, of course, purely selfish.

At a moment when the old-fashioned form of imperialism commenced losing favor in the West, not for moral but for material reasons, Japan has suddenly taken the field, affirming the once familiar principles and employing the ancient practices. On the other hand, having become satisfied that these former practices are no longer profitable for themselves, the Western Democracies are moved to common condemnation of the Japanese course. This Japanese action must, however, be identified as a simple if belated fidelity to principles which once found complete Western acceptance.

Actually the Japanese have crowded into the brief span of four decades imperialistic operations which in British history consumed at least three centuries. Not until the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 did Japan take the first step toward continental lodgment. European intervention then robbed her victory over China of its calculated fruits. Only ten years later, after the triumph of the Russo-Japanese War, did the capture of Port Arthur and the occupation of Korea clear the way. A decade later, the World War permitted the eviction of Germany from Shantung. Another ten years, and the descent of Europe into new political anarchy, and the whole world into the depths of the Great Depression, permitted the Japanese to consolidate their position in Manchuria by the creation of the puppet Empire of Manchukuo. Nor does the Western world appear to have sufficiently recovered from this period of paralysis

to present effective opposition to the most recent of Japanese imperialist and military ventures in China.

Meantime, the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922, on the one hand, threw Great Britain and the United States back strategically upon Singapore and Hawaii, and on the other hand established a ratio of naval strength between the two great maritime powers and Japan which assured Japanese naval supremacy in all the waters of the western Pacific from Indo-China to the Aleutian Islands. Last of all, relying upon the accomplished facts of military occupation of Manchuria and naval supremacy in all waters of national interest, Japan has begun to arrogate to herself the authority inherent in her "Monroe Doctrine" investing her with the same rights in China which the United States formerly claimed in certain Caribbean countries.

Diplomatic, military, and naval activities, moreover, have been accompanied by economic. Such economic activity, too, has had the heaviest consequences for the British, consequences measured by the ever-declining share of her industries in Asia's trade. While, therefore, British naval power still suffices to halt Japanese imperialism at Singapore, and American naval power is adequate to check it at Hawaii, economically Japan has with success invaded all of Asia and made startling inroads upon South American and East African markets.

In the Asiatic region, all other problems are subordinate to the Japanese phenomenon, as in the European region all others are less serious than the German. The essential difference lies in the fact that while in Europe the Western Democracies are geographically in a stronger position to meet the German challenge, in Asia they are too far removed to defend their interests. With her

triumph over Russia, in 1905, Japan became in fact a Great Power. Since that time she has followed an imperialistic policy in no sense different from the imperialistic policies followed by all the other Great Powers in the nineteenth century.

What has invested the Japanese action with the air of novelty, however, is the fact that it is identified as an anachronism because either satiety or disillusionment has led the other imperialist powers to renounce their old policies and practices. What has bestowed upon it the character of a menace is the further fact that the powers which no longer dream of expanding their territorial holdings see in it an eventual threat to the lands they once seized and still desire to retain. Thus Russia in Siberia, Great Britain in India, France in Indo-China, and the United States in the Philippines identify in Japanese policy an ultimate danger to their possessions and interests.

In point of fact, the student of history cannot fail to find striking and illuminating parallels between the Far Eastern question of today and the Near Eastern question in all of the years between the fall of Napoleon and the outbreak of the World War. About a helpless China the Great Powers have long been gathering, as they assembled about the Turkish Empire in the nineteenth century. In the present instance, Japan is playing the role of Russia in the earlier case, while the present attitude of the Soviet Union toward China is vaguely that of the old Hapsburg Monarchy toward Turkey, and British concern in the Far East now is little different from what it once manifested in the Near East.

At the moment, none of the four Western Great Powers—Great Britain, Russia, France, and the United

States—is prepared to fight to prevent that extension of Japanese power in China which all desire, for obvious reasons, to prohibit. In this respect, the situation differs from the circumstances of the crisis which led to the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Being unwilling or unable to resort to war in the pursuit of their national policies, the Western nations have sought by invoking the Covenant of the League of Nations¹, the Treaty of Washington², and the Pact of Paris³ to restrain actions clearly illegal by sanctions which were purely moral.

Without permanently escaping from the possibility of war, Great Britain, the United States, and Russia have so far completely failed in their undertakings.⁴ The reasons for failure must be sought in the circumstances of Japan itself, explaining as they do a national policy that has made Asia the graveyard of all the postwar programs of world peace based upon the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Washington Treaty, and the Pact of Paris.

¹ For text, see Appendix A.

² For text, see Appendix D; note also the other Washington Treaty shown in Appendix C.

³ For text, see Appendix F.

⁴ Examples of fighting Japan by resolution are illustrated by the League of Nations and the Brussels Conference. On October 6, 1937, the Assembly of the League adopted two reports submitted by its Far Eastern Advisory Committee which not only condemned Japanese bombardment of open towns in China, but declared the invasion of China to be "in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, and under the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928." The Assembly furthermore resolved that "members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's powers of resistance, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China."

On November 3, 1937, the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty, Japan being absent, assembled at Brussels. Conciliatory efforts of the Conference having failed, there was adopted a declaration, fifteen votes to one (Italy). By its provisions the existing obligations of Japan as a signatory of the Nine-Power Treaty were reasserted, it being further declared that no warrant in law existed for the Japanese aim to change the policy of China by armed force. The provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty were again reaffirmed with the observation that "force could provide no lasting solution," and a demand for suspension of hostilities,

Chapter XIX

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A VERY slight study of the map suffices to demonstrate how striking is the resemblance between the position of Japan in relation to the Asiatic continent and that of Great Britain in relation to the European. The Korea Strait replaces that of Dover, the Sea of Japan takes the place of the North Sea, Korea measurably takes the place of Belgium, and Hokkaido and Sakhalin command the Russian outlet to the open sea on the north as Scotland and the Orkneys control that of Germany.

During past centuries, the British position has imposed two wholly different directions upon national policy. Until the close of the Hundred Years War, the proximity of the English shores to those of the Continent bound the fortunes of England closely to those of the mainland. Caesar conquered Britain for Rome. Angles and Saxons from the mainland founded the English nation: William the Conqueror made England a part of his Norman kingdom. Under the Plantagenets the order was reversed and English sovereigns ruled over the larger part of France.

Not until the middle of the fifteenth century did the feeble Charles VII, thanks to Joan of Arc, succeed in freeing French soil, and even in the sixteenth Calais still remained in English hands. With Elizabeth, however, England turned her back upon the Continent definitively and launched herself upon that imperial career which was to end by the creation of a great empire scattered about the Seven Seas.

From the Age of Louis XIV to the present hour, moreover, British policy in Europe has been defensive. The narrow seas which separate England from France have been primarily a barrier and not a bridge of empire. On the Continent of Europe, the British have fought neither to acquire territory directly nor to establish protectorates. On the contrary, their dominating interest has always been national security, which, to be sure, they have ever sought to defend on foreign soil.

In Japanese history something of the British experience is reproduced. In the thirteenth century the Japanese defeat of the Mongols recalls the English destruction of the Spanish Armada; in the sixteenth, Japanese invasion of Korea is vaguely reminiscent of English action in France. Then for three centuries the Island Kingdom retired into that complete isolation which was broken by the famous mission of Commodore Perry in 1853-54.

Since that time it has been the example of Plantagenet England and not of Tudor England which Japan has followed.¹ And the reason is obvious: while the Japanese position, like the British, dictated overseas expan-

¹ Hara, Katsuro, *Introduction to the History of Japan*, 1920; Latourette, K. S., *The Development of Japan*, 1926, 2d ed.; Murdoch, James, *A History of Japan*, 1926; Sansom, G. B., *Japan: A Short Cultural History*, 1931; Takekoshi, Yosaburo, *The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan*, 1930, 3 vols.

sion, it was only in the middle of the last century that Japan emerged from her long isolation, and then not only the Americas and Africa, but northern, western, and southern Asia as well were barred against her. Actually there was left open to her only those Asiatic shores facing her own coast.

Strategically, too, the Japanese problem was identical with the British.¹ Naval supremacy in all the waters surrounding her islands was the prerequisite of security.² To be sure, the problem was simpler. For Great Britain there is the double necessity of mastery in the near-by Atlantic, Channel, and North Sea, and in the Mediterranean as well, to insure safety at home and security of the lines of communication with India and Australia. For Japan, by contrast, supremacy in domestic waters alone insures safety for all the maritime lines of communication in which she has strategic interest.

To be secure at home, however, Japan must dominate all the waters which extend from the Aleutian Islands to the broad strait separating Formosa (Taiwan) from the Philippines. But it was not until the Washington Conference of 1921-22 that the Western powers, particu-

¹ "Japan is an island nation. But her distance from the continent of Asia is so small that she cannot be indifferent to what happens in Korea, Manchuria, China, and Siberia, any more than England can keep aloof from developments in the Low Countries across the Channel and along the North Sea. Particularly in Korea and Manchuria, we have consistently followed a policy dictated by the sole motive of establishing our own security. We have looked upon their frontiers as our own frontiers, even as England looks upon the frontiers of the Low Countries as her own." ("The Permanent Bases of Japanese Foreign Policy," by Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1933.)

² Ballard, G. A., *The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan*, 1921; Bywater, H. C., *Sea-Power in the Pacific*, 1921; Causton, E. E. N., *Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan*, 1936; Colegrove, Kenneth W., *Militarism in Japan*, 1936; Davis, Col. W. J., *Japan: The Air Menace of the Pacific*, 1928; Etherton, P. T., and Tiltman, H. H., *Japan: Mistress of the Pacific?*, 1933; Falk, Edwin A., *Togo and the Rise of Japanese Sea Power*, 1936; Kennedy, Capt. M. D., *Some Aspects of Japan and Her Defence Forces*, 1929.

larly the United States and Great Britain, were finally put on notice of Japanese policy in this respect.

At Washington in 1921-22, Japanese ends were served, first, by persuading the British and American powers to renounce all plans for extending the fortifications of their establishments in Alaska, the Philippines, Guam, and Hong Kong; and, second, by also acquiring their approval of a relative naval strength for the Japanese fleet which insured to it actual supremacy in all the seas washing the Asiatic littoral from Kamchatka to Indo-China.

Japanese security, then, demands Japanese naval supremacy in the Far East. That supremacy, however, constitutes the basis not merely of security but of hegemony as well. For not only does her naval superiority enable Japan to defend her own shores from both military and naval attack, but it also insures the same freedom of communication with the adjoining coasts of Asia which the British fleet bestowed upon British armies during the World War. At will, Japan can move her military forces by sea against any point from Vladivostok to Shanghai.

For Japan, therefore, the East China, Yellow, and Japan seas are, at present, as secure as are the North and Irish seas and the English Channel for Great Britain. Neither on her homeland territory nor in domestic waters can she be attacked. Such challenge as can threaten her must come by way of the Asiatic mainland and be directed at her position there. Thus in practice the two possible perils for Japan are discoverable in China and in Soviet Siberia.

To abolish these dangers, the Japanese have already fought two wars: the Sino-Japanese, 1894-95, which

gave them Formosa and brought about the separation of Korea from China; and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05, which gave them both Korea and Port Arthur. In addition, her participation in the World War enabled Japan to evict Germany from the Shantung Peninsula and thus to dispose of another potential rival. Finally, the disarray of the other Great Powers in the postwar period has permitted the Japanese, by creating the shadowy state of Manchukuo, to establish themselves as firmly in Manchuria as the British in India or the French in Indo-China,—a process which made essential an extension of paramount influence in North China, resulting in the commencement of hostilities in July, 1937.

Looking back over the five decades which mark the rise of imperialism in Japan, it is obvious that she has proceeded logically and almost ineluctably to the situation in which she now finds herself. China, Russia, and Germany have, in turn, been removed from her pathway by war; the British and American powers, by the less expensive method of conference. Her geographic position, however, has imposed three concerns. In respect to China, she had to guard against attacks which might be inspired and financed by foreign states unable themselves to strike directly. In respect to the Soviet Union, she has always to be on guard against a military challenge to her whole position on the Asiatic mainland. Finally, in respect to the British and American powers, especially the United States, she has always to maintain an adequate degree of naval strength.¹

¹ For recent publications dealing with Japanese foreign policy see: Akagi, Roy Hidemichi, *Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936*, 1936; Hindmarsh, Albert E., *The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy*, 1936; Ishii, Viscount Kikujiro, *Diplomatic Commentaries*, 1936; Kennedy, Malcolm D., *The Problem of Japan*, 1935; Saito, Hiroshi, *Japan's Policies and Purposes*, 1935; Stein, Guenther, *Made in Japan*, 1935; Takeuchi, Tatsuji, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire*, 1935.

From the first of these concerns of national policy has come Japanese insistence in recent times upon what has already been described as a Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine. That doctrine in fact constitutes the assertion by the Japanese of a right to supervise Chinese financial and political relations with the outside world in such fashion as to insure Japan's immunity from Western-inspired and -subsidized Chinese attacks upon her vital interests.¹

From the second concern is derived the ever-recurring rumor of a new Russo-Japanese War, a war of prevention designed to throw Russian frontiers back to the Baikal, thus assuring to Japan the security of Manchukuo and possession of the natural wealth of eastern Siberia.²

Last of all, from the third concern has arisen the constant insistence of the Japanese upon a larger relative naval strength vis-à-vis both Great Britain and the United States. From the 10-6 ratio of Washington, (1922) raised to the 10-7 at London (1930) in respect

¹ The famous Amau "restatement and clarification" of Japanese policy toward China (*New York Times*, April 18, 1934) reads in part as follows:

"We regard Japan as principally responsible for the maintenance of peace in Eastern Asia and we are determined to fulfill this mission. In order to do so, Japan must share China's responsibility for the maintenance of peace.

"Japan sincerely desires the integrity, unification, and restoration of order in China. History teaches that that is achievable only through China's own self-awakening and China's own endeavors. . . .

"In the situation which has arisen since the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents, if other powers attempt to co-operate in assistance to China, whether under the guise of financial or technical assistance, ultimately such efforts almost inevitably produce political results. The outcome for China may be calamitous, endangering her integrity and producing a division of spheres of influence.

"Japan does not object to other powers individually negotiating with China for assistance in the fields of economics and commerce, provided this does not disturb peace and maintenance of order in Eastern Asia.

"But if such efforts lead to a disturbance of the peace, Japan must object.

"Japan must object to the supplying of military airplanes, the establishment of airdromes, the furnishing of military advisers and instructors, and the granting of political loans."

² Betts, T. J., "The Strategy of Another Russo-Japanese War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 4; also Lattimore, Owen, *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict*, 1935; *Foreign Policy Reports*, "Soviet-Japanese Relations: 1931-1938," Vol. XIV, No. 22, 1939.

to cruisers, Japan has now risen to claim full rights to parity, since her renunciation of the naval treaties following the London Conference of December, 1935.¹ And obviously her demand is based upon the fear that at some future time the British and American fleets may be united in common challenge of Japanese imperialism, and under such circumstances, parity would mean only a 10-5 ratio in the face of the combined British and American naval forces. Sufficient as even that ratio seems in the eyes of foreign naval experts, to Japan it appears inadequate.

* If the geographical position of Japan is responsible for her pursuit of security by methods which insure her supremacy in Eastern Asiatic waters, it is nevertheless to economic rather than strategic circumstances that it is necessary to turn to discover the explanation of the Manchurian adventure which at last brought her into sharp controversy with the Western world, and also of her later war with China. For it is in search, not of prosperity measured by American or even European standards, but of the means of bare existence that Japanese imperialism has asserted itself upon the Asiatic continent.

To understand the Japanese situation one must keep in mind a few statistics. On an area three fourths as great as that of Germany in 1937, Japan maintains an equal population. But while more than half of the German lands are arable, less than one fifth of the Japanese lands are available for agriculture. Whereas German coal production annually exceeds 200,000,000 tons, the Japanese rarely exceeds 40,000,000. Iron resources are

¹ Bienstock, Gregory, *The Struggle for the Pacific*, 1937; Denlinger, Sutherland, and Gary, Lt. Commander Charles B., *War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies, Peoples and Battle Problems*, 1936.

even more inadequate. Water power, by contrast, is considerable but insufficient for industrialization on any great scale.¹

In the matter of foodstuffs, Japan might conceivably support herself at an excessively low standard of living from her own production. Annually, however, nearly a million mouths are added to the number to be fed as contrasted with a third of a million for Germany and four hundred thousand for Italy. Save for Great Britain, Japan has the highest density of population of any Great Power, and that population is established on the poorest of all homeland areas.²

Until the late sixties of the last century, Japanese population had remained fairly stationary at the figure of twenty-five millions. To have added forty millions to the population of an area materially smaller than that of the state of California, and inferior in natural resources as well, and to have permitted this transformation to take place in less than three generations, is obviously to have created a problem of the first magnitude.³

Nor have the Japanese, like the Italians before the World War, succeeded in sending any considerable portion of their growing population abroad. On the con-

¹ See Coal, Iron Ore, and Water Power Map, Chapter III, pages 46-47.

² For books dealing with various aspects of the economic position of Japan, see Field, F. V., ed., *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area*, 1934; Holland, W. L., ed., *Commodity Control in the Pacific Area*, 1935; Hubbard, G. E., and Baring, D., *Eastern Industrialization and Its Effect on the West*, 1935; Moulton, H. G., and Ko, Junichi, *Japan: An Economic and Financial Appraisal*, 1931; Orchard, J. E., *Japan's Economic Position*, 1930; Pearose, E. F., *Food Supply and Raw Materials in Japan*, 1930; Stein, Guenther, *Far East in Ferment*, 1936; Utley, Freda, *Japan's Feet of Clay*, 1937; Tanlin, O., and Logan, E., *When Japan Goes to War*, 1936.


³ Crocker, W. R., *The Japanese Population Problem; the Coming Crisis*, 1931; Dennery, Etienne, *Asia's Teeming Millions*, 1931; Gulick, Sidney L., *Toward Understanding Japan*, 1935; Ishii, Ryoichi, *Population Pressure and Economic Life in Japan*, 1937; Thompson, W. S., *Danger Spots in World Population*, 1929.

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


NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOODSTUFFS, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, AND RAW MATERIALS

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND NET IMPORTS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES OF
AVERAGE NATIONAL CONSUMPTION (1925-29)

— GREAT ESSENTIALS —



CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS



■ PRODUCTION
▨ NET IMPORTS

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trary, in the English-speaking countries of North America and Australia, immigration laws have closed the door to Japanese immigrants.¹ And in Korea and Manchuria, climate and domestic standards of living have proved fatal obstacles to Japanese settlement.

Of necessity, therefore, the Japanese have been driven to meet the ever-growing problem of population pressure by domestic devices rather than by means of emigration. Like the Italians and Germans, they have turned to the double method of increasing domestic agricultural production and expanding national industry.

* As to the first method, there can be little question that the limit of possible extension has been reached. Actually, in recent years Australian and Manchurian foodstuffs have annually become a more considerable factor in national imports; although at the same time Japan has become an exporter of many types of canned goods.

In the field of industry, poverty in coal and relative destitution in iron have proved to be serious obstacles to the development of any large iron and steel production. When it is realized that the annual steel and iron output of Japan today, in normal times falls short of that of the small state of Belgium and even under war conditions has not exceeded the production capacity of the single city of Cleveland, the nature of the limitations Japan faces in this field can be properly appraised.

In fact, it is only in cotton, wool, and silk textiles that Japanese industrialization has made real progress. Here the growth has been remarkable; but it has imposed a far-reaching change in Japanese economy. Cotton and wool have to be imported, and this rising dependence upon the outside world for raw materials is

¹ Paul, Rodman W., *The Abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement*, 1936.

paralleled by what will be a similarly rising dependence in the matter of foodstuffs. Thus Japan is moving steadily toward the situation of Great Britain, without, however, making the smallest attempt to limit population by birth control as is now being done voluntarily in Great Britain.

Impressive as has been the progress of Japan in the field of textiles, there is here, too, an eventual if not an immediate limit. Today Japanese success at the expense of Great Britain is unmistakable. That success, however, has led the British government to seek to limit the ravages of Japanese competition in Lancashire by closing Crown colonies (where alone their political control is complete) to Japanese production. Even more serious, however, is the growing competition of India and also of China before the war of 1937, because costs of production in both those countries are naturally much lower than in Japan.

Nevertheless, for Japan, the Chinese market continues to have primary importance; not, to be sure, because of immediate sales, but because of future possibilities. The possibility of future Japanese exports to China has steadily been rising, especially under war conditions, which enable Japan to exercise certain monopolies. On the other hand, the possibility of Japanese domination of the Chinese market has been exaggerated, for in the field of heavy industries Japan is out of the running, while she has neither foodstuffs nor raw materials to sell and cannot long meet the competition of the Chinese themselves in textiles, once hostilities have ceased.

As the situation stands today, despite an enormous expansion of industry, Japan is still, as in the past, confronted by two facts of ominous import: a rising cost

of living and a rapidly expanding population. In 1938-39 the situation was still further complicated by the continuance of hostilities in China. Doubtless there will be further gains in foreign trade in textiles and in rubber goods, electric appliances, novelties, and certain other manufactures. An adequate supply of cheap labor is also assured, and costs of production may therefore for the present fall rather than rise in relation to foreign production costs.

Nevertheless, Japanese exports must continue to encounter an expanding number of obstacles in the way of competition from India and China and of tariff barriers among the Western nations. The further advantage of the depreciated *yen*, to which no inconsiderable part of recent trade expansion has been due, is of course transitory. Thus, so far as Japan and her Korean and Formosan possessions are concerned, it is plain that these cannot long continue to support their growing population under existing conditions. Like the Italians, therefore, the Japanese face the alternative of artificial restriction of population or the acquisition of new territory.

It is precisely at this point that one comes face to face with the Manchurian policy of Japan. Manchukuo is, in fact, the first answer Japanese statesmen and soldiers have undertaken to give to the problem of future national existence posed by the economic, demographic, and strategic circumstances of their homeland territory.¹

¹ American Academy of Political and Social Science, "Prerequisites of Japanese Security," by Orchard, J. E., *The Annals*, July, 1933; Eldridge, F. R., *Dangerous Thoughts on the Orient*, 1933; Etherton, P. T., and Tiltman, H. H., *Manchuria, the Cockpit of Asia*, 1932; Foreign Policy Association, "Two Years of the Manchukuo Regime," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. X, No. 14, 1934; Hishida, Seiji, *The Manchoukuo Question in Its Wider Aspects*, 1935; Kawakami, K. K., *Manchoukuo, Child of Conflict*, 1933; Kuno, Yoshi, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent*, Vol. 1, 1937; Lattimore, Owen, *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict*, 1935; Rea, George Bronson, *The Case for Manchukuo*, 1935; Young, C. W., *Japan's Special Position in Manchuria*, 1931, 3 vols.

How far does the answer seem adequate? Obviously the question remains difficult, because the ultimate appraisal of Manchurian resources has yet to be made—as also the final result of the war in China.

Nevertheless certain facts seem at least tentatively established. Thus, on an area more than three times as great as Japan proper, Manchukuo possesses many resources which are complementary to the Japanese. There is considerable coal and some iron, although neither the quantity of the former nor the quality of the latter are such as to permit any large development.¹ Beyond these there are resources in foodstuffs which, in fact, constitute for Japan the chief importance of its new sphere of influence. Soybeans and wheat are raised in considerable and increasing quantities, and both are precious additions to Japanese domestic food supplies.²

Although the density of population in Manchukuo is relatively low, something like 80 per square mile as contrasted with 460 for Japan, there is, however, small prospect that any considerable number of Japanese can be persuaded to settle there. The explanation of this fact is twofold. On the one hand, the thirty millions of Chinese already established can underlive and outlive the Japanese workers; on the other, the climate is such that the Japanese masses find it too rigorous. For Japan, therefore, Manchukuo seems destined to be always a land of exploitation, like Senegal for France, or Nigeria for Great Britain.

¹ Japanese occupation of North China in July, 1937, was a clear indication of intent to control the rich coal resources of Shansi and Chahar, together with the iron ore reserves of Hopoh. For Chinese mineral resources see Bain, H. F., *Ores and Industry in the Far East*, 1933, rev. ed.

² Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The International Trade of Manchuria," *International Conciliation*, No. 269, 1931; Field, F. V., ed., *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area*, 1934; *Japan-Manchukuo Year Book*, 1937.

In this relatively vast territory, with a population of more than thirty millions, which is still mounting rapidly, and an area nearly four times that of Italy, it is manifest that Japan can, for a certain period of time, find a field for profitable development and exploitation. But she cannot find new fields for her surplus population or adequate markets for her industry. The answer to her supreme problem, that of population, is hardly discoverable in eastern Asia.

Nevertheless, it is plain that, in the minds of the Japanese masses, the Manchurian adventure has been accepted as the direct consequence of national necessity. Since the establishment of Manchukuo in 1931 Japanese trade with this area has considerably expanded, her exports to it being more than double those to the rest of China. Manchukuo is thus for the Japanese people what the Danubian Basin is for the German—the line of least resistance. Japanese national feeling, too, is exacerbated as is German by a sense of injustice, an injustice which for Japan arises, on the one hand, from the stigma of inferiority disclosed in the immigration laws of the United States¹ and, on the other, from the prohibition of Japanese settlement on the still vast empty spaces of the American and Australasian regions.

Psychologically, then, Japanese reaction to the protests and interferences of the West, growing out of her Chinese policy, has, like the German feelings about treaty revision, taken the form of intense and explosive nationalism in which the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States have in turn been identified as the relentless enemy. As a consequence, military and naval leaders have found it easy to exercise decisive

¹ Paul, Rodman W., *The Abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement*, 1936.

influence politically, and Manchukuo has come to occupy in Japanese eyes the character of Austria in German eyes.

It is idle to suppose that it is possible by any other means save that of war, to bring about a modification of Japanese policy in Manchuria. Nor is there any indication of a retreat from the present position of paramount influence which Japan maintains in China proper. The British, who have viewed with the largest measure of calm the concentration of Japanese interest and energies upon the Asiatic continent, have recognized that, for a time at least, the danger of Japanese expansion to the south has been abolished, or at least postponed. For so long as Japanese military and economic resources are expended upon the areas of northern Asia, British interests in the East Indies and the unsettled regions of Australia and New Zealand, which alone seem to offer climatically and otherwise a suitable field for Asiatic colonization, remain secure.

What is most important to note is the fact that geographic position plus existing naval strength have given Japan naval supremacy in the western Pacific. This supremacy is supplemented by military force sufficient to defend the Japanese position upon the Asiatic mainland against any present challenge, whether Chinese or Russian. In the nature of things, however, Japanese policy must also concern itself with the prospect of eventual challenge, and that explains its efforts on the one hand to assert a political and financial guardianship over China, and on the other to achieve the isolation of Russia through the Anti-Communist Pact.¹

¹ The German-Japanese Anti-Communist Agreement of November 25, 1936, was later adhered to by signatures of Italy, Manchukuo, Spain, and Hungary. For text of this pact see Appendix N.

That there is any dream on the part of Japan of achieving a complete and continuing domination of China, or of organizing this vast empire as the British have undertaken to organize India, seems unlikely. Such a task all sensible Japanese plainly perceive is beyond national resources and might lead to disasters which are incalculable. On the other hand there has been a determination on the part of the Japanese to prevent the rise of a united government in China hostile to Japanese pretensions of "paramount influence." It was the "Anti-Japanism" of the Kuomintang which, by the summer of 1937, led the Japanese to begin hostilities.

To the student of international relations the history of Asia since the invasion of Manchuria offers an interesting example of the ultimate danger in aggressive policies. For although repudiation of international engagements and the conquest of Manchuria and eastern China were carried out in the name of security, both territorial and economic, the results have proved to be otherwise.

Prior to 1931, the paramount position of Japan in Asia was unquestioned. The 5-5-3 ratio in naval strength and the prevailing restrictions upon fortified naval bases in the Pacific gave to the Japanese the enviable position of complete control of their territorial seas. On the mainland, China, helpless because of disunity and civil war, was unable to menace Japanese interests seriously. To the north, relative calm along the borders of Manchuria had precluded the necessity of Soviet Russia's concentrating extensive armed forces in eastern Siberia. In the councils of nations, particularly at Geneva, Japan's diplomatic position and prestige were such as to command both respect and friendly co-operation.

Since the invasion of Manchuria and the open assertion of claim to paramountcy in China, the position of Japan as to security and prosperity has been altered. The Japanese repudiation of the disarmament treaties has relieved Great Britain and the United States of previous limits upon their navies, and has resulted in a vast extension of the naval bases at Singapore and Pearl Harbor. The British, moreover, have regained their freedom to fortify Hong Kong, and the Americans have likewise the right to insure their naval position in Manila Bay and to construct a naval base in the Aleutian Islands. Against these two wealthy naval powers, the Japanese are at a grave disadvantage in the race of competitive arms.

On the mainland, Japanese aggression has served at last to bring about national unity of purpose in China on a scale before unknown in modern times. While China has by no means the naval strength or military power to defeat Japanese forces in open conflict, the unity of Chinese opposition to Japanese pretensions has resulted in a fighting spirit which has amazed the entire world. Though defeated in frontal attacks through inferior equipment, the Chinese have turned what was to have been a rout into a war of attrition.

In Manchukuo and China proper, Japanese policy has likewise provoked defensive measures which render the position of Japan in the long run less secure than it was formerly. Through mistrust of Japanese intentions, Soviet Russia has not only increased many times over the concentration of her military, aerial, and naval forces in eastern Siberia, but has completed both the double tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the construction of an alternate road running north of Lake Baikal beyond the reach of Japanese forces.

In the long run, therefore, the circumstances of Japanese naval and military security may prove to be more precarious than before the commencement of Japan's policy of expansion on the Asiatic mainland and the assertion of her right to absolute naval parity with Britain and America. For although Japan possesses today larger military and naval forces and enjoys a more advantageous strategic situation in Manchuria than was the case a decade past, her relative position of armed strength has considerably lessened. The Japanese are not only faced with the possibility of formidable British and American naval superiority, but the forces of opposition which their policy has aroused in Nationalist China and Soviet Russia are already attaining alarming proportions, both actual and potential.

Nor has Japanese expansionist policy been achieved without sacrifices on the home front. On the contrary, both human liberties and standard of living have suffered in the name of national security. Since the assassination of Premier Hamaguchi, November 14, 1930, following the ratification of the London Naval Treaty in the same year, the forces of nationalist imperialism with both army and navy support have been in the ascendancy. The militarist contempt for liberal constitutionalist thought has been apparent throughout. The assassination of Premier Inukai in March, 1932, and the abortive military coup d'etat of the Tokyo garrison in February of 1936, were but the more violent manifestations of internal discord.

On the other hand, while unquestionably the military clique received in the beginning the whole-hearted support of Japanese public opinion, both as a repudiation of the liberal tradition in foreign policy and as the

Japanese reply to the "moral" sanctions of the League of Nations, indications of disillusionment are becoming manifest. The liberal party registered gains in the elections of February, 1936, and, together with more conservative constitutional elements, overwhelmingly defeated the candidates representing the Hayashi militarist group in the general elections of April, 1937. Out of 466 seats in the Diet but 66 governmental candidates were returned, resulting in the eventual resignation of Premier Hayashi, who was succeeded by the government of Prince Konoye in June.¹

Beginning in July, 1937, the Japanese invasion of China covered a wide area.² Contemporaneous with the rapid occupation of the five northern provinces, the attack on Shanghai, which commenced August 14, opened the campaign for the control of the Yangtze Valley. The fall of Nanking, capital of the Chinese Republic, on December 13, was followed by a slow but steady progress of the invading forces, resulting finally in the Japanese occupation of Hankow on October 25, 1938. On October 11, moreover, the invasion of southern China was begun under the very shadow of Hong Kong, the important city of Canton falling soon thereafter.

These first steps in the attempted conquest of China

¹ The most important Japanese Cabinet changes from May, 1937, to August, 1939, are as follows: (1) May 31 to June 3, 1937, first Konoye Cabinet; Koki Hirota, Foreign Minister; General Sugiyana, Minister of War. (2) May 26, 1938, second Konoye Cabinet; General Ugaki, Foreign Minister; General Sugiyana, Minister of War. (3) June 3, General Itagaki, Minister of War; General Sugiyana, Supreme War Counsel. (4) September 29, General Ugaki resigns as Foreign Minister; Prince Konoye takes over office. (5) October 29, Hachiro Arita appointed Foreign Minister. (6) January 5, 1939, Prince Konoye resigns; Baron Hiranuma, Prime Minister; Hachiro Arita, Foreign Minister.

² For reference studies on the Japanese invasion of China, see: Bisson, T. A., *Japan in China*, 1938; Gunther, John, *Inside Asia*, 1939; MacNair, Harley Farnsworth, *The Real Conflict Between China and Japan*, 1938; Young, A. Morgan, *Imperial Japan, 1926-1938*, 1938.

were carried out at tremendous loss of life to both sides, as well as enormous destruction of towns and cities through bombardment and the "scorched earth" policy of the Chinese. The war of frightfulness, however, far from breaking resistance, has served to unite the Chinese still more solidly.

After the fall of Hankow, the Japanese advance was extremely slow, the Japanese lines of communication having been constantly harassed by Chinese guerrillas in occupied areas. Nor did the Japanese succeed in entirely shutting off foreign sources of supply to the Chinese. Certain vital necessities not only continued to be smuggled from the coast cities through the Japanese lines, but direct communications with Russia to the north and with Burma to the south were maintained.

On the economic side, the strain upon Japan has been tremendous. Contrasted with a national debt of 9,000,000,000 yen¹ at the outbreak of the war, estimates for the budgetary year 1940 stood at 25,000,000,000 yen. Industry, moreover, having become geared to the necessities of war, has been thrown completely out of balance. Foreign trade has likewise been severely penalized both through the decline in purchasing power at home and in China and because of drastic restrictions on imports to Japan and foreign boycotts of Japanese exports.

Socially and politically, too, costs have been great. To the reduction in the standard of living of the masses, already extremely low before hostilities, have been added the severities of governmental control born of war necessities. The economic life of the nation has become virtually the creature of the state, with conse-

¹ The Japanese national debt in the middle of 1931, before the invasion of Manchuria, was 4,700,000,000 yen.


quent invasion of property rights. Popular government no longer functions, the military having largely usurped, in violation of election results, such prerogatives as previously belonged to the legislative branch.

Nor has Japanese security been enhanced by spreading so thinly the lines of defense. For while the territories occupied at great cost in China, and the seizure of Hainan and Spratly Islands in the South Sea, extended the Japanese area of control, the liabilities were proportionately increased. To the long-enduring hatred felt by the Chinese masses and their determination to continue resistance, moreover, there were added increasingly strained relations between Japan and the great naval Powers of the West,¹ as well as with Soviet Russia.

Being unable to compete in the long run against the naval programs of the Western Democracies, and having provoked Soviet Russia to provide for defense of her Asiatic possessions on a gigantic scale, Japanese aggression has been productive of potential dangers upon all fronts. Not only do the Western Powers refuse to accept a final abdication of their Far Eastern interests, but an even greater hazard to Japan lies in the danger of internal collapse under the strain of present conquests.

¹ By the first of August the Japanese blockade of French and British concessions at Tientsin, which began in the middle of June, the prohibition of shipping between Hong Kong and Canton, which was established on July 25, and the continued infringements upon the foreign rights as regards persons and property in other parts of China, had greatly increased tension with the Western Powers. Nor did the course of Anglo-Japanese negotiations at Tokyo over the Tientsin affair give promise of relief. As a countermove to Japanese "victory" in extracting from the British a declaration that "it is not British policy to encourage any action that could embarrass the Japanese army's actions," there followed on July 27 the denunciation by the United States of the American-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911. This move would make possible our freedom of action, six months later, in stopping the shipment of war materials to Japan, without a violation of previous treaty commitments. Whether it also signified, as was interpreted abroad, an abandonment on America's part of a policy of "words" in the Far East for one of "deeds" only the future could reveal.

JAPANESE CONQUEST



Chapter XX

THE PROBLEM OF PEACE IN ASIA

BETWEEN the situation of the Germans in Europe and of the Japanese in Asia, the parallel is striking. It is the revolt of the people of the Third Reich against the status quo of the Treaty of Versailles which constitutes the single serious challenge to peace and order upon the European Continent; and, in the same fashion, it is the attack of the people of Japan upon the status quo envisaged by the Treaty of Washington which produces the danger of general war in the Orient arising from the Sino-Japanese conflict.

At bottom, the driving impulse is the same. In both cases, a great people is in revolt against physical circumstances which in their eyes constitute permanent barriers to national prosperity and even to tolerable national existence. For Germany, ethnic considerations have reinforced economic; but underneath all else is a corroding sense of injustices born of the conviction that the world is seeking by force to confine the German people within limits equally incommensurate with national needs and with national rights.

For Japan, there is no ethnic factor in its imperialism, since there are no Japanese minorities to be redeemed on the Amur as was the case of the Germans on the Danube. On the other hand, the strictures of a rising population pressure enhance a dominating sense of domestic limitations. Japan has therefore already launched in Manchuria and in China proper an imperialist enterprise similar to that contemplated by Germany in middle and eastern Europe.

Japanese imperialism, too, is of long standing. As far back as the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the way was cleared for that undertaking which was finally launched in the autumn of 1931 and led swiftly and successfully to the establishment of Manchukuo. This phantom state, even more completely under Japanese control than is India under British, having an area more than twice that of France and a population of over thirty millions, represents a Japanese attempt to escape from the ever-tightening grip of population pressure and economic poverty in her insular homeland.

In launching herself upon this career of imperialism, Japan has at once encountered the opposition of at least three of the Great Powers. As France, Italy, and the Little Entente bloc resisted German attempts to achieve Austro-German union, so Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States have similarly, but with equal lack of success, tried first to prevent Japanese seizure of Manchuria, and thereafter, by non-recognition of Manchukuo, to deny this Japanese puppet state the appearance of permanence.

In addition, as the European powers invoked the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain to establish the illegality of the projected *Anschluss*, the nations con-

cerned over Asiatic circumstances appealed to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, the Pact of Paris, and the Covenant of the League of Nations to prove Japanese action at once unlawful and immoral. What are the bases of the opposition of the British, Russians, and Americans? In fact, they are so different as to make community of action difficult if not impossible.

To the British, the principal danger lies in the threatened advance southward of Japan's imperialist ambitions toward the East Indian possessions. In addition, the destruction of British vested interests and trade in China is involved. To the Russians concern is likewise strategic, though the ideological threat is also present. Finally, to the United States, Japanese action has not only violated American principles of the "Open Door" and the "territorial integrity" of China, but offers a potential threat to the future security of the Philippines as well.

For Great Britain, the implications of Japanese imperialism are twofold—economic and political. On the economic side, Japanese textiles have already largely driven the British from the Far East, and the invasion has even reached India and Africa. Profoundly as this competition has disquieted Lancashire, British statesmanship is faced by the fact that what Japan is doing is also being done by India and China and that for all practical purposes the Far East has recovered control of its own market in textiles. Commercially, therefore, however irritating Japanese competition may be, it does not constitute a cause for war.

Politically, the British public viewed the Manchurian affair with divided emotions. For them, the danger of Japanese expansion toward the south, toward the wide

open spaces of Australia and New Zealand, is real. Only in that direction is there any hope for the Japanese to find lands suitable for colonization, since Korea is already densely populated and Manchuria climatically unsuited to their needs. The spectacle of Japanese imperialism turning west rather than south and committing itself to an experiment which may well absorb its energies for many decades, is therefore by no means wholly distasteful to the British.

It is true, however, that speedy success in Manchuria and North China and a rising tide of nationalism stimulated by success have recently led the Japanese to extend the field of imperialist ambitions by commencing their march southward. And that march must be equally threatening for India and for Australia and New Zealand. Thus the British have already completed far-reaching extensions of the fortifications of Singapore and are obviously preparing to make this stronghold the advanced base of their empire, as Hawaii has become for the United States.

In Asia as in Europe British national policy is dominated by the conception of the balance of power. On the one hand, British statesmanship is resolved at all costs to avoid actual war with Japan, unless the safety of the Empire is directly assailed. On the other, it is unmistakably seeking to encourage resistance to Japan by the United States and by the Soviet Union; for it is self-evident that if one or both of these states should come into conflict with Japan, British security would be inexpensively established for a long time to come.

Clearly, it would be contrary to British interests to permit Japan to defeat the United States in war. But of this there is no real danger. And while decisive defeat

of Japan would hardly be possible, a long costly struggle would necessarily weaken the Japanese disproportionately. On the other hand, a new Russo-Japanese War, since it would be fought on land, would have slight interest for the British. Even if the Japanese were successful again, as in 1905, and the frontiers of the Soviet Union were thrust back to Lake Baikal, the result would involve Japan still more deeply in north-eastern Asia.

In Europe, Great Britain is inescapably entangled in German action because, as Stanley Baldwin declared in a memorable speech in July, 1934, her military frontier is at the Rhine. Since, to attack France, Germany must pass the Rhine, she thus constitutes a potential menace to Great Britain. In Asia, however, a Japanese naval war with the United States or military collision with the Soviet Union would leave the British in the comfortable position of a neutral, observing from a safe vantage point the struggle between a prospective enemy and a present competitor. All British interest, therefore, would dictate neutrality in a war between Japan and the United States, or between Japan and Russia.

As for the Soviet Union, its interests are evidently best served by a long period of tranquillity. The gigantic task of industrializing Russia can be accomplished only during peace. Japanese occupation of Manchuria constitutes no considerable injury to Soviet interests. For a long time to come, the status quo must and can satisfy Soviet interests; and recognition of the need for peace was plainly disclosed in the willingness of the Russian regime to part with ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway and more recently to compromise with the Japanese over fishing rights.

On the other hand, there is no mistaking the fact that the Soviet Union will fight to preserve the status quo, so far as its own frontiers are concerned. To that end, it has already double-tracked the Trans-Siberian railway and constructed a parallel line north of Lake Baikal to the Pacific beyond the reach of Japanese attack. It has, moreover, concentrated a very large portion of its military and air forces along the border of Manchukuo, in addition to establishing an important submarine and air base at Vladivostok, a program still further justified in Russian opinion since the announcement of the German-Japanese Anti-Communist Pact.¹

But time works for the Russians. Eventually they seem likely to be superior to the Japanese both in machine power and in man power. Nor is it to be questioned that each year a war of prevention is postponed, greater risks and larger costs would devolve upon the Japanese. In fact, for the Soviet Union, the failure of Japan to precipitate such a conflict in 1933 appeared a cause of genuine surprise as it certainly was of enormous satisfaction. Actually, for Japan, the single real menace is the Russian air force, which from Vladivostok could reach Japanese industrial centers. And that menace would, of course, disappear if a successful war of prevention thrust the Russians back to Lake Baikal.

For Russia, then, the problem of peace in the Far East turns upon Japanese acceptance or rejection of the idea of a war of prevention. Even as late as the winter of 1934-1935 it still seemed within the realms of possibil-

¹ The treaties supplementary to the London Naval Treaty of 1936, signed by Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union on July 17, 1937, provided that Russia keep all details of her Far Eastern fleet in the matter of new construction secret, her European fleet alone being bound by qualitative limitations. Such a provision inserted upon the insistence of Russia is a clear indication of her intention to meet so far as possible the Japanese naval challenge.

ity, at least, that by a direct and smashing attack Japan could capture Vladivostok and thrust the Soviet frontier back to the region of Lake Baikal. Then, and only then, could the security and permanence of Manchukuo be fairly assured. In the mountain ranges which constitute the eastern border of the Baikal country, with both the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern railways to supply them, Japanese armies could stand permanently and relatively inexpensively, for these mountains would constitute the strategic frontier of a Japanese empire on the Asiatic mainland.

There was, however, no blinking the fact that such a war would involve a grave risk. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 a far shorter advance than it would now be necessary to make led to the exhaustion of Japanese resources; and at the moment when the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed, Linevitch was in a position to resume an offensive which would have had disastrous results for Japanese fortunes. Undoubtedly the Soviet forces would fight better than the Imperial armies in 1905, nor is there any question as to the superiority of their equipment, or as to the advantages to be derived from the recent construction of new industrial units in central and western Siberia. On the other hand, present failure to resort to a war of prevention will leave Japan open to an eventual challenge which will progressively become more difficult to deal with.

There remains the question of the policy of the United States. What, after all, has it at stake in this Far Eastern mess? Plainly no question of territory arises, for in that respect it is in full retreat from Asia. Nor is the problem of national security involved, because as Japanese armies advance into China they naturally turn their

backs upon American shores. Not less unmistakable is the fact that such threat as Japanese policy may have for the United States, as for Great Britain, will be lessened as Japanese resources are absorbed in a continental struggle, whether with China or with Russia.

The American stake in the Far East, then, is exclusively trade. In the interests of that trade it has for a generation sought to uphold the principle of the "Open Door" and the doctrine of the inviolability of Chinese sovereignty. It was to protect this material interest, moreover, that the Harding administration sought and obtained Japanese participation in the Nine-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference, which pledged all signatory nations to respect the status quo in the Far East so far as China was concerned. For Japanese signature to that treaty, the United States paid by renouncing the right to extend its fortifications at Corregidor, Guam, and the Aleutian Islands.

It was, furthermore, on the basis of the Washington Treaty and of the Pact of Paris that the Hoover administration protested against Japanese action in Manchuria and associated itself with the League of Nations in an attempt to arrest it. And it was in the hope of exerting moral pressure while renouncing all employment of physical sanctions, that the Stimson Doctrine was proclaimed, withholding American recognition from the state of Manchukuo because of the circumstances attending its creation.

Naturally the Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition of the fruits of conquest, like the Kellogg Pact and the League Covenant, was without avail, for the Japanese were in deadly earnest. For them, the control of Manchukuo had become a question of life or death.

As a consequence, while continuing to consolidate their situation in Manchuria they also withdrew from the League of Nations. Finally, their resentment was chiefly directed against the United States, because the immigration laws, which single out the Japanese among the peoples of the Great Powers for exclusion on racial grounds, were an affront to national pride, and also because the Japanese correctly perceived that the Chinese drew their chief inspiration for resistance to Japanese policy from the official attitude of the United States, and from private American aid.

The relations between Japan and the United States therefore became strained and still remain so. That the Japanese will deliberately attack is wholly unlikely. On the other hand, there is just as little chance of their renouncing that policy upon which, in 1938, they were completely embarked after more than a generation of sustained preparation. Furthermore, they are likely to continue to present the American people with *faits accomplis* which do violence to the two policies of the "Open Door" and the status quo in China.

The latent menace of general war has always to be reckoned with, as was clearly shown in the spring of 1939. The precedent of the "Maine," too, must linger in many minds. What adds to the danger is the total failure of the American people to perceive that the course laid down by the Stimson Doctrine cannot in the smallest measure restore vitality to the shattered pacts of Paris and Washington. Nor do preachments on "quarantining" and the continued pursuit of policies of irritation change in any way Japanese aims. Only through the imposition of economic and naval force can America give sanction to its proclaimed purposes.

In reality the American position constitutes a striking but by no means unfamiliar paradox. The people of the United States have not the smallest intention of going to war to support the "Open Door" or to defend the status quo in China. On the other hand, they have committed themselves, for reasons which are moral and material alike, to a course which constitutes a refusal to bestow formal recognition upon what has taken place. At the bottom of their minds is the rather naïve notion that they can obtain, without resort to arms, the results usually achieved only by armed intervention. The danger lies in the obvious possibility that they may have to face the consequences of armed intervention, while they are certainly unlikely to harvest any profits from their present course.

Japanese resentment disclosed itself in uncompromising rejection of a proposal to perpetuate at the Naval Conference of 1935 the ratios of Washington and London in 1922 and 1930. In those earlier gatherings, the three great naval powers, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, agreed upon relative strengths expressed in the 5-5-3 ratio. That agreement has now expired with Japanese renunciation, leaving all parties free to construct their navies and fortify their possessions at will. American and British resistance to Japanese pretensions to parity is, of course, assured, and official warning to that effect was uttered as far back as the London Conference in December, 1934.

It is with the logic of circumstances, therefore, that Japanese policy of the "lone hand" again manifested itself in the summer of 1937. By that time concern in Europe over the Italo-German challenge had become so acute as to preclude the maintenance of Western interests

in China by the use of force. Where Japanese calculations had failed, however, was in the determined resistance of the Chinese. Although Japan succeeded, through superiority in military equipment, in occupying the greater part of the coastal regions, including North China and the Yangtze Valley, in the first two years of the war, she was far from having delivered the knock-out blow originally contemplated.

The spectacle of Japan in the summer of 1939, therefore, was that of a nation mired deeply in the vastnesses of China. While her forces controlled most of the key cities and main highways of transportation, Chinese resistance continued both in front of and behind the spearhead of Japanese attack. Nor had effective puppet regimes in occupied territories been established. Even Japan's command of Far Eastern waters, which gave temporary freedom of action to pursue her purposes, could not be guaranteed short of war in Europe. And with the increasing strength of the Democratic Front and Soviet Russia, there appeared less likelihood in the summer of 1939 of any effective support being given by the Axis Powers to their Far Eastern ally.

Upon what, then, do the prospects of ultimate peace in the Far East depend? These turn fundamentally upon a combination of future circumstances, the absence of any one of which may become the cause for serious and widespread conflict. The first condition is, of course, the restoration of confidence in the nonaggressive purposes of Japanese policy both in relation to China herself and in respect to the legitimate interests of the Western Powers in the Far East as well. So long as divided responsibility prevails in the conduct of foreign relations as between the Japanese military and the

foreign office, world opinion can never be assured that what the right hand of diplomacy proclaims the left hand of the Japanese military will not deny.

During 1936 and the first half of 1937, there was promise of a growing recognition within Japan of the futility and ruinous cost of intransigence in the conduct of Far Eastern relations. This was exemplified not only by widespread domestic resentment over the German-Japanese anti-Communist pact and the overwhelming repudiation of militarist policies in the elections of April, 1937, but also by the appointment of the reputedly liberal Prince Konoye as Prime Minister in June of the same year. Although a battle with Russians, and armed invasion of China proper which followed immediately thereafter, only served to postpone indefinitely the return of the hoped-for era of confidence and good will, the financial, military, and moral sacrifices involved in this latest of Japanese continental ventures may eventually be the cause for the restoration to power of Japanese liberal and anti-imperialist elements.

Of equal importance to the change of circumstances in Japanese policy, however, are the policies of other states, particularly of the United States and the British Empire. Unless, under the leadership of these two powerful states, a general reduction in the burden of armaments can be achieved, through a restoration of mutual confidence and by the assurance to all nations, Japan included, of greater economic security, financial stability, and free trade, economic necessity will inevitably dictate disturbing and extremest policies in Asia.

No nation in the world entered more whole-heartedly and with greater confidence upon the postwar program of international co-operation and conciliation than the

Japanese. If succeeding events have undermined their confidence in the adequacy of the international system for the protection of their security, a change in the short-sighted policies of other states concerned in Asiatic affairs can eventually restore a spirit of good will and confidence indispensable to the preservation of peace.

The Japanese phenomenon is identical with that manifesting itself in the case of other dissatisfied nations such as Italy and Germany. And just as European peace must ultimately depend upon the restoration of circumstances favorable to a decent standard of livelihood on the part of less favored nations, so do similar conditions apply in the Far East.

What the student of international affairs must perceive is that the World War and the Washington Conference together bestowed power upon Japan in the Far East, which is still beyond serious challenge, alike on the naval and on the military side, save as the British and American peoples are prepared to undertake a war in which they would inevitably have to make use of China or the Soviet Union as an ally. He must also see that the economic circumstances of Japan, and the decisions her people have reached upon the basis of those circumstances, render futile all attempts to restrict Japanese imperialism by such means as the Pact of Paris or the Stimson Doctrine, the former of which has been evaded by the simple device of failing to declare war upon China, and the latter by being ignored.

To defend their position on the Asiatic continent, the Japanese are prepared to fight. To retain their vested interests in the Far East, they are ready to arm further, even at the cost of new sacrifices measured in the national standard of living through a crushing burden of

increased taxes. So far the steadily mounting population pressure has been met by an industrial expansion which has with difficulty postponed a crisis that would otherwise have been inescapable in view of the fact that Japan can no longer hope to feed her population from purely domestic resources.

It is, however, self-evident that domestic social dangers arising from the double burden of imperialist ambitions and unfavorable economic and demographic circumstances have been at best only temporarily exorcised. As in the case of Italy and Germany, Japanese ambitions are becoming far out of balance with her national wealth and economic strength.

In the summer of 1939 it was apparent, therefore, that future circumstances in Asia depended far less upon the immediate outcome of the Sino-Japanese conflict than upon future developments in Europe. That Japan by her recent policies had not created conditions for a peaceful solution of her problems was evident. The determined and continued opposition of the Chinese masses, the Asiatic concerns of the rearmed Soviet Union, and the distrust of the great naval Powers of the West over Japanese purposes, suggested possibilities of the spreading of the field of conflict.

The dilemma of Asia and Europe remained the same. For just as the absence of circumstances of national security and prosperity had caused the revolt of the "Have-nots" in both regions, so was their restoration a prerequisite of peace. Eventually, moreover, the methods of conference and understanding, exemplified in the Washington Treaties, needed to be revived and enlarged if stability in Asia were to be assured.

Chapter XXI

THE AMERICAN REGION

BETWEEN the conditions of the American region and those of the European region the difference is impressive. Whereas in the Old World rival powers have for centuries struggled for mastery, in the New World the disproportionate strength of the United States has long assured it an unquestioned supremacy. Possession of irresistible strength has not, however, at least in the present century, tempted the United States to engage in military conquest, even where it has been moved to undertake temporary intervention. Accordingly, while these transitory interferences have aroused passing apprehensions among the smaller states, they have never driven those states to unite to establish a balance of power.

Again, while the Americas, like Asia, are the seat of but one Great Power, the two regions differ in all other essential respects. In the former there is no clash of rival imperialisms such as constitutes the significant detail of the latter. On the contrary, between the Dominion of Canada and the United States peace has

become a tradition and the status quo is mutually satisfactory. And while disorder is not an unfamiliar detail in various Latin-American areas, notably in the Caribbean, there is nothing anywhere to parallel Chinese conditions.


In fact, what constitutes the unique characteristic of the American region is the total absence of any problem having its origin in the clash of the domestic interests of Great Powers or in the collision of their imperial enterprises. Sufficiently strong itself to forbid any European or Asiatic power to engage in imperialistic adventure within the Americas, the United States has today no purpose which could constitute even a remote threat to the sovereignty or security of any other American state, large or small.

While, too, the United States stands ready to protect the nations of Latin America against invasive imperialism, whether European or Asiatic, the rapid expansion of many of the larger of these nations in population and in resources has already brought them to the point where they are capable of defending their own liberty and unity unaided,¹ and are therefore openly resentful of any pretensions on the part of the United States to play the unnecessary role of protector. Finally, so far as any question of peace or war can arise within the American region itself, that can hardly go beyond the limits of a minor dispute over boundaries such as the recent war between Bolivia and Paraguay about the Gran Chaco.²

¹ Foreign Policy Association, "Toward a New Pan-Americanism," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 16, 1936; Haring, C. H., *South America Looks at the United States*, 1928; Nerval, Gaston (*pseud.*), *Autopsy of the Monroe Doctrine*, 1935; Rippey, J. F., *Latin America in World Politics*, 1938; Royal Institute of International Affairs, "The Republics of South America," 1937.

² Foreign Policy Association, "The League and the Chaco Dispute," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 9, 1936; Pan-American Union, *Bulletin*, Vol. 72, 1938.

THE AMERICAN REGION



Within the relatively enormous area of the two Americas, moreover, there are lacking economic as well as political conditions like those which are responsible for European and Asiatic turmoil. Everywhere, save in and near a few very large cities, the population is sparse as compared with large areas in Europe and Asia, and most of the land is fertile and easily available. Nowhere does the population pressure exert its disruptive influence as in Italy and Japan. In all states prosperity is still a problem of national development and not of territorial expansion. Finally, disputes having their origin in ethnic issues are totally lacking, and consequently psychological conditions do not, as in Europe and Asia, constitute barriers to international accord.

Precisely as the disproportionate strength of the United States has not produced any resort to the European balance of power technique by the lesser American states, the development of the larger of the Latin-American nations has likewise been unattended by any menacing rivalries having their origin in questions of prestige or sentiments of jealousy.¹ Already Brazil exceeds in population both France and Italy and has become the largest of the Latin-American nations. While there is actual rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, for example, yet, since it is a competition in progress rather than in power, there is in their relations nothing to suggest the bitterness which characterizes the relations of Italy and France.

In dealing with the two Americas, Nature has been unequally lavish, bestowing upon both vast agricultural resources but limiting to North America the abundant

¹ Chapman, Charles Edward, *Republican Hispanic America: A History*, 1937; Jones, Chester L., *The Caribbean Since 1900*, 1936; Robertson, W. S., *History of the Latin-American Nations*, rev. ed., 1932; Wilgus, A. C., ed., *The Caribbean Area*, 1934.

essentials of industry;¹ and it follows naturally that, with the exception of Brazil and the smaller states of the Caribbean and Pacific coasts, the economic relations of Latin America with Europe are at least as important as those with the United States. It has been in Great Britain, France, and Germany rather than in the great North American republic that many South American peoples find the principal markets for their foodstuffs and raw materials. And it is from their European customers rather than their American competitor that they buy more considerably.²

Culturally, too, the face of Latin America is turned toward Europe and not toward the United States. Paris and Madrid, rather than New York and Washington, attract its leisure classes. In art, literature, and music, France and not the greatest of the American republics comes first. For Canada, by contrast, economic relations with the United States are far more considerable than with Europe, and the influence of New York upon the press and thought of the great Dominion is also much more important than that of London.³

Politically, however, the attention of all of the states of both Americas is directed toward the United States and not toward Europe. On the part of Latin America, it is true that this attention has in the past been marked

¹ Bain, H. Foster, and Read, Thomas Thornton, *Ores and Industry in South America*, 1934; Emeny, Brooks, *The Strategy of Raw Materials; A Study of America in Peace and War*, 1936; Haring, Clarence, *South American Progress*, 1934.

² Cooper, C. S., *Latin America: Men and Markets*, 1927; Jones, C. F., *Commerce of South America*, 1928; Lee, T. F., *Latin American Problems*, 1932; Normano, J. F., *The Struggle for South America*, 1931; Phelps, Dudley Maynard, *Migration of Industry to South America*, 1936; *South American Handbook*, annual since 1924; Foreign Policy Association, "Trade Rivalries in Latin America," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIII, No. 13, 1937.

³ Callahan, James Morton, *American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations*, 1937; Innis, H. A. and Plumptre, A. F. W., eds., *The Canadian Economy and its Problems*, 1934; Mackay, R. A., and Rogers, E. B., *Canada Looks Abroad*, 1938.

by at least as much suspicion as sympathy, and the continued membership of some of these states in the League of Nations has been influenced considerably by this fact.¹ In the case of Canada, on the other hand, there is happily absent any element of distrust, and while the two English-speaking neighbors quarrel over business and dispute about tariffs, their frontiers remain unfortified. The presence of Canada in the League of Nations is explained chiefly by British imperial considerations.

In reality, then, the Americas constitute not merely a region but almost a world within themselves. Such regional problems and provincial rivalries as exist within their limits are without concern for the outside world, while for the nations of North America and South America alike, disturbances in Europe or Asia are primarily of importance because of their effect upon domestic trade and commerce. Of the American nations, none save the United States can exert real influence beyond the Atlantic or the Pacific; and within the American region, foreign nations have, in recent years at least, invariably respected the wishes of the United States.

Were the United States at some future time to set forth on a career of imperialism in Latin America, it is far from impossible that it might one day have to face the resistance of a coalition of the southern republics united to establish some form of balance of power. Un-

¹ Every Latin-American nation is or has been a member of the League of Nations. The following is the list of American republics which have resigned membership, the year of notice of resignation being given in each case: Costa Rica, 1924; Brazil, 1926; Paraguay, 1935; Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 1936; Venezuela and Salvador, 1937; Chile, 1938; Peru, 1939. For general survey of the policy of the Latin-American nations toward the League, see: Foreign Policy Association, "The New American Neutrality," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XI, No. 23, 1936; "The League and the Chaco Dispute," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Volume XII, No. 9, 1936; "Toward a New Pan-Americanism," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 16, 1936. Kelchner, W. H., *Latin American Relations with the League of Nations*, 1930.

der such circumstances, too, European powers might conceivably undertake to fish in troubled waters as Napoleon III intervened in Mexico while the United States was paralyzed by Civil War. Similarly, were there to be a revival of the once familiar annexationist policy in respect to Canada, Anglo-American relations might take on a different aspect and Great Britain might strive to repeat in the Americas the policy of the balance of power she has pursued in Europe.

Such speculations, however, are without present basis. Today in the American region only two things are important: first, the fact that, because of its strength, the United States has asserted and all other powers have in the end accepted the Monroe Doctrine, which insures the preservation of the status quo in both Americas; second, the equally significant fact that the United States has attained the continental limits and acquired the advantages of an insular position which respectively satisfy its own standards of prosperity and of security. And, together, these deprive its policy of all threat to any other American state, large or small.

Supremacy in the Western Hemisphere the United States undeniably possesses. It is difficult to see what limits could be set to its imperialism, if it should undertake to follow the traditional pattern of foreign expansion. But although from time to time such an enterprise has seemed possible and even probable, on every occasion it has ultimately been rejected by the conscience and common sense of its own people. Nor is it less unmistakable that, at the present time, the direction of public opinion in the United States is away from economic as well as territorial imperialism and toward the "Good Neighbor" ideal of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

It is, of course, geographic isolation and economic good fortune which together explain the difference between the political conditions in the American region and those in the European and Asiatic regions. Looking to the distant future, however, it is possible to conjecture that the Americas may in their turn be assailed by those evils which attend the economic and political maturity of continents as well as of countries. The student of international relations must therefore recognize that differences in the physical circumstances and historical background of Europe and America, and not in ethical or intellectual details, explain the fact that the tradition of the American region is peace whereas that of the Asiatic and European regions is war.

The fact that the American region has no concern for "natural frontiers," no problem of ethnic minorities, no curse of "lost provinces," the circumstance that no state, large or small, is confronted by the consequences of population pressure, and the further detail that as a result of these conditions the policies of all American countries are static and not dynamic, certainly explain the comparatively fortunate condition of the Western Hemisphere. But all these things are in their turn simply explicable in terms of physical geography, economic circumstance, and historical development.

It is natural, therefore, that such inter-American problems as exist should find adjustment either through normal diplomatic channels or within so loosely knit an association as the Pan American Union. For not only are there absent from the American regions all circumstances which would necessitate a complicated organization like the League of Nations, but also European conceptions of sanctions and balance of power, arising from

the eternal conflict between status quo and revisionist states, are alien to American thought and action.

Although the Pan-American movement¹ originated in 1826 at a conference held at Panama under the leadership of Simon Bolivar, it was not until the close of the century that political circumstances in the New World gave impetus to the establishment of a permanent organization.² Under the inspiration of James G. Blaine, the American Secretary of State, the first conference of the modern Pan-Americanism was assembled in Washington at the close of 1889. A major part of its sessions were devoted to the discussion of a general arbitration convention and the proposed American Customs Union. The only concrete achievement, however, was the establishment of a Commercial Bureau of American Republics, later to become known as the Pan American Union.

On the invitation of the Mexican government a second conference of American nations was held in Mexico City in 1901. This meeting, reflecting the influence of the first Hague Conference (1899), adopted a protocol declar-

¹ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The Sixth International Conference of American States," *International Conciliation*, No. 241, 1928; also "The Montevideo Conference, Antecedents and Accomplishments," *International Conciliation*, No. 300, 1934; Foreign Policy Association, "The Pan-American Arbitration Treaty," *Information Service*, Vol. V, No. 18, 1929; "The New Era in Pan-American Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1937; Foreign Policy Association, "The Seventh Pan-American Conference," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. X, No. 7, 1934; Foreign Policy Association, "Toward a New Pan-Americanism," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 16, 1936; Inman, S. G., *Problems in Pan-Americanism*, 1925; Lockey, J. B., *Pan-Americanism; Its Beginnings*, 1920; Scott, J. B., ed., *The International Conferences of American States, 1889-1928*, 1931; Urrutia, F. J., *Le Continent Américain et le Droit International*, 1928.

² From 1826 to 1889 there were held eight Latin-American International Conferences, some of a political and some of a nonpolitical nature. The United States, however, was not represented at any of these. From 1889, the year of the assembling of the first Pan American Union Conference, to the present day, more than a hundred political and nonpolitical inter-American International Conferences have been held, at the majority of which the United States has been officially represented. (See Department of State "Inter-American Conferences," Conference Series No. 16, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1933.)

ing the principles of the Hague Convention for the peaceful adjustment of international differences to be a part of the public international law of America. Seventeen American nations, including the United States, signed a treaty for the compulsory arbitration of disputes arising out of pecuniary claims.

In 1906 the third International American Conference assembled at Rio de Janeiro, the United States delegation being headed by Elihu Root, then Secretary of State. During this conference the subject of arbitration again received primary attention. A resolution was unanimously passed recommending that the respective nations should give instruction to their delegates to the Hague Conference of 1907 to promote the adoption of a universal treaty of arbitration, as well as a consideration of the question of the compulsory collection of public debts. Another convention provided for the codification of international law by an American Commission of jurists. Finally, the Bureau of American Republics (originally called the Commercial Bureau), was also reorganized and became the permanent committee of the International American Conferences.

At the fourth Pan-American Conference, held in 1910 at Buenos Aires, the American republics again agreed to a convention for the settling of important pecuniary claims of their citizens which could not be adjusted by diplomacy. Such claims were to be submitted to the Hague Court unless the parties decided upon a special tribunal. Conventions on copyrights and patents were also agreed to, and there was adopted a resolution for the exchange of professors and students between universities of different nations. One of the last acts of the Conference had to do with the final reorganization

of the International Bureau of American Republics, which became known thenceforth as the Pan American Union.

Among the chief functions of the Pan American Union were to be the collection and distribution of statistics regarding the commerce, laws, treaties, and conventions of the American nations. The general control of the Union was to be entrusted to a board composed of diplomatic representatives of the American republics at Washington, with the Secretary of State of the United States acting as chairman. A director and a subdirector selected by the governing board were to administer the Union, which was to be housed in a building erected by funds donated by Andrew Carnegie.

The World War intervening, the next conference of American nations was postponed until 1923, a hiatus indicative of the fact that Pan-Americanism as a movement had not passed much beyond the limits of a statistical and cultural society. Nor did the fifth conference, held at Santiago in 1923, indicate a closer consolidation of international political interests, despite the intervening years of the war. The most notable work of this assembly was a treaty providing a specific procedure for the settlement of international disputes, a document obviously inspired by League of Nation's influence, which was then stronger among the Latin-American nations than at any time since.

The sixth conference, held at Havana in 1928, indicated some progress toward a more effective Pan-Americanism. Resolutions were passed condemning all aggression and accepting "in principle" compulsory arbitration of all disputes. A convention giving effect to a code of private international law prepared by a

Pan-American Committee of Jurists was also adopted, and the organization of the Pan American Union was modified so as to reduce the preponderant influence of the United States—by providing that the Chairman of the Board should be elected and not be *ex officio* the Secretary of State of the United States, as had been the case theretofore.

The Montevideo Conference of 1933, meeting in the midst of a world depression, passed a strong resolution advocating the reduction of trade barriers through bilateral tariff treaties. The displeasure of all Latin-American states toward the tariff policy of the United States was freely expressed. The most significant event of this conference, however, was the adherence of the United States delegation to a convention declaring that "no state has a right to interfere with the internal or external affairs of another." This was regarded as signifying an important change of policy by this country under the Monroe Doctrine and was strictly in keeping with the "Good Neighbor" principle announced by President Roosevelt.

In December, 1936, a special "American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace upon the American Continent" was held in Buenos Aires, President Roosevelt delivering in person the inaugural address. Three outstanding agreements were signed in furtherance of the consolidation of peace in the Americas: a convention pledging the American nations to observe and utilize existing treaty provisions for the avoidance of war,¹ a

¹The existing treaty provisions for the avoidance of war were five in number: (1) the Gondra Pact, signed in Santiago in 1923, which was a treaty designed to avoid and prevent conflicts between the American states; (2) the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the Pact of Paris, signed in Paris in 1928; (3) the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, signed at Washington in 1929; (4) the General Treaty of Inter-American

second treaty establishing a procedure to be followed in case any part of the Americas should be threatened by war;¹ and, finally, a protocol reaffirming the nonintervention agreement adopted at the Montevideo Conference in 1933.

It was by virtue of the above agreements that a resolution concerning regional solidarity and common action in defense of foreign dangers was successfully agreed to at the Eighth Pan-American Conference held in Lima, in December, 1938, three months after Munich. Although this instrument, known as the "Declaration of Lima,"² fell far short of establishing an American League of Nations,³ it at least served to reaffirm and strengthen existing procedure for the maintenance of peace in the Americas. Furthermore, were general war to break out in the future in Europe as well as in Asia, threatening thereby the security of the Americas, a basis had been laid for effective co-operation of the states of this hemisphere in their common defense.

Since the abandonment by the United States of its traditional policy of intervention, as a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the actual achievements of Pan-Americanism have indeed been notable. Before 1933 the Pan-American movement had always been more popular in the United States than in Latin America, where it was usually regarded as no more than a screen

Arbitration, signed in Washington in 1929; (5) the Saavedra Lamas Antiwar Pact, or Antiwar Treaty of Nonaggression and Conciliation, signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1933.

¹ For the text of this agreement and of the accompanying Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Co-operation, see Appendices P and O.

² For text, see Appendix S.

³ The United States and a bloc of Caribbean countries favored a more definite collective security program, whereas the majority of nations to the south, led by Argentina, were inclined to be more skeptical of dangers of Fascist aggression and fearful of offering needless affront to nations with which they had important economic and cultural ties

to Yankee imperialism. Now that the "Colossus of the North" had become the "Good Neighbor," a major barrier to more friendly relations was removed.

It was clear, however, that such a new and happy circumstance in American relations remained contingent upon the continuance of the nonintervention policy by the United States. Nor could sight be lost of the fact that the expropriation of American properties in Bolivia and Mexico was putting a severe strain upon the "Good Neighbor" principle. The future of Pan-America depended, therefore, as much upon the reconciliation of conflicting internal policies of member states as upon the dilemma of peace or war in Europe.

The essential fact as to the American region today is that, unlike the European and Asiatic regions, it is confronted by no problem of balance of power from within its own area. Nor would Canadian participation in another European conflict,¹ or involvement in future Asiatic conflicts of the British Empire, have other than minor significance. Only as the American region constitutes a setting for the national policy of the United States has it any world importance in the balance-of-power game. In this respect, moreover, its influence is negative rather than positive; for it is the absence from the Americas of precisely those regional circumstances which are characteristic of Europe and Asia that bestows upon the United States a freedom to act elsewhere unhampered by concern over its security within its own region.

British policy, wherever in the world the British Empire has interests, is always handicapped by the perils incident to the proximity of the British Isles to

¹ The Dominion of Canada has never been a member of the Pan American Union.

the European Continent. French action in Asia or in Africa is likewise invariably conditioned upon the existing situation beyond the Rhine and the Alps. Soviet Russia, like Czarist Russia before it, whether facing west in Europe or east in Asia, must always reckon with the possibility of attack in the rear. Finally, Japan, even when she is able to control the seas which have importance for her, is confronted by circumstances on the Asiatic mainland at once beyond her control and perilous to her security.

By contrast, two broad oceans give the United States identical security against attack whether coming from Europe or from Asia. In addition, her control of the Caribbean gateway to the Panama Canal is far more complete than the British hold upon the Mediterranean approach to Suez can ever be, and her land frontiers alike at the Rio Grande and at the St. Lawrence River constitute no danger. As a consequence, she is free to adventure in Europe or in Asia as she may choose, ever tranquil as to her own domestic security. That, after all, is the significance of the regional situation of the United States, and that regional situation itself is important to the world only in its relation to the one and only Great Power of the Americas.

Chapter XXII

THE UNITED STATES¹

THE twenty-four years between the administrations of the two Roosevelts witnessed an almost incredible transformation in the circumstances of the United States.² Thus, in the brief span of a single generation, the practice of intervention was substituted for the tradition of regional isolation. Simultaneously, the

¹ In the study of American foreign policy the student should have available for general reference the following: Bemis, Samuel Flagg, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, 1936; Howland, C. P., ed., *Survey of American Foreign Relations*, 1928-31, 4 vols.; Lippmann, Walter, and Scroggs, W. O., *The United States in World Affairs*, annual, 1931-1934; Sears, Louis M., *A History of American Foreign Relations*, rev. ed., 1938; Shepardson, Whitney H., and Scroggs, William O., *The United States in World Affairs*, annual since 1934; Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs*, annual; Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., ed., *Documents on International Affairs*, annual since 1930; Foreign Policy Association, *Foreign Policy Reports*, fortnightly; *Foreign Affairs*, quarterly; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *International Conciliation*, monthly; World Peace Foundation Publications.

² Adams, J. T., *The Epic of America*, 1931; Beard, C. A., and Beard, Mary, *The Rise of American Civilization*, Vols. 2, 1927; Jolliffe, M. F., *The United States as a Financial Centre, 1919-1933*, 1935; Madden, John T., Nadler, Marcus, and Sauvain, Harry C., *America's Experience as a Creditor Nation*, 1937; Malin, J. C., *The United States after the World War*, 1930; National Bureau of Economic Research, *Recent Economic Changes in the United States*, 1929, 2 vols.; Miller, F. P., and Hill, H. D., *The Giant of the Western World*, 1930; Patterson, E. M., *America: World Leader or World Led?* 1932; Slosson, P. W., *The Great Crusade and After, 1914-1928*, 1930; Sullivan, Mark, *Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925*, Vol. VI. *The Twenties*, 1935; Weinberg, Albert K., *Manifest Destiny*, 1935; Williams, B. H., *Economic Foreign Policy of the United States*, 1929.

role of a debtor nation was exchanged for that of a creditor nation, and a predominantly agricultural position for that of the most extensively industrialized country in the world. And, finally, from the strategic point of view, the United States, through the construction of the Panama Canal and the establishment of a fleet equal to the British, attained absolute regional and territorial security.

The most striking detail in the contemporary situation, however, is that public opinion in the United States has not kept pace with the physical change in the circumstances of the nation. Confronted by a wholly new international situation, the American people have, as yet, decided upon no viable compromise between tradition and actuality.¹ On the contrary, they, like the British, continue to cherish an apparently ineradicable instinct for "muddling through." Inevitably, the result has been an endless series of contradictions and a long-protracted period of confusion. Thus while the national policies of many other powers have seemed clear and their objectives unmistakable, it has always been and still remains a matter of conjecture what ends the people of the United States will actually seek when important decisions must be made.

To explain these contradictions of policy, it is necessary first to examine the circumstances of the United States and particularly its situation in respect to security, prosperity, and unity. As to unity, that may be dismissed at once, for no ethnic problem such as confronts

¹ Hartley, Livingston, *Is America Afraid?*, 1937; Madariaga, S. de, *I Americans*, 1931; Miller, F. P., and Hill, H. D., *The Giant of the Western World*, 1930; Pearson, Drew, and Brown, Constantine, *The American Diplomatic Game*, 1935; Sayre, F. B., *America Must Act*, 1936; Simonds, F. H., *Can America Stay at Home?*, 1932; Whitton, J. B., *Isolation: An Obsolete Principle of the Monroe Doctrine*, 1933; Young, Eugene J., *Powerful America*, 1936.

various European nations, great and small alike, exists anywhere in the American region. Security and prosperity, therefore, are the sole objectives of the national policy of the United States.

In regard to security, the situation of the United States is completely different from that of any other Great Power. While for all other Great Powers there exist perils which are real and in many cases immediate as well, such dangers as it is possible to conjure up for the United States appear by comparison remote and even shadowy. The fears of foreign attack which still lurk in the American mind seem based upon traditions coming down to us from the Revolution and the War of 1812 rather than founded on contemporary realities.

Actually, the geographic situation of the United States, separated as it is by broad oceans alike from Europe and from Asia, bestows upon it an immunity from foreign danger enjoyed by no other Great Power. When that safety, due to distance, was doubled by an assured naval supremacy in the waters of the American region, the security of the United States became, at least in the eyes of the peoples of all other Great Powers, little short of absolute.


With the withdrawal of the soldiers of Napoleon III from Mexico, a withdrawal which represented inescapable surrender to the demands of the United States when released from the restraints of the Civil War, the era of military intervention by Europe in the Americas came to an end. The equally complete surrender of Germany in the Venezuelan affair nearly four decades later put a similar term to foreign naval adventure in American waters. When, too, following the extinction of Spanish rule in the New World in 1898, the British voluntarily

withdrew their fleet from the Caribbean Sea, the last potential challenge to American supremacy in the waters of the western Atlantic disappeared. The opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, together with the earlier annexation of Hawaii in 1897, bestowed similar supremacy in the eastern Pacific Ocean.

With the annexation of the Philippines (1898-1900), the proclamation of the doctrine of the Open Door in China (1899), and the participation of American troops in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion (1900), the United States renounced isolation for intervention in the Far East and resumed a course which had been momentarily adopted half a century earlier, when Perry first entered Japanese waters (1853). Similar intervention was foreshadowed in respect to Europe when American representatives attended the Algeiras Conference of 1906, and was consummated when the United States became a belligerent during the World War in 1917.

National policy has therefore outrun national tradition. Between 1898 and 1918 the United States in practice renounced isolation for intervention, with the appearance of its armies alike in China and Siberia and in France and Germany; and at the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22 it also claimed for itself naval parity with Great Britain and superiority over Japan which would insure for it supremacy in the American region. That claim, partly realized in the American capital in 1922, was fully recognized in London in 1930. But when Japan denounced the Treaty of Washington in December, 1934, the naval issue again came to the fore.¹

¹ Cf. Chapter XXVIII.



Security for the United States, however, no longer constitutes a problem of policy nor can it become a question of national concern as long as the people of this country are prepared to support a navy of present relative proportions. For all practical purposes, the Monroe and Caribbean doctrines, the former seeking to exclude European imperialism from American shores, and the latter to establish American naval supremacy in waters which constitute the approaches to the Panama Canal, have become past history because both have been universally and voluntarily accepted by those countries which might formerly have challenged them.

* Henceforth, both European and Asiatic powers are hardly more likely to attempt imperialistic adventures in the Americas than in the moon. For any calculable future only an admiralty which is an annex of Bedlam could think of challenging the American fleet in its own waters. Once Great Britain, in the Conferences of Washington and London, had recognized the right of the United States to naval parity, and an American administration had come to power ready to translate that right into reality, the question of security became academic since that security itself had in fact been attained.

By sea, by air, and even by land, the United States is today immune from attack. London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo are easily accessible targets for air raids launched from the territories of prospective or potential enemies. Washington, by contrast, is almost as safe from aerial threat at present as it was a century ago. And in the same fashion, while all the European Continental powers are condemned to face the dangers of invasion on their land frontiers, the United States,

because of its greatly superior strength, can consider with perfect tranquillity the situation at its boundaries on the north and on the south.

Distance from possible enemies and decisive naval superiority in its home waters, however, are only the façades of the security of the United States. Behind these is an industrial strength not merely unrivaled but actually unapproached by that of any other power. And the industrial strength of the United States rests not only upon a vast amount of machine power but also upon the largest measure of economic self-sufficiency of any nation, great or small. Security against direct attack by sea, by air, and by land is thus reinforced by immunity from the indirect menace of blockade in war or embargo in peace.¹

Not only is half the machine power of the world concentrated in the territory of the United States, but in addition, inside its own frontiers or within that American region dominated by its fleets, are practically all of the raw materials and sources of motive power necessary to support the national industry in peace or war, together with resources in foodstuffs sufficient to sustain the population. Even in the case of the few essentials which are lacking, such as rubber and tin, for example, stocks kept on hand and secondary recovery would remove any danger of defeat in war due to shortage in economic necessities.²

National prosperity, moreover, has the same foundation as national security. Neither need of additional

¹ Beard, C. A., *The Navy: Defense or Portents?*, 1932; Eliot, George Fielding, *The Ramparts We Watch*, 1938; Hagood, Major General Johnson, *We Can Defend America*, 1937; Phelps, Phelps, *Our Defenses Within and Without*, 1932; Stein, Rose M., *M-Day, the First Day of War*, 1936; Williams, B. H., *The United States and Disarmament*, 1931.


² Bicheowsky, F. Russell, *Is the Navy Ready?*, 1935; Emeny, Brooks, *The Strategy of Raw Materials; A Study of America in Peace and War*, 1936.

UNITED STATES




NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOODSTUFFS, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, AND RAW MATERIALS

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND NET IMPORTS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES OF
AVERAGE NATIONAL CONSUMPTION (1925-29)

— GREAT ESSENTIALS —



CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS



resources in foodstuffs or raw materials, nor want of fresh reserves in the supplies of motive power, drives American statesmanship to expansion and therefore to dynamic policies. Since, too, the national lands which are rich in all forms of natural wealth are also as yet relatively sparsely settled, no population pressure disturbs American calculations. On the contrary, satiety in the economic field completely reconciles the people of the United States to their status quo.

The very uniqueness of the situation of this country economically, however, poses problems which have no counterpart in the case of any other power. Great Britain and Germany, deficient as they are both in foodstuffs and in raw materials, are able to exchange the products of their factories for those of the fields and mines of other countries. Even Japan, as she has risen to the rank of an industrial nation, has come to rely upon foreign sources for iron, food, and cotton. The United States, by contrast, appears on the markets of the world able and eager to sell her manufactures, minerals, meats, and cereals; but what shall she buy? That question is vital, for the student of international relations must accept as axiomatic the fact that nations can, in the larger view, sell abroad only to the extent to which they buy or lend. Small incidental differences between exports and imports, to be sure, can be balanced by gold payments, but the supply of this precious metal is too limited to permit it to serve in the case of constant and considerable annual disparities.

Before the World War, this problem did not exist for the United States, for although even then it annually sold more abroad than it bought, it was still a debtor nation since the holdings of American securities by

foreign investors were in excess of American investments abroad. As a consequence, the annual difference between exports and imports sufficed to meet the interest charges on what this country owed to Europe.

The World War changed all that, for, while the United States was still neutral, it sold abroad so much more than it bought that the European nations were compelled to balance the account by turning back to American investors their own holdings in American securities. Even before the United States entered the conflict it had already increased its lendings to Europe by billions, not by shipping money to Europe, but by sending great quantities of munitions, food, and other supplies and accepting in exchange the notes of the Allied nations.

Once the war had ended and conditions had become normal again, the United States was faced by a problem of incalculable complexity. European nations owed it upwards of \$12,000,000,000 in governmental debts, and private investments abroad exceeded foreign holdings in the United States by some \$3,000,000,000. At the same time, the United States was still selling abroad more than it bought. How, then, was it to be paid on the interest and principal of the \$15,000,000,000 lent abroad, as well as on the surplus of its foreign sales over its foreign purchases?


For that problem there were but two practical solutions: the United States could either cancel the foreign debts or open its markets to foreign goods by the reduction of its own tariffs. Both solutions were politically out of the question, the first because it involved the transfer of the burden of the \$12,000,000,000 owed by the foreign governments to the backs of the domestic taxpayers, and the second because it was widely believed

UNITED STATES




POTENTIAL REGIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOODSTUFFS, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, AND RAW MATERIALS

EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES OF ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES
OF SUPPLY (NATIONAL AND REGIONAL) TO DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION

— GREAT ESSENTIALS —



CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS



■ AVERAGE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
 ▨ NECESSARY EXTRA-AMERICAN IMPORTS
 ● EXPORTABLE SURPLUS
 ■ ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES POTENTIALLY AVAILABLE FROM INCREASED DOMESTIC OUTPUT AND AMERICAN REGIONAL SOURCES. (SUBSTITUTES, STOCK-PILING, AND SECONDARY RECOVERY NOT CONSIDERED)
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that American workmen would stand idle when foreign products crowded the American market.

Since these solutions were politically impossible, the United States rejected both. By contrast, although it insisted upon the payment of the war debts, it also proceeded to raise the duties it levied upon foreign goods.¹ Under these circumstances, a crisis which otherwise would have been immediate was temporarily adjourned by an expedient which for the moment escaped general notice. In effect, the investors of the United States proceeded to lend European debtors and customers annually a sum sufficient to cover the interest charges on debts and also the surplus arising from the excess of foreign purchases in America over domestic buying abroad. Thus, between 1920 and 1929, while on the one hand the government debts were but slightly reduced, on the other, American holdings of foreign securities in Europe increased from \$3,000,000,000 to \$10,000,000,000. As a result, by the end of 1929 the United States was on balance a creditor nation to the tune of \$22,000,000,000 instead of \$15,000,000,000 as in 1919.²

Then in 1929, following the boom and crash in Wall Street, the United States stopped lending. Thereupon,

¹ Academy of Political Science, "Tariffs and Trade Barriers," *Proceedings*, Vol. XV, No. 3, 1933; Boucke, O. F., *Europe and the American Tariff*, 1933; Culbertson, William S., *Reciprocity*, 1937; Hall, Ray Ovid, *International Transactions of the United States*, 1936; Jones, Joseph M., *Tariff Retaliation*, 1934; Larkin, John Day, *The President's Control of the Tariff*, 1936; National Industrial Conference Board, *Trends in the Foreign Trade of the United States*, 1930; Schattschneider, E. E., *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff*, 1935; Wright, P. G., *The American Tariff and Oriental Trade*, 1931.

² Angell, J. W., *Financial Foreign Policy of the United States*, 1933; Jolliffe, M. F., *The United States as a Financial Centre, 1919-1933*, 1935; Madden, John T., Nadler, Marcus, and Sauvain, Harry C., *America's Experience as a Creditor Nation*, 1937; Moulton, H. G., and Pasvolksy, L., *War Debts and World Prosperity*, 1932; Robinson, George B., *Monetary Mischief*, 1935; Southard, F. A., Jr., *American Industry in Europe*, 1931; Staley, Eugene, *War and the Private Investor*, 1935; Stern, S., *Fourteen Years of European Investments, 1914-1928*, 1929; Stoddard, Lothrop, *Europe and Our Money*, 1932.

inevitably, the foreign debtors ceased paying and the foreign customers stopped buying. As a consequence, the American government and investors were confronted by the default of foreign debtors, and American exporters were confronted by a decline of two thirds in their sales abroad.¹ By 1934 foreign interest paying had almost completely stopped and foreign purchase of American goods was limited to amounts covered by American buying of foreign goods and services.

Inevitable as was this outcome of the attempt of the United States to combine the role of a creditor nation with that of a debtor country, the collapse of the experiment produced a popular resentment as general as it was unreasonable. To the minds of the masses, the simple truth that a nation can sell only to the amount that it buys or lends internationally was wholly incomprehensible. The fact that international money does not exist and foreign trade is a process of barter rather than of sale was not to be grasped, and the easier if fallacious explanation of lack of honesty and good faith on the part of the debtor nations was readily accepted.

American passions, however, were awakened without practical results. To pass legislation forbidding American investors to purchase the securities of defaulting governments, as Congress did,² could afford a measure of moral satisfaction, but materially it could not contribute to the collection of a single dollar of all the bil-

¹ Rogers, J. H., *America Weighs Her Gold*, 1931; Simonds, F. H., *The A B C of War Debts*, 1933; Winkler, Max, *Foreign Bonds, an Autopsy*, 1933.

² On April 13, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the Johnson Act, providing that "it shall be unlawful within the United States . . . for any person to purchase or sell the bonds, securities, or other obligations of any foreign government or political subdivision thereof . . . issued after the passage of this Act, or to make any loan to such foreign government, . . . while such government is in default in the payment of its obligation . . . to the government of the United States." *New York Times*, April 14, 1934.

lions lent abroad, or to the sale of an additional bushel of wheat. Nor could a contemporary agitation adequately described by the slogan "Buy American" have any other effect than further to restrict sales as it reduced purchases. And in the same fashion, when American Jews undertook to boycott German goods in reprisal for Nazi persecutions, it was American exporters who paid the first costs in reduced sales.

With unmistakable if uneven world economic recovery under way, in 1937, the restrictions and pressures which forced recourse to destructive trade practices were noticeably easing. Greater currency stability, to which the currency agreements between the United States, France, and Britain had largely contributed, the rise in prices of raw materials, and the armament race were stimulating recovery in world trade.

Among the factors contributing to long-term recovery, however, the reciprocal trade program of the United States is most noteworthy. The provisions of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934,¹ envisaged the double purpose of stimulating international trade through the reduction of excessive barriers impeding its free flow, and of removing discrimination against American commerce.

Under the provisions of this act the President is empowered to modify American customs duties and other import restrictions in exchange for similar concessions from other countries for the purpose of "expanding foreign markets for the products of the United States."

¹ By an act of Congress in April, 1937, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was renewed for a period of two years to June 12, 1939. See "The New Trade Policy of the United States," by Henry F. Grady, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1936; Foreign Policy Association, "The Hull Trade Program," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 15, 1936; Tasca, Henry J., *The Reciprocal Trade Policy of the United States*, 1938.

It is provided, however, that no existing duty can be changed by more than fifty per cent and no article transferred from a dutiable list to the free list or vice versa. The act authorizes the administration, furthermore, to reduce trade barriers set up by the United States in exchange for the reduction of such barriers in other countries. Inasmuch as every bilateral trade agreement under the act carried with it the unconditional most-favored-nation principle, applicable to all other nations which did not discriminate against the United States, international trade in the aggregate was thereby stimulated to a noticeable degree.¹

Such, then, is the background of national policy in respect to territorial security and the basic elements of prosperity. In both instances it is manifest that the situation of the United States is without parallel. What, then, must be the objectives of national policy? Obviously, since no direct dangers exist, it must be to remove perils which are at once indirect and relatively remote.

Thus in the matter of security it is clear that the only menace for the United States is not invasion at home but involvement abroad. Peace in Europe is therefore a proper objective of national policy.² Again, the possibility of involvement in an Asiatic conflict imposes similar aims in the Far East.³ In the latter field, also, the desire to preserve equality in opportunity in the

¹ By July, 1939, twenty-one pacts were negotiated under the Trade Agreements Act. By virtue of these agreements almost 550 American tariff items and many hundreds of export products had been affected. The following are the countries with which trade agreements had been concluded: Sweden, Finland, Canada, Cuba, Brazil, Haiti, Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, France, Costa Rica, Salvador, Ecuador, Great Britain, Turkey; also Czechoslovakia, but the pact with that country was cancelled after its annexation, in March, 1939.

² See Chapters XXIV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, and XXIX.

³ Bienstock, Gregory, *The Struggle for the Pacific*, 1937; Denlinger, S., and Gary, C. B., *War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies, Peoples, and Battle Problems*, 1936.

Chinese market dictates further concern for the status quo in the Orient.¹

If peace in Europe and the preservation of the status quo in Asia are concerns of American policy, it must, however, be perceived that they affect our interests only indirectly. They have not for the United States the same importance that peace and the status quo in Europe have for the British or the French, for example, or that peace and the status quo in Asia have for the Soviet Union. As a consequence, while the United States has, in the postwar period, consistently sought to promote peace in Europe, it has also steadily refused to assume responsibility for the maintenance of that peace. In the same fashion, while striving to insure the territorial integrity of China, it has always refused to resort to force to insure respect for Chinese sovereignty.

To assist in the prevention of war in Europe and the perpetuation of the status quo in Asia, the United States is prepared to do almost anything except to incur the risk of fighting. It was because the Treaty of Versailles and membership in the League of Nations carried the risk of conflict incident to the duties of the Covenant that the United States Senate rejected the treaty. On the other hand, because the Pact of Paris purported to establish peace without imposing responsibility, it was welcomed in Washington. But to the Washington Treaties designed to insure the status quo in Asia, as to the Pact of Paris, the Senate, with the approval of the country, attached reservations excluding all responsi-

¹ Clark, Grover, *Economic Rivalries in China*, 1932; Dulles, Foster R., *Forty Years of American-Japanese Relations*, 1937; Griswold, A. Whitney, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, 1939; Ma, Wen Hwan, *American Policy Toward China as Revealed in the Debates of Congress*, 1934; Stimson, Henry L., *The Far Eastern Crisis*, 1936; also cf. Chapters XVIII, XIX, and XX.

bilities for upholding by force what was established by phrase.

This apparent confusion between word and deed, this evident unreadiness to back enthusiasm for principle by effective promise of action, have been responsible for endless criticism both at home and abroad, and for no little confusion of thought as well. Such confusion in thought has originated in a failure rightly to appraise the true objectives of the policy of the United States. In Europe, this country's objective is to prevent a war in which the United States might become involved. In Asia it is both to prevent war and also to preclude territorial changes or the establishment of an economic and political hegemony by another Great Power, which might be costly to our national interests.

Clearly, to risk war to avoid war would be absurd, while to risk war for trade would be an unprofitable undertaking. And the people of the United States in the postwar period have remained unshaken in their conviction that the extent of the risks incident to guaranteeing peace in Europe would be out of all proportion to the chances that such guarantees might prevent conflict.

To persuade the American people to join the League of Nations, to subscribe to any system of collective responsibility for preserving peace in either Europe or Asia, or to bestow an individual guarantee upon any power in order to promote disarmament, it would be necessary to prove to their satisfaction, first, that only such action would insure their own security or prosperity, and secondly, that these are directly and gravely endangered by the prospect of conflict. And to make such proof, of course, is today utterly out of the question.

As a consequence, while the people of the United States are at all times prepared to permit their government to participate in international conferences and councils and to sign all forms of self-denying ordinances, they are resolutely opposed to every form of international commitment. "Intervention in words, isolation in action," sums up the proper policy for the country in the eyes of the American people. To disarm the armed nations of Europe is an objective worth seeking alike for moral and for material reasons, but attainment of that objective at the price of involvement is an unattractive project.

In the light of their own present circumstances in respect to security and prosperity, therefore, the people of the United States are satisfied that the risks of foreign responsibilities for the maintenance of peace by force are out of proportion to the possible benefits. This being the case, there is nothing left for administrations which for moral or material reasons are moved to participate in international discussions, but to propose pacts without sanctions, advocate disarmament without security guarantees, and endorse international order uninsured by international policies.

But in the present posture of the world, at least, it is self-evident that all such proposals are foredoomed to failure, and the collapse of the various American projects based on this general principle of peace by consent and not by authority, serves to demonstrate this fact. It is, moreover, open to question whether in thus pressing projects which in the very nature of things cannot succeed, the United States does not risk entanglements it is desperately seeking to escape. That conclusion, too, in recent times has been responsible for a growing

impatience with the practice of participation in futile conferences. But it has not prompted any serious proposal for a change in national policy.

What is, perhaps, worthy at least of passing note is the extent to which the people of the United States, in their international relations, have fallen in with the custom of the British in readily justifying as a matter of conscience what is primarily a question of convenience. Thus, because they are resolved not to give guarantees of force to maintain world order, the American people pronounce the proposal itself unethical and its supporters responsive to inspirations which are, as the case may be, undemocratic, militaristic, or imperialistic.

At bottom, the conceptions of the American people, like their national policy, have their origin in physical circumstances which are unique.¹ That fact explains the misconception of European realities which is general on this side of the Atlantic. The same emphasis should also be laid upon the tendency of European people to assume that the conclusions which they have reached on the basis of their own physical circumstances hold good for America.

Actually, the question which is still pending in respect to the national policy of the United States is whether, in view of the extent of its security and the character of the bases of its prosperity, the visible risks of sharing in a collective system to insure world peace and order exceed the possible profits.² To say that the United States cannot usefully promote world peace by its present course is to say what is demonstrably true. To insist

¹ Semple, E. C., *American History and Its Geographic Conditions*, 1931, rev.

² Jessup, Philip C., *International Security*, 1935; Staley, Eugene, *War Losses to a Neutral*, 1937.

that, as a consequence, the wise course would be to abstain from futile effort is, at least, not illogical. But to assert that in the world of today, and specifically in Europe and Asia under existing circumstances, the United States could by assuming responsibilities realize profit out of proportion to the risks run is to proclaim what has neither been proved as yet nor is at present susceptible of proof.

Looking back over a century and a half of national existence, it is clear that the policy of the United States has passed through various stages.¹ In the earliest period, the great convulsion of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic epoch, followed by the European Reaction after Waterloo, served to consolidate American resolution to keep out of Europe and to keep Europe out of America. The acquisition of Louisiana from France and of Florida from Spain, followed by the extension of the frontiers of the United States to include Texas and later the conquests of the Mexican War, bestowed upon the nation a territorial estate of satisfying proportions.

As the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic events in Europe were responsible for the Monroe Doctrine, the Mexican War, in its turn, was the signal for an outburst of American imperialism. Even the strain of the Civil War upon American resources did not arrest this eagerness for expansion, which found expression in the purchase of Alaska and various proposals for the acquisi-

¹ Bemis, S. F., ed., *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, 1927-29, 10 vols.; Fleming, D. F., *The United States and World Organization, 1920-1933*, 1938; Johnson, W. F., *America's Foreign Relations*, 1921, 2 vols.; Jones, R. L., *History of the Foreign Policy of the United States*, 1933; Latané, J. H., *A History of American Foreign Policy*, 1934; Mathews, J. M., *American Foreign Relations*, 1928; Moore, J. B., *A Digest of International Law*, 1906; Sears, L. M., *A History of American Foreign Relations*, 1938; Simonds, Frank H., *American Foreign Policy in the Post-War Years*, 1935; Stuart, Graham H., *American Diplomatic and Consular Practice*, 1936; Williams, Benjamin Harrison, *American Diplomacy: Policies and Practice*, 1936.

tion of Cuba, Santo Domingo, and even Canada. In the Pacific, too, possession of California proved the preface to the expedition of Perry which opened Japan to the Western world.

With the Spanish War, a new wave of imperialism swept the country, finding its inspirations in the British model of which Kipling was both the poet and the prophet. Possessor of the Philippines, the United States seemed for a moment launched upon a career of conquest and expansion such as, at that moment, was being followed by all the European Great Powers. Nevertheless, even in the Far East where it was most frankly imperialistic, American policy sought expression in the championship of abstract principles such as that of the Open Door, rather than in the customary processes of territorial aggrandizement.

Before the coming of the World War, the second explosion of American imperialism, which had followed the Spanish-American War, had died away. In 1918 there was no American demand for a share in the territorial spoils of victory, and the notion of mandates in Armenia or at Constantinople found no support on this side of the Atlantic. On the contrary, in still more recent times, the desire to be rid of the responsibility and competition of the Philippines has led to an ultimate surrender of sovereignty there.

Within the American region, the opening of the twentieth century saw the rapid development of a policy which seemed to foreshadow the assertion of the right to organize regimes which could provide peace and order in the islands and Central American states about the Caribbean Sea. By the Platt Amendment, the United States asserted rights of supervision over both

the foreign relations and the domestic circumstances of Cuba, while its intervention in Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua, and its actions in Mexico, aroused apprehension in Latin America and expectation in Europe that the United States was entering upon a policy in the regions to the south of it identical with that pursued by European powers in Africa.¹

Actually, apart from the role played in the revolution which produced the separation of Panama from Colombia and made possible the construction of the Canal, and the acquisition by the United States of the territories and islands necessary to defend it, American imperialism in the Caribbean area had had only transitory consequences and by 1934 was in full retreat. Thus the power of reoccupation reserved by the Platt Amendment in the case of Cuba had been renounced, and the withdrawal of American forces from occupied countries had taken place. Finally, in the Pan-American Conference at Montevideo (1933), the United States formally renounced the right and practice of occupation of foreign territory in the interests of order and thus for the benefit of American creditors.²

With the inauguration of the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United States sought on the one hand to win and deserve the confidence of its Latin American neighbors, and on the other to expand

¹ Guggenheim, Harry Frank, *The United States and Cuba*, 1934; Howland, C. P., ed., *American Foreign Relations*, 1929; Jones, C. L., *Caribbean Backgrounds and Prospects*, 1931; Latané, J. H., *The United States and Latin America*, 1926; Lee, T. F., *Latin American Problems; Their Relation to Our Investors' Billions*, 1932; Miller, H. G., *The Isthmian Highway; a Review of the Problems of the Caribbean*, 1929; Munro, D. G., *The United States and the Caribbean Area*, 1934; Young, Eugene J., *Powerful America*, 1936.

² Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The Montevideo Conference, Antecedents and Accomplishments," *International Conciliation*, No. 300, 1934; Foreign Policy Association, "Seventh Pan-American Conference," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. X, No. 7, 1934.

the commercial relations between North and South America. "Dollar Diplomacy" was then frankly renounced, and "Good Neighbor" methods formally substituted. As a result, there is at least a promise that the doubts and suspicions, if not the jealousies, which in recent years have poisoned the relations between the United States and Latin America, will presently disappear.

Within the American region, therefore, national policy in recent times has been made to square with long-standing pretension. Of imperialistic purposes, whether territorial, economic, or financial, nothing is left. So far from seeking to act as the single policeman of the American region, the United States has clearly predicated all future intervention upon association with the other American nations. Within the American region, then, national policy has today become clear and consistent.

In respect to Europe and Asia, by contrast, the policy of the United States is lacking in definition. So far, the American people are equally eager to promote world peace, for both moral and material reasons, and to avoid foreign involvements, for considerations which are at least comprehensible. Thus American action continues to respond alternately to the inspiration of Wilson's Fourteen Points and to the admonition of Washington's Farewell Address, invariably reverting to the latter, however, when the question of assuming foreign responsibilities is raised.

Although the United States enjoys the maximum of security from attack, either European or Asiatic, failure to clarify national policy in its relations with both regions carries obvious dangers. Thus, in Europe, since

the issue which was responsible for our involvement in the World War, namely that of Freedom of the Seas, found no determination either during or at the close of that conflict, it is clear that another European struggle might lead to new perils of entanglement.

At the outset of the last great struggle, President Wilson undertook to establish the legally imprescriptible rights of his country as a neutral. But inasmuch as he was unprepared to employ an embargo against the Allies or to resort to arms against the Germans, American notes, unsupported by force, were without practical effect.¹ Since Great Britain would certainly undertake in any future war to employ the means which proved most effective in the last, fresh collisions between American rights and British acts on the high seas would be inevitable. Similar collision might also take place were the Japanese and the Soviet Union to engage in war.

It is by virtue of these conflicting circumstances that the Neutrality Act of 1937 would be rendered largely unworkable in time of general war. It will be recalled that in August, 1935, when the Italian conquest of Ethiopia had produced a critical situation, Congress passed a Neutrality Act which was intended to keep this country out of European war. It provided principally that, on the President's proclamation of the existence of a state of war, the export of arms, ammunition, and war implements to any belligerent would be unlawful.

¹ Hallgren, Mauritz A., *The Tragic Fallacy*, 1937; Paxson, Frederic L., *American Democracy and the World War; Pre-War Years 1913-1917*, 1936; Savage, Carlton, *Policy of the United States Toward Maritime Commerce in War*, 1934; Seymour, Charles, *American Diplomacy During the World War*, 1934; same author, *American Neutrality; 1914-1917*, 1935; Tansill, Charles Callan, *America Goes to War*, 1938.

The international situation being still critical at the time of expiration of the Act on February 29, 1936, Congress extended its application, adding a provision against the flotation of loans in the United States by belligerent nations. This act, which expired on April 30, 1937,¹ was renewed on that date, in the form of a third Neutrality Act, the principal provisions of which were as follows:

(1) The export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war from the United States is prohibited upon the proclamation by the President of the existence of a state of war between two or more foreign states or of civil strife within a foreign state.

(2) The arms embargo does not apply to the export of other articles or raw materials unless, in the opinion of the President, such restrictions are necessary "to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States."

(3) The "cash and carry" principle is adopted, providing that in the trade of permitted commodities with belligerents, the foreign purchaser would be required to pay for the shipment and assume full title to it before it left American shores.

(4) The arming of American merchant ships trading with belligerents is forbidden and the President is further empowered to prohibit the shipment in American bottoms of materials to belligerents or to neutrals for transshipment to belligerents.

(5) No Americans are to be allowed to travel on belligerent vessels.

(6) The provision against the flotation of loans in the United States by belligerent nations is also made to

¹ For text of Neutrality Act of 1937 see *New York Times*, April 30, 1937.

apply to private contributions to belligerents, except for medical aid or food to relieve suffering, and, in the latter case, the authorization of the President for such solicitation of funds is necessary.

(7) In keeping with the ideals of Pan-American solidarity, the Neutrality Act does not apply to any American republic engaged in war against a non-American state, provided the American republic is not co-operating in such a war with a non-American state.

With the passage of the above neutrality provisions the United States, in making a self-sacrificing gesture to avoid involvement in war, repudiated the freedom-of-the-seas policy which it had upheld for over a century and fought in three major wars to maintain. In addition this country pledged itself to forego a vast amount of legitimate commerce, provided for under the principles of international law, without in any way guaranteeing that belligerent navies would not prohibit the carrying on of commerce still legal according to American law.

The Act clearly left open the possibility of a large amount of such commerce in the event of war. It must be recalled that the interference on the part of British and German naval forces in what the United States claimed to be its legitimate commerce during the World War involved this country in disputes with both the belligerents. Obviously, therefore, the problem of escaping involvement through prohibitions on American trade and travel had by no means been completely solved.¹

¹ Borchard, Edward, and Lage, William P., *Neutrality for the United States*, 1937; Dulles, Allen W., and Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, *Can We Be Neutral?*, 1936; Grison, Philippe, *La Liberté des Mers et la Rivalité Anglo-Américaine de 1920 à 1930*, 1930; Kenworthy, J. M., and Young, G., *Freedom of the Seas*, 1929; Percy, Lord Eustace, *Maritime Trade in War*, 1930; Rutherford, V. H., *War or Peace? England and America*, 1930.

On the contrary, the Act having been designed to prevent American involvement in European quarrels was now being severely attacked at home on the ground that it prevented such intervention by prohibiting adequate aid to the Democratic Front in its struggle with the Axis.

The explanation of this inconsistency lies largely in the shift in American opinions and policies that took place in the late thirties, similar to that of 1914-1917. For although open warfare had not broken out in Europe, an unmistakable struggle for power was being waged between "Peace Front" and Axis with every other weapon in the arsenal of diplomacy. In the course of this struggle, a rising tide of American opposition to German, Italian, and Japanese policies developed. As the United States had been shocked by German atrocities during the World War, so, after two decades of isolationism, it manifested indignation over the German partition of Czechoslovakia, the persecution of the Jews, the Italian tactics in Ethiopia and Spain, and the Japanese war in China.

This conflict in American policy was nowhere more clearly reflected than in the divergent proposals before Congress, in 1939, regarding the revision of the Neutrality Act.¹ Equally illustrative of the confusion in American policies was the offer of President Roosevelt, in his telegrams of April 15² to Mussolini and Hitler, to act as a mediator between Germany and Italy and

¹ The Nye-Clark Bill provided for the automatic application of the "cash and carry" provisions to all ordinary commodities in time of war. The Thomas Amendment would have authorized the President, with Congressional approval, to discriminate between aggressors and the victims of aggression in applying the embargo on armaments. The Pittman Bill proposed to remove the embargo on armaments and place them under the "cash and carry" provisions. The abandonment of all neutrality legislation was also favored by some Congressmen.

² See Appendix U.

the Anglo-French Entente. Previous pronouncements of the President and other officials severely criticizing the Axis Powers had obviously disqualified this country for the role of impartial arbitrator.

The immediate result of the division in American opinion was a Congressional impasse which eventually led to a postponement of any revision of the Neutrality Act, at least until the next session of Congress, January, 1940. Since Section 1 of the Act prohibited the export of munitions upon the outbreak of war, this meant that Britain and France, despite their control of the seas, would be unable to draw upon the United States for armaments in the event of a European conflict. The "cash and carry" provisions, however, which applied to all other commodities, automatically expired on May 1. Thus the Democracies were at least assured of an unrestricted supply of the ordinary goods of commerce during hostilities as long as these could be purchased without floating loans in this country. From the American standpoint, this removal of all restrictions on wartime trade in goods other than munitions, again opened the way for disputes with belligerents over the old issue of the freedom of the seas.

The problem of American neutrality has its Asiatic sequel in the future policy of this country in the Far East. The United States has not intervened directly in the Sino-Japanese conflict to maintain either of its traditional policies, the territorial integrity of China or the Open Door. But if it is determined to safeguard Philippine independence after 1945 or to become a guarantor of British and Dutch Far Eastern possessions against Japanese attack, it must still envisage the possibility of a war with Japan. If, on the other hand, it is

unready or unwilling to carry its protests against Japanese aggression to their logical conclusion, it must abandon all efforts to attain by indirection, and by such devices as "non-recognition," an objective which can be reached only by force.

Thus, as the fourth decade of the century drew to a close, it became evident that the American attempt to promote peace in Europe by pacts without sanctions and its similar efforts to arrest Japanese imperialism by paper protests had alike failed. In Europe open conflict had been avoided only by a series of diplomatic retreats and surrenders by England and France before the aggressive moves of the Axis Powers. In Asia, Japan was proceeding unchecked with the subjugation of China.

The effect of the current confusion of policy at home could only be to increase uncertainty abroad as to American action. Because of its enormous economic strength, the United States had, of necessity, been of the greatest importance in the calculations of European and Asiatic diplomats. What America would do, had been since 1914 a consideration of prime importance in foreign capitals. With this nation's armament programs of 1938 and 1939, unparalleled in magnitude during peacetime, the diplomatic weight of the United States in the world balance of power became even greater. In the rapidly shifting politics of the post-Munich world, then, America remained a factor as great as it was indeterminate. The only certainty seemed to be that if the United States should decide to intervene in either Europe or Asia, such intervention would be an even more decisive factor than it had been in 1917.

Chapter XXIII

THE WORLD POWERS

OF THE seven states which, by reason of the size and importance of their homeland populations and territories, constitute the Great Powers, four are also reckoned World Powers because of the influence which they exert beyond their own continental regions. To this category belong the British Empire, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

Of the World Powers the British Empire is in size by far the greatest.¹ Alike in area and in population it is four times as large as the United States, and its population is also three times as great as that of the Soviet Union. More than half of this great mass of people, however, dwell in Asia. In addition almost a third of the white population of the Empire live in self-governing Dominions. The Crown Colonies, in which alone the British government exercises complete authority, are not materially greater, in population and area, than the French colonial domain.

¹ Clark, Henry W., *A Short History of the British Empire*, 1935; Somervell, D. C., *The British Empire*, 1930; Stoye, Johannes, *The British Empire*, 1926; Williamson, J. A., *A Short History of British Expansion*, 1922. See chart on page 103.


In considering the British Empire, it is necessary to take note of the three divisions; for already the white Dominions have become nations in their own right, bound to the Mother Country and to each other only by the single tie of allegiance to a common Throne, and of late years not only has India been moving toward a dominion status but agitation for complete independence has taken on formidable proportions. Thus, for the future, the unity of the Empire may fairly be considered a matter of speculation and conjecture.¹

It is, moreover, plain beyond dispute that the present stage in imperial conditions is transitional. In fact, the British Empire today furnishes the most impressive example of the breakdown of nineteenth-century imperialism in the postwar period. While the Dominions still constitute a profitable field for the trade and investment of the Mother Country, they themselves have all made marked progress in industrialization and are determined to dominate their home markets to the exclusion of British goods as well as those of other countries.

In theory, the British Empire could, like the United States and the Soviet Union, constitute a single and largely self-contained economic unit. In practice, however, it does not; nor is there any present prospect that it ever will. On the contrary, for the British Isles, Europe is at least as important a market as the Dominions; the United States sells three times as much to Canada normally as does the Mother Country, and,

¹ Baker, P. J. N., *The Present Juridical Status of the British Dominions in International Law*, 1929; Elliott, W. Y., *The New British Empire*, 1932; Evatt, Herbert Vere, *The King and His Dominion Governors*, 1936; Keith, A. B., *The Dominions as Sovereign States*, 1938; same author, *The Constitutional Law of the British Dominions*, 1933; same author, *Governments of the British Empire*, 1935; Nathan, Manfred, *Empire Government*, 1929; Toynbee, A. J., ed., *British Commonwealth Relations*, 1934; Wheare, K. C., *The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status*, 1938.

NAVAL BASES AND COMMUNICATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE OLD WORLD



finally, in the Far East the textiles of India compete successfully with those of Lancashire. Nevertheless, forty per cent of British exports still go to the other parts of the Empire and thirty per cent of the imports of the United Kingdom are of imperial origin.

With the still recent renunciation of free trade by the British, it is manifest that the whole question of the economic relations between the United Kingdom and the rest of the Empire has come up for review and not improbably for drastic revision. In the world, too, the great period of British industrial supremacy is over. Not only have Germany, France, and the United States out-distanced Great Britain in heavy industry, but with the development of water power and the growing use of oil, British coal, once the basis of British trade, has also steadily lost ground.

During the war and postwar periods, the whole world has embarked upon a process of industrialization which has inevitably led to a steady restriction of British trade. Currency chaos also has had disastrous consequences, while the shrinkage in value of the British investments abroad has automatically reduced British purchasing power. Even the agreements of the Ottawa Conference of 1932, designed to promote inter-imperial trade by preferential duties, while moderately advantageous for the Dominions, have been of little real profit for Great Britain itself.

Today, after permitting a brief domestic boom, reversion to tariffs is producing in Great Britain the consequences that it must inevitably have everywhere. Agriculture is now demanding for itself the same monopoly in the home market that industry has recently acquired. But all concessions made to domestic agrarian interests

must be at the expense of the Dominions which have hitherto been the chief sources of British foodstuffs. And as the United Kingdom seeks to protect its farms, Canada and Australia, as well as India, will strive to guard their factories still further.

In sum, one phase of imperial history seems to be coming to an end. Economically, the Dominions have come of age and, as a consequence, the Mother Country has been forced to revert to that system which it abandoned with the repeal of the Corn Laws nearly a century ago. Instead of imperial self-sufficiency, there is developing everywhere in the Empire a parochial spirit of economic nationalism which is centrifugal and not centripetal. Distance, which sometimes lends enchantment, has served not to promote co-ordination but to produce competition within the British Empire.

Even today, there still remains within the regions over which George VI reigns practically all the reserves in motive power and resources in raw materials and foodstuffs essential to self-sufficiency. The coal of Great Britain, the wheat of Canada, the wool of Australia, the rubber of Malaya, and the cotton of India, together with gold and diamonds of South Africa, are all available. The British merchant marine is still the largest on the Seven Seas. After a brief abdication, "the City" in London has replaced the Wall Street of New York as the financial center of the world. Yet, even before the Great Depression, Great Britain was losing ground in every field, and the process continues.


Politically, as well as economically, great changes have taken place since the war. Thus the self-governing status of the white Dominions has been so fully established that in Parliament British legislators have heard

IMPERIAL BRITAIN




POTENTIAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOODSTUFFS, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, AND RAW MATERIALS

EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES OF ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES
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 (SUBSTITUTES, BY-PRODUCTS, AND SECONDARY RECOVERY NOT CONSIDERED)
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the Mother Country described as one of King George's Dominions. Again, on the military side at least, the traditional situation has been reversed, and in the last war it was the soldiers of the Dominions who fought for the Mother Country on French and Belgian battlefields. That experience, too, has had a profound influence upon Dominion minds:¹ the imperial tie, which has so long seemed an inexpensive symbol of security and prestige, has come to have very definite implications of responsibility and risk.²

As a consequence, British policy in Europe has, in the postwar era, been subject to Dominion restraints. From beyond the seas there has come a constant protest against the assumption of Continental responsibilities. From the Locarno Pacts the Dominions significantly withheld their signature. In Ottawa, Canberra, and Cape Town, European conflicts awaken the same enthusiasm for isolation as in Kansas City, Omaha, or Denver. For Canada, too, the American fleet is at least as solid a guarantee of security as the British,³ while even for Australia it is not without value.

Only a rash prophet would undertake to forecast early or even eventual dissolution of the British Empire polit-

¹ Cole, Capt. D. H., *Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence*, 1930; Dewey, A. G., *The Dominions and Diplomacy*, 1929; 2 vols.; Toynbee, A. J., *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations Since the Peace Settlement*, 1928.

² Boycott, A. G., *The Elements of Imperial Defence*, 1931; Cole, Capt. D. H., *Imperial Military Geography*, 1930, 6th ed.; Fortescue, Sir John, *The Empire and the Army*, 1932; Fuller, Major-General J. F. C., *Empire Unity and Defence*, 1934.

³ Canadian appreciation of this fact was recently given renewed emphasis in a letter written by Mr. G. H. Ferguson, High Commissioner for Canada in London, to a British correspondent and published in the *New York Herald Tribune*, August 7, 1934. In discussing the motives of loyalty to the Empire which prompted Canadian participation in the World War, Mr. Ferguson says: "A moment's thought, I think, will convince you that Canada has no selfish purpose in that action. She could have stayed out of the fight without the slightest fear of invasion of her own territory. The United States would have seen to it that no foreigner would be allowed to set foot on North American soil."

ically, although economic separation still proceeds apace. Not impossibly the Dominions would again fight for the Empire as they did in 1914-18. Nevertheless it is self-evident that the old relation between them and the Mother Country has largely disappeared and politically no substitute has as yet been established. As a consequence, the British Empire is today the largest question mark on the map of the world.

Within Great Britain, moreover, there has been unmistakably developing a state of mind which was first disclosed by the "Little Englanders" of the epoch of the Boer War. The imperial gospel of which Rudyard Kipling was the high priest has lost most of its disciples. The cost of empire has seemed increasingly to outweigh its value alike in profit and in prestige. Surrender of the mandate for Iraq¹ was one evidence of this conviction, and continued protest against retention of that of Palestine,² another. And as for ambition for new possessions, that has vanished utterly.

¹ With the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations on October 3, 1932, the mandatory control exercised by Great Britain over this territory under the terms of the Peace Settlement of 1919, came to an end. For an excellent summary of the terms under which the independent status of Iraq was established see: Foreign Policy Association, "The State of Iraq: A Mandate Attains Independence," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VIII, No. 16, 1932.

² Since the rejection by the Permanent Mandates Commission, late in 1937, of the Peel Commission Plan providing for the division of Palestine into three territorial units, Jewish, Arab, and neutral, unrest has continued. In July, 1938, a new wave of terrorism broke out, leading to the dispatch of about 25,000 British troops to Palestine. In November, the Woodhead Commission, established to work out the details of the Peel Partition Plan, recommended a new partition scheme providing for: (1) a northern section, including Galilee, to continue under mandate; (2) a small coastal strip given over to the Jewish state; (3) the Jerusalem area as a mandated territory; and (4) the rest as an Arab state, but with the southern part under mandate.

The above scheme having been opposed by all parties, a conference of Jews and Arabs, together with delegates from neighboring Arabian states, met in London February 7, 1939. Being unable to reach any agreement, however, the conference was adjourned on March 17 by the British government, which announced its intention to proceed to draw up and apply its own plan, meanwhile maintaining troops in Palestine.

In addition to the surrender of the British mandate of Iraq and the proposed change in the status of Palestine, the British and Egyptian governments came to an agreement in November, 1936, in which Great Britain granted the independence of Egypt under terms similar to those of Iraq, and proposed that Egypt should become a member of the League of Nations. Although certain reservations were made as to British military forces in Egypt, ostensibly for the protection of the Suez Canal, the agreement brought to an end eighteen years of agitation and protest against British occupation and control of the lower Valley of the Nile.

Like the Rome of Augustus, therefore, the British Empire is unmistakably seeking to restrict rather than to expand its frontiers, to discover defensible barriers, such as the ancient Empire found at the Rhine and the Danube, and to maintain an imperial state which has definitely accepted the defensive. Even in the Far East, the British have for all practical purposes withdrawn from Chinese waters and have created at Singapore the principal outpost of empire.¹

In India,² while British purpose has seemed to waver more than once in recent years, the determination to hold on seems still dominant today. While the Government of India Act of 1937, which displaces the Act of 1919, grants a larger measure of autonomy in the Provinces, the all-important Federal powers of defense and

¹ In 1930 the British withdrew their naval base definitely from Weihaiwei in the Shantung Peninsula, making Hong Kong the only important British harbor on the Chinese coast. Under the terms of the Washington Treaty, 1922, Hong Kong could not be further fortified. Following Japanese renunciations of the treaty, however, Britain was free to refortify Hong Kong, a policy she has carried out since Japanese seizure of Canton (October 21, 1938) and Hainan (February 10, 1939).

² Cumming, Sir J. G., ed., *Political India, 1832-1932*, 1932; Joshi, G. N., *The New Constitution of India*, 1937; Thompson, E. J., and Garratt, G. T., *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India*, 1934; Younghusband, Sir F. E., *Dawn in India*, 1931.

external affairs still remain within the "discretion" of the Governor General. In addition, moreover, the Viceroy may, if he is satisfied that the constitution cannot be carried on, take to himself all or any powers vested in any Federal authority. While granting autonomy to India in practice, therefore, the British Raj still reserves unto itself the power of ultimate control.

In international conferences, the voice of Great Britain has lacked during recent years its ancient note of authority. In Europe, France and not England had up to the rise of Hitler exercised the predominant influence. In the Far East, Japan has enhanced her prestige at British expense. To the United States, Great Britain has voluntarily conceded a naval parity which could no longer be denied in the light of the superiority of the financial and industrial resources of the American Republic. Nor has this concession, which disclosed wise statesmanship, concealed in reality a decline in the relative world power of Britain. Even the vast armament projects commenced in 1937 cannot restore the British Empire to its former position of world primacy.

The postwar period has witnessed a sustained and gallant attempt on the part of the British to regain the old status; and it would be idle to deny that progress has actually been made. On the other hand, it is not less unmistakable that economically, financially, and politically the Empire of King George V's Silver Anniversary was from the world aspect very different from that of Victoria's Diamond Jubilee. And although the British Empire still remains one upon which the sun never sets, nowhere in that vast domain does the sun shine today with the same assured brilliance as in the closing years of the nineteenth century.

To the student of international relations, nevertheless, the British Commonwealth of Nations, composed of the self-governing units of the Empire, offers the most interesting and instructive political organization in the world today. Composed of Great Britain, the Irish Free State, and the Dominions Beyond the Seas,¹ it exemplifies the only truly effective league of nations in existence.² Having many features in common with the Geneva institution, it has been able to realize them much more effectively in practice.

In both organizations full self-government is a necessary qualification for membership. The powers and functions of a superstate are likewise studiously disclaimed by each. As in the case of major decisions within the League of Nations, the settlement of questions arising between members of the British Commonwealth can be arrived at only through unanimous decision after mutual consultation. The outlawry of war as an instrument of national policy, which is assumed in theory to be binding upon all members of the League, has become a reality within the British Commonwealth of Nations. Finally, in both organizations the distinction between

¹ The Dominions enjoying full membership in equality of status with Great Britain are the Irish Free State, the Union of South Africa, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and the Dominion of Canada. In 1934 Newfoundland abandoned its dominion status, becoming a crown colony. Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, enjoys limited dominion status. India is in a similar position, though the unique circumstances of that vast section of the Empire make the evolution toward complete self-government and independence a more lengthy process.

² The status of the relationship of the self-governing communities of the British Commonwealth was defined at the Empire Conference of 1926 as follows: "They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." In 1927, the British Parliament, in conformity with this definition of the Commonwealth, authorized a change in the King's title, which now stands as follows: "George VI, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland, and the Dominions Beyond the Sea, King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India." See also Appendix G.


"passive" and "active" belligerency in war is fully recognized.

Although the problem of the peaceful relationship between the independent units of the Empire no longer exists, the question of a united front in foreign policies has by no means been solved. At the Imperial Conference of May and June, 1937, which followed the coronation of George VI, unanimity of opinion on foreign policies and national defense did not pass beyond the stage of pious resolutions. Not only did the Dominions refuse to share equally with Britain the burden of armaments in the defense of Empire, but future commitments to British policy on the part of the outlying units of the Empire were likewise not forthcoming. Even in the matter of imperial trade with foreign states a conflict of opinion and interests prevailed, leaving Britain in the difficult position of either having to abandon the Ottawa agreements or being strictly limited in the negotiation of trade treaties with nations outside the Empire.

While the Empire remains, therefore, a world power of first rank, it is by no means assured of united action such as is enjoyed by the two great federal powers, the United States and Soviet Russia. In time of war, moreover, the survival and effectiveness of the Empire as a fighting unit can be maintained only provided the disabilities of the geographic separation of its component parts can be overridden to the extent of maintaining both material and spiritual unity.

When one turns from the British to the French overseas empire, comparison is possible only between the Crown Colonies of the former and the Asiatic and African possessions of the latter. Here, however, the

FRENCH AFRICAN POSSESSIONS



resemblances are striking and the comparison not unfavorable to the French. It is, moreover, worth at least passing note that as the uncertainties of the future in respect to the Dominions continue to mount, British attention is increasingly being directed to Kenya, Nigeria, and the Gold Coast as French attention is similarly being concentrated upon Morocco and the regions of the Niger and the Congo.

In the main, the French colonial domain is the achievement of the Third Republic.¹ At the close of the Napoleonic era, there was left little of an empire which had once included the larger part of the North American continent and much of India. Martinique and Guadeloupe in the Caribbean area, Réunion in the Indian Ocean, Pondichéry in India, and Senegal in Africa—these were the chief remnants of that empire. Algeria was the later and final gift of the Bourbons, although the conquest of this ancient stronghold of the Barbary corsairs was completed only under the Third Empire.

With the defeat of 1870, however, France turned abroad to seek in Africa and Asia colonies to replace the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Everywhere, too, success crowned her efforts. Faïdherbe in Senegal, Gallieni in Madagascar, Joffre in the Sudan, De Brazza in the Congo, and last and greatest of all, Lyautey in Morocco, added new provinces and harvested fresh laurels. Diplomacy, too, played its role, and Waddington, with the somewhat cynical consent of Bismarck, brought Tunisia back from the Congress of Berlin, while Ferry, despite the thunders of Clemenceau, extended French rule in Indo-China.

¹ Roberts, S. H., *History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925*, 1929, 2 vols.; Southworth, Constant, *The French Colonial Adventure*, 1931.

By 1904, when France made her final settlement with Great Britain, her colonial empire was far larger than the United States, and today with Morocco and the Cameroons its population exceeds that of Germany. The value of that empire as a source of man power was fully demonstrated during the World War, when, even as early as the Battle of Charleroi, African contingents fought with distinction in Belgium. In Champagne in 1915, Marchand, who had once defied Kitchener at Fashoda, led colonial troops to victorious assault. First and last, over half a million of overseas troops fought in French armies,¹ and another two hundred and twenty-five thousand were in the auxiliary services. After the war, German protests over the "Black Horror of the Rhine" signaled the presence of the Senegalese in Mainz.

France has therefore turned to her colonies to redress the balance between her numbers and those of Germany, and, since the war, the dream of Mangin in 1909 has found ever-increasing realization as the native battalions have been expanded. Primarily sources of recruitment, her colonies are only less valuable on the economic than on the military side. Even in the years of the Great Depression, her trade with her overseas possessions continued to grow. To them she now sends a third of her exports and from them draws a quarter of her imports.

Like the British Crown Colonies, these French possessions are fields of exploitation rather than of colonization. France, with an almost stationary population, sends few of her sons abroad. Nevertheless the European


¹ "Thus, all together the French Colonies have furnished 545,000 native fighters, largely used in our shock troops; 115,400 have been killed under our flag."—*Comment Finir La Guerre*, by General Mangin, 1920, p. 259; see also Davis, S. C., *Reservoirs of Man*, 1934.

FRANCE




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 © BLOOMSBURY

element in Algeria exceeds 900,000, and in all of North Africa numbers nearly a million and a quarter, in larger part French citizens. Algeria, too, is regarded rather as an extension of France than as a colony, and sends representatives to the French Parliament.

The proximity of the French North African territories to France proper—Algiers is as near to Marseille as Boston to Baltimore, and Tunisia closer to Paris than Kansas to Washington—is for France important both economically and strategically; economically, since French exports to Algeria alone exceed those of Great Britain to India; strategically, because the "Wet Triangle" of Toulon, Bizerta, and Oran enables France, with the support of a friendly Great Britain, to dominate the western Mediterranean and thus to insure the transportation of colonial troops to homeland ports in war.

It is the territories in North, West, and Equatorial Africa which constitute by far the larger and more valuable portion of the French colonial empire. Greater in area than the United States, even with Alaska included, they extend uninterruptedly from the Mediterranean Sea to the Niger and the Congo. When the long-delayed Trans-Saharan Railway is constructed, France will therefore be able to move her native troops from the heart of Africa to the Mediterranean without risk, and the security of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria will thus be better assured.

From this empire, France draws many raw materials and foodstuffs: iron and phosphate as well as wine, cereals, and olive oil from North Africa; vegetable oils, cacao, and small quantities of rubber and cotton from the Congo and the Niger. In that empire, she finds a

precious and growing market for her steel and iron as well as for her textiles. Year by year, her network of railways is expanding and in Morocco she has found a rich field for investment and development.

If, almost involuntarily, France in the prewar years became again a great colonial power, at least since the war her empire has acquired an ever greater importance in French eyes. Today with the extinction of all ambition for further territorial expansion in Europe, there is in France a growing conviction that the material future of the nation lies in Africa. By contrast, the rise of Japanese imperialism in Asia has reawakened those misgivings as to the permanence of French rule in Indo-China which Reclus voiced half a century ago.

The expanding importance of North Africa has also had a direct influence upon French national policy. Today France feels herself threatened in the Mediterranean by Italian ambition as she has long felt herself menaced by German purpose on the Rhine. As a consequence of the challenge of the Axis Powers, moreover, British alarm has likewise been aroused. The Mediterranean has therefore become a focal point of concentration for British-French naval units as a reinforcement of their defense against this new threat to the security of their trade routes and colonial possessions, as well as to their position of dominant power.

Modest by comparison with either the British Empire or the Soviet Union, nevertheless the French colonial empire, which entitles France to the rank of a World Power, provides an enormous reservoir of man power, supplies a large and growing market for French goods, and furnishes an invaluable source of raw materials and foodstuffs. In an era in which economic nationalism is

steadily restricting the flow of goods across national frontiers, French Africa has acquired a new value for its possessor. Nor can its importance for the national merchant marine be ignored, for that enjoys a practical monopoly in the carrying trade between France and her colonies.

Unlike the British Empire and France, the United States and the Soviet Union are not in any real sense of the word imperial states, for Siberia, like our Pacific States, constitutes a complete contiguous portion of the national domain. They are, however, World Powers, and their importance, which is, of course, unequal, has its origin not so much in the situation as in the extent and natural resources of their territories and in the size and vitality of their populations. Since all of these circumstances have been considered elsewhere they need no further comment here.

What is of importance in any speculations upon the future, however, is the probable role of the United States and the Soviet Union in the drama of international relations. Being the two greatest industrial powers—the former actually and the latter potentially—it is patent that the policies of both will have a profound influence upon the circumstances of future world conditions. Both, moreover, will undoubtedly be called upon to play the role of balance of power between the two great centers of world disturbance, Asia and Europe, the one upon the sea and the other upon the land.

The matter of immediate concern, however, relates to the present colonial claims of the "Have-nots" against the "Haves." To the Germans, Italians, and Japanese the necessity for possession and control of sources of raw materials, as well as room for the expansion of their

populations, remains the same. The challenge of the Axis, moreover, to the security of the colonial Powers in Europe is being matched in Asia by the Japanese advance into China proper and the South China Sea.

To the student of international relations it must be evident, therefore, that the prerequisite of any possible settlement between the Powers must concern the colonial question. Whether there is to be, on the one hand, a revival and extension of the mandate system or a pooling of all colonial possessions for the benefit of all nations, or, on the other, a resort to conquest on the part of the challenging Powers, only the future can foretell. That the colonial claims of the "Have-nots" can be made an excuse if not a cause for war against the "Haves," is evident. It is for this reason that the question cannot be long postponed.

PART THREE

CAN PEACE BE PRESERVED?

Chapter XXIV

THE BACKGROUND

AT THE Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the first attempt was made to establish a system of organized and administered peace which was designed to be universal in its application. In Europe there was already a long-standing tradition of co-operation through the medium of a Concert of Powers. Before the World War the United States had participated in the two Conferences of the Hague and in the conclave at Algeciras summoned to prevent war over Morocco. In the Old World, too, the memories of the great Congresses of Vienna and Berlin still survived.

Nevertheless the League of Nations, created by the Paris Conference, was without precedent, at least in modern history. It was the first clear evidence of reaction against the conceptions of the nation states system which had been gaining ground steadily ever since the Reformation had deprived Rome of the authority once exercised by the medieval Papacy. Nor was the nature of the grandiose experiment to be mistaken: it was publicly proclaimed by its author as designed to extend to

international relations that system of parliamentary democracy which, as a consequence of the World War, had become the accepted form of national governments in all of the Great Powers save Russia.

Throughout the century which had elapsed between the fall of Napoleon and the outbreak of the World War, European history had been dominated by two forces, democracy and nationalism. On the one hand, masses within national frontiers had sought political equality; on the other, nationalities, without regard to political frontiers, had striven to attain liberty and unity. As a consequence, parliaments had progressively absorbed the prerogatives of monarchs, and national states had replaced dynastic empires assembled without regard for ethnic circumstances.

With the victory of the Allied and Associated Nations in 1918, the triumph of the democratic doctrine seemed at last complete. That triumph, at various stages, had been attended by violence. The Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, while insignificant when compared with the mighty convulsion of 1792, had again shaken the European Continent. More permanently significant, however, had been the three great national wars, the Sardinian in 1859, the Austro-Prussian in 1866, and the Franco-Prussian in 1870. Nor had the pursuit of national unity been restricted to the Italian and German peoples. On the contrary, it had been common to all divided nationalities, great and small alike.

In fact, from Waterloo to the Marne, all the significant and considerable European wars had been due directly or indirectly to the aspirations of some people for unity. While Napoleon was still alive, the Greek War of Independence had opened the century-long series of national

wars. The Belgians had risen successfully in 1830, the Poles vainly in 1833, and the Italians and Hungarians with equal futility in 1848-1849. The process had continued after the national wars of 1859-1870, and on the very eve of the World War the Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks had brought to a brief and brilliant close their five centuries of struggle with the Turk. Last of all, it was a Serb patriot who, in 1914, fired the train which produced world-wide explosion.

It was natural that the Allied democracies, having at last triumphed in 1918, should undertake to found their system of international order upon the two doctrines which asserted the right of majorities to rule within states and the right of peoples to national unity. It was even more natural that, since the pursuit of these goals had been the cause or the occasion of all of the considerable wars of the recent past, peoples should conclude that, now that these rights had been established, peace could also in its turn be insured.

Examination of the events of the past century, however, disclosed certain facts of more than passing challenge. Thus, although the two doctrines of democracy and nationalism had similarly been vitalized by the French Revolution and had later marched abreast for the first generation after Waterloo, with the failure of the Revolution of 1848 a subtle but very far-reaching change had taken place. Before that upheaval, peoples had with equal violence reacted against autocracy and against alien domination. To the minds of Metternich and those whom he served, moreover, the demands for political and racial rights seemed similarly subversive.

After 1848, however, the revolt of the masses against their monarchs had gradually ceased and the dynasties in

their turn increasingly identified themselves with the national aspirations of their subjects. As a consequence, by 1914 the struggles between peoples and their princes, which had marked the first half of the nineteenth century, had largely been forgotten. Thanks to Cavour, the House of Savoy had become the symbol of the *Risorgimento*, and, through the genius of Bismarck, a Hohenzollern sovereign had forged a new German Empire in blood and iron. Thus, with the exception of the Romanovs, still haunted by the ghosts of the Russian Revolution of 1905, thrones had recovered much of that prestige and popularity which had once seemed fatally compromised by the French Revolution.

This restoration of the *Einheitsfronte* between peoples and their kings, however, had been only a detail in the larger phenomenon of the spread of nationalism all over the European Continent. Originally that spirit had been born of the aspiration of peoples for unity, for a unity primarily based upon ethnic circumstances. After 1848, however, it had become colored by ambitions for national expansion. Acquisition of ethnic unity did not bring with it a sense of satiety either for the Italians or for the Germans. On the contrary, the Italians, having recovered Venice, now demanded the southern Tirol, where the population was German, and Dalmatia, where it was Slavic. And, in the same fashion, the Germans, having achieved their own unity, promptly shattered French unity by annexing Alsace-Lorraine.

Precisely the same spirit was disclosed by the smaller peoples. Thus, having liberated their own brethren from Turkish rule, the Greeks, the Bulgarians, and the Serbs promptly took up arms to enslave populations belonging to their recent allies. And similarly the Rumanians of

the old kingdom, while proclaiming the right of their brethren of Transylvania and the Banat to political liberty and racial unity, forcibly annexed the Bulgarians of Silistria without concern for their rights.

Before 1815, European wars had resulted mainly from the rivalry of monarchs. Provinces and populations had been the pawns of such conflicts, and at the Congress of Vienna human beings had been parceled out by the head to insure parity in plunder for the victorious sovereigns. When, however, as the nineteenth century wore on, parliaments had largely replaced absolute sovereigns, the substitution of popular for royal authority had not been accompanied by any change in the character of national policies. On the contrary, democracy, rising to the seat of autocracy, instinctively and insensibly adopted the traditional aspirations of its predecessors. Peoples had acquired political power but they had displayed no inclination to exercise it peacefully. Europe had become progressively more democratic, but democracies showed themselves no more reasonable where national ambitions were concerned than had kings where royal appetites had been involved.

It is essential to perceive this paradox between the practice and the pretensions of democracies, because it constitutes a key to many occurrences in the postwar years which would otherwise be completely unintelligible. The basic assumption upon which the League of Nations was founded was that democracy itself was a prescription of peace. And that assumption, in turn, had its origin in the contemporary Liberal interpretation of the causes of the World War, an interpretation which found eloquent and authoritative expression in the speeches of Woodrow Wilson.

To the mind of the American President, responsibility for the great tragedy rested upon the shoulders of the monarchs and autocrats of prewar Europe. They had plunged their peace-loving subjects into war in pursuit of their own selfish and ignoble ends. To prevent a repetition of the catastrophe of 1914-1918, it was necessary to substitute for the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns and their military and naval servants that system of parliamentary democracy prevailing among the victorious Western Allies. The war had been fought to make the world safe for democracy, and it was now the mission of democracy to render the world secure for peace.

That was the first great assumption upon which the League of Nations was founded. There was a second, only less important, and that was that the transfer of political power to majorities would also insure the peaceful and permanent settlement of the disputes between nations over territories. The prewar world had been plagued by the problems of Alsace-Lorraine and of Trieste and the Trentino, by the claims of the Slavs of the Dual Monarchy, and by the wrongs of the Poles partitioned among three great empires. All of these problems, too, had their origin in the unmistakable denial to majorities of the right to determine their allegiance themselves.

Manifestly both of these major assumptions had their origin in the ideology of the American and French Revolutions. They were equally reminiscent of sentiments expressed in the Declaration of Independence and in the Proclamation of the Rights of Man. They had also found authentic echo in the Revolution of 1848. But, by contrast, they completely ignored the evidence supplied by the events of the years following Sedan. They dismissed

the performance of the British democracy in South Africa, of the French in Tunisia, of the Italian in Libya, and of the American about the Caribbean. Above all, they turned a deaf ear and a blind eye to the unmistakable proofs of the extent to which democracies had succumbed to the subtle corruption of power and the extent to which peoples now demanded for themselves the prizes for which princes had once contended.

Unless the World War had brought with it a profound change in the point of view of peoples everywhere, there was no reason founded upon experience to justify these two assumptions. But at the moment of the Armistice, there were signs that such a change had taken place. The masses in every country had found the war to be an agony without parallel and without limit. They had borne the brunt of the fighting, they had carried the burdens of privation, they had now to shoulder the weight of the war debts. For the populations of the Great Powers, too, the fact was beyond challenge that their sufferings had been without reward; and for their countries the war had proved a tremendous disaster. In the furnace, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary had disappeared altogether, Russia had collapsed to Communism, and in Germany a poverty-stricken republic had been established amid the ruins of imperial splendor. Nor was the situation of the so-called victorious powers of Europe different, save in degree. For all, the conquerors and the conquered alike, the conflict had demonstrably proved a catastrophe.

Taught by their experience in the last war, was it not natural to believe that peoples everywhere would now exercise their political power to prevent a next war? If in their blindness majorities had, in the past, been the

consenting victims of imperialistic policies and militaristic leaders, could they not be relied upon for all future time to follow men and support policies of peace? Everyone now knew what war meant. The masses who constituted the political majorities were fully aware of the fact that theirs would be the sacrifice in war and the suffering after it.

It is evident, however, that every assumption that democracy would henceforth insure peace rested upon the belief that the Paris Settlement could establish it. To the European map there was now to be supplied the principle of self-determination; but that principle could promise peace only as Paris was able to provide conditions nationally acceptable and economically tolerable. It was obvious, in advance, that various groups of people—fifty millions in all—who had been subject and divided were now to attain liberty and unity. Poland was to rise from the grave; Bohemia, rechristened Czechoslovakia, was to reappear as an independent state after three centuries of servitude. Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta would henceforth cease to trouble European tranquillity.

But what about the circumstances of the hundred millions of Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians, whose frontiers were mutilated, whose unity was destroyed, whose provinces were surrendered to permit the creation of the new Europe of self-determination? For, unhappily, Central and Eastern Europe are not divided into neat and convenient ethnic compartments. On the contrary, from Danzig to Salonika and from Bavaria to the Pripet Marshes, the Old World is a *macedoine* of races inextricably mingled and traditionally and irreconcilably hostile.

Would the inhabitants of those states whose territorial solidarity was destroyed and whose ethnic unity was abolished accept the decisions of the Peace Conference as just, even when sanctioned by the verdict of self-determination? Looking across their own mutilated frontiers to the territories once their own and now held by the Poles, the Czechs, the Rumanians, and the Serbs, would the Germans, the Magyars, and the Bulgarians reckon the miseries of another war more terrible than the permanence of the circumstances in which they found themselves? And for these circumstances war was clearly the only remedy.

Such temptation to war might be resisted if ethnic division were accompanied by economic well-being. Hitherto, the application of the principle of self-determination had resulted in the substitution of large states for small. The unification of Italy and the creation of the German Empire were familiar examples of this process, and both had brought prosperity. Now, however, it was proposed to reduce the Hapsburg Monarchy to its ethnic factors; and although it was a mosaic of nationalities it was an admirably balanced economic unit. Six states with as many frontiers were now to divide the territories of the old Dual Monarchy with its single fiscal frontier.

Could Europe collectively, could the Danubian area where this process of Balkanization was to be applied most rigorously, survive it? Would the Europe of self-determination be economically viable or would material misery accompanying political humiliation serve to fan into fresh flames the still smoldering fires of racial passions? And in such case would not the peoples who had been partitioned in the name of nationality and

plundered on the ground of reparations, and thereby reduced from prewar prosperity to a permanent condition of poverty, confound the Peace Treaties and the League of Nations? Would they not see in the latter the instrument of tyranny to perpetuate the injustices of the former?

For the Settlement of Paris and the creation of the League of Nations were to be accomplished simultaneously. The inclusion of the Covenant of the League in the four Treaties of Paris severally named the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly, which imposed new frontiers and different conditions upon Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, was rendered inescapable by the terms of the Armistice which made Wilson's Proposals the basis of peace. These treaties were to become, thenceforth, the public law of Europe, and the League was constituted the executor of that law. Peace and the treaties of peace were henceforth inextricably entangled. But if the treaties proved in the eyes of the defeated inequitable and therefore intolerable, how was the League to escape sharing the evil consequence of that fact?

Such a question had been raised before in Europe. The settlement made at the Congress of Vienna had aroused resentment all over the Continent. But to perpetuate that settlement Alexander I of Russia had proposed his notorious Holy Alliance. Invoking the principle of legitimacy and appealing to the world in the name of peace, the Czar had sought to make permanent the status quo of 1815 by the collective guarantee of the victorious sovereigns. To the conception of Alexander, strangely compounded of religious mysticism and dynastic anxiety, neither Castlereagh nor Metternich had paid much

heed, and as a consequence the Holy Alliance was never consummated.

Instead, the British and Austrian statesmen secretly made the Quadruple Alliance, which included Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, and was rigidly restricted to the realistic purpose of preserving the status quo of Vienna. But in the popular mind the Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance had been confused, and under the former name the association of the victors became the symbol of tyranny and reaction from Waterloo to the Revolution of 1848. And yet the underlying purpose of the partnership proposed in the name of religion, and of that alliance actually made in the name of practical politics, had been the preservation of peace.

At Paris, Woodrow Wilson appeared in the role of Alexander I. In his turn he proposed a new international association, at the outset, at least, to be composed of the victors. This new League of Nations was to be established upon the dogma of democracy, and not, like the Holy Alliance, upon the doctrine of legitimacy. It was to be a partnership of peoples and not of princes; but it was also designed to be the guarantor of a status quo established upon the foundations of a military victory and an imposed peace. And if in the eyes of conquered peoples the Settlement of Paris immediately or eventually assumed the character which the Settlement of Vienna had acquired in the eyes of the parceled and partitioned peoples a century before, was not the League bound to possess the ill repute of the Holy Alliance?

But the problem was not limited to the future attitude of the peoples that had been defeated in the World War. It was not merely the status quo in Europe established by the Settlement of Paris which was henceforth to be the

basis of peace. What was now aimed at was not a European but a universal system of order. But would the Japanese, for example, find more tolerable that institution which forbade them the realization of their imperialistic purposes in eastern Asia, than the Germans would find the same institution which constituted a similar obstacle to their ambitions in Middle Europe?

Inherent in the whole League conception was the idea that the world had become static, that the age of expansion was over, that the moment had come when peoples everywhere were now prepared to accept as final the frontiers which existed in 1919, when the Treaties of Paris had been applied. And that conviction was vital to the whole idea of a League of Nations because all the territory of the world was now divided among the various nations and none could thereafter extend its own boundaries save through violence and at the expense of another. And it was to prevent such resort to violence that the League was called into being.

Consent and authority, these were to be pillars of the new structure: consent of peoples everywhere voluntarily to accept the territorial status quo of the moment as enduring; and authority delegated by the member nations to maintain that status quo against any future challenge by any single nation for the moment fallen into evil hands and dominated and directed by leaders inspired by the old doctrines of conquest and hegemony, by the ancient reliance upon force rather than by the new respect for law. Against such a regime there was to be mobilized through the League the public opinion of mankind. Against the force of that individual nation there was to be assembled the collective resources of all other states for coercion.

At the very bottom of the whole conception, moreover, was the belief that, internationally as nationally, the will of the majority could and would prevail, not by violence but naturally and inevitably as it did within democracies everywhere. Beyond all else, the League was to be an instrument to make effective the will of the peoples, as parliaments already served as the means to express the will of majorities within states. And this belief involved the supreme assumption that the moment had arrived when peoples could and would think internationally. It was, moreover, on the rock of that assumption that Wilson undertook to found the League of Nations.

In approaching the history of the postwar period, the student of international relations must therefore perceive at the very outset that all the experiments in peace have rested upon the basic assumption that the World War had not merely been a war but also a revolution; that as the French Revolution had launched a new gospel of nationalism, the later convulsion had set in motion a religion of internationalism; that as, after 1792, peoples had been dominated by the double resolution to possess political liberty and national unity, so, after 1919, they were destined to be inspired by a similar passion for peace.

If that world which was unmistakably nationalistic in 1914 had, after 1919, become—not momentarily, while the memories of the war still survived, but for all future time—international, then and only then could a League of Nations prove successful. It was beyond dispute an instrument exclusively designed to serve the ends of a new world. It could, in the very nature of things, have no validity in the prewar world. It was,

in fact, a supreme testimonial to the conviction that the Age of Nationalism was over and that an Era of Internationalism had begun.

The test of the accuracy of the assumptions upon which the League rested must therefore be the fashion in which peoples themselves have thought and acted in the postwar years. Theirs was the power to use, abuse, or ignore the machinery of Geneva. It was for them to impose upon their governments and leaders policies in accord with the principles set forth in the Covenant. The price of a successful League was the subordination of national policies to international accord. These national policies were, in themselves, irreconcilable. To this fact had been due the World War. To continue to pursue these policies, and thus necessarily to attempt to impose them upon other countries, could only lead to fresh conflict.

Between the absolute sovereignty of the individual state and the supreme authority of the superstate there is no halfway station. The will of the majority must prevail internationally or the condition of anarchy which had existed before 1914 was bound to reappear after 1919. Either peoples were now prepared to modify their national policies to conform to international decision, or they were not. And if they were not, the circumstances of Geneva in the postwar period were condemned in advance to be no more fortunate than those of the Hague between 1907 and 1914, when the World War was coming on apace.

In the consideration of the history of the League of Nations, therefore, the student of international relations must not permit his attention to be drawn away from the main issue, which is the attitude of peoples as dis-

closed by their policies, and concentrated upon details concerning the nature and structure of the machinery set up at Geneva. The primary problem is not how that machinery was designed to operate, but why it did not function; and the key to that problem lies not in Geneva but in the policies of the several nations. Each in turn, beginning with the United States, was called upon to give a clear and unequivocal sign that it accepted or rejected the fundamental principle of the League, which was sacrifice of sovereignty either by delegation of national powers to an international institution, or by voluntary subordination of national interest to international decision.

When, moreover, in the first weeks of 1935 the Senate rejected the resolution which would have taken the United States into the World Court, clear evidence was supplied that there had been no modification of the feeling of the Senate in respect of the League. For the defeat of the World Court resolution was due directly to the general acceptance of the charge that the World Court was an agency of the League and that adherence to it would mean seeking admission to Geneva by the back door.

Chapter XXV

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE

THE Covenant of the League of Nations,¹ which is in fact its charter, called into being, at the summons of the high contracting states that made the Settlement of Paris, an international congress consisting of two bodies, the Council and the Assembly. The Council includes representatives of all the Great Powers that are members, together with representatives of several of the smaller powers, while the Assembly is composed of delegates from all of the many member nations. Attached to the League is a Secretariat which fulfills the mission of a permanent civil service.² The Secretariat is housed at Geneva, Switzerland, which is also the meeting place of the Council and of the Assembly. Joined to the League is a World Court, which possesses a large degree of independence and holds its sessions in the Peace Palace at the Hague.

¹ For text of the Covenant, see Appendix A.

² For general studies on the origin and structure of the League, see: Howard-Ellis, Charles, *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, 1928; Mower, E. C., *International Government*, 1931; Walp, P. K., *Constitutional Development of the League of Nations*, 1931; Zimmern, Sir Alfred, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918-1935*, 1936.

The functions of the League were designed to be threefold: to prevent war, to organize peace, and to promote international co-operation in that vast field where the interests of nations are common or subject to amicable adjustment.¹ In addition, there were transferred to it by the Paris Conference many temporary and permanent tasks incident to the administration of the peace treaties, such as the supervision of mandates² and the government of the Saar Basin and the Danzig Free State.

Recalling in some measure the traditional Concert of Europe, the League was, nevertheless, to be of universal scope, and constituted a final testimony to the belief that the World War had demonstrated that conflict could no longer be localized in an integrated world. It was not an alliance, because eventually, if not immediately, it was to be open to all nations on equal terms. It was, furthermore, not provided with the resources of a superstate, and although it most closely resembled a national legislature, it was in fact able to proceed, in the main, only by unanimous consent. Thus, in prac-

¹ For general studies on the functioning of the League, see: Conwell-Evans, T. P., *The League Council in Action*, 1929; Eagleton, Clyde, *International Government*, 1932; Greaves, H. R. G., *The League Committees and World Order*, 1931; Hedges, R. Y., *International Organization*, 1935; Hill, N. L., *International Administration*, 1931; Jackson, Judith, and King-Hall, Stephen, *The League Year-Book*, annual since 1932; League of Nations, *Ten Years of World Co-operation*, 1930; McClure, Wallace, *World Prosperity as Sought Through the Economic Work of the League of Nations*, 1933; Myers, D. P., *Handbook of the League of Nations Since 1920*, 1935; Williams, Sir J. F., *Some Aspects of the Covenant of the League of Nations*, 1934.

For special reference in addition to the *Official Journal* and *Monthly Summary*, the publications released by the following Sections of the League of Nations will be useful: Administrative, Communications, Disarmament, Economic and Financial, Intellectual Co-operation, Legal, Mandates, Minorities, and Political.

² Bentwich, Norman De Mattos, *The Mandates System*, 1930; Gerig, Benjamin, *The Open Door and the Mandates System*, 1930; Maanen-Helmer, Elizabeth van, *The Mandates System in Relation to Africa and the Pacific Islands*, 1929; Margalith, A. M., *The International Mandates*, 1930; Wright, Quincy, *Mandates Under the League of Nations*, 1930.

tice, it became little more than an international conference having a permanent existence.

In becoming members of the League, states are, by virtue of the Covenant, required to take a variety of engagements, of which the most important are those contained in Articles X and XVI of that document. In accordance with the former, member nations "undertake to respect and to preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." In conformity with the latter they agree that, should any member nation resort to war in violation of its various other commitments in the Covenant, that nation shall "be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League."

With the nation guilty of such an act of war, member nations agree to sever all trade and financial relations and also to take steps calculated to insure the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse. In such actions they also pledge themselves to support one another. It is the "friendly right" of each nation, moreover, to bring to the attention of the Council or the Assembly any question which threatens to disturb international peace,¹ and all agree that any war or threat of war is a matter of concern to the entire League, which is bound to take any action it deems wise and effectual to safeguard peace.²

All member nations are bound by the Covenant to submit any dispute, likely to lead to a rupture of relations with another state, to arbitration, to judicial settlement, or to inquiry by the Council, which in practice

¹ Article XI, Paragraph 2.

² Article XI, Paragraph 1.

means to the Arbitration Tribunal at the Hague, to the World Court, or to the Council. Nor may any state resort to war until three months after decision has been had following such submission.¹ Member states also pledge themselves to submit issues to arbitration or judicial decision when they recognize them to be suitable for such procedure,² and to carry out in good faith any decision rendered. Nor may they resort to war against a member nation which complies with the terms of such a decision.³

When states do not deem issues suitable for arbitration or judicial settlement, they must submit them directly to the Council of the League for inquiry; and they may not go to war with a state which complies with the decision of the Council if that decision is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of the parties to the dispute.⁴ On the other hand, if the decision is not thus unanimous, the parties to a dispute reserve the right to act as they may choose.⁵ But more important still to the machinery of peace is the provision in the Covenant which empowers the Assembly to "advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."⁶

¹ Article XII.

² "Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement." (Article XIII, Paragraph 2.)

³ Article XIII, Paragraph 4.

⁴ Article XV, Paragraph 6.

⁵ Article XV, Paragraph 7.

⁶ Article XIX.

In respect to armaments, member nations agree to accept such regulations of their military, naval, and air forces as the League may prescribe, and recognize that it is essential to peace that armaments shall be reduced to the lowest point consistent with national safety. The member states recognize, furthermore, that the private manufacture of munitions is open to grave objections, and the Covenant provides that "The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented. . . ."¹

Beyond these primary concerns of Geneva, the Covenant prescribes many other duties of the League, including due attention to slavery, opium traffic, and disease.² In reality, there is no fixed or discoverable limit to its possible field of activity in what may perhaps be described as the non-controversial questions having international importance, such for example as economic and transportation problems.

Here, then, is created an institution without close parallel in history, composed of a Council of fourteen members, of an Assembly in which sit three representatives of each member state, and of a Secretariat. The first meets four times a year; the second, annually in September; and the third is always in being.

The judicial counterpart of the League of Nations is the World Court, located at the Hague.³ This tribunal, designed for the settlement of international disputes of

¹ Article VIII, Paragraph 5.

² Articles XXIII and XXV.

³ Fachiri, A. P., *The Permanent Court of International Justice*, 1932, rev.; Hudson, M. O., *The World Court, 1921-34, 1934*, 4th rev.; same author, *The Permanent Court of International Justice*, 1934; Jessup, P. C., *The United States and the World Court*, 1929; Lauterpacht, H., *The Development of International Law by the Permanent Court of International Justice*, 1934; Lindsey, Edward, *The International Court*, 1931; Ralston, J. H., *Supplement to the Law and Procedure of International Tribunals*, 1936; World Peace Foundation, *Ten Years of International Jurisdiction*, 1932.

a legal character, was organized in accordance with Article XIV of the League Covenant, which provides for the establishment of such a body. Its organic connection with Geneva is further established in the fact that its fifteen judges are elected by the League Council and Assembly. Any state, however, whether or not a member of the League, may be an adherent of the Court. Most of the nations have accepted its jurisdiction, including in 1939, however, only two of the seven Great Powers. Russia and the United States had never acceded to it, while Germany, Japan, and Italy had withdrawn from both the Court and the League.

By signature of the so-called Optional Clause, a member state may put itself under obligation to submit to the Court all legal disputes to which it is a party; otherwise the submission of any controversy to adjudication remains voluntary. Cases thus brought before the Court are decided on the basis of accepted rules of international law and international custom, universally accepted principles of domestic law or, in the absence of any guiding precedent, on the basis of equity and justice. The disputants are bound to accept the decisions of the Court and to carry out its judgments in good faith. Member states are under obligation, moreover, not to declare war on any nation over a controversy in which that nation has accepted a ruling of the Court.

In addition to hearing cases brought before it directly by the states involved, the Court may give an advisory opinion on the legal aspects of any dispute submitted to it by the Council or Assembly of the League. These decisions are not legally binding, but are usually accepted as final by all parties. Such an opinion was the Court's very important decision in the matter of the

proposed Austro-German Customs Union. On this occasion, in a manner somewhat suggestive of the United States Supreme Court in numerous instances, the judges declared the Union illegal by an eight-to-seven decision, dividing in accordance with the political predilections of their particular states. This decision was accordingly a serious blow to the prestige of the Court as an impartial judicial tribunal.

Associated with the League, though not a part of it, is the International Labor Organization¹ which has its headquarters at Geneva and deals with all international issues affecting labor. In structure it bears a close resemblance to the League, having a General Conference, Governing Board, and permanent Office corresponding to the Assembly, Council, and Secretariat of the larger body. A significant difference between the two, however, appears in the fact that on its directing bodies the ILO, as it is called, has representatives of capital and labor in addition to the delegates appointed directly by the member governments.

The primary purpose of the Labor Organization is to improve, through international action, the condition of workers throughout the world. To this end the General Conference passes resolutions recommending steps to be taken by individual governments, and adopts draft conventions on wages and conditions of employment open to signature by all states represented. Likewise the Labor Office gathers factual data on standards of living and working conditions throughout the world and undertakes various related projects of research.

¹ Cheyney, A. S., ed., *The International Labor Organization*, 1933; Foreign Policy Association, "The International Labor Organization," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. X, No. 9, 1934; Lorwin, L. L., *Labor and Internationalism*, 1929; World Peace Foundation, *The International Labour Organization*, 1931.

About fifty nations, including the United States, send representatives to the General Conference at Geneva. However, the ratification of its numerous conventions has been uniformly slow and limited to a minority of the member nations. The chief value of the ILO has been in the information it has disseminated in respect to international labor conditions and in the mitigation of some of the worst labor practices in small and backward states.

All the members of the League of Nations are pledged in advance to respect the territorial integrity of one another and to defend it as well, and to submit their disputes to the Council, to the World Court, or to an Arbitration Tribunal. In the case of some incident endangering peace, a nation fearful of attack can appeal to the Council. The Council will then call upon parties to submit their dispute to the inquiry of a commission it will name. The disputants are pledged, furthermore, not to resort to arms until three months after the decision of the commission has been delivered, and not at all if that decision is unanimous.

At Geneva, most of the member nations maintain ministers as they do in national capitals. There the statesmen and diplomats of all countries are constantly in contact. With the passing of years, the League has developed a conference technique, and a machinery of international co-operation in non-controversial fields. It now possesses a splendid palace for its headquarters, and its reports, investigations, and activities generally continue to multiply.

Such, briefly summarized, is the machinery of the League. Nor could any summary, however brief, be fair or exact which did not lay emphasis upon the extent

of the achievement of Geneva outside the area of high politics. In fact it would be impossible, even in a far greater space than the present study affords, merely to catalogue the various forms of activity of the League or to set down the value of the services which it renders. It must therefore suffice to note here that in the field of non-controversial international problems its success has been so unmistakable that its permanence is no longer open to doubt.

Nevertheless, there remains the larger field. Primarily the League was created to deal with those issues of peace and war which concern Great Powers directly or indirectly. It was to preserve and to organize world peace that this most grandiose of all experiments in internationalism was originally launched. It is, therefore, upon its achievement in these respects that its record must in the end be judged. And here the contemporary evidence of failure is not to be gainsaid.¹

In 1934, fifteen years after the first Assembly of the League was convened, three of the seven Great Powers were absent from its sessions, and a fourth, the Soviet Union, had only just been admitted to membership. And while the United States had never belonged, and Germany and Japan gave notice of withdrawal in 1933, Italy from the beginning had attended only to proclaim hostility to the whole spirit of the Geneva experiment. Not less illuminating is the fact that the two Great Powers always present and in principle still loyal—Great Britain and France—have in recent years met at Geneva only to disagree on most issues and, as a consequence of their disagreement, to precipitate deadlock.

¹ Beer, Max, *The League on Trial*, 1933; Morley, Felix, *The Society of Nations*, 1932; Williams, Sir J. F., *Some Aspects of the Covenant of the League of Nations*, 1934; Zimmern, Sir Alfred, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law*, 1936.

Equally significant is the fact that in the twenty years 1919-39 not one of the causes of dispute between Great Powers has found acceptable solution through the interposition of the League. On the contrary, all of the reasons for future conflict which existed when the League began, and notably those which have reduced the Danubian region to political anarchy and economic misery, still endure. In fact, many of them have become progressively more and more acute and dangerous.

The fact of the persistence of disputes dangerous to peace was fully demonstrated by the clash between Yugoslavia and Hungary in December, 1934. Several weeks after the murder of King Alexander, the Yugoslavs, backed by their Rumanian and Czech partners of the Little Entente, assailed Hungary on the ground that she had harbored Croatian terrorists responsible for the crime. Danger of war, however, was very slight, because four Great Powers, France, Italy, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, were united in the double determination not to be dragged into conflict themselves, and not to permit hostilities between the smaller states.

As a consequence, these powers worked together in the Council of the League and elaborated a compromise which was accepted by both Hungary and Yugoslavia. The compromise, however, did nothing to remove the basic cause of the crisis, which was the demand of the Hungarians for treaty revision to abolish the grave wrongs done them in the Treaty of Trianon by the transfer of one and a half million Magyars to the nations of the Little Entente without any other grounds than those which were purely strategic.

The achievement of the League in bringing about a compromise in this dispute was identical with similar

results achieved by the old Concert of Europe over and over again in the prewar years and notably in the winter of 1912-13 at the close of the Balkan Wars. In that instance, as in the crisis of 1934, the Great Powers were similarly resolved not to be dragged into a general war because of the quarrels between Balkan states. As a result they co-operated in a council of ambassadors meeting at London and evolved the compromises which were embodied in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913.

A year later, however, when, following the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, Austria issued first an ultimatum and then a declaration of war against Serbia, the operations of diplomacy were futile because there was no agreement of the Great Powers. On the contrary Austria was ready to risk war with Russia, so determined was she to abolish the Serbian menace. Russia, for her part, was prepared to fight rather than let Serbia be crushed. And Germany and France at all times stood with their Austrian and Russian allies. Under such circumstances nothing could be done; and, of course, the same results would have occurred in 1934 had the Great Powers been again divided.

Likewise, when Mussolini undertook the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, the other powers of Europe refused to allow his African adventure to become a source of general war. With the possible exception of the British there were for them no issues involved in this affair alone, vital enough to justify the rupture of a precarious peace. The stand which was made at Geneva, therefore, while not effective enough to save Ethiopia from Italian imperialism, was at least productive of their determination not to precipitate a European conflagration. For although the League, impelled by

Britain and the smaller states, attempted the assertion of the collective system through the coercion of Italy into peace by economic sanctions, when Mussolini announced that an extension of the embargoes to include oil would mean war, Ethiopia was thereafter left to her fate in the interests of peace.

Again, during the Spanish War of 1936-39, although the League had become too weak to function adequately in the crisis, general war was effectually prevented through the concerted if unwilling action of the European Great Powers. By means of the *ad hoc* Committee of Non-intervention, the alignment of intervening powers was sufficiently restricted to prevent the precipitation of war. Nor did the circumstance that the strict neutrality which the Committee was designed to enforce became honored more in the breach than in the observance, alter the essentials of the situation. For it was well known that all of the four Continental Great Powers at one time or another had actively intervened in the struggle. Whatever has activated them in their Spanish policies, the essential fact of their common participation in the Non-intervention Committee has at least shown, if it has done little more, an unmistakable realization that war for the present had to be avoided at all costs.

In a word, when the Great Powers are united in their determination to prevent war, the machinery of the League or the older method of the Concert of Europe will suffice to serve the ends of peace. In 1905 after the crisis of Tangier, in 1908 in the Bosnian episode, in 1911 in the Agadir affair, old-fashioned diplomacy functioned adequately because all the Great Powers were anxious to avoid actual conflict. And, whereas the

existence of an instrument such as the Council of the League which is immediately available, patently permits action with greater celerity and ease, it is by no means the only instrument of diplomacy available for the purpose.

The student of international affairs must not, therefore, confuse the situation arising from recent crises in Europe with that of 1914, nor read into the success or failure of Geneva a significance which is not justified. While no one would undertake to minimize the usefulness of the League machinery, it must be plain that nothing which has been achieved has constituted any promise that, in case of an open clash between Great Powers, such as occurred in July, 1914, the new method of diplomacy would be of more avail than the old. Nor can the fact be disguised that the basic causes of the general European crisis have survived intact, to the enduring peril of future peace.

How is it possible to explain this situation? Obviously it is not a question merely of faults in machinery to be cured by amendments to the Covenant or by a modification of the methods of procedure. Nor would it be enough merely to bring the absent Great Powers to Geneva, unless in advance some basis of agreement for common action by them were discovered.¹

What, then, is wrong with the League? Primarily the fact that it was based upon a major assumption which has proved false. This assumption was that, as

¹ Following is the membership record of the Great Powers in the League of Nations: France entered the League June 28, 1919. Germany entered the League Sept. 8, 1926; but announced withdrawal Oct. 14, 1933. Great Britain entered the League June 28, 1919. Italy entered the League June 28, 1919; but announced withdrawal Dec. 11, 1937. Japan entered the League June 28, 1919; but announced withdrawal March 27, 1933. Russia entered the League Sept. 18, 1934.

a consequence of the lessons of the World War, peoples everywhere had arrived at two revolutionary decisions: first, that a new conflict must bring common disaster to all mankind, and, second, that this disaster could be averted only by collective efforts of the several nations, all similarly ready and willing to sacrifice sovereign rights to insure the success of the international agency for peace to be established at Geneva.

As the original thirteen states of the American republic had been driven by common political dangers abroad and economic and social weaknesses at home to seek security in union, so it was assumed by the founders of the League of Nations that the peoples of the Great Powers, as well as of the smaller states, would, in the light of the supreme catastrophe of 1914-18, be led to the delegation of sovereign powers to an international organization and to the acceptance of duties and responsibilities inherent in such a course. Vague and ill-defined as were the conceptions of the extent and limitations of the power of the new League of Nations, at bottom there was a clear conviction that peoples, even if they had in the prewar era thought nationally, were henceforth in the postwar years ready to think internationally and to give expression to their thought by collective action at Geneva.

That conviction found expression in Articles X and XVI of the Covenant. For what, after all, is the primary condition of any international association which is not foredoomed to futility? Obviously an agreement on the part of all nations, but primarily of the Great Powers, not merely to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of one another, but also to take common action against any nation, great or small,

which violates this fundamental contract. That commitment Woodrow Wilson himself correctly described as the very heart of the whole League conception. For, if nations will not agree to obey the law, then the law has no moral validity; and if they will not agree to enforce it, then it can have no practical value.

In point of fact, however, all of the seven Great Powers have, from the very outset, evaded one or both of these essential engagements. The United States, while prepared to renounce any design to disturb the territorial integrity or to destroy the political independence of another country, rejected the Treaty of Versailles because it carried with it the responsibilities of the Covenant for the enforcement of peace. And by doing this, America gave the first clear proof of the inexactitude of one of the basic assumptions upon which the League had been established.

Like the Americans, the British were willing to obey the law because, also like the Americans, they were content with their own territorial possessions. Having by past aggression attained present satiety, they were now able, with complete sincerity, to renounce all purpose to disturb the status quo. But they, too, were not prepared to defend it, as they demonstrated by the rejection alike of the proposed Cecil Pact of Mutual Assistance (1923) and of the Protocol of Geneva (1924).

What the Americans and British were prepared to maintain was the status quo only in the regions in which their interests were vital. Thus the United States had long ago asserted the Monroe Doctrine, and in the post-war period the British, through the Pact of Locarno, undertook specific responsibility for the preservation of the status quo in the Rhineland. But in both instances

responsibility had been based upon national interest and not primarily upon concern for international peace. And both peoples were at one in the rejection of responsibilities for the enforcement of the law on the Vistula, the Danube, or the Tisza.

Like the English-speaking nations, France and the Soviet Union—at least after the fall of Trotzky—were also quite ready to respect the territorial integrity and the political independence of other nations. For each of them, their present territorial circumstances were sufficient; for each, the period of imperialistic expansion was over. But whereas for the United States no problem of security arose outside of the American region, and for the British that problem in its European aspect was bounded by the Rhine, for France security was contingent upon the enforcement of the law and therefore the preservation of the status quo all over the European Continent. And the Soviet Union, sharing French circumstances in Europe, was similarly concerned with the status quo in the Far East as well.

In Europe, France was confronted by the double challenge inherent in the national policies of Germany and Italy, while Russia was threatened by German designs upon the Ukraine and by the Japanese designs upon Siberia. For these countries, therefore, it was not enough that the League should be the witness of the resolution of all nations to obey the law. On the contrary, it was for them even more important that Geneva should have the authority and the means to enforce the law. That, moreover, was the basis of French policy from the outset; but only much later, under the pressure of events in both Europe and Asia, did Russia come to the acceptance of the French basis.

Finally, Germany, Italy, and Japan in practice utterly refused to accept the law, which was the status quo established by several treaties of the Paris and Washington conferences. For them that status quo was intolerable because, unlike the other four Great Powers, they found themselves restricted to limits incommensurate with present prosperity or future national development. While for the French the primary objective of an international organization was necessarily preservation of the status quo, which insured security, the primary objective for the Germans, Japanese, and Italians was the revision of the existing frontiers of the world, to permit national existence on terms which were nationally acceptable.

But it must be obvious that no effective co-operation by the Great Powers, either through the League or otherwise, is even conceivable while there is a complete disagreement in principle. The status quo of the world in 1919 and thereafter was based upon public international law embodied in treaties. Either the seven Great Powers had to accept that status quo or they had to agree voluntarily to a system of revision, if there was to be any true partnership. Failing that, at the very least, the four satisfied Powers had to undertake to defend the law, which meant in practice to guarantee the status quo, if there was to be any order in the world.

Agreement between the status quo Powers and the revisionist Powers was, however, always impossible. Consent of the British and American Powers, which were at once satisfied and secure, to assume responsibility for the enforcement of the law was similarly unattainable. Thus the League began, based not upon a community of purposes but upon a collision of policies.

The Americans outside of the League, and the British within, refused to assume responsibility for the enforcement of the existing law. The French and their allies within the League mobilized their resources to prevent a revision of the law. The Japanese and the Germans, when they found the law an obstacle to their pursuit of revision, quit Geneva altogether. And while the Italians lingered, they continued to demand the transformation of the League to permit revision. Finally the Russians, as their own security became endangered by German and Japanese programs of revision, moved toward the French and even entered the League. But if Dan thus came to Beersheba, this dislocation was a question of expediency pure and simple.

It was assumed—and still is, in quarters friendly to Geneva—that the desire of peoples everywhere for peace was a sufficient foundation for an international association to preserve peace. It was believed that the very existence of an institution such as was created at Paris would, in itself, mark a long step toward the abolition of war. What was not perceived was that unless there were agreements in advance, at least among the Great Powers, on the terms of such peace, controversies between the powers would inevitably be carried to Geneva and the League would become a place not for co-operation but for confrontation.¹

¹ "Putting aside these theoretical arguments, we are faced at Geneva with the following reality: that the Powers—large and small—carry their difficulties and their conflicts of interests to the League of Nations. These conflicts do not shrink at Geneva: they expand. The Great Powers, in conflict with one another, seek for allies among the lesser Powers and form hostile groups which complicate and aggravate the situation; the small states court the support of the Great Powers, who in order to maintain their diplomatic combinations at once take sides. Thus all disputes brought to Geneva finish sooner or later, either directly or indirectly, as conflicts between the Great Powers. During my stay in Geneva I never saw a dispute of any importance settled otherwise than by an agreement between the Great Powers. They

That, too, was exactly what happened over the Manchurian affair, at the Economic Conference in London (1933), and at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva (1932-34). The same thing would have happened also over the Austrian question had it been referred to the League in 1934, as it did occur in the World Court when the legality of the projected Austro-German tariff union was referred to that tribunal, in 1931, for an advisory opinion.

American public opinion in respect to the League of Nations has always been blinded by a failure to distinguish between actual peace and an absence of armed conflict. And this failure has its origin in the fact that, for the people of the United States, there is no distinction. But the situation which existed before 1866 was, for the Italians, something quite different from peace, because they found themselves divided and subject in part to alien rule. For fifty millions of Poles, Serbs, and Rumanians, too, the status quo of 1914 was not peace but something only to be suffered while it could not be challenged.

The Austrians, Prussians, and Russians who partitioned Poland thereafter described the existing situation as peace and after two unsuccessful rebellions the Poles submitted to it because they had no alternative; but

alone are responsible for the situations that arise. A few states that remain outside of fixed diplomatic combinations and are therefore able to maintain an independent attitude, have from time to time exercised a conciliatory influence at Geneva. But this only happens in the case of secondary disputes, and, moreover, these lesser Powers, not having at their disposal the forces that might become necessary to back their action, are themselves compelled to have recourse to the Great Powers.

"The whole of the Geneva procedure is, in fact, a system of *detours*, all of which lead to one or other of these two issues: agreement or disagreement between Great Britain, Italy, France, and Germany—the latter now formally absent, but not yet entirely detached from the League." ("The Foreign Policy of the Duce" by Dino Grandi in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1934, p. 558.)

they did not renounce the purpose to regain their liberty and unity. The Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians accepted, in the same spirit, the Settlement of Paris, which shattered their national unity, because they were likewise without resources to resist; but they too did not abandon the purpose to change it by violence if no other means were discoverable.

Actual peace, as contrasted with a truce of exhaustion or necessity, must arise from the fact that peoples generally find their territorial circumstances satisfactory alike from the ethnic and from the economic point of view. Only then will they renounce the purpose to change those circumstances, a purpose which can be realized only by violence. No such situation existed in 1919 or in the following years. On the contrary, Europe was divided between peoples resolved to maintain the existing system, because it fulfilled national ambitions, and those determined to bring about a change in the status quo which they found intolerable.¹

As a consequence, the existing system could be maintained only by force, and force sufficient to constitute a permanent guarantee was always lacking while Great Britain and the United States declined to assume responsibility for the Continental status quo.² The attempt of the French to transform the League into an instrument to maintain the status quo was successful in principle, because the status quo was the law and the League was

¹ See map, page 353.

² Angell, Sir Norman, *The Menace to our National Defense, 1934*; Bourquin, Maurice, ed., *Collective Security*, 1936; Davies, D. D., Lord, *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, 1931; same author, *Force*, 1934; Hindmarsh, A. E., *Force in Peace*, 1933; Holland, Sir Thomas H., *The Mineral Sanction as an Aid to International Security*, 1935; Mitrany, David, *The Progress of International Government*, 1933; Rowan-Robinson, Henry, *Sanctions Begone!*, 1936; Royal Institute of International Affairs, "International Sanctions," 1938; Shotwell, J. T., *On the Rim of the Abyss*, 1936; Thomas, W. B., *An International Police Force*, 1936; Wild, P. S., *Sanctions and Treaty Enforcement*, 1934.

naturally the executor of the law. It was, however, unsuccessful in practice, because, on the one hand, the British and American Great Powers refused to provide the police force necessary to enforce the law, and, on the other hand, the revisionist states openly declared their purpose to challenge a law which thus lacked adequate police backing.

The League provides the means for making effective the agreements of powers, but it possesses no resources for compelling agreement and none for carrying into effect the will of a majority. It supplies a meeting place for nations, but if the national policies of the powers are irreconcilable, they must meet as opponents and not as collaborators. Such encounters constitute a peril, not an aid, to peace, because Geneva becomes a sounding board for the conflicting theses and passions of peoples exacerbated by these clashes. The histories of the Manchurian affair and the Disarmament Conference constitute irrefutable evidence of this fact.

What the student of international affairs must perceive is that so far the League of Nations has failed to fulfill its larger mission, and that this failure has resulted from the fact that, contrary to the assumptions of the immediate postwar period, the World War produced no change in the spirit of peoples. The relations between the Great Powers were not basically different in 1939 from what they were in 1914. As a consequence, the old struggles, which were formerly carried on between foreign offices directly, were fought out for a time upon the conference field of Geneva. Such battles, however, generally ended in deadlock, because decision, that is to say, settlement, was usually out of the question on any important matter. For a Japanese delega-

tion at Geneva to agree to abandon Manchuria, for a French delegation to consent to sacrifice national security, for a German to renounce revision of the Versailles treaty, for a British or American to accept responsibility for European frontiers, would have only led to another prompt domestic repudiation, as happened in the case of Woodrow Wilson and his Paris agreements. All of these peoples, Japanese, French, German, British, and American, unmistakably desired peace, but none for a single moment conceived that the price of peace must be the sacrifice of national policy and the subordination of national interests to international accord.¹

In brief, although peoples originally welcomed the creation of the League of Nations as an instrument of world peace, they had without exception sought to employ it as an instrument of national policy, and the result was the decline of the fortunes of Geneva to their present low estate.²

¹ Dulles, John Foster, *War, Peace and Change*, 1939; Friedrich, Carl Joachim, *Foreign Policy in the Making*, 1938; Streit, Clarence K., *Union Now*, 1939; Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs*, 1937.

² *Members of the League in July, 1939*, were: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eire, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Haiti, India, Iraq, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Persia (Iran), Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

Former Members of the League were: Austria, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, Venezuela.

Never Members of the League were: Saudi Arabia, United States.

Chapter XXVI

LOCARNO

Six years after the dramatic scene in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, when the terms of peace were formally presented to the German delegates, there took place beside the waters of Lake Maggiore in the little Swiss town of Locarno a ceremony which at the moment seemed hardly less memorable. This was the signing of the Pacts of Locarno which were to bestow upon Europe five years of relative tranquillity. For, as a result of these agreements, France, Germany, and Great Britain were to co-operate in the task of removing the debris of the World War, and the League of Nations was at last to become the center of international relations.¹

Although the subsequent arrival of the Economic Blizzard and the accompanying and at least measurably consequent rise of Hitler have, for the time being, dissipated the hopes of Locarno, it is difficult to escape the conviction that for a brief moment statesmanship took the true route and that sooner or later it is to that road

¹ For text of Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee made by Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, see Appendix E.

that Europe and the rest of the world, as well, must return if there is to be any escape from the chaos and conflict which have crowded the years since it was abandoned.

The Pacts of Locarno were an expression of the common weariness of the French, British, and German peoples with post-war struggles which had continued without interruption from the making of the Treaty of Versailles to the occupation of the Ruhr. In that time, British policy, incarnated by Lloyd George, had sought to restore a balance of power in Europe by re-establishing Germany as a counterweight to France. French policy, illustrated by Poincaré, had endeavored to hold Germany within the constricting limits of the Treaty of Versailles until such time as Great Britain was prepared to guarantee French security. Finally, German statesmanship, directed by a number of insignificant public men, had attempted to exploit Anglo-French quarrels to escape altogether from the chains of Versailles.

In this triangular struggle, however, France had triumphed. British policy had been everywhere unsuccessful and British prestige had sunk to the level it had known only in the age of the Stuarts. At the same time German resistance had provoked the occupation of the Ruhr, and that had brought about the financial and economic ruin of the Reich. But while French policy had prevailed and France was now supported by allies and dominant on the Continent by reason of her military force, she had neither collected reparations from Germany nor obtained guarantees from Great Britain.

By 1924, moreover, the French felt themselves dangerously isolated, the franc had begun to slump disas-

trously, the occupation of the Ruhr, while it had demonstrated French military power, had also awakened a sobering realization of the harvest of hatred which must inevitably be reaped from a policy of violence pursued indefinitely and directed against the most powerful of the peoples of the Continent. As for the Germans, their resistance to the treaty had led only to a ruin more complete than that of the war itself, and once more, as in November, 1918, they were exhausted.

Finally, the British had at last discovered that, unless they were prepared to make war to combat French policy, they must meet the French demand for security. All three peoples were thus in a mood for compromise for the first time since the making of the Paris Settlement. That mood was clearly indicated also when in the winter of 1923 Labor came to power in Great Britain and in the spring of 1924 the Left resumed a control of France which had lapsed with the war, while German affairs passed into the competent hands of Gustav Stresemann.

Before Locarno, however, there came a full year of preparation. The Dawes Plan was made in London, with decisive if unofficial American participation. At Geneva, Ramsay MacDonald and Herriot pledged their respective countries to make the League the basis of their international action. And it is with this Fifth Assembly of September, 1924, that the League of Nations at last emerged from the obscurity which had been its fate ever since the United States Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and repudiated the promises of the President who had been the chief architect of the Geneva institution.

At Geneva, however, one last battle had yet to be

fought between the British and French conceptions of organized peace. MacDonald called upon the Continental nations to disarm and to accept compulsory arbitration as the substitute for war. But the Continent riposted by demanding that Great Britain subscribe to the newly constructed Protocol,¹ the successor of the Cecil Pact of Mutual Assistance, which, by binding all nations to defend as well as to respect the territorial integrity of others, undertook to give reality to Articles X and XVI of the Covenant.

That Protocol the British Parliament rejected. The British people were no more ready in 1924 than they had been in 1919 to commit themselves to blanket responsibilities for the frontiers of Europe.² But the Tory Government which succeeded, headed by Stanley Baldwin and having Austen Chamberlain as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was ready at last to face the fact that nothing affirmative could be accomplished in Europe until France felt herself secure.

From all of these several circumstances, there presently flowed the Pacts of Locarno.³ By the terms of these agreements and by those of various written and unwritten understandings, three things were accomplished. To insure French security, Great Britain undertook to maintain the status quo in the Rhine area against

¹ Baker, P. J. N., *The Geneva Protocol*, 1925; Miller, D. H., *The Geneva Protocol*, 1925; Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, 1926; World Peace Foundation, "Protocol of Arbitration, Security and Disarmament," *Publications*, Vol. 7, No. 7, 1924.

² Williams, Roth, *The League, the Protocol and the Empire*, 1925.

³ Bonnamour, George, *Le Rapprochement Franco-Allemand*, 1927; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, 1925, and Treaties Between France and Belgium, and France and Czechoslovakia," *International Conciliation*, No. 216, 1926; Glasgow, George, *From Dawes to Locarno, 1924-1925*, 1925; Milenkovich, V. M., *Le Problème de la Sécurité Européenne d'après les Accords de Locarno*, 1928; Toynbee, A. J., ed., *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, 1928, Vol. II, pp. 1-78.

all comers, a responsibility Italy likewise assumed; but neither accepted any responsibility for the frontiers in the east. In doing this, the British evaded all unilateral commitment. They did not renew the old Anglo-French Entente. On the contrary, they bound themselves to defend Germany against France, and France and Belgium against Germany, in case of violence originating on either side of the Rhine.

The Germans, on their side, accepted as final the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France and, at the same time, pledged themselves not to attempt by force to change the frontiers in the east and south, that is, the Austrian, Czech, and Polish boundaries. And they also agreed to enter the League, receiving in advance the assurance that they would at Geneva occupy the status of a Great Power with membership in the Council.

The French, on their side, consented to the early evacuation of the Rhineland as well as of the Ruhr, although they were entitled under the treaty to occupy the former until 1935. And already in London they had, by accepting the Dawes Plan, consented to a substantial modification of the reparations clauses. In effect, the Truce of Locarno temporarily closed the period of post-war strife, which had lasted from 1919 to 1924, as the Armistice of Rethondes had terminated the fighting which had continued from 1914 to 1918.

Actually this system of Locarno for the time being re-established the old Concert of Europe, but re-established it under the colors of the League of Nations. A year after the Pacts of Locarno were made, Briand welcomed Stresemann to Geneva, Chamberlain added his material contribution to this reconciliation of the recent foes, and there began a collaboration of this triumvirate

of peace, which lasted until the death of the German statesman and the fall of the cabinet to which the British Foreign Secretary belonged, in 1929.

Between 1926 and 1929, Geneva was practically the capital of Europe. Its Assemblies were made memorable by the presence of all the considerable statesmen of the Old World. And the League itself quickly acquired the prestige which Wilson had dreamed for it. France, at last reassured as to her security, relaxed her hold upon Germany, and Anglo-French resentments died out. All over the Continent, a sense of tranquillity encouraged economic and financial reconstruction. By the arrival of 1929, it seemed at last that the World War was ended, that Europe was back to "normalcy," and that the League had become that instrument of international co-operation and collective effort which its author had designed it to be.

All of this promise, however, was swiftly blighted by the coming of the Great Depression, which in this and the following years swept first over Europe and then over the whole world. Germany, her middle class destroyed by inflation following the occupation of the Ruhr, progressively succumbed to the rising tide of explosive nationalism which was to culminate in the triumph of Adolf Hitler. France, correspondingly aroused by the march of German events, in her turn reverted to the state of mind of the pre-Locarno days. The British, alarmed by Continental events, strove to restrict their commitments and responsibilities, which seemed to be dragging them toward participation in a next war on the terms of the last.

As a consequence, Geneva, which had been the center of conciliation and co-operation in the years during

which the sun of Locarno still shone, inevitably became the scene of conflict. British, French, and German policies came increasingly into collision until, with the meeting of the Disarmament Conference (1932), London, Paris, and Berlin, having drifted completely apart, arrived at a deadlock.

The Conference of Lausanne in 1932, which finally disposed of reparations,¹ was lighted by the last lingering afterglow of Locarno, but by that time it was too late. Stresemann and Briand were both dead and their common policy discredited in their own countries. Chamberlain, too, had given way to MacDonald, who significantly made Lausanne, and not the League, the scene of negotiations. A year later, with the deadlock over armaments unbroken, Germany left the League and in the subsequent crises following the arrival of Hitler, Geneva was pushed into the background completely.

The lasting significance of the whole episode of Locarno has so far found little appreciation, and yet it must supply by far the most illuminating testimony both to the strength and to the weakness of the League of Nations in the contemporary world. Before the Pacts of Locarno were made, Geneva had played no conspicuous role in international affairs. Its real history begins with 1924 when Herriot and MacDonald went there and laid the foundations for Anglo-French co-operation which were seized upon by Briand and Chamberlain as the bases of their Locarno agreements a year later.

The Assembly of 1926, which witnessed the entrance of Germany into the League, opens the pitifully brief period in which the Geneva institution actually func-

¹ Foreign Policy Association, "The Lausanne Reparation Settlement," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VIII, No. 19, 1932; Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., *The Wreck of Reparations*, 1933.

tioned as its author and his followers believed that it would. But all of the steps which led to this sudden blossoming were taken outside. Locarno was made with only a side glance at the League, and it was not until the Dawes plan had been formulated on the banks of the Thames, and Locarno on the shores of Lake Maggiore, that Geneva came into its own.

In effect, British, French, and German statesmanship, after having quarreled and fought for five years, with results equally unfortunate for all, finally made a truce. The terms of that truce included an agreement to employ the machinery of the League for carrying on that co-operation which they planned. But those terms also included an accommodation or adjournment of the political issues which had hitherto divided them. They came to Geneva with a bargain already struck, to the making of which the League had contributed nothing. And, precisely as long as they stuck to the terms of that bargain, they were able to make use of the machinery of Geneva profitably for themselves, and for the world in general.

When, however, the co-operation begun at Locarno broke down, then the consequences were immediately communicated to Geneva. And, just as the League had contributed nothing to producing the Truce of Locarno, so it could do nothing to prevent or even to postpone its rupture. When the French felt their security again imperiled, when the Germans saw their claims rejected, when the British felt their responsibilities mounting dangerously, all three immediately took separate routes once more. And the result was the conflict in the Disarmament Conference which paralyzed its operations and terminated in German secession from the League.

The importance of the Locarno episode lies in the fact that it clearly demonstrated the value of the League machinery for a world which actually desires to employ it and is ready to endure existing territorial conditions. Thus in 1925, when Great Britain, France, and Germany made the Locarno Pacts, all were equally eager to put a term to the chaos and conflict of the preceding years, and to that end Germany was also willing, temporarily at least, to accept the status quo, territorially and politically.

Stresemann¹ and Briand,² who were the moving spirits of the Locarno agreements, both envisaged a gradual evolution of the territorial situation. The German was not prepared for all future time to accept the Polish Corridor or to submit to the prohibition of Austro-German union. The Frenchman was aware that only at the cost of a new war could France forever sustain the status quo of the Treaty of Versailles on the Vistula and the Danube. Yet both saw that to raise the issue of territorial revision in 1925 or in the immediately succeeding years would only precipitate controversy and lead to ultimate conflict. Therefore they agreed to postpone discussion of what they could not settle.

When, however, in the fall of 1930, a year after Stresemann's death, the Brüning Cabinet—under the threat of Hitler, who was exploiting the nationalistic emotions of the German people—did reopen the question of the Polish Corridor and, in the spring of 1931, that of the Austro-German union, the Truce of Locarno automatically came to an end. After that European conditions rapidly reverted to the situation of 1919-1924, and

¹ Olden, Rudolf, *Stresemann*, 1930; Vallentin, Antonina, *Stresemann*, 1931.

² Thomson, Valentine, *Briand, Man of Peace*, 1930.

concomitantly the League relapsed to that impotence which had been its lot in the same years.

Had the policies of Stresemann, Briand, and Chamberlain continued to command the support of majorities within their own countries after 1929, as they had enlisted it in 1925, the League might have retained its importance, the settlement of the reparations question might have taken place at Geneva instead of Lausanne, and the Disarmament Conference in Geneva and the Economic Conference in London, which were held under the auspices of the League, might easily have had useful results.

Instead, first Germany, then France, and finally Great Britain were swept by nationalistic actions and reactions. The Germans, disappointed by the failure to obtain the national ends which they had looked for from the League, turned from the policy of Stresemann to the violence of Hitler. The French, confronted by this change in German policy, repudiated the idealism of Briand and returned to the logic of Poincaré. The British, in the face of growing Continental unrest, reverted from the policy of co-operation to that of isolation. Thereafter, Geneva was in permanent eclipse.

Such, too, had been the history of the Concert of Europe. From 1878 to 1914, it had, on the whole, worked efficiently and by virtue of its operation many wars had been prevented. As late as the winter of 1912-1913, a council of ambassadors, meeting in secret, had just managed to avert the general conflict which threatened as a result of Russian and Austrian disputes over Serbian boundaries. Before that, the old diplomatic machine had worked after Tangier in 1905 and during the Bosnian crisis of 1908 and the Agadir affair in 1911.

In July, 1914, however, the Concert broke down, because the nations at odds refused to employ it. All Sir Edward Grey's frantic and futile efforts in the tragic twelve days preceding the catastrophe were directed at the restoration of the Concert through the medium of a new council of ambassadors leading to a fresh conference like that of Algeciras which had prevented war in 1905. But these attempts of the British statesman failed, not because the machinery of the Concert was inadequate but because the previous willingness of statesmen to use that machinery was now nonexistent.

Twenty years later, at the moment of the assassination of Dollfuss in Vienna, the League machinery was as available as that of the Concert had been when Francis Ferdinand was murdered in Serajevo in 1914. But once more it was mobilization and not conference which was invoked, and the reason that mobilization did not lead to conflict in the later incident, as it had in the earlier, was solely that Germany was not prepared to meet the Italian challenge as she had met the Russian.

Wilson's theory of the League of Nations, which lingers in many quarters both in Great Britain and in the United States, was that of an international organization clothed with world-wide authority and able to invoke those moral sanctions which he believed would suffice to enforce its decisions. The conception of Geneva expressed in Locarno, on the other hand, was that of an instrument to be employed by Great Powers already in agreement in matters of high policy. It was, in fact, the conception of the old Concert functioning in a new and wider sphere.

Locarno, then, was in effect an attempt to bring Wilson's vision down to the limits of practical politics.

As such, after a brief period of brilliant success, it failed abysmally. But success and failure are equally illuminating, because temporary success bestowed upon the League its only period of prosperity, and eventual failure brought it back to the level of the years before the Pacts of Locarno were made.

In Locarno there was embodied an idea which, after nearly a decade, began again to find favor, and that is the idea of the regional pact. Originally the League was established to give the collective guarantee of its members to the security of each. That plan, however, broke down immediately when the United States rejected the League because it was unwilling to assume any responsibilities for European frontiers. Later, in rejecting the Geneva Protocol of 1924, Great Britain disclosed a repugnance for responsibilities at the Vistula and the Danube like that which the United States had shown for all European commitments.

By the terms of Locarno the British formally assumed responsibility for the status quo at the Rhine, as the United States had in the past continuously asserted responsibility for the American status quo through the Monroe Doctrine. Thus, for the universal responsibility, the British substituted the regional. After Locarno the French continuously, but without success, sought to persuade the British to extend their responsibilities to an eastern Locarno covering the Vistula, and also to a Mediterranean pact applying to the inland sea. In 1934, however, with the direct support of the Soviet Union and with the benevolent but nonparticipating approval of the British, they returned to the charge and sought to enlist the Germans in this eastern Locarno. Again, following the signing of the Franco-

Soviet treaty in 1935, the new allies sought to allay the consequent German and Polish suspicions by offering to unite the four governments in a nonaggression pact.

This attempt, however, failed and it seemed likely to continue to fail as long as the Hitler regime survived, for it obviously envisaged renunciation by the Germans of their ambition to bring about the Austrian *Anschluss*, as in the original Locarno they renounced further claim to Alsace-Lorraine. By contrast, the National Socialist dictatorship did in 1934 consent to a nonaggression pact with Poland which for a ten-year period assured the status quo in respect to the Corridor and Upper Silesia.

Republican Germany and National Socialist Germany have in turn thus agreed to regional pacts covering the status quo on the Rhine and the Vistula, the former permanently, the latter for a ten-year period.¹ The agreement on the Rhine brought a truce of five years in which Franco-German relations were more friendly than at any other period since the Treaty of Frankfurt. The agreement on the Vistula has, at least momentarily, bestowed a character upon German-Polish relations without historical precedent. Both agreements, moreover, were voluntary, in contrast to the terms imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.

Without some similar regional agreement covering the Danube, it became evident that European tranquillity could not be restored, and such agreement, made in the name of Germany by the Hitler regime, would, in the light of its own professions and performances, be long in enlisting Continental confidence. On the other hand, it was equally clear that it is to Locarno and to the

¹ Morrow, Ian F. D., and Sieveking, L. M., *The Peace Settlement in the German-Polish Borderlands*, 1936.

regional pact, rather than to Geneva and the collective system, that European statesmanship would look.

The Accords of Rome¹ in January, 1935, sketching as they did an agreement among all of the nations of the Danubian region to respect the existing frontiers and to refrain from interfering in the domestic politics of the signatory states, were designed to establish a Danubian Locarno, one to which Germany was asked to subscribe, and of which France and Italy were to become guarantors as Great Britain and Italy had been of the Western Locarno. Nor did the collapse of these Accords under the immediate pressure of succeeding events bring to an end European concern for regional pacts.

The lapse of the League into renewed impotence and the failure of all efforts to replace Locarno with an equally inclusive treaty for the insurance of European peace resulted, from time to time, in the conclusion of a number of lesser regional agreements. It was the aim of these, for the most part, to give to limited areas a security which a more inclusive collective system might have given to the entire Continent.

Thus, in 1933, under the renewed threat of German expansion, the Little Entente drew closer together with the strengthening of its existing diplomatic ties through a new agreement. Under its terms the closest collaboration among the three states in matters of foreign policy was instituted. A permanent Council, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the three states, was to meet three times a year, and a permanent Secretariat was to be established. Not only would the Council be responsible for the direction of the foreign policy of the Little

¹ Foreign Policy Association, "Europe's Struggle for Security," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XI, No. 8, 1935; Schacher, Gerhard, *Central Europe and the Western World*, 1936.

Entente, but its unanimous approval of all important treaties concluded by member states was required.¹

Later in the same year Russia pledged, through a general nonaggression treaty with seven of her neighbors, —Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan,—the maintenance of peace in Eastern Europe. Impelled by Nazi imperialism, too, the three small Baltic states went still further in 1934 when they signed a treaty of understanding and co-operation modeled after the Little Entente agreements.²

Even the Balkan states, whose history has been traditionally that of enmity and chronic quarrels, became aroused to the need of mutual insurance against aggression. This growing tendency toward co-operation, which had been manifest in the annual conferences of these states, beginning in 1930, reached fruition in the ratification of the Balkan Pact of 1934.³ By its terms Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey mutually guaranteed the security of their Balkan frontiers.⁴

The Rome Protocols (1934),⁵ signed by Italy, Austria, and Hungary, likewise partook of the nature of a regional security agreement, in so far as they were con-

¹ For text of this agreement see Appendix H. The Italo-Yugoslav Pact of March 26, 1937, providing for a five-year guarantee of frontiers and the peaceful solution of all disputes, was obviously a violation of the Little Entente agreement, inasmuch as it had been negotiated and signed by Yugoslavia without consultation with her allies. At the conference of the Little Entente, April 2, 1937, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mr. Stoyadinovitch, while admitting the agreement with Italy as being a violation both of the spirit and the letter of the Little Entente Pact, expressed his conviction that the agreement did not affect its solidarity.

² Foreign Policy Association, "Toward a New Balance of Power in Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. X, No. 5, 1934; "Europe's Struggle for Security," Vol. XI, No. 8, 1935.

³ Kerner, R. J., and Howard, H. N., *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente, 1930-1935*, 1936; Padelford, N. J., *Peace in the Balkans*, 1936.

⁴ For text of the Balkan Pact, see Appendix K.

⁵ For text, see Appendix L. See also: Royal Institute of International Affairs, "The Rome Protocols and the Question of the Danube Basin," *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. XIII, No. 11, 1936.

cerned with the preservation of Austrian independence. With the consolidation of the Rome-Berlin Axis, however, and the consequent abandonment of Austria to Germany, the Protocols, which were originally instruments for preventing Germany's expansion, became the medium for its realization.

In addition to the above post-Locarno agreements, still another example of regional agreement was provided by the nations to the north. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland had, since 1926, insured peace in the Baltic area through a series of treaties binding them to settle all mutual disputes by arbitration. With this group the Netherlands had been frequently associated in European councils, particularly at the meetings of the League of Nations.

Finally a more recent type of regional understanding was exemplified by the Anti-Communist Pact, signed originally between Germany and Japan, November 25, 1936, as a means of working in common "against Communistic disruptive influences." By the spring of 1939 this Pact, having received the adherence successively of Italy, Manchukuo, Hungary, and Spain, was partaking of the character of a formidable inter-regional alliance for purposes other than mutual protection against Communism. As a counterbalance, moreover, there was commenced during April the formation of a British-sponsored coalition of Powers in which particularly Russia, Rumania, Poland, Turkey, and Greece were offered guarantees of security in return for support of the Anglo-French front against the Axis. Thus was Europe fast returning to the old system of balance of power in its most acute and dangerous form similar to what it was in the days of Louis XIV, Napoleon I, and William II.

Chapter XXVII

THE PACT OF PARIS¹

THE Pacts of Locarno had represented a deliberate and statesmanlike attempt to bring about at least a temporary adjustment between British, French, and German policies. Three years after these had been made there was signed at Paris still another of the formidable number of postwar pacts. This treaty, multilateral in form, since it was open to all nations to sign it, was known in Europe as the Pact of Paris and in the United States as the Kellogg Pact.²

In theory directed at the abolition of war, this treaty was actually designed to put an end to the confusion created by the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the United States Senate. For nearly a decade after the treaty fight the United States had stood aside and aloof from all the efforts of the League to organize world

¹ For text of the Pact of Paris, see Appendix F.

² The following are the most important books which have been written upon various aspects of the Pact of Paris: Butler, N. M., *The Path To Peace*, 1930; Miller, D. H., *The Peace Pact of Paris*, 1928; Myers, D. P., *Origin and Conclusion of the Paris Pact*, 1929; Shotwell, J. T., *War as an Instrument of National Policy*, 1929; Wehberg, Hans, *The Outlawry of War*, 1931; Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., *Information on the Renunciation of War, 1927-1928*, 1928.

peace, and in that time there had been no weakening of the popular resolution to stay out of future European political quarrels.

By 1928, however, American interest in the preservation of peace in Europe had been enormously increased by reason of the recent and relatively huge expansion of the holdings of the American investor in the securities of Continental countries. To the war debts there had been added private loans amounting to upwards of \$5,000,000,000. In addition, exports to Europe were still maintained at huge figures. European peace had, therefore, become an obvious and legitimate concern of American national policy.

During the second Coolidge administration, too, the passions awakened by the fight over the Treaty of Versailles had died down. Wilson was dead, the Democratic party had abandoned his international projects, and the League had ceased to be an issue in domestic politics. For all but a handful of devoted but politically uninfluential champions of the League, the "solemn referendum" of 1920 had been accepted as a definitive verdict. In the eyes of the great mass of the American people, Geneva had become the seat of an institution whose importance was restricted to Europe.

As the League was no longer a cause for controversy in the United States, the apprehension in administrative circles which had moved Hughes to ignore communications from the League to the State Department had disappeared. The "overshadowing Senate," for the moment at least, was no longer suspicious, and little by little there was growing up between Geneva and Washington a habit of co-operation which was destined to become even more marked in the Hoover administration.

No leader of importance still urged that the United States should join the League, but, on the one hand, the considerable fraction of the population concerned over peace for moral reasons and, on the other, that smaller but not less influential fraction interested in European conditions for material considerations, advocated co-operation with Geneva. The new conception was that the United States, reserving entire freedom of action, could safely and usefully participate in League conferences and activities where its own interests were affected.¹

Naturally the League welcomed this change in American attitude, although it too easily interpreted the change as disclosing a reversal in public opinion on the larger question of membership. Co-operation of America, moreover, was an essential detail, because hitherto the problem of enforcing League decisions had been complicated by the possibility of collision between League sanctions and American policy in the matter of neutral rights. Thus even if the United States were still to refuse to join the League, much would be gained if its position in this respect were clearly defined and its passive, if not active, support assured.

But to bring about such a co-ordination between Washington and Geneva was by no means easy. The direct road to Geneva was still certainly closed. The door against specific commitments was still as evidently double-barred. If the United States was now willing to co-operate with Geneva, it was only on American

¹ Berdahl, C. A., *The Policy of the United States with Respect to the League of Nations*, 1932; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The Cooperation of the United States with the League of Nations and with the International Labour Organization," *International Conciliation*, No. 274, 1931; Geneva Research Center, "The United States and the League," *Geneva Special Studies*, Vols. II, III, and IV, January of years 1931-32-33.

terms. To escape from this impasse, Frank B. Kellogg, when he succeeded Charles E. Hughes as Secretary of State, had recourse to a project which was at the moment attracting attention in the United States.

By the terms of this project, the nations of the world were to make a new and solemn compact pledging themselves not to employ war as an instrument of national policy, but henceforth to settle their disputes by arbitration. War, in the phrase of the moment, was thus to be "outlawed." For the League members such a pact would have value because it would close the famous "gap" in the Covenant¹ which still left a way to war open if the Council should be unable to reach unanimous decision when called upon to make inquiry in case of dispute between nations.²

As for the United States, by signing and ratifying the new contract it would establish a basis of common action with the League powers in a future crisis; for the nation which broke its faith pledged in the Covenant would similarly disregard its oath of the Pact. Inevitably, therefore, in moments of crisis the signatory powers of both treaties would come together to take counsel. Since war was thus made illegal, recourse to it became a crime and to the mind of the lawyer, as also to that of the moralist, this constituted a significant step toward the assurance of peace.

Unhappily the task of outlawing war was not as simple as it seemed to the lay and legal mind alike, for several reasons. First of all, while every nation signed

¹ Article XV, Paragraph 7.

² Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "What Follows the Pact of Paris?", *International Conciliation*, No. 276, 1932; Clark, Evans, ed., *Boycotts and Peace*, 1932; Geneva Research Center, "The Covenant and the Pact," *Geneva Special Studies*, Vol. I, No. 9, 1930; also "Sanctions and Security; An Analysis of the French and American Views," *Geneva Special Studies*, Vol. III, No. 2, 1932.

and ratified the new Pact of Paris, many attached to it reservations of immense significance. Thus the United States expressly stipulated that it undertook no responsibility for the enforcement of the new law.¹ Great Britain, in turn, announced that there were certain regions in which it would be inconvenient to permit the Pact to operate.² All nations, too, reserved the right to make war in self-defense.

But how was this question of self-defense to be decided? What was to constitute an aggression warranting resort to war, and who was to decide that such an aggression had in fact taken place? As to these details, the Pact was silent. Thus it lay within the right of every state to decide when considerations of self-defense dictated resort to war, and its decision was not subject to any international review.

Inevitably, therefore, the French demanded that the Pact of Paris be provided with teeth. To be effective at all, they argued, it must be amended, first, to provide a method for establishing the fact of aggression, and, second, to supply the means for proceeding against the aggressor. For the French, the Pact of Paris was worthless as mere law without court to interpret and police to enforce. But for the Americans its chief merit lay in the fact that, unlike the Covenant, it imposed no responsibility and involved no commitment.

¹ In the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, upon the basis of which the Kellogg-Briand Treaty was ratified, is the following significant paragraph:

"The committee further understands that the treaty does not provide sanctions, express or implied. Should any signatory to the treaty or any nation adhering to the treaty violate the terms of the same, there is no obligation or commitment, express or implied, upon the part of any of the other signers of the treaty to engage in punitive or coercive measures as against the nation violating the treaty. The effect of the violation of the treaty is to relieve the other signers of the treaty from any obligation under it with the nation thus violating the same."

² See Chapter I, page 26, footnote 2.

Signed with great ceremony in Paris in 1928, celebrated briefly thereafter as a significant American contribution to the cause of world peace, the Kellogg Pact three years later shared with the Covenant the evil consequences of the Japanese adventure in Manchuria. In the crisis precipitated by that adventure, the Pact did, as it had been designed to do, furnish a basis for co-operation between Washington and Geneva, but the co-operation produced no useful result, because, where only force could avail, none was provided.

On the contrary, the whole effect of the Pact was evaded by a simple procedure. It had imposed upon all signatories the duty of refraining from employing war as an instrument of policy. The Japanese, while using their military forces both in Manchuria and before Shanghai, omitted to declare war; and the Chinese, in their turn, also refrained because they had submitted their case to the League and were thereby bound under the Covenant to wait until three months after the decision of the League, which did not come until nearly a year and a half after the actual aggression.

In effect, therefore, the Pact of Paris did not restrain Japan from an action as clearly aggressive as Frederick the Great's invasion and annexation of Silesia. Nor did it protect the Chinese against wanton aggression. Thus it resembled a law making murder a crime only when the killer obligingly warns his victim of his purpose in advance. For the traditional declaration of war which preserved the courtesy of the duel and the challenge, the Pact in effect, although of course not by design, substituted a new style of attack borrowed from the gangster.

That style, too, was followed by the National So-

cialist dictatorship in Germany in the summer of 1934 when it undertook to destroy Austrian independence, and by Italy two years later in Ethiopia. Hitler did not declare war, he did not actually resort to armed invasion, but by every other conceivable means he undertook to destroy Austrian independence. Rebellion was preached from German soil, rebels were armed with German guns. In the struggle, the Austrian Chancellor was murdered, but technically war was not employed as an instrument of national policy, because it was not declared.

These three episodes, the Manchurian, the Austrian, and the Ethiopian, constitute excellent examples of the fallacy underlying such international compacts as the Pact of Paris, which undertake to abolish war by resolution. Such undertakings could succeed only provided all of the nations which share in them do it in an identical spirit. To abolish crime in a community by a plebiscite in which all citizens renounced illegal practices and thereafter to dismiss the police as unnecessary would hardly seem a sound proceeding. But in effect that was what the Pact set out to do.

The Pact of Paris failed because, although the Japanese, the Germans, and the Italians signed it, they did not thereby renounce their aggressive policies. And it was these policies which constituted the true peril to world peace. It was not the intention to employ war as an instrument of policy, but the purpose of these states to seize the territories of others, which had to be renounced if there was to be peace in the world.

Again, while the people of Japan, Germany, and Italy supported their respective governments in accepting the Pact of Paris, they also endorsed their governments' actions in its violation. But when the public

opinion of the world protested against these aggressions, the peoples of the aggressor states should in theory have turned against their governments. That was how the sanction of world opinion, the only sanction claimed for the Pact of Paris, was assumed to act. In practice, however, nothing of the sort happened. On the contrary, Japanese, German, and Italian nationals flamed into fury over foreign opposition to their governments' policies.

There was, then, only one way in which aggression could have been halted and that was by the collective force of the nations which had ratified either the Covenant or the Pact of Paris. They had to stand ready to enforce the law they had together established. Although the machinery of Geneva was invoked and the Council and the Assembly functioned with the co-operation of the United States, the judgment which was finally passed by the League upon Japanese and Italian action was denied all sanction, since the powers declined to act effectively. Thus China lost territory as large as all of western Europe combined, and the independent state of Ethiopia was surrendered to Italian rapacity.

What the student of international relations must perceive is that, in the contemporary world, the value of public international law is in direct ratio to the physical force which can be mobilized to apply it. The collapse of all the postwar machinery for preventing violence has been due to the fact that it has been long on law, both moral and judicial, but short on police.

The Pact of Locarno, unlike that of Paris, was a realistic contribution to the cause of peace because it provided force to maintain what it undertook to establish. The British engaged their military and naval

resources to defend the status quo in the Rhine area, and so did the Italians; and from that day to this there has been no attempt on the part of the Germans or French to disturb that status quo. The Pact of Paris undertook to do the same thing on a far wider scale, but since it made no provision for force to insure application, it fell to the ground three years after it had been ratified.

At the moment when the Manchurian affair was still at an acute stage, Henry L. Stimson, Mr. Kellogg's successor as Secretary of State, undertook to implement the Pact of Paris by interpretation.¹ He asserted that, in signing the Pact, the United States had surrendered its traditional policy in the matter of neutrality. His reasoning was this: The Pact had outlawed war. Resort to it therefore must be a crime. In the presence of a crime, there could be no neutrals. The United States as a signatory to the Pact was bound therefore to come to council with all other signatories, and thereafter, if it concurred in the decision reached, not to insist upon its rights as a neutral when such insistence might benefit the aggressor.²

This ingenious interpretation, however, found little general acceptance. The United States was willing enough to come to conference, but it was utterly unwilling to do more than that. And it was very far from

¹ "War is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. Hereafter when two nations engage in armed conflict, either one or both of them must be wrongdoers—violators of the general treaty. We no longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the punctilios of the duelist's code. Instead we denounce them as lawbreakers.

"By that very act we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of re-examining many of its codes and treaties." (Secretary Stimson's speech of August 8, 1932.)

² Stimson, Henry L., *The Far Eastern Crisis*, 1936.

having reached a point where it was ready to scrap its historic policy in the matter of neutral rights. Accordingly, with the support of President Hoover, Mr. Stimson presently produced a new project henceforth to be known as the "Stimson Doctrine."¹ In conformity with it, the United States was never again to recognize territorial changes resulting from acts of violence, and this course was to be illustrated by a refusal to give *de jure* recognition to the state of Manchukuo or to Italian annexation of Ethiopia.

The object of this Stimson Doctrine was obvious. It was one more of the innumerable efforts of Americans, official and unofficial, to find some means of enforcing international law without the sanction of force. It was a new effort to set up a moral sanction in the place of the familiar military and naval means of enforcement. It was still another attempt to get around the national resolution neither to fight to maintain peace nor to act to enforce international law anywhere, save in those regions in which American interests were directly at stake.

But the trouble with the Stimson Doctrine is twofold. It does not lead to any renunciation of the fruits of

¹ In Secretary Stimson's note to China and Japan, dated January 8, 1933, the following significant paragraph appears:

"But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto*, nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open Door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties."

aggression by a guilty nation, and it does not guarantee that the nation invoking it may not in the end become involved in actual conflict. Thus while no nation of importance recognized Manchukuo, the Japanese proceeded steadily to consolidate their position, and no one imagined that they could be expelled by any other means than that of armed force.

American refusal to recognize Manchukuo, and American condemnation of Japanese invasion of China which followed, have served to encourage Chinese resistance and thus to render the Japanese task at once more difficult and more costly. As a consequence, Japanese resentment directed at America has become increasingly bitter, relations between the United States and Japan have worsened, and the danger of an explosion following some accident or incident has always been present. American policy, therefore, has been equally unsuccessful in changing Japanese purposes and in avoiding the risks of war. The United States has not promoted peace, protected China, or escaped political involvement.

Of itself, the Pact of Paris had little actual importance. No European nation was naïve enough to imagine that it was possible to abolish war by resolution. The French and the British, however, did correctly foresee the Pact as a bridge over which the United States might travel from Washington to Geneva. Thus they signed, ratified, and otherwise ignored it. For Europe, the main disappointment was that the collapse of the League's Manchurian intervention came so swiftly after the appearance of the United States at Geneva, that American presence was without lasting importance.

Actually, the Pact was the latest in the long series of American prescriptions for peace which have with complete uniformity renounced force and instead have relied upon the sanction of world opinion to prevent war. It was brought forward at a moment when the sun of Locarno was still shining brilliantly, but it had hardly been ratified when Europe and the rest of the world were plunged into a series of crises which proved similarly fatal to hopes centered in the Covenant and those centered in the Pact.

Chapter XXVIII

NAVAL DISARMAMENT¹

APART from the League activities and aside from the various pacts, of which that of Paris was the most ambitious and that of Locarno the most realistic, postwar efforts to promote peace have largely taken the form of endeavors to bring about so-called disarmament. The term "disarmament," however, is misleading, for what has been sought has at most been no more than the limitation or reduction of existing military and naval forces. Since, too, neither of these objectives has been attained, nothing has been possible in the larger field.

In the consideration of the postwar attempts to bring about the limitation and reduction of armaments, a clear distinction must be drawn between land and naval armaments. While permanent achievement has been lacking in both respects, in the matter of naval forces

¹ In the study of naval and land disarmament, the following will prove useful for general reference: Howland, C. P., ed., *American Foreign Relations*, 1928-31; League of Nations, Disarmament Section, *Armaments Year Book*; same Section, *Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference*, 1925-1934; Myers, D. P., *World Disarmament*, 1932; Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs*, annual. *The Annotated Bibliography on Disarmament and Military Questions*, published by the League of Nations Library in 1931, is particularly valuable for extended bibliographical references.

certain interesting if impermanent agreements were made, notably at the Washington Conference in 1921-1922 and at the London Conference in 1930. And in the explanation of such progress as was achieved in respect of fleets at these two gatherings lies the key to the failure in respect of land armaments, which has been absolute.

At the very outset of the consideration of the question of armaments, it is essential to emphasize again the familiar fact that fleets and armies are merely the means by which nations seek to give effect to their national policies. They are, therefore, of but secondary importance and comparable with other instruments of policy such as money, tariffs, and embargoes. What is of primary importance is the policy of a state. If that is dynamic and therefore aggressive, then the armaments which it possesses, whether military or naval, are obviously a matter of concern for all nations menaced by that policy.

In 1921, when the Washington Conference was convoked, the policies of the three great maritime powers, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, were not in direct collision. Since none of these states coveted the lands of another, the question of security was not at issue. Each nation naturally asserted the right to maintain a fleet adequate to insure its control of the waters vital to its own security and prosperity. But each could concede that right to the others without sacrifice of national interest.

This fact is of transcendent importance because it alone explains why any agreement was possible at Washington.¹ And not only did it find no parallel in the

¹ Archimbaud, Léon, *La Conférence de Washington*, 1923; Buell, R. L., *The Washington Conference*, 1922; Kawakami, K. K., *Japan's Pacific Policy*, 1922; Willoughby, W. W., *China at the Conference*, 1922.

circumstances of the military powers of Europe, but it was also not duplicated by the relations of France and Italy among the maritime states. On the contrary, since the policies of these latter countries were in collision in the Mediterranean, the consideration of security was invoked by both. It was, however, in the London Conference (1930) and not in Washington (1921-1922) that Franco-Italian relations played an important role, for in the Washington Conference both countries were similarly ignored.

What was considered in Washington was the question of the relative strength of British, Japanese, and American fleets, actual and prospective. And this question arose because during the later stage of the World War the United States had undertaken a building program which by 1921 was nearing fulfillment and was bound in no long time to bestow actual supremacy in the battle line upon the American fleet. In this situation the British had to do one of three things: embark upon a huge building program of their own, or resign that naval supremacy which had been theirs for three centuries, or come to an agreement with the United States.

As to the first possibility, the state of British finances in the first years following the war made such a venture difficult if not in fact impossible. As to the second, the British Government and public were equally unwilling to see their fleet fall to second rank and the United States replace Great Britain as the supreme naval power of the world, with all that this must involve. For the British, therefore, the single way of escape from the dilemma was to come to terms with the Americans.

Nor was there any insuperable obstacle to an Anglo-American agreement. While the United States now pos-

sessed prospective superiority, the cost of the completion of its naval program was bound to be enormous and the further expense of the upkeep of a supreme fleet sure to be staggering. And no practical advantage could flow from such expenditure, for the British and the Americans were both sated and therefore status quo powers, and neither, at the moment, was menaced by attack by a third power or by a coalition of powers.

Common sense therefore dictated that the two English-speaking nations should come to terms, and the obvious basis of agreement was equality. In battleships and battle cruisers the United States had a prospective superiority, in smaller vessels the British possessed an actual advantage except for destroyers. Between the two nations, the problem was one of mathematics. The only conceivable political issue had its origin in the desire of the American administration to do away with the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was a cause of more or less annoyance but in no sense constituted an actual danger.

The British, on their part, were ready to scrap this alliance because for them it had lost practical value.¹ Originally made as an insurance against Russia, it had been of great use during the war with Germany. But in 1921 Russia had fallen away to Bolshevism and Germany had ceased to be a naval or colonial power. In addition, the Dominions, Canada and Australia in particular, were, like the United States, insistent that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be terminated.

A bargain between Great Britain and the United States was therefore obviously possible. As between Great

¹ Chang, Chung Fu, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 1931; Dennis, A. L. P., *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 1923; Weale, Putnam, (pseud.), *An Indiscreet Chronicle From the Pacific*, 1922; Wood, Ge-Zay, *China, the United States and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 1921.

Britain and Japan, too, there was no question of policy whatever at stake. For the United States, on the other hand, not merely was the question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of importance but, in addition, American policy had long ago adopted the double thesis of the "Open Door" and of the territorial integrity of China. Because President Wilson had failed to insure the return of Shantung to China by the Japanese, his work at Paris had been effectively attacked in America. His Republican successor, therefore, was anxious to succeed where the Democratic President had failed; and, as yet, despite the "Twenty-one Demands" served upon China by Japan during the World War, no direct clash between American and Japanese policy had arrived.

In contrast to Great Britain, and like the United States, Japan had certain political issues to serve. Ever since the Sino-Japanese War a generation earlier, Japanese policy had been directed toward the establishment of hegemony in Eastern Asia. The Russo-Japanese War had bestowed Korea and Port Arthur upon Japan and thrust Russia far back in Manchuria. The World War had resulted in the eviction of Germany from her Chinese possessions in Shantung. There remained only Great Britain and the United States as possible obstacles to Japanese dominance, the former seated at Hong Kong and the latter at Guam and in the Philippines.

To establish her own situation impregnably in the regions she purposed to control, it was necessary for Japan to eliminate the possibility of interference by either or both of the English-speaking nations. To do that, she had to remove the chance of their having the use of Corregidor and Hong Kong as naval bases in case of war. At Washington, therefore, the stake for

which Japan played was absolute naval mastery in all Asiatic waters between the Aleutian Islands and Indo-China. In effect, she sought to throw the United States back upon Hawaii and Great Britain back upon Singapore.

In all respects the Washington Conference was a complete Japanese triumph. On the one hand, she successfully asserted her claim to a ratio of 3-5-5 vis-à-vis Great Britain and the United States, and on the other, she obtained from them a pledge not to add to the existing fortifications in Guam, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. The ratio thus established insured her actual supremacy in the waters in which she was interested, because distance more than counterbalanced the numerical advantage of the other fleets. In case of war with the United States, Corregidor and Guam were henceforth at her mercy, as was Hong Kong in the event of a war with Great Britain.

In return for these substantial benefits, the Japanese abandoned the alliance with Great Britain, consented to transfer Shantung to China, and accepted the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of China. How Japan purposed to interpret that treaty was only disclosed a decade later in Manchuria and China. Actually she exploited the so-called Disarmament Conference of Washington to insure for herself a clear field for a national policy which aimed at the attainment of hegemony in Eastern Asia. After that conference, power to interfere with that policy was lacking both to the British and to the Americans. But in 1922 the real purpose of the Japanese was disguised and their acceptance of the Nine-Power Treaty was taken at its face value.

As to the British and Americans, at Washington they reached an agreement which established a state of parity between them in the naval battle line. The agreement was not extended to cover smaller vessels, because the French declined to accept any limitation in the matter of submarines and the British therefore refused to set any limit to their cruiser and destroyer forces. The United States, as a consequence, sacrificed prospective superiority in capital ships without obtaining any commensurate return in other categories. Since it consented in advance to scrap its excess tonnage in capital ships, the United States thus surrendered the most effective means of obtaining British consent to parity in all categories.

The Washington Conference was, then, a double defeat for the United States. It had been compelled to surrender its power to act in the Far East to preserve the "Open Door" and the territorial integrity of China in order to obtain Japanese adherence to the naval agreement. Because of his anxiety for a successful conference, the Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes, was maneuvered into giving up prospective supremacy in the battle line without obtaining parity in other categories. Nor had actual progress in limitation or reduction of naval armaments been achieved, because competition was now transferred from capital ships, which had been limited, to big cruisers; and in this category competition took on fresh acuteness. As a result, the Washington Conference acquired in American eyes much the same character which that of Paris already possessed.

After the Washington Conference, the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations were caught between two conflicting currents of public opinion. The

American people desired parity with Great Britain in total naval strength, believing they had paid for it at Washington by scrapping their excess tonnage in battle-ships. But they were also averse to achieving that parity by the only means possible, which was matching the British fleet by new construction of their own. As a consequence, Washington continued to call upon London to reduce, and neglected to build itself.

In point of fact, however, there was still no clash in vital interests. What was at stake was prestige, not security. Accordingly, when after the failure of the Geneva Conference of 1927¹ the Coolidge administration presently indicated its resolution to achieve parity by building, if no agreement were to be had, and the superiority of American financial resources demonstrated that such tactics must win, the way was still open for amicable adjustment. That adjustment, too, was reached at London in the Naval Conference of 1930, during the Hoover Administration.²

At London, the British finally recognized the fact that the United States was resolved to have parity and that it was useless to attempt to prevent such parity by insisting upon tonnage totals which were prohibitively high. The Americans for their part perceived that they would not be able to get equality cheaply and must undertake a huge building program. Actually, the tonnage agreements reached at London imposed upon the American treasury an expenditure of approximately a

¹ Baker, P. J. N., *Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference*, 1927; Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs*, 1927, 1929; United States, *Limitation of Naval Armaments, Records of the Conference at Geneva, June 20 to August 4, 1927*, 1928.

² Bouy, Raymond, *Le Désarmement Naval*, 1931; Foreign Policy Association, "The London Naval Conference January 21-April 22, 1930," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VI, No. 6, 1930; Howland, C. P., ed., *American Foreign Relations*, 1931, 1931; Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs* 1931, 1932.

billion dollars in new construction. Since the Roosevelt administration, moreover, presently undertook to endow the United States with a Treaty navy, the question of parity with Great Britain was at last settled.

By contrast, at London the Japanese, with their Manchurian adventure now clearly in mind, showed significant signs of impatience with the existing ratio of strength which they had accepted at Washington. They demanded and obtained a slightly higher ratio in cruisers, and parity in submarines. And, what was far more disturbing, they served notice that five years thereafter, when the naval powers were to meet in conference again, they might demand parity in all categories.

All results actually achieved at London, moreover, were rendered purely conditional because, on the one hand, the British insisted upon retaining a two-power standard of naval strength vis-à-vis Europe and, on the other, the French declined to accept tonnage totals consonant with such British strength, unless the English-speaking nations consented to make fresh engagements in respect of French security. Since Italy, on her part, insisted upon parity with France, the prospective strength of the two Latin states was in excess of the totals accepted by the British, Americans, and Japanese.

Save as the United States was willing to agree to a consultative pact, Great Britain was resolved not to concede to France the Mediterranean Locarno which she sought. And, although the American delegation momentarily played with the idea of such a pact, public sentiment in the United States was obviously hostile to it. As a consequence, no satisfactory five-power treaty could be made. France and Italy stood aside. Great Britain, the United States, and Japan signed a

treaty, but in that treaty the notorious "Escalator Clause"¹ reserved to Great Britain the right to exceed the tonnage totals agreed upon when they were insufficient to insure her two-power standard in Europe.

In the period between the signing of the London Treaty (1930) and the Conference of 1935, at which time that treaty as well as the Washington Pact came up for renewal, political conditions had grown no more favorable for general naval agreement. On the contrary, not only had the clash of French interests and Italian aspirations in the Mediterranean remained unreconciled, but after the brief rapprochement signaled by the Rome Accords, relations were again strained by French opposition to Mussolini's Ethiopian conquest. This crisis, moreover, raised the possibility of an Anglo-Italian as well as a Franco-Italian naval conflict. Not only was this true while Britain was leading the attempt to check Italian aggression against Ethiopia, through League sanctions, but Italy's expansion in the Mediterranean constituted a permanent threat to British communications along the "life line" of Empire.

Nor was the situation more propitious as regards Japan. The Japanese Empire's march into Manchuria and invasion of China six years later to establish Japa-

¹ Article 16, Part III of the London Naval Treaty, which was not signed by France or Italy, contains the so-called "Escalator Clause":

"If, during the term of the present treaty, the requirements of the national security of any High Contracting Party in respect of vessels of war limited by Part III of the present Treaty are in the opinion of that Party materially affected by new construction of any Power other than those who have joined in Part III of this Treaty, that High Contracting Party will notify the other Parties to Part III as to the increase required to be made in its own tonnages within one or more of the categories of such vessels of war, specifying particularly the proposed increases and the reasons therefor, and shall be entitled to make such increase. Thereupon the other Parties to Part III of this Treaty shall be entitled to make a proportionate increase in the category or categories specified; and the said other Parties shall promptly advise with each other through diplomatic channels as to the situation thus presented."

nese hegemony in the Far East had come into conflict with both American and British interests. Faced with the opposition of these two powers, Japan felt it imperative to strengthen her fleet in order to forestall any possibility of combined British and American intervention. Consequently in December, 1934, she denounced the Washington Treaty, making it void two years later.

Other disturbing factors had also entered the situation. Russia and Germany, safely ignored in previous conferences because of their negligible fleets, were now undergoing a renaissance of naval strength. In particular the ambitious construction program of the Third Reich was an immediate threat to British security. But when in 1935 the two governments sought to avoid a naval rivalry, which had aroused so much mutual suspicion in the prewar years, by signing a bilateral limitation agreement,¹ which insured Great Britain against a German challenge to its naval supremacy by limiting the Reich's tonnage to 35 per cent that of the British, the French were thrown into consternation. Nor did they later consent to the British proposal of German participation in the general conference of 1935, on the grounds that it would involve recognition of illegal armament by the Hitler government and thereby set the seal of approval upon a breach of the Versailles Treaty.

Meeting in these circumstances, the conference of 1935 seemed foredoomed to failure. The early withdrawal of Japan, following the rejection of her demands

¹ The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, concluded June 18, 1935, provides that total German naval tonnage shall not exceed 35 per cent of that of the British Commonwealth. This ratio is also to be observed for the various individual categories of warships, except that Germany shall be permitted to have 45 per cent of the British submarine tonnage and "in the event of a situation arising which in their opinion makes it necessary," the German Government may maintain a submarine tonnage equal to that of the British.

for parity with the United States and Britain, and the later defection of Italy due to her resentment of the imposition of economic sanctions on her by the League, made its fate certain. Thereafter, realizing that the only hope of a significant agreement lay in the future accession thereto of the absent powers, the conference did not even attempt a treaty embodying quantitative limitation, but finally drafted a pact restricting only the size and armament of various types of individual vessels. Moreover, as long as the agreement remained unsigned by three of the important naval powers it was rendered largely nugatory.

The result of the first three naval conferences at Washington, Geneva, and London was, therefore, agreement upon temporary and conditional limitation on the three larger naval powers at maximum figures. At the second London Conference in 1935, even these modest achievements were abandoned and a return was made to conditions of unlimited competition. And this was the signal for a general armaments race on a scale far in excess of that which preceded the World War.

Fifteen years after the Washington Conference it was plain that only two concrete results had flowed from that meeting for which so much was claimed at the moment. During this period the question of relative British and American naval strength had been settled on the basis of the principle of parity. In return for abandoning the alliance with Great Britain and accepting the ratio of Washington, Japan had achieved naval mastery in the waters which interest her. Moreover, when she departed from the agreement of 1932 in 1936 it was further to insure the Far Eastern supremacy she had thereby secured. Having already repudiated the

engagements of the Nine-Power Treaty, shattered the territorial integrity of China, and proclaimed a Monroe Doctrine in the Far East, which in American eyes seemed a clear challenge to the "Open Door," she was now prepared to meet any British or American challenge to Japanese imperial expansion in Eastern Asia.

In effect, as a result of the Washington and London Conferences, the three larger naval powers, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, divided control of the seas among themselves. They asserted and made good claims which insured that they would each possess absolute superiority in the regions of primary interest to them, the British in Europe and Southeastern Asia, the United States in the Americas,¹ and Japan in the Far East. Each thus demanded and obtained more security for itself and at the same time abolished all possibility of interference with its national policy.

Between the United States and Great Britain there was no clash of policy, and therefore agreement on parity had no political consequences. When, however, the British and Americans protested against Japanese invasion of China, both were confronted by the fact that they lacked the means to make such protest effective, because at Washington they had not only surrendered the right to maintain adequate naval bases near Japan but had also consented to a Japanese ratio rendering intervention impossible. Ironically enough, therefore, the Washington Conference, called in the name of disarmament and celebrated as a contribution to peace, proved only a preface to aggression.

Thus, so far as anything practical was achieved in the matter of the limitation of naval armaments during the

¹ Map, pages 470-471.

period 1920-37, it was achieved by the British and Americans. Nor did agreement between these two peoples go beyond the elimination of a competition in construction between themselves, at once costly and futile. This modest attainment, too, was possible largely because there was now no serious clash in national policy between these two nations which had maintained a record of unbroken peace with each other extending over more than a century.

If American policy envisaged the annexation of Canada or of the corridor separating Alaska from the United States, or if British policy contemplated the seizure of Alaska to anticipate such annexation, no Anglo-American agreement in the matter of naval strength would have been possible. For parity would have conferred such decisive superiority upon the United States in American waters that Canada would be completely cut off from British aid, while the superiority Great Britain would demand for the defense of Canada would constitute a threat to the security of the United States.

It is because France and Italy are rivals in the Mediterranean and Italian policy envisages the acquisition of French territories in North Africa that no agreement has been achieved between them as to naval strength. If France should surrender her present superiority while Italy declined to modify her purpose to acquire Tunisia, parity would serve Italian interests at the expense of French, as British and American abandonment of the right to fortify Corregidor and Hong Kong served Japanese interests. Since France intends to maintain her territorial situation in North Africa, and Italy to challenge it, only naval superiority can insure French security.

Adjustment between the United States and Great Britain in the matter of fleets having been predicated upon prior agreement in questions of territory, disarmament in national policy has already taken place in so far as the British and American peoples are concerned. In their relations with each other, therefore, armaments are not an instrument of national policy, because national policies already have been adjusted amicably and the adjustment accepted voluntarily. Between the two nations, therefore, the question of fleets is academic. It was this consideration that led the United States to accept a prospective large increase of the British fleet, announced in 1937, as constituting no conceivable threat to American security.

Likewise, in the case of Anglo-French relations no basic reason for rivalry exists. For years the British have suffered the French to maintain air forces vastly superior to their own because they were satisfied that French policy constituted no threat to British security. On the other hand, at the first sign of German expansion in air and naval forces the British took alarm because they saw in German purposes a threat to their security.

In setting out to promote disarmament in Europe while political issues remain unadjusted, American administrations have put the cart before the horse, and as a result have invariably met only with disappointment. They have also uniformly encountered demands that the United States give its guarantees to replace the armaments it would eliminate, and that has, in turn, aroused American resentment.

Such resentment, however, has no justification. Nations that feel themselves threatened by the policies of their neighbors will not reduce their armaments save as they see these neighbors abandon their menacing poli-

cies or can persuade other countries to underwrite their security. And although the United States could arrive at an agreement with Great Britain over naval armaments, it has never been able to persuade the British to abandon the two-power standard in Europe, 'because, while American equality had no menace for Great Britain, only decisive superiority in Europe seemed consonant with British security.

It is apparent, therefore, that agreement in the matter of armaments is possible only when the policies of states do not clash. If their policies are in collision, no progress can be made in the adjustment of armaments without a previous accommodation in the matter of policy.¹ With political agreement once achieved, moreover, the question of arms loses most of its importance, because dangers of conflict have already been largely removed.

Final proof of this is disclosed by a comparison of the Washington Conference of 1922 with the London Conference fourteen years later. At the former meeting the absence of any important conflicts of national policy among the leading naval powers made some measure of armament limitation possible. At London in 1936, however, no significant agreement could be achieved in view of the distinct clashes of national interests that were in prospect in the Pacific, in the Mediterranean, and in the waters of Northern Europe. Three Great Powers, Germany, Japan, and Italy, had challenged the status quo and significantly, of these, the first did not participate, the second withdrew, and the last refused to accede to the resulting agreement.

¹ Bywater, H. C., *Navies and Nations*, 1927; Engely, Giovanni, *The Politics of Naval Disarmament*, 1932; Madariaga, Salvador de, *Disarmament*, 1929; Richmond, Admiral Sir H. W., *Economy and Naval Security*, 1931; Williams, B. H., *The United States and Disarmament*, 1931.

Chapter XXIX

LAND DISARMAMENT¹

INTO the Treaty of Versailles the victors wrote their double assurance that the disarmament of Germany was "to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations" and also that the members of the League of Nations must subscribe to the principle "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

Even more specific was the language of Clemenceau in his letter to Brockdorff-Rantzau. On June 16, 1919, the French Premier wrote to the head of the German delegation at Versailles: "The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps toward that general reduction and limitation of

¹ For general bibliography on Disarmament, see Chapter XXVIII, "Naval Disarmament."

armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote."

Vague as is the language alike of the Treaty, the Covenant, and the Clemenceau letter, in the matter of time and detail, it is clear that at Paris the victors gave a solemn engagement, not alone to the Germans but to the world as well, that disarmament was to be a major objective of the League and that the disparity between their armed forces and those of the recent enemy was to be eliminated by reduction to the German level.

A decade and a half after these commitments were made, it remained still unmistakable that practically nothing had been done in the field of land armaments to fulfill the pledges of 1919, and also that the prospects of disarmament were less hopeful than at any moment since the completion of the labors of the Paris Conference. In fact, as the year 1933 saw upwards of \$4,000,000,000 expended for armaments, 1934 witnessed a further intensification of competition on the part of nations great and small, alike in Europe, Asia, and America. And the signal for this new race was given by the evident collapse of the Disarmament Conference, which had undertaken to put into effect the promises of Paris.¹

When one undertakes to grasp the reasons for the total failure of all attempts to bring about reduction or even limitation of land armaments, it is necessary first of all to state the problem.² In giving their assurances

¹ Foreign Policy Association, "The World Disarmament Conference: First Stage," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VIII, No. 5, 1932; also "The World Disarmament Conference: Second Stage, May 17, 1932-January, 1933," Vol. VIII, No. 23, 1933.

² Foreign Policy Association, "Limitation of Land Armaments," *Information Service*, Vol. VI, No. 2, 1930; also "Limitation of Air Armaments," Vol. VI, No. 17, 1930; Lefebure, V., *Scientific Disarmament*, 1931.

at Paris, the statesmen of the Allied and Associated Powers saw that problem in different lights. For Wilson, the assumption was that the League would presently constitute an effective guarantee for the security of all the member nations. For Clemenceau, the calculation was that the Treaty of Guarantee, bestowed upon France by Great Britain and the United States, would insure French security against later aggression. For Lloyd George, the goal was British return to the traditional policy of the balance of power.

When, however, the United States Senate repudiated the Treaty of Guarantee and refused to permit American membership in the League, the calculations of all three statesmen were brought to nothing. The nascent League was, as yet, patently incapable of guaranteeing the security of any member. Anglo-American guarantee of the security of France was destroyed. The policy of the balance of power had become inapplicable because France demanded assurances of her own security in advance of permitting the recovery of Germany to the point where the Reich could serve Great Britain as a counterweight to France.

The withdrawal of the United States had thus, on the one hand, destroyed French calculations for security and, on the other, left France, by reason of her military strength, supreme upon the Continent. Henceforth, in the very nature of things, the French were certain to cling to their existing military supremacy until they were able to establish other guarantees of their safety, either through alliance with Britain and the United States or through organization of the League into an international body clothed with the authority and provided with the force to restrain aggression. Thus under

all circumstances the French consistently maintained the thesis that security came before disarmament.

The British and the Americans, by contrast, being secure themselves by reason of their navies, and therefore content with small land forces, steadily pressed the thesis that military armaments themselves were a cause of insecurity and that the way to peace was through the reduction of armies. Always, however, their attention was concentrated upon land armaments. For themselves both nations demanded a superiority in naval strength, in the regions vital to them, far in excess of the advantage possessed by France on land. Actually, they strove to bring about the reduction of the land armaments of the European Continent because they were fearful of becoming involved in another European struggle, as they had been in the World War, and calculated that a disarmed Continent could not fight.

Between the French- and the English-speaking nations, there was no question of possible conflict. The French were not fearful lest British or American fleets should attack them. The English-speaking peoples were equally undisturbed as to the possibility of direct aggression by the French army. But the French demanded Anglo-American guarantees of French security in advance of reducing their military forces, while the British and the Americans sought to persuade the French to consent to reduction without guarantees.

On this point the French were from first to last immovable, because for them there existed a danger absent in the case of both the British and the Americans. Four times within a century, Prussian or German armies had approached Paris and on three of these occasions had entered it victoriously. The second Treaty of Paris had

in 1815 deprived France of the Saar, and the Treaty of Frankfort had cost her Alsace-Lorraine. In the phase of the World War when the Central Powers were confident of victory, the German press and public had proposed new mutilations and demanded new cessions.

In the World War, France had escaped the partitions of the Franco-Prussian conflict solely because she had been supported first by the British and then also by the American armies and fleets. Alone, she would have been overwhelmed in 1914; and in any future war, if she were isolated, the superiority of German numbers and industrial organization would insure defeat. Thus the supreme objective of France in the World War had been security, and the dominating purpose of Clemenceau at the Paris Conference had been the same. No security for France could, however, be absolute, could in fact approximate the safety bestowed upon both the English-speaking nations by sea barriers, save that provided either by military alliance or by collective insurance obtained through an effective League.

The German thesis, in turn, differed both from the British and from the French. The Treaty of Versailles had reduced German military resources to the level of those of Belgium and prohibited any future rearmament. But in the Treaty there had been the clear declaration of purpose on the part of the victors to make German disarmament the first step in a general process. That was a contract, and the fulfillment of this contract the Germans demanded unconditionally.¹

In addition, apart from all questions of treaty promises, it was in itself contrary alike to right and reason

¹ Rohde, Hans, *Franco-German Factors of Power*, 1932; Schmidt, Richard, and Grabowsky, Adolf, *The Problem of Disarmament*, 1933; same authors, *Disarmament and Equal Rights*, 1934.

to attempt to keep a nation of sixty-odd millions of inhabitants effectively disarmed in a Europe where other Great Powers were armed, and where Germany was surrounded by a circle of a million French, Polish, and Czech bayonets to which she could oppose but the hundred thousand allowed her by the Treaty of Versailles. In addition, her frontiers were demilitarized and her ancient fortresses either lost or demolished by the terms of the same treaty.

Three years after Waterloo, the armies of occupation of the victors had left French soil and automatically France had recovered her freedom of action in the matter of armaments. Within an equal time after Sedan, evacuation on the same terms had taken place, and but a few years later the rapidity and extent of French rearmament had gravely alarmed German military leaders. But when in 1932 the League Disarmament Conference actually assembled, German helplessness had already endured for a dozen years after the Armistice.

France asked security, Great Britain and the United States urged military disarmament, but the Germans demanded parity with France either through the reduction of French forces to the German level or through the expansion of the German forces to the proportions of those of her neighbor beyond the Rhine. Unless, however, the British and Americans, either by direct contract or through the medium of the League, guaranteed France against any evil consequences from the recognition of the German right to parity, it lay within the power of France, by invoking the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, to prohibit German rearmament legally, as it also did to prevent it physically.

When Great Britain, the United States, and Japan at

Washington and at London agreed to adjust their naval forces in accordance with the ratio of 5-5-3, each had, in effect, surrendered the power to molest either of the other two states in their domestic waters. Parity between Great Britain and the United States thus automatically insured the security of both. Parity in military forces between Germany and France, by contrast, would fatally compromise French security, because it would bestow upon Germany the power, once equality was attained, to proceed with complete immunity from danger to organize its superior numbers and resources for a new war of aggression.

Possession of naval parity by the United States, while in theory permitting a similar performance, in practice had no such implications, because there was no clash of policy between Great Britain and the United States. Fleets, like armies, are instruments of policy, but as no conflict of policy between Great Britain and the United States existed, parity in instruments was without significance. By contrast, French and German policies were in shock because French purpose envisaged the preservation and German purpose the revision of the status quo of the Paris Settlement. While the ratio between French and German military power was 3-1 or 4-1, as the Treaty of Versailles permitted, the disparity in the instruments of policy between the two countries precluded any challenge of the status quo by the Germans. As that disparity was reduced, however, the chances of successful challenge mounted *pari passu*.

All the problem of disarmament in the postwar years centers in this question of Policy. For France, German policy constituted a direct and deadly threat, but for the British and the Americans it had, up to the rise of

Hitler, no immediate menace. For Germany, French resolution to preserve the status quo was a barrier to future greatness, and French military supremacy was a direct threat to national safety. To the British and the Americans, an armed and quarreling Continent seemed the promise of a new war and a fresh danger of involvement, and therefore reduction of French armaments to German levels appeared a program of peace.

In this situation, the British and American powers concentrated their efforts upon persuading the French to consent to reduce their military forces. They did not concomitantly endeavor to bring the Germans to renounce their policy of territorial revision, because that was out of the question. But since it was German policy which explained French insistence upon military superiority, neither the British nor the Americans, acting now together and now separately, were able to accomplish anything of importance. Inevitably a deadlock in the matter of policy insured a deadlock in the discussion of the instruments of policy.

By contrast, in the field of naval armaments, agreement in policy between the British, American, and Japanese governments, an agreement set forth in the Nine-Power Treaty and in the Anglo-American renunciation of the right to fortify various naval bases, had originally made possible an adjustment of naval forces. When, however, the Japanese by their Manchurian operation precipitated a clash of policies, then the prospects of agreement upon naval armaments in the conference of 1935 became slight. For, having at last openly adopted a policy which conflicted alike with British and with American interests, the Japanese naturally sought to acquire a larger measure of naval strength than

that which they had accepted either at Washington or at London. But in the light of the newly revealed policy of Japan, the British and American governments disclosed a common resolution not to suffer disproportionate increase in the instruments by which Japan could pursue her policy.

Turning now to the details of the discussions of disarmament in the postwar period, these present three phases. From 1920, when the League was actually launched, until 1925, when the Pacts of Locarno were made and German entrance into the League assured, all discussion at Geneva was concentrated not upon disarmament but upon security. In that time there were formulated both the Cecil Agreement of Mutual Assistance and the far more important Protocol of Geneva. Both of these projects were directed at investing Geneva with the authority and means of preventing aggression and therefore of preserving peace by binding the member nations to use their collective forces, both military and naval, to protect a member nation wantonly assailed.

Both of these programs, although the former bore the name of a British representative at Geneva, were rejected by the British parliament because they committed Great Britain to specific duties on the call of Geneva. The same considerations which led the United States Senate to reject the League because of the implications of Articles X and XVI of the Covenant, inspired British action in respect of the later engagements. Only when a crisis arrived, and even then solely on the basis of their own material interests, were the British prepared to share in any collective system to maintain order and prevent war.

In this first phase, from 1920 to 1925, the discussions

at Geneva did not lead to any solution of the problem of security. Nevertheless, with the coming of the Germans to Geneva, further delay in facing the question of disarmament became impossible. The years from 1925 to 1932, therefore, constitute a second phase, during which in a Preparatory Commission, acting in the name of the League, the attempt was made to deal directly with the issue of armaments and to discover some way of combining the French insistence on security with the German demand for parity.

All the various attempts failed, however. While an elaborate Draft Convention was eventually framed, in it those columns which were designed to be filled with the figures of the military forces of future armies were left significantly blank. On minor points there was agreement but in every case where differences among the French, Germans, and British over basic issues had developed, no viable compromise had been possible. During six years these discussions dragged on interminably and fruitlessly while German impatience mounted steadily, until at last the dangerous expedient was employed of transferring the still unsettled problem from the Preparatory Commission to a full-fledged Disarmament Conference with all the League powers, and the United States as well, represented therein.

Even before this Conference assembled in February, 1932, events in Europe and in Asia had foredoomed it to failure. In Europe the Truce of Locarno had expired, and Stresemann's successors, impelled by the growing menace of National Socialism, had embarked upon two catastrophic ventures. Thus before the Reichstag election of September, 1930, one member of the Brüning Cabinet had publicly reopened the question of the Polish

Corridor, and after it, in March, 1931, another had renewed the dispute over the *Anschluss* by proposing the Austro-German tariff union.

The result had been a new shock between French and German policies, a fresh period of turmoil, and ultimately still another German defeat in the Austrian affair produced by French financial coercion exerted both in Vienna and Berlin. As a consequence of this conflict, Franco-German relations had reverted to the pre-Locarno condition, and alarm as to German purpose was acute alike in Paris, in Warsaw, and in Prague. Thus on the eve of the convening of the Disarmament Conference the question of security had acquired new importance in the eyes of France and of her allies. On the other hand, defeat in the Austrian affair, the onset of the Great Depression, and the ever-rising tide of Hitlerism supplied new force to the demand of the Brüning Government for parity.

Even less propitious were Asiatic events, for the Disarmament Conference actually assembled to the overture of Japanese artillery about Shanghai. And these Japanese guns, in fact, demolished the whole case which the British and the Americans had brought to Geneva. Both came to urge reduction of armaments and each was similarly prepared to plead with France and her allies to meet German demands, although neither was ready to meet the French demand for security. But now, day by day, events in Asia, the military campaign which had opened with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in defiance of the ultimatum of the Council of the League, demonstrated with increasing clarity that there was no power in Geneva to restrain a nation bent on aggression, and no means to protect a state which was the innocent

victim of such assault. And that, after all, was the French case. That was what France had been saying through the mouths of Clemenceau, Poincaré, and Briand ever since the Armistice. That was what she now proceeded to say with fresh emphasis in the voice of Tardieu.

What Japan had done Germany obviously could do, once she had obtained military parity with France. That she was resolved to do it, the double offensive revealed by the speech of Treviranus about the Polish Corridor and by the agreement of Curtius about Austrian affairs, satisfied the French and their allies. Therefore even before the delegates met, Tardieu set forth in crystal-clear phrase the old familiar demand of France that security should precede disarmament and that the League must be furnished with a force, this time in the air, adequate to insure that no European state should presently be overtaken by the fate of China.

The Disarmament Conference which constituted the third phase of the discussions, therefore, inevitably ended like the second. Agreement, which could not be reached in the Preparatory Commission, was equally unattainable in a regular Conference. Although eventually the French under British and American pressure did accept in principle the right of Germany to parity, in practice they insisted upon such postponements in attainment as to make the concession appear derisory in German eyes.

Two American Presidents intervened sensationally but unsuccessfully. Mr. Hoover, lightly brushing aside the political issues, in the midsummer of 1932 called for a cut of one third alike in naval and military forces. But for once the British and French were able to agree and

both with polite finality dismissed the Hoover project. A year later, Roosevelt, with greater appreciation of the realities, proffered his pledge that if substantial disarmament took place he would refrain from pressing American neutral rights against powers engaged in the coercion of a state which had resorted to violence and, in American judgment, was guilty of aggression. But while this proposal awakened apprehension in the United States, it found little favor in France. The French, seeing that the promise was personal and recalling the episode of the Treaty of Guarantee which Wilson had bestowed and the Senate repudiated, rejected the Roosevelt proffer as they had dismissed the Hoover proposal. If it was a matter of concern to the United States to procure the reduction of French military forces, then it was for the American government to pay the price, which was—and always had been—the guarantee of French security. That was the view of Paris.

Last of all, Ramsay MacDonald made an eleventh-hour effort to save the Conference. His program envisaged a standard army of 200,000 for each of the Great Powers, and for Poland as well, intricate regulations of so-called defensive and offensive armaments, and progressive approach to parity by Germany. But although the British proposal found favor in American eyes, it failed to satisfy a Germany now wholly in the hands of Hitler, and in October, 1933, the dictator impatiently swept his country out of Conference and League alike and proclaimed the purpose to rearm without regard for the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles.

For the larger part of a year after the German withdrawal the Conference staggered toward inevitable collapse. Without Germany, further discussion had become

futile and even foolish. But it was not until midsummer, 1934, that the British Government faced the fact squarely and in the House of Commons simultaneously proclaimed its conviction that the failure of the Disarmament Conference was definitive and that its purpose to expand its own armaments, particularly in the air, could no longer be postponed.¹ Thus, like the Economic Conference of 1933, the Disarmament Conference, while technically surviving, practically came to an end. It could be reconvened, but to reassemble it had now become fruitless so long as the causes of its failure continued unmodified.

Like the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Conference of 1932-1934 came to grief because nations whose policies were irreconcilable were unwilling to consent to any curtailment of the means by which they had to pursue these policies. And, like the earlier failures, the later collapse proved the preface to new competitions in armaments because it was followed by fresh collisions of policy.² Nor was there the smallest basis for hoping, after the failures of the three conferences of the past, that there could be success in any new international gathering save as such an assembly was preceded by a compromise in policy between the Great Powers at odds.

¹ For total war expenditures on armament since 1932, see footnote 1 on page 634.

² Einzig, Paul, *The Economics of Rearmament*, 1934; Foreign Policy Association, "Impending Naval Rivalries," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. X, No. 3, 1934; Foreign Policy Association, "Economic Consequences of Rearmament," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIV, No. 14, 1938; League of Nations, "Armaments Year Book," 1932-1940.

Chapter XXX

EIGHTEEN YEARS

LOOKING back over the eighteen years which separated Wilson from Hitler and the Paris Peace Conference from the Spanish Civil War, it is clear that the facts of 1937 bore little resemblance to the hopes of 1919. During this period, efforts without precedent have been made to establish world order by the substitution of a system of organized peace for the old chaos produced by the pursuit of individual and irreconcilable national policies by the several states.

To that end, the League of Nations was created in 1919, and besides the original Covenant there have since been made the Pact of Paris and many other agreements, all designed to bring about a condition of international order. For the same purpose, conferences have again and again been convened to reach international accord with respect to tariffs, currencies, and armaments. The post-war period has thus seen a multiplication of the means for the prevention of war which has no parallel in history.

Thanks to such untiring industry, the world found itself by 1931 far more richly endowed with resources to

prevent war and to promote international co-operation than ever before. The League of Nations was organized, the World Court established, the habit and technique of international conference acquired. By that time, too, Germany had actually joined the League and, although the United States and Soviet Russia still remained outside, long steps had been taken toward effective co-operation between Washington and Geneva, and Moscow was on the threshold of abandoning her policy of refusal to concert with the capitalist nations by becoming a member of the League.

Nevertheless in 1931, and in the immediately succeeding years, a series of events came to shatter the illusion of international association which had been created between 1925 and 1930, that is, during the period of the Truce of Locarno. The Manchurian affair in 1931, the fiasco of the London Economic Conference in 1933, the failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1933-34, and the *coup de grace* delivered by Mussolini and Hitler to the collective system, disclosed the fact that public opinion had not kept pace with the expansion of the machinery of peace, and that, as a consequence, peoples had remained nationalistic and their governments unable or unwilling to make effective use of the available instruments of international accord.

All the various assumptions upon which the League of Nations had originally been founded started from the primary calculation that as a consequence of the lessons of the World War, if not by reason of the instinctive will for peace and order of majorities, peoples were at last prepared to seek and to accept international accommodation of national policies where these conflicted. The League had therefore been created to do two things:

to prevent war growing out of an immediate conflict of interests of nations, and to remove those issues which were the historic causes of conflict.

Success or failure for the great experiment, however, always turned upon the willingness of the majorities in all countries, in moments of crisis, to agree to international determination of their disputes and, in times of calm, to consent to similar adjustment of issues which otherwise would one day precipitate crises. In a word, the fate of the League of Nations was at all times contingent upon the extent to which all peoples, but primarily those of the Great Powers, were prepared to subordinate their sovereignties and to engage their resources in collective action to organize and to maintain world peace.

It is perfectly clear that the sixty-odd nations of the globe could not at the same time retain for themselves every prerogative of sovereignty and also co-operate effectively in a League of Nations. They had either, in advance of all crises, to undertake to submit voluntarily to the decision reached by the League where their own interests were at stake, or else to invest this League with the power to impose its decisions by force when these were made. Both courses, however, involved a modification of sovereign rights, a delegation of power, a restriction of national policy.

In point of fact, no Great Power was prepared to sacrifice any portion of its sovereignty, and no great people was even aware of the impossibility of reconciling the mutually exclusive systems of the sovereign state and of the League of Nations. On the contrary, each people, satisfied that its own rights, policies, and possessions were established in justice and reason, conceived that in

an international parliament its cause must prevail. And none accepted the idea of going to Geneva as having any implication of the sacrifice of national interest. To every people, on the contrary, the League seemed an instrument for establishing the inherent justice of its cause without recourse to arms.

The champions of Geneva believed that because the majorities in most of the nations of the world had accepted the League, they had also accepted that idea of it which had existed in the mind of its founder, Woodrow Wilson. And, in the same fashion, the advocates of the Fourteen Points had been satisfied that when these had been accepted by both the Allies and the Central Powers, the character of the Paris Settlement had been determined in advance. But in reality each nation had interpreted Wilson's proposals in terms of its own interests, and when later the terms of the Peace Treaties did violence to the interests of any nation, it saw therein a breach of the contract of the Armistice.

Woodrow Wilson was able to persuade the statesmen of other nations to accept his Fourteen Points and to adopt his League of Nations. But in each case acceptance blinded him to the fact that peoples without exception saw the League not as a means for co-ordinating national policies at the sacrifice of national sovereignty but as an instrument to carry out those policies. Once the League was established, they looked to Geneva to provide the double blessing of peace and the protection and promotion of national interests.

The League was thus established upon a gigantic equivocation; but between 1920 and 1924 that equivocation was not disclosed, because all of the Great Powers ignored Geneva utterly and transacted their business

elsewhere. Nor was it exposed between 1925 and 1930, because, although Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy, operating under the terms of the Truce of Locarno, came to Geneva, they tacitly excluded from their discussions those vital and unsettled issues which, had they been raised, must have precipitated controversy and produced deadlock.

During the first ten years of its existence, therefore, the League was never called upon to deal with an immediate clash between Great Powers over a vital issue and thus to remove the continuing causes of conflict. It had viewed the Franco-German struggle over the Ruhr from the side lines. It had refrained from any attempt to find solution for such problems as the Polish Corridor, the *Anschluss*, or the chaos in China.

In 1931, however, the League was suddenly called upon to act in a crisis precipitated by an undisguised act of violence by one Great Power against a weaker nation—Japan against China in Manchuria. In 1933, it was asked to provide an accommodation between the conflicting tariff and currency policies of all nations. Between 1932 and 1934, it sought to bring about an adjustment in the armaments of nations. And finally, in 1935-37 the League sought to deal successively with the Italian challenge in Ethiopia and the far more serious international crisis produced by the Spanish Civil War. In each case, however, it failed. The Japanese continued to impose their will in Manchuria and North China. The Economic Conference in London collapsed in swift fiasco. The Disarmament Conference in Geneva suffered a lingering and tragic fate. And last of all, following the collapse of the collective system through the Italian challenge in Ethiopia, European diplomacy staggered

to maintain, outside the League, the last remaining props in the structure of peace dangerously threatened by the Spanish conflict.

Common to all these episodes was an identical resolution of each Great Power to serve its own national interests without regard for international consequences. Japan was resolved to have Manchuria, as was Italy to possess Ethiopia. The American administration was determined to proceed with its own program of domestic recovery regardless of its effect upon other national economies. France insisted upon security without regard to the German demand for parity, and Germany upon parity without concern for the French claim to security. And in every instance, although the action of the government of one state was fatal to the co-operation of the many, that government was supported by its own citizens unquestioningly.

The fact that must be evident to all objective minds is that in each of these episodes both the theory and the practice of the League of Nations were subjected to tests which were at once fair and final. To prevent aggression, promote economic co-operation, forestall a race in armaments, these were tasks properly and inevitably set for any international institution. To have failed as the League did in all three was to demonstrate one of two things, either that the machinery of Geneva was inadequate, or that the will of peoples to employ it was nonexistent.

But in every case the machinery functioned efficiently up to the point where it became necessary for member nations, on the one hand, to consent to sacrifice their interests or, on the other, to permit the employment of their forces. What was at fault was not the machinery

of the League but the assumption that peoples would subordinate in all cases national interests to international consideration.

The consequences of the failure of the League in Manchuria and in the London and Geneva Conferences were fully disclosed in the Austrian crisis of July, 1934. The murder of Dollfuss in Vienna produced a situation ominously reminiscent of that precipitated by the assassination of the Archduke in Serajevo just twenty years before. European peace was again in the balance. It was of the earlier situation, too, that Sir Edward Grey had written, after the war, that had the League machinery been available in 1914 he was satisfied that the catastrophe could have been averted.

But in 1934 the League did exist, its machinery was in order, everything was ready and waiting. Nevertheless, as Russia had mobilized in 1914 to protect Serbia, Italy mobilized two decades later to defend Austrian independence. It was not to Geneva but to London and Paris that Mussolini turned to seek and to obtain a mandate for his program of action. And in the presence of a force beyond German power to overcome, Hitler bowed to necessity and the "Nazi" campaign in Austria collapsed instantly and ingloriously.

In effect, moreover, the Austrian affair was quite as disastrous for the prestige of the League as the events in Manchuria. In the Manchurian case, the machinery of Geneva had been invoked unsuccessfully. In the Austrian affair, the futility of appeal to Geneva was assumed in advance, and Europe reverted to the old familiar technique of mobilization and the Concert. To have waited for Geneva would have insured the success of the *Putsch*,

as two years later it permitted the Italian conquest of Ethiopia.

Unmistakably, therefore, that world which the League of Nations was designed to serve does not yet exist. World public opinion whose instrument it was to become is as yet lacking. Those majorities within countries which were to drive their governments to enter and follow pathways of peace are still undiscoverable. On the contrary, the masses everywhere today support governments which build great navies, organize large armies, or construct huge air fleets. These masses are equally responsive to appeals based upon considerations of ethnic nationalism and those of economic nationalism. Wherever in any country the issue between nationalism and internationalism has been raised, it is the former which has prevailed.

The successive triumphs of Mussolini, Stalin, and Hitler, and half a score of other dictators, each in his own country the incarnation of nationalistic faith, were in themselves clear evidence of the direction the minds of the masses were taking. Between dictatorship, whether Fascist, National Socialist, or Communist, and Geneva there can be no basis of co-operation, because at bottom the League of Nations was designed to abolish precisely that spirit of which the dictator is invariably the symbol. In a world half democratic and half dictatorial, international co-operation is always out of the question.

In a word, the League of Nations was conceived as the lasting expression of the meaning of the World War. It was to be the instrument of a new world made wise by the mistakes of the old. It was to provide the machinery for creating collective order in the place of the

anarchy of the individualism of the past. But, like a sailing ship on the sea or a water-driven mill beside a river, the League depended upon something outside itself for motive power. And that something was the effective will of the majorities within countries to seek international peace and order by the only means possible, namely the subordination of national policy to international adjustment.

If the majorities within states supported statesmen and policies which were nationalistic, then precisely as long as that situation endured, the League of Nations was bound to be like a ship in a calm or a mill in a drought. And when, after 1930, the majorities in all countries turned definitely to nationalistic camps, the present plight of the League became inescapable. As early as 1920, Woodrow Wilson had described the presidential election of that year as a "solemn referendum." He had appealed to the American people over the heads of his opponents and on behalf of an international conception as contrasted with national conceptions. But he was beaten.

Elsewhere in the world similar struggles had the same ending. The Italian, British, Japanese, and German peoples each in turn followed the American example. The Manchurian and Ethiopian episodes were the epitome of the history of the pursuit of peace in the post-war years. What the Japanese and Italians wanted, they took. When the League protested, the challenging peoples turned a deaf ear to Geneva. When the League called upon the member nations to make good the principles of the Covenant and the Pact of Paris, by upholding the law which had been broken and by defending a victim of unprovoked aggression, these member nations

put a blind eye to the telescope, and thus ignored the signals flying from the Quai Wilson.

But if one nation would not obey the law voluntarily and the others would not enforce it, a League without moral authority to persuade or physical resource to coerce had become at best an ideal and at worst an illusion.

In only one outstanding instance since 1931 has the League functioned effectively. For the peace of Europe and for the prestige of Geneva as well, the plebiscite of January 13, 1935, which registered the will of the inhabitants of the Saar Region to return to Germany, was a significant gain. The dispatch of British and Italian troops to insure order during the election was, too, an example of international co-operation as rare as it was impressive.

Nevertheless, it is essential to note that both the election itself and the dispatch of international forces were predicated upon Franco-German accord. And it was the consent of both countries to have the issue decided by an election supervised by the League, and to abide by the result, which actually exorcised the perils inherent in the situation.

If, by contrast, either France or Germany had adopted in the Saar the policy Japan followed in Manchuria or Italy in Ethiopia, the machinery of Geneva would have been again ineffective. But France preferred peace with Germany to precarious possession of the Saar, and Germany was satisfied that—as the event proved—a fair election would insure her triumph.

In fact, then, the Saar Plebiscite demonstrated anew the basic truth that the creation of the League had constituted not a solution but a revision of the problem of

peace. Thenceforth there existed a machine capable of producing peaceful adjustment of international disputes, but the problem of persuading peoples to employ that machine when their vital interests are in question still remained.

The most striking, ominous result of the universal disillusionment in regard to the League of Nations and the collective system has been the astounding and unprecedented increase in armaments. As it became clear that the protection of national interests and the removal of injustices could not be achieved through the Geneva institution, it became equally clear that the only alternative was reliance upon national resources. To the dissatisfied states it had been demonstrated that if they were to fulfill their national aspirations they must do so by the use or threat of force; while to the satisfied states it was equally apparent that to check the aggressive designs of their neighbors the opposition of even greater force was the only surely reliable means.

The result of this disastrous revival of purely nationalist conceptions has been a race in competitive armaments unparalleled in history. Even in 1932, before the final collapse of the collective system, the nations of the world expended a total of \$3,780,000,000 on their military and naval establishments. During 1936, moreover, when Geneva had become little more than a tragic and half-forgotten reminder of the world's efforts toward international peace, this annual outpouring of wealth had reached the sum of \$13,000,000,000. The staggering significance of this amount, moreover, which comprised about 13 per cent of the world's net industrial production for that year, could be appreciated only when compared with the \$2,380,000,000 spent upon

arms in 1913, when the nations were at the height of their preparations for the World War. Nor had this crushing burden upon the world's productive resources and the standard of living of its peoples reached the maximum. For during the next three years world expenditure on armaments alone came to the astronomical figure of about \$55,000,000,000, bringing the total cost of the race in arms from 1932 to 1939 inclusive, which was carried on in the name of the security of nations, to approximately \$90,000,000,000.¹

The fact that the peoples of the earth are willing to shoulder these crushing financial burdens gives clear proof of their determination to carry out their national policies and to protect their national interests, whatever the costs may be and however they may conflict with the policies of their equally determined neighbors. These irreconcilable clashes of national interests upon which the League foundered, therefore still remain, and the nations of the world continue in the preparation for resolving their conflicts by the traditional ultimate means of diplomacy, the threat or use of armed force.

¹ The following are the estimated total world expenditures on armaments during the eight-year period, 1932-1939: 1932, \$3,780,000,000; 1933, \$3,960,000,000; 1934, \$5,000,000,000; 1935, \$8,800,000,000; 1936, \$13,000,000,000; 1937, \$15,400,000,000; 1938, \$17,600,000,000; 1939, \$22,000,000,000; total \$89,540,000,000. (See Foreign Policy Association, "Economic Consequences of Rearmament," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIV, No. 14, 1938.)

CONCLUSION

No student of contemporary history can fail to note the obvious parallel between the decade and a half following the Congress of Vienna and the eighteen years which came after the Conference of Paris. Politically, both were eras of reaction provoked by earlier convulsions: the first by the French Revolution, and the second by the Russian.

Between 1815 and 1830 what existed was clearly a truce of exhaustion. After a quarter of a century of almost continuous conflict, France was in no condition to challenge the territorial decisions of the two Treaties of Paris which had reduced her to the limits of 1789. By contrast, the later pause which lasted from the July Revolution in 1830 to the Crimean War a quarter of a century later was, primarily, a peace of calculation. War was then no longer beyond the resources of France but it was unattractive to those who directed French policy.

Precisely in the same fashion, the years from 1920 to 1937 constituted another truce of exhaustion dictated by the conditions in which Germany found herself following the World War. When, too, Adolf Hitler, like Louis Philippe, came to power as a result of a domestic upheaval, he found himself face to face with a political problem strangely reminiscent of 1830; for, as the pos-

sibility of recovering Belgium confronted the Citizen King, so the Reichsfuehrer was faced by the chance to join his native Austria to the Reich.

In both cases, however, the pathway of ambition was blocked by the combined strength of the other 'Great Powers of Europe. As Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia had closed the pathway of France down the Scheldt to Antwerp, so France, Italy, and the Little Entente now barred the road of Germany southward along the Danube to Vienna. Like Louis Philippe, therefore, Adolf Hitler in his turn was forced, temporarily, to renounce a program of national expansion.

So far, then, the resemblances between the two post-war periods were at once striking and, for those who lived in the later time, not without a measure of reassurance, since, despite contemporary fears, the July Revolution had proved a preface not to a new convulsion but to two decades of further peace among the Great Powers. Nevertheless there was in 1937 one circumstance which was without parallel in 1830 and went far toward dissipating the optimism inspired by precedent. Whereas after the arrival of Louis Philippe in 1830 the government and people of France had found peace, if not distinguished, at least tolerable and even profitable, neither the German dictator nor the German people could discover promise of a similar situation under the Nazi regime.

In 1830 the French bourgeoisie had aided and abetted the July Revolution because they saw in the stupid and oppressive policies of the restored Bourbons the seeds of a new upheaval like that of the Great Revolution. To prevent such a catastrophe, they successfully intervened, so that Charles X made way for Louis Philippe. When

that change had been accomplished, however, French Business and Finance were under no temptation to permit domestic upheaval to be followed by foreign war, because in that direction lay the danger of a new Napoleon. Peace was then their chief concern, and for two decades the French people found that peace tolerable because it was increasingly prosperous.

Much the same circumstances at first attended the Fascist upheaval in Italy in 1922. High Finance and Big Business in Italy saw in the continuing weakness of parliamentary democracy there the growing menace of a Communist triumph. To protect property from the dangers this Red threat held for it, Italian Capitalism followed the example of the French bourgeoisie and gave their decisive aid to a change in regime. Thus in Italy Mussolini served the purposes of Louis Philippe in France a century earlier.

Once Fascism had triumphed, however, Italian Capitalism could have no interest in seeing the program of foreign aggression, which Mussolini had preached, translated into fact. For when the new regime had consolidated its position, the Red Peril was definitely exorcised. Thereafter, no further danger of Communism in Italy could exist unless the strain and disillusionment of still another war should restore the conditions out of which the crisis of 1922 had emerged.

Mussolini, therefore, despite his warlike utterances, was as little able—and perhaps as little anxious—to undertake the seizure of Dalmatia as Louis Philippe had been ready for the annexation of Belgium. To gratify Italian pride without risking foreign war became the aim of policy, and as a consequence the Duce was as cautious in action as he was reckless in phrase. Like

Louis Philippe, however, he was able in the opening years of his rule to provide Capitalism with profits and Labor with employment, since these years were a time of relative prosperity and considerable recovery.

When in 1933 Hitler, in his turn, mounted to absolute control in the Reich, he was faced by an economic problem without parallel in the experience of Louis Philippe or Mussolini. To his rise to power the same forces had contributed as had supported the Citizen King and the Duce. Heavy Industry and High Finance in Germany had, in the domestic consequences of the Great Depression, seen a threatening prospect of disruptive upheaval. To arrest the visible growth of Communism, they had exploited Hitler and his National Socialist movement to overthrow the Republic.

The major purpose of Capitalism in Germany, as in Italy, however, had been not to clear the way for foreign war, but to insure domestic order. Having put absolute power in the hands of their selected agent, those who had favored and financed Hitler would normally have viewed war in the same light as did those who had similarly supported Mussolini. For, in the existing circumstances of Germany, the odds against her victory were very great, while the domestic consequences of another military defeat would be disastrous. And since National Socialism had been far less successful than Fascism in crushing opposition on the home front, its hold upon power was correspondingly more precarious.

Unhappily for Hitler and for German Capitalism which had backed him, however, there was in Germany a problem of domestic prosperity that was lacking in the earlier days of the Fascist experience in Italy. At the moment the Reichsfuehrer's control became abso-

lute, Germany was confronted by the devastating consequences of the economic nationalism of the rest of the world. Under the stress of the Great Depression all countries, large and small, had committed themselves to the passionate pursuit of autarky, trying to gain the highest possible degree of self-sufficiency.

Since Germany was completely dependent upon the outside world for many of the essential raw materials of industry and could obtain these only as she could give her manufactures in exchange, her situation was bound to become increasingly desperate as the world refused her goods. Deprived of foreign raw materials, some of her factories would shut down, her industry would halt, and as unemployment mounted, the Red menace was certain to revive. Raised to power under a pledge to abolish all danger of Communism, Hitler thus found himself faced by a situation in which the economic nationalism of other nations inevitably fostered Communism within the Reich.

It was, moreover, self-evident that whatever regime ruled in the Reich, whether imperial, republican, or dictatorial, it could not hope to survive permanently unless it was able to provide the working masses with food and employment, and the capitalistic classes with order and prosperity. It was inability to perform this primary function of government that had, in the end, sealed the fate of the Weimar Republic. As long as that regime had been able to provide domestic prosperity, it had also been able to repulse Communism and National Socialism.

On the prospectus of material well-being supplied by the Dawes Plan, Stresemann had been able to take his fellow countrymen both to Locarno and to the League.

Recovery at home had permitted him to pursue policies of peace abroad. It was only when, after the death of Stresemann, Brüning was forced to multiply the taxes of the rich and to increase the privations of the poor in order to counteract the effects of the Great Depression, that Labor had turned to the example of Moscow, and Capital to that of Rome.

Thereupon Hitler had marched to power to the accompaniment of music which was martial, but the forces which were operating to insure his triumph were economic. To satisfy the needs of Capitalism which had supported him, he had now to provide Labor with employment, and thus with food; for masses long deprived of food and employment must in the end constitute the stuff of which revolutions are made, and while people can exist without glory, they will not long endure a shortage of bread.

In the same fashion, while Capital will instinctively reject the hazards of foreign war as long as it is assured of domestic order, it will accept the risks of such war if these constitute the sole alternative to revolution at home. And as early as 1934 a hundred voices charged publicly that German Heavy Industry and High Finance already accepted war as the only alternative to revolution otherwise inescapable by reason of the economic policies of other nations, and that as a consequence the peace which persisted was only a peace of preparation for war.

What was true of the economic circumstances of Germany was becoming true also of those of Italy. Like Germany, Italy was dependent upon the outside world for most of the raw materials essential to its industry. To exchange for these, Italy possessed little but labor.

When the world closed its doors to her laborers the consequences to the domestic economy of Italy were therefore disastrous. And upon the Fascist regime was placed the responsibility for domestic conditions which were beyond its power to remedy and made necessary the diversion of discontents at home through hazardous adventure abroad. Far away in Asia, too, Japan as early as 1931 had undertaken to solve the same problem by foreign aggression, deliberately exploiting national patriotism to provide the means of national existence.

Thus in 1937 it was becoming clear that a new note had crept into international relations. A generation after the Armistice the old familiar issues dividing peoples still seemed on the surface to retain their traditional vitality. Lost provinces, defenseless frontiers, suffering minorities, these continued to supply the material out of which nationalistic campaigns were manufactured. Even those peoples whose material circumstances were becoming intolerable still thought of their wrongs in terms of the old ideology. The Treaty of Versailles and not the tariffs of other nations seemed to the Germans the major cause of their contemporary sufferings. But what peoples perceived only dimly, dictators were already seeing plainly, namely that it was the economic and not the political status quo which had become intolerable. And the consequences of this economic status quo could not be abolished by any revision of the territorial decisions of the Paris Peace Conference.

Thus while it was possible after 1936, as after 1830, that the caution of dictators, the concern of capitalists, the exhaustion of countries might in Europe postpone a conflict which in recent years had come to seem not only inevitable but also imminent, it was no longer possible

to believe that enduring peace could be founded upon the existing circumstances. And that, after all, constituted the final lesson of the experience of the previous century. The system created by the Congress of Vienna had survived for four decades, but it had eventually gone down in ruin following a long series of wars, because it had totally disregarded that spirit of political nationalism which was born of the French Revolution.

In the end the subject and divided nationalities of the Continent had set liberty above peace, and, since national unity was to be had only by force, had unhesitatingly accepted the hazards and hardships of war. By the close of the World War, however, this principle of nationality was everywhere triumphant. All the peoples of the Old World had acquired liberty, and also substantial unity, with the one important exception of Germany, which gained it by forcibly annexing Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938. At most what remained were boundary disputes. The right of every nationality to freedom had been established; only the details of adjustment of rival interests remained to be regulated.

But in the place of the old problem of political nationalism a new issue of economic nationalism was coming to the fore; for the ability of free and united peoples to exist decently and prosperously was not yet established. What the implications of this new issue were, the Great Depression plainly disclosed alike in Germany, in Italy, and in Japan. What the consequences of failure to solve the new problem peacefully would be, the examples of China, Ethiopia, Spain, and Czechoslovakia also clearly indicated.

In a word, it was becoming more and more unmistakable that the world's real problem at the time of the

Paris Peace Conference had not been to make the world safe for Democracy but to make it tolerable for those democracies which already existed in 1914 or had emerged from the World War. And that problem had been primarily economic and not political. If the French Revolution had aroused nationalities to consciousness of their political rights, the Industrial Revolution had just as clearly awakened nations to their economic necessities. And against inequalities in economic circumstances countries were as certain to react violently as they had been to resist political injustices. To expect the German, Italian, or Japanese people to accept as definitive the economic status quo of 1919 was therefore as absurd as to expect the Italians, Poles, or Balkan peoples to accept the political status quo of 1815 as final.

But for the peaceful solution of this new problem the machinery of the League and the provisions of the Pact of Paris were useless. Nor was public international law of any avail, for, like the municipal law, it constituted a guarantee of the rights of those possessors of property whose titles were clear. The Covenant of the League of Nations, which provided no mandate for the enforcement of domestic economic policies in conformity with the demands of the necessities of international peace, made it a forbidden act of aggression to undertake by violence to disturb the status quo. But to enact a law against theft while permitting starvation to exist, could not prevent stealing but only populate prisons. And to abolish war without providing some other means of remedying economic circumstances which insure national misery for some peoples while bestowing national prosperity upon others, must prove equally futile.

It was on this rock of the status quo that the League of Nations ultimately came to grief. Had the League existed in 1777, with real powers, it must have made American independence impossible, for the British could have invoked its Covenant to restrain the French intervention which alone made the victory of the colonists possible. Had it existed in 1859, it must have been a similar weapon of Austria, and equally fatal to Italian unification. For the Americans of the Revolution and the Italians of the Risorgimento, however, theirs was the battle of Liberty against Tyranny, of Justice against Oppression; and had the League intervened against them, for both it would have lost all moral value. But both in 1777 and in 1859 the League would have been compelled to intervene; for French and American policy in the earlier year, and Sardinian in the later, constituted a clear threat to peace and an employment of war as an instrument of national policy.

In 1919, in the immediate presence of the devastation of the World War, and also in the conviction that, with the liberation of subject peoples, the old causes of conflict had been abolished, it was possible to believe that the memories of the horrors of the past struggle would preclude their repetition in a new. Two decades later, however, it was evident that while all peoples had largely forgotten the agonies of the distant war, many were finding the conditions of present peace intolerable. And since war seemed to constitute the sole means of escape from these conditions, it was coming to appear, alike to the masses and to the classes in several states, a lesser evil.

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The student of international relations must, therefore, perceive that so far from solving the problem of peace

the postwar world has, at most, only succeeded in stating it. To prevent war it is not enough to interpose legal or moral obstacles to war. That is like damming a river without providing an exit for the flood waters, thus merely causing extension of the area of inevitable inundation and destruction. Nor is it sufficient to prove war terrible thereby to prevent it. On the contrary it is also necessary to demonstrate that the existing peace is equitable and therefore tolerable.

Since, too, various nations find the existing peace inequitable and unendurable as a consequence of their own material circumstances and of the economic practices of more fortunate peoples, the world is faced with the problem, not of keeping the peace but of creating it.

Today, however, the doctrine of absolute sovereignty bars the way to the establishment of any system of international order, because it is the rights of nations, everywhere reckoned imprescriptible, which are responsible for the present condition of anarchy. The price of peace, therefore, is the readjustment of national rights to international necessities. The alternative is new wars for old; but such wars are not inevitable.

Only those wars are inevitable which result from the decisions of peoples that their present conditions are not to be endured and cannot be changed save by war. In the nineteenth century many peoples found their political circumstances intolerable because these constituted a denial of independence or unity. As a consequence, they took up arms and no effort to preserve peace was successful because none proposed any substitute for war as a means for ending what appeared injustice to those who were ready to fight rather than endure.

Today economic conditions have largely replaced political as causes for conflict. But this transformation has neither changed the nature of the problem nor modified the resolution of peoples. Thus the contemporary question is whether peaceful means can be found for removing economic inequalities which nations will not endure; for in the end, if these nations discover no alternative, they will resort to arms. If mankind actually believed that war is the greatest of human evils, there would be no problem of peace. But such has never been the case in the past and obviously is not in the present.

On the contrary, Italian Fascism, Japanese Imperialism, and German National Socialism, each in its turn, has put the world on notice that it has rejected all the postwar prescriptions of peace because these would guarantee the permanence of disparities in economic circumstances fatal to national well-being, and is now openly training its youth for battle.

In the face of this clear warning the more fortunate nations, Great Britain, France, and the United States, have not materially modified their economic practices but instead have multiplied their military and naval preparations. And in this respect the Soviet Union has significantly followed their example. Nor is it possible to discover any alternative to this course consonant with policies which these countries are pursuing.

Thus the problem of peace for the future is patently a question of reconciling the traditions of absolute sovereignty with the conditions of contemporary economic existence. On the one hand the peoples of the British Empire, the United States, Russia, and France, which together possess an approximate monopoly of the world's resources in the essentials of industry, finance,

and trade, have remained firm in their assertion of the right to the exclusive exploitation of these according to the dictates of purely nationalist interest. On the other hand, the less favored nations of Japan, Germany, and Italy are making parity in the bases of prosperity, through equal opportunity in trade and in the availability of the world's natural resources, the price of enduring peace.

From the frantic diplomatic and military maneuverings of 1939 there was clearly emerging a new balance of power—one which would either provide for a rational settlement of the world's problems through the method of conference or would harden into the impasse of another world war. Upon the ability of the "Haves" to utilize intelligently their undoubted power in meeting the issues raised by the "Have-nots" would depend the destiny of nations in the matter of peace and war.

CHRONOLOGY

- 843 *Treaty of Verdun*. Frankish territory east of the Rhine, plus the district around Mainz, Worms, and Spires on the left bank, united under Louis the German.
- 1542 *Portugal-Japan*. Portuguese open trade relations with Japan.
- 1611-32 *Sweden*. Reign of Gustavus Adolphus.
- 1636 *Japan*. Seclusion Decree: foreign missionaries forbidden to enter Japan; Japanese forbidden to go abroad; foreign trading strictly regulated.
- 1640 *Portugal-Spain*. Portugal gains its independence from Spain.
- 1643-1715 *France*. Reign of Louis XIV.
- 1648 *Treaty of Westphalia*. Terminates Thirty Years War fought by an alliance of German Protestant princes, Holland, Sweden, France, and England, against Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor. Principalities of the Holy Roman Empire made virtually sovereign and independent states. Principle of equality and mutual toleration between Catholicism and Protestantism established. Dutch and Swiss independence recognized. France gets full sovereignty over Alsace and is granted Lorraine as a sphere of influence. Carelia, Ingria, and Livonia on the Baltic, the western half of Pomerania, and part of West Prussia ceded to Sweden. Important territorial additions granted to Brandenburg (Prussia).
- 1659 *Treaty of the Pyrenees*. Special settlement of Thirty Years War between France and Spain. Pyrenees fixed as Franco-Spanish boundary.
- 1682-1725 *Russia*. Reign of Peter the Great.
- 1683 *Siege of Vienna*. Turkish penetration in Europe ends with defeat in attempt to capture Vienna.
- 1700-21 *The Northern War*. Denmark, Poland, Russia, and Prussia attack and ultimately defeat Sweden.
- 1702-12 *War of the Spanish Succession*. An alliance of the Netherlands, England, Austria, and smaller European states fights France to prevent its union with Spain.
- 1707 *Great Britain*. England and Scotland joined in the United Kingdom of Great Britain.
- 1713 *Treaty of Utrecht*. Peace settlement of the War of the Spanish Succession. Philip V, grandson of Louis XIV, recognized as king of Spain on condition that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united. Naples, Milan, Sardinia, and the Spanish Netherlands ceded to Charles V of Austria. Great Britain gets Gibraltar from Spain, and Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the Hudson Bay region from France.
- 1721 *Treaty of Nystadt*, signed by Russia and Sweden in settlement of the Northern War. Sweden cedes Carelia, Ingria, Estonia, and Livonia on the Baltic to Russia.

- 1740 *Austria*. Death of Charles VI; accession of Maria Theresa.
- 1740-48 *War of the Austrian Succession*. Prussia, France, Spain, Bavaria, and Saxony unite against Austria in hope of territorial gains. Great Britain and Holland allied with Austria.
- 1748 *Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle*, signed by all the belligerents of the War of the Austrian Succession except Prussia. Recognizes Prussian conquest of Silesia. Duchies of Parma and Piacenza in Italy ceded to Spain.
- 1756-63 *Seven Years War*. Austria opens hostilities with Prussia in an effort to regain Silesia. France and Spain allied with Austria. Great Britain enters war against France and Spain in contest for colonial possessions.
- 1762-96 *Russia*. Reign of Catherine the Great.
- 1763 *Peace of Hubertsburg*, signed by Austria and Prussia in settlement of Seven Years War. Status quo preserved.
- Peace of Paris*, settlement following Seven Years War, signed by France, Spain, and Great Britain. Great Britain gets Canada, the territory east of the Mississippi River, and French territory in India from France, and gets Florida from Spain.
- 1766 *France*. Lorraine formally annexed.
- 1772 *First Partition of Poland*. Russia, Prussia, and Austria each annex parts of Poland. Russia acquires a large section of eastern Poland, Austria gets Galicia, and Prussia obtains West Prussia, connecting Pomerania and East Prussia.
- 1774 *Russia-Turkey*. Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji signed in settlement of War of 1768-74. Turkish territory on the north shore of the Black Sea ceded to Russia.
- 1776 *Great Britain*. American Declaration of Independence.
- 1783 *Treaty of Paris*, peace settlement of the American Revolution, Great Britain recognizing the independence of the United States. Great Britain also cedes Florida to Spain.
- 1789 *France*. Beginning of the French Revolution.
- 1792-1815 *Napoleonic Wars*. Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Spain unite in successive coalitions to oppose the French Revolution and French expansion.
- 1793 *Second Partition of Poland*. Russia annexes a large section of eastern Poland; Prussia acquires Posen, Danzig, and Thorn.
- 1795 *Third Partition of Poland*. Russia annexes all remaining Polish territory east of the Niemen; Austria and Prussia divide the remainder, Austria obtaining Cracow, and Prussia obtaining Warsaw.
- 1803 *Louisiana Purchase*. The United States buys the territory of Louisiana from France for \$15,000,000.
- 1804 *France*. Napoleon declares himself Emperor.
- 1812 *Russia-Turkey*. Turkey cedes Bessarabia to Russia.
- Spain*. Constitution of 1812. Cortes established as popular legislature with the king as executive.
- 1812-14 *War of 1812*. Fought by Great Britain and the United States.
- 1813 *Spain-Venezuela*. Revolt of Venezuela under Bolivar.
- 1815 *Treaty of Vienna*. General European settlement following the Napoleonic Wars, concluded by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France. Thirty-nine German states organized as the German Confederation, with Austria as perpetual president. The Papal States, Naples, Tuscany, Parma, and Modena restored. Venice, Dalmatia, and Lombardy annexed to Austria. Belgium

united with Holland. Swiss Confederation re-established and its independence and integrity guaranteed. Russia gets the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; Prussia gets Pomerania, half of Saxony, and certain Rhine territory; Great Britain gets Cape Colony, Ceylon, Heligoland, and Malta. Norway annexed to Sweden.

- 1815 *The Holy Alliance*. Russia, Prussia, and Austria make a joint declaration of good will, co-operation, and adherence to Christian principles in their political relations.

The Quadruple Alliance. Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria agree to act in concert to maintain peace and uphold the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna.

- 1816 *Argentina-Spain*. Independent government established by Argentina.

- 1819 *Colombia-Spain*. Successful revolt by Colombia under Bolivar against Spain.

The Florida Treaty. Spanish Florida ceded to the United States by Spain; the United States renounces all claim to Texas.

- 1820 *Spain*. Democratic revolution; Constitution of 1812 readopted.

- 1821-29 *Greek War for Independence*. Greeks, with the help of Great Britain, France, and Russia, gain their independence from Turkey.

- 1822 *Mexico-Spain*. Mexican independence proclaimed.

Brazil-Portugal. Brazilian declaration of independence.

- 1823 *France-Spain*. France intervenes to restore the monarchy in Spain.

Monroe Doctrine. Declaration by the United States that any attempt by a European power to extend its political control on the American continent will be considered an unfriendly act.

- 1829 *Treaty of Adrianople*. Peace settlement of war conducted by Russia and France against Turkey. Autonomy granted by Turkey to the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia; independence of Greece recognized.

- 1830 *Belgium* proclaims its independence from Holland.

- 1834-42 *The Zollverein*. German Customs Union formed, including nearly all the German states except Austria.

- 1839 *Treaty of London*. Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Holland recognize and guarantee the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

- 1839-42 *The Opium War*. Action by the Chinese government to suppress the sale of opium by British merchants in Canton results in war. China defeated by Great Britain.

- 1842 *Treaty of Nanking*, signed by China and Great Britain in settlement of Opium War. Provides that in addition to Canton, Amoy, Ningpo, Fuchow, and Shanghai be opened to foreign trade; that Hong Kong be ceded to Great Britain, and that China pay an indemnity of \$21,000,000.

- 1845 *United States*. Annexation of Texas by the United States.

- 1846 *Oregon Treaty*. Signed by Great Britain and the United States, fixing the boundary between Oregon Territory and Canada at the parallel of 49 degrees north latitude.

- 1846-47 *The Mexican War*, fought by the United States and Mexico over American annexation of Texas, which was still claimed by Mexico. Mexico defeated.

- 1848 *Democratic uprisings* in France, Italy, Prussia, and Austria. Second Republic established in France.

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, peace settlement following the Mexican War. Mexico cedes California and New Mexico to the United States.

- 1849 *Austria*. Revolt against Austria in Lombardy and Venetia, led by Charles Albert of Sardinia, put down at Battle of Novara.

- 1851 *France*. Coup d'état of Napoleon III. Third Empire established.
- 1853-54 *Japan - United States*. American squadron under Commodore Perry sent to Japan; demands that American ships be allowed to provision in Japanese ports. Demand granted.
- 1854-56 *Crimean War*. Great Britain and France fight against Russia to prevent the extension of Russian power over Turkey and the Dardanelles.
- 1855 *Italy*. Sardinia joins Great Britain and France in the Crimean War.
- 1856 *Conference of Paris*. Peace settlement following the Crimean War is signed by Great Britain, Austria, France, Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia. Wallachia and Moldavia given autonomy under Turkish suzerainty; the independence and integrity of Turkey guaranteed; the Black Sea to be neutralized and demilitarized.
- 1858 *China-Russia*. Territorial agreement concluded, granting Russia all territory north of the Amur River.
- Japan*. Commercial treaties concluded with the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia.
- 1859 *Austro-Sardinian War*. France and Sardinia join forces to defeat Austria in two battles.
- Agreement of Villafranca*, peace settlement of Austro-Sardinian War between France and Austria. Lombardy to be ceded to France and transferred from France to Sardinia.
- 1860 *China-Russia*. Siberian maritime provinces ceded by China to Russia.
- Italy*. Modena, Parma, Tuscany, the Papal States, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and Romagna annexed to Sardinia.
- Treaty of Turin*. Savoy and Nice ceded by Sardinia to France.
- 1861 *Italy*. Kingdom of Italy under Victor Emmanuel II proclaimed.
- 1861-65 *United States*. American Civil War.
- 1863-64 *German-Danish War*, fought by an alliance of Prussia, Austria, and smaller German States to prevent the complete absorption of Schleswig and Holstein in a unified Danish state. Denmark defeated.
- 1864 *Treaty of Vienna*, peace settlement of the German-Danish War. Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg ceded to the allies; Denmark to pay an indemnity for the expense of the war.
- 1866 *Austro-Prussian War*. Prussia, with Italy as an ally, attacks and defeats Austria.
- Treaty of Prague*, peace settlement between Austria and Prussia. Germanic Confederation dissolved and a new North German Confederation, not including Austria, provided for. Schleswig, Holstein, Hanover, Cassel, and Frankfurt to be annexed to Prussia.
- Austria-Italy*. Treaty of peace signed. Venetia ceded to Italy.
- North German Confederation*. Twenty-two northern German states combine under the leadership of Prussia.
- 1867 *Russia - United States*. Alaska purchased from Russia by the United States for \$7,000,000.
- Nicaragua - United States*. United States granted the right to build a Nicaraguan Canal and agrees "to guarantee the neutrality and innocent use of the same."
- Austria*. Autonomy granted to Hungary.
- 1868 *Suez Canal*. Opening of the Suez Canal.
- 1868-78 *Spain*. Cuban rebellion; finally suppressed by Marshal Campos.
- 1870 July 15 - Feb. 25, 1871, *Franco-Prussian War*. A coalition of Prussia and the smaller German states defeats France.

- 1870 Sept. 4. *France*. Proclamation of the Third Republic.
Sept. 20. *Italy*. Italian troops take possession of Rome, the Pope retiring to the Vatican.
- 1871 Jan. 18. *Germany*. German Empire proclaimed.
May 10. *Treaty of Frankfurt*, peace settlement following the Franco-Prussian War. France cedes Alsace and Lorraine to Germany; agrees to pay an indemnity of \$1,000,000,000
Japan. Feudalism abolished by Imperial decrees.
- 1873 *The Dreikaiserbund*. Germany, Austria, and Russia agree to co-operate in the maintenance of peace and in case of the threat of a war to confer on a common course of action.
Sept. 5. *France-Germany*. Payment of the French war indemnity completed.
- 1875 May 7. *Japan-Russia*. Territorial agreement: Kuril Islands recognized as Japanese by Russia; Japan renounces all claim to the island of Sakhalin.
- 1876 Feb. 27. *Japanese-Korean Treaty*. Korea opened to trade with Japan; extra-territorial privileges granted to Japanese.
June 30. *Spain*. Constitution of 1876: limited monarchy established with restricted suffrage.
- 1877 April 24 - Jan. 31, 1878. *Russo-Turkish War*. Russia intervenes to support a revolt of Turkey's Balkan principalities. Turkey defeated.
- 1878 March 17. *Treaty of San Stefano*, first peace settlement following Russo-Turkish War. Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro to be independent; a "Greater Bulgaria" to be established, consisting of Bulgaria, Rumelia, and Macedonia. Kars, Ardahan, and Batum in the Caucasus ceded to Russia.
July 13. *Treaty of Berlin*, drawn up by the Powers to replace the Treaty of San Stefano. Signed by Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Austria. Montenegro, Serbia, and Rumania to be independent; Bulgaria proper to be an autonomous principality under Turkish suzerainty; Eastern Rumelia to have "administrative autonomy"; Macedonia to remain a part of Turkey. Austria-Hungary to occupy and administer Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is to remain legally a part of Turkey. The island of Cyprus ceded to Great Britain. Russia to retain Ardahan, Kars, and Batum in the Caucasus.
- 1879 Oct. 7. *Austro-German Alliance*. Provides that if either party is attacked by Russia, it shall receive the fullest support from the other. If either party is attacked by another power, the other shall preserve a benevolent neutrality.
- 1881 June 18. *Second Dreikaiserbund*. Agreement between Russia, Germany, and Austria, providing that if any one of them is at war with a fourth power, the others shall observe a benevolent neutrality. Any modifications of the treaty of Berlin (1878) to be effected only by a mutual agreement of the three powers.
May 23. *France*. Annexation of Tunis.
- 1882 May 20. *The Triple Alliance*. Treaty signed by Germany, Austria, and Italy, providing that in case France, without direct provocation, should attack either Italy or Germany the other two parties shall come to the assistance of the party attacked. Assistance shall likewise be rendered if any party is attacked by two or more Great Powers, except that the agreement shall in no case be construed as directed against England.
- 1884 July 14. *Germany*. German colony of the Cameroons founded in western Africa.
Sept. 8. *Germany* announces a protectorate over Southwest Africa.
Nov. 17 - Feb. 26, 1885. *Berlin Conference*. Meeting of the colonial powers to arrive at certain agreements in connection with the partition of Africa. Congo and Niger rivers declared open to all nations; "possession" defined; Territory later to become Congo Free State established.

- 1884 Dec. *Germany* claims New Guinea and New Britain, Pacific islands.
- 1885 Oct. 15. *Bulgaria*. Union with Rumelia proclaimed.
Nov. 13-28. *Bulgarian-Serbian War*. Serbia attacks Bulgaria, but is defeated and forced to sue for peace.
- 1886 Jan. 1. *Great Britain*. Annexation of Burma.
- 1887 March 13. *Triple Alliance*. Treaty of 1882 renewed.
June 18. *Reinsurance Agreement*. Treaty signed by Russia and Germany, providing that each party shall maintain a benevolent neutrality if the other should be at war, except that this shall not apply to any conflict resulting from an attack by either party on France or Austria. This agreement to be in force for three years.
- 1888 June 15. *Germany*. Death of William I; accession of William II.
- 1889 Feb. 11. *Japan*. Constitution promulgated by the Emperor.
Oct. 2 - April 19, 1890. *First Pan-American Conference*, held at Washington on invitation of the United States.
- 1890 March 18. *Germany*. Resignation of Bismarck as Chancellor; succeeded by Prince Hohenlohe.
July 1. *Anglo-German Convention*, settles colonial claims of Great Britain and Germany in East Africa and cedes the small island of Heligoland in the North Sea to Germany.
Oct. 28. *Germany*. German East Africa Company cedes German East Africa to the Empire.
- 1891 June 28. *Triple Alliance*. Treaty of alliance renewed.
- 1893 Dec. 21 - Oct. 26, 1896. *Italo-Ethiopian War*. Italian troops finally defeated at Adowa. Treaty of Addis Ababa (1896), signed as peace settlement, recognizes complete independence of Ethiopia.
Dec. 30. *Franco-Russian Alliance*, provides that if France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy and Germany, Russia shall employ all her available resources against Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany or by Austria, supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available resources against Germany.
- 1894 Aug. 1 - April 17, 1895. *Sino-Japanese War*, arising out of controversy over Japanese interference in Korea. China decisively defeated.
- 1895 Feb. 24. *Cuba-Spain*. Beginning of the Cuban Revolution.
April 17. *Treaty of Shimonoseki*, peace settlement following Sino-Japanese War. Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula to be ceded to Japan; Korea to be independent; China to pay an indemnity of \$150,000,000.
May 6. *China-Japan*. Upon "advice" of Russia, France, and Germany, Japan retrocedes Liao-Tung to China.
- 1896 May 22. *Li-Lobanoff Treaty*. China and Russia agree to render mutual support to each other in case of Japanese aggression in eastern Asia; Russia to be allowed to construct a railway across northern Manchuria to Vladivostok.
June 9. *Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol*. Agreement between Japanese and Russian governments, establishing a joint protectorate over Korea.
- 1898 Feb. 15. *Spain - United States*. The *Maine* destroyed by an explosion in Havana harbor.
March 6. *China-Germany*. Germany granted a 99-year lease on Kiaochow.
March 22. *China-Russia*. Russia granted a lease on Port Arthur.
April 24 - Aug. 12. *Spanish-American War*.
July 1. *China - Great Britain*. Weihaiwei leased to Great Britain.

- 1898 Dec. 10. *Treaty of Paris*, peace settlement of Spanish-American War. Independence of Cuba recognized; Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam ceded by Spain to the United States.
- July 10 - March 21, 1899 *Fashoda Incident*. Occupation of Fashoda in the Sudan region by French expedition causes crisis with Great Britain. Settlement reached as France withdraws from the Sudan, but is allowed to annex the Wadai district, connecting her western and northern African possessions.
- 1899 May 18 - July 29. *First Hague Conference*. General conference of European states convoked by Czar Nicholas II for reduction of armaments reaches no general agreement for that purpose; but poison gas, aerial bombardment of cities, and certain other forms of warfare are banned. Permanent Court of Arbitration established to settle international disputes.
- June 2. *Germany-Spain*. The Caroline Islands, Pelews, Marianas, and Ladrone sold by Spain to Germany.
- Sept. 6. *Open-Door Policy*. Note from the United States to the European Powers and Japan proposes that they guarantee equal economic opportunities to all nations within their respective spheres of influence in China.
- Oct. 9 - May 31, 1902. *Boer War*. War between Great Britain and the Boers—Dutch settlers—in South Africa. Boers finally defeated.
- 1899-1900 *Boxer Uprising*. Rebellion of antiforeign elements in China against Europeans. Many foreigners killed and foreign legations in Peking besieged. Movement put down by international army of the Powers.
- 1900 Feb. 9. *Hay-Pauncefote Treaty*, signed by Great Britain and the United States. Grants the United States the right to construct and maintain an Isthmian canal, such canal to be neutral, but the United States to have the power to police it and provide in connection therewith for its own defense.
- Oct. 18. *Germany*. Von Bülow succeeds Prince Hohenlohe as Chancellor.
- Dec. 14. *Italo-French Agreement*. Italy recognizes Morocco as a French sphere of influence; France recognizes Tripoli as an Italian sphere.
- 1901 June 12. *The Platt Amendment*. Eight articles drafted by the United States made a part of the Cuban Constitution; provide that Cuba shall never enter into any agreements with a foreign power tending to impair her sovereignty or grant to such power the right to construct military or naval bases; that Cuba will grant to the United States the right to construct naval and coaling stations, and that the United States shall have the right to intervene in Cuba in order to maintain a government adequate to protect life, liberty, and property.
- Sept. 7. *The Boxer Protocol*. China to pay an indemnity of \$132,000,000 to the Powers for damages done during the Boxer Uprising and suppress all anti-foreign associations.
- 1902 Jan. 30. *Anglo-Japanese Alliance*. Great Britain and Japan agree to remain neutral in case either should become engaged in a war with any one Power in defense of its interests in China. If either party should become involved in a war with two Powers, the other shall render it military assistance.
- March 18. *Germany-Turkey*. Concession granted by Turkey to German interests for a Berlin-Bagdad Railway.
- April 8. *Sino-Russian Convention*. Russia agrees to evacuate Manchuria.
- June 28. *Triple Alliance*. Treaty of alliance renewed.
- Nov. 1. *Franco-Italian Agreement*. Italy to remain neutral if France is the object of direct or indirect aggression by one or more other powers.
- Dec. 20 - Feb. 22, 1904. *Venezuelan Incident*. Great Britain and Germany blockade Venezuela because of Venezuelan failure to pay debts due to their nationals. The United States intervenes and the three nations accept arbitration.

- 1903 May 22. *Cuban Treaty*, signed by the United States and Cuba, regulating their mutual relations on the basis of the Platt Amendment.
- Nov. 3. *Panama Revolution*. Revolt of Panama, aided and abetted by the United States, throws off control of Colombia.
- Nov. 18. *Panama Treaty*. Republic of Panama grants the United States a canal zone ten miles wide across the Isthmus in return for \$10,000,000 and an annual rental of \$250,000.
- 1904 Feb. 8 - Sept. 5, 1905. *Russo-Japanese War*, resulting from a conflict of Russian and Japanese interests in Korea and Manchuria. Russia defeated. (See Treaty of Portsmouth, below.)
- April 8. *Entente Cordiale*. Friendly relations established between France and Great Britain by the settlement of outstanding colonial disputes. France to have a free hand in Morocco and Britain a free hand in Egypt.
- 1905 Aug. 12. *Great Britain - Japan*. Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 renewed for ten years.
- Aug. 31. *Treaty of Carlstadt*. Agreement separating Norway from Sweden.
- Sept. 5. *Treaty of Portsmouth*, peace settlement following Russo-Japanese War. Russia recognizes Korea as a Japanese sphere of influence; transfers her lease of Port Arthur to Japan; cedes to Japan the southern half of Sakhalin Island.
- Oct. 30. *Russia*. Constitution granted by the Czar following widespread insurrectionary movements against the regime.
- 1906 Jan. 16 - April 7. *Algieras Conference*. Meeting of the Great Powers to determine their respective rights in Morocco, on invitation of the Sultan, impelled by German pressure. Agreement reached; France, strongly supported by Great Britain, retains her dominant position.
- Dec. 13. *Ethiopia-Italy*. By agreement with France and Great Britain, Italy receives practically the whole of Ethiopia as a sphere of influence.
- 1907 June 15 - Oct. 18. *Second Hague Conference*, attended by forty-four nations. Declarations adopted concerning peaceful settlement of international disputes and the laws and conduct of war on land and sea.
- Aug. 31. *Anglo-Russian Treaty*. Respective spheres of influence defined in Persia; Afghanistan to be a British sphere of influence, neither party to undertake any imperialistic activities in Tibet.
- 1908 July 24. *Young Turk Revolution*. Liberal Constitution of 1876 is restored in Turkey.
- Oct. 5. *Bulgaria* declares her independence from Turkey.
- Oct. 7. *Austria-Hungary* annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Nov. 30. *Root-Takahira Agreement*. Japan and the United States agree to support the territorial integrity of China and the principle of the Open Door.
- 1910 May 7. *Great Britain*. Accession of George V.
- Aug. 24. *Japan*. Korea formally annexed to the Japanese Empire.
- 1911 July 1 - Nov. 4. *Agadir Crisis*. Germany sends warships to Agadir, Morocco, alleging French violation of the Treaty of Algieras of 1906. Britain supports France, and Germany finally agrees to recognize the special rights of France in Morocco.
- July 15. *Great Britain - Japan*. Anglo-Japanese Alliance renewed for ten years.
- Sept. 20 - Oct. 18, 1912. *Italo-Turkish War*. Italy attacks and defeats Turkey during the confusion of the Turkish Revolution.
- Oct. 10. *China*. Democratic-Nationalist revolution against the Manchu dynasty under Sun Yat-sen begins.
- 1912 Jan. 1. *China*. Republic proclaimed under Sun Yat-sen.

- 1912 Feb. 14. *China*. Sun Yat-sen resigns as provisional President of the Chinese Republic.
- June 18. *China Consortium*. Agreement among American, French, German, British, Russian, and Japanese banking groups for the joint extension of loans to China.
- Oct. 8 - May 30, 1913. *First Balkan War*. An alliance of Montenegro, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, secretly supported by Russia, attacks and defeats Turkey.
- Oct. 18. *Italy-Turkey*. Peace treaty in settlement of Italo-Turkish War signed. Recognizes Italian conquest of Tripoli.
- Nov. 28. *Albania-Turkey*. Albanian independence proclaimed.
- Dec. 5. *Triple Alliance*. Treaty of alliance renewed.
- March 3. *France*. French protectorate over Morocco established by the Treaty of Fez.
- 1913 May 30. *Treaty of London*, peace settlement between the Balkan states and Turkey following the first Balkan War. Turkey cedes to the Balkan allies all her European territory except Albania and a small region around Constantinople. Crete ceded to Greece.
- July 8 - Aug. 10. *Second Balkan War*. Disagreement over division of Turkish territory under the Treaty of London leads Bulgaria to attack Serbia and Greece. Rumania intervenes to end the war.
- July 10 - Sept. 1. *China*. Rebellion of Southern leaders under Sun Yat-sen against the Peking government crushed.
- Aug. 10. *Treaty of Bucharest*, peace settlement following the second Balkan War. Southern Macedonia ceded to Greece; part of Macedonia and Novi Bazar ceded to Montenegro; Rumania gets a strip of Bulgarian territory on the Black Sea.
- Nov. 4. *China*. Mandate of the Peking government dissolves the Kuomintang party for complicity in revolt against it and expels its members from the National Assembly.
- Nov. 5. *China-Russia*. Treaty signed providing for autonomy of Outer Mongolia under Chinese suzerainty.
- 1914 April 15. *Mexico - United States*. American occupation of Vera Cruz in dispute with Mexico.
- June 28. *Austria-Serbia*. Assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, by a member of a Serbian secret society organized to carry on Serbian propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- July 23. *Austria-Serbia*. Austro-Hungarian ultimatum delivered to Serbia.
- July 25. *Russia*. Mobilization begun.
- July 28. *Austria-Serbia*. Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia.
- July 31. *Germany-Russia*. Germany demands Russian demobilization within twelve hours.
- Aug. 1. *Germany-Russia*. Germany declares war on Russia.
- Aug. 2. *Turkey*. Secret treaty of alliance between Turkey and the Central Powers signed.
- Aug. 3. *France-Germany*. Germany declares war on France.
- Aug. 4. *Belgium-Germany*. Germany invades Belgium.
- Aug. 4. *Germany - Great Britain*. Great Britain declares war on Germany.
- Aug. 5. *Nicaragua - United States*. United States granted by treaty the exclusive right in perpetuity to construct an isthmian canal through Nicaragua.
- Aug. 23. *Germany-Japan*. Japan declares war on Germany.
- Nov. 3-5. *Turkey*. Great Britain, France, and Russia declare war on Turkey.

- 1914 Nov. 15. *Poland*. Polish legions formed under Pilsudski to fight with Austria-Hungary against Russia.
- Dec. 18. *Scandinavian States*. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark agree on joint diplomatic action during the war.
- 1915 Jan. 18. *The Twenty-one Demands*. Japan presents China with a draft treaty which would make China virtually a Japanese protectorate. The most important provisions: that China consent to whatever disposition Japan and Germany may make in regard to Shantung; that China consult Japan before granting concessions to foreigners; that China accept the services of Japanese civil and military advisors; and that she grant certain important economic concessions to Japan.
- April 26. *Secret Treaty of London*, signed by Italy and the Allies. Italy promises to enter the war against Austria-Hungary in return for South Tyrol, Trentino, and Trieste, northern Dalmatia, a protectorate over Albania, sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands, a sphere of influence in Asiatic Turkey, and cessions of African territory if Great Britain and France annex the German African colonies.
- May 3. *Italy* renounces the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, first made in 1882 and renewed at later dates.
- May 7. *Germany - United States*. Sinking of the British liner *Lusitania*; 114 Americans lost.
- May 23. *Austria-Italy*. Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary.
- May 25. *China-Japan*. Treaty signed, embodying a modified version of the Twenty-one demands. Japan to be granted special rights in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia; a 99-year lease on the South Manchurian Railway, and option on all loans and economic concessions. (Never ratified by China.)
- June 7. *Russo-Chinese-Mongolian Treaty*. Recognizes autonomy of Outer Mongolia under Chinese suzerainty as provided by the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nov. 5, 1913.
- Oct. 14. *Bulgaria-Serbia*. Bulgaria declares war on Serbia.
- Nov. 21. *Austria-Hungary*. Death of Emperor Francis Joseph; Accession of Archduke Charles.
- 1916 July 3. *Russo-Japanese Secret Treaty*. Russia agrees to recognize and support changes made by the Sino-Russian Treaty of 1915; Japan recognizes Russia's special interest in Outer Mongolia.
- Aug. 4. *Denmark - United States*. United States purchases the Virgin Islands from Denmark for \$25,000,000.
- Aug. 17. *Rumania*. Secret treaty signed with the Allies, promising Rumania the Banat, part of Transylvania, and part of Bukovina in return for military support against the Central Powers.
- Aug. 27. *Austria-Rumania*. Rumania declares war on Austria-Hungary.
- 1917 Jan. 31. *Germany* announces resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare.
- Feb.-March. *Japan*. Secret agreement made with the Allies by which they agree to support Japan's claim to Shantung and the German Pacific islands north of the equator in return for more extensive Japanese aid against the Central Powers.
- March 1. *Zimmermann Note*. Publication by the United States of a proposal by Germany to Mexico that in case the United States should join the Allies, a German-Mexican Alliance be concluded and Mexico invade the United States.
- March 14. *Russia*. Provisional government established by the Duma.

- 1917 March 15. *Russia*. Abdication of Nicholas II.
 March 30. *Poland-Russia*. Russian provisional government grants independence to Poland.
 April 6. *Germany - United States*. United States declares war on Germany.
 July 2. *Greece* joins the Allies.
 July 16-18. *Russia*. Bolshevik revolt against the provisional government led by Lenin and Trotsky suppressed by troops.
 July 20. *Yugoslavia*. Declaration of Corfu proclaims an independent Yugoslav state.
 Aug. 6. *Russia*. Kerensky becomes Premier.
 Aug. 14. *China-Germany*. War declared by China on Germany.
 Sept. 3. *China*. Sun Yat-sen and followers establish government in Canton in opposition to Peking government.
 Sept. 10. *Russia*. Kerensky assumes dictatorship.
 Sept. 28-Sept. 28, 1918. *Nishihara Loans*. Japanese bankers lend Peking government 145,000,000 yen on very inadequate security, with the approval of the Japanese government.
 Oct. 26. *Brazil-Germany*. Brazil declares war on Germany.
 Nov. 2. *Lansing-Ishii Agreement*. United States and Japan confirm the principle of the Open Door in China, but the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous.
 Nov. 7. *Russia*. Bolsheviks under Lenin seize control of the government of Russia.
 Dec. 6. *Finland* proclaims its independence from Russia.
 Dec. 11. *Lithuania* proclaims its independence from Russia.
- 1918 Jan. 8. *United States*. President Wilson announces his Fourteen Points in an address to Congress on war aims.
 Jan. 12. *Latvia* proclaims its independence from Russia.
 Jan. 28. *The Ukraine* proclaims its independence from Russia.
 Feb. 24. *Estonia-Russia*. Formal declaration of Estonian independence by a provisional government.
 March 1. *Finland-Russia*. Bolshevik government of Russia recognizes the independence of Finland.
 March 3. *Treaty of Brest-Litovsk*. Peace settlement between the Central Powers and Russia. Russia to give up Poland, Courland, and Lithuania to be reorganized by the Central Powers; to cede Ardahan, Kars, and Batum in the Caucasus to Turkey. Estonia, Livonia, the Ukraine, and Finland to be independent. Russia to pay an indemnity of \$1,500,000,000.
 March 15. *Germany*. Protectorate proclaimed over Courland.
 April 5. *Great Britain - Japan - Russia*. Japanese and British troops land in Vladivostok.
 May 6. *Rumania* makes peace with the Central Powers.
 May 23. *Russia*. Admiral Kolchak establishes an anti-Communist government in eastern Siberia.
 July 10. *Russia*. New constitution adopted by the Congress of Soviets.
 July 19. *Russia*. Execution of Nicholas II and his wife, Alexandra, by the Bolsheviks.
 July 29. *Great Britain - Russia*. Russia declares war on Great Britain and her allies.

- 1918 Aug. *Russia*. French, British, and American troops land at Archangel and establish the Government of Russian Northern Territory. Begin operations against the Soviet army.
- Sept. 4. *China*. Hsu Shih-chang, candidate of Anfu Club (pro-Japanese), elected President of Peking government by Parliament.
- Sept. 29. *Bulgaria*. Armistice signed with the Allied Powers.
- Oct. 7. *Poland*. Poles in Warsaw proclaim their independence.
- Oct. 17. *Czechoslovakia*. Czech republic proclaimed at Prague.
- Nov. 1. *Poland-Ukraine*. Poland declares war on the Ukraine.
- Nov. 4. *Austria-Italy*. Austria-Hungary surrenders to Italy.
- Nov. 9. *Germany*. Abdication of William II.
- Nov. 10. *Czechoslovakia*. Masaryk elected first President of the Republic.
- Nov. 11. *Armistice* ending hostilities in the World War, concluded between Germany and the Allies.
- Nov. 12. *Austria*. Austrian Republic proclaimed at Vienna.
- Nov. 16. *Hungary*. Hungarian Republic proclaimed.
- Nov. 22. *Estonia-Russia*. Soviet forces cross the Estonian frontier.
- Dec. 9. *Poland-Russia*. Diplomatic relations with Russia severed by Poland.
- Dec. 15. *Germany-Poland*. Diplomatic relations with Germany severed by Poland.
- 1919 Jan. 5. *Lithuania-Russia*. Vilna occupied by Soviet forces.
- Jan. 6. *Poland*. Paderewski becomes Premier and Foreign Minister, with Pilsudski as Chief of State.
- Jan. 18 - June 28. *Paris Peace Conference*.
- Jan. 24 - Feb. 5. *Czechoslovakia-Poland*. Armed clashes between Czechs and Poles in dispute over Teschen territory.
- Jan. 24 - Oct. 11, 1922. *Greco-Turkish Campaign*. Greeks finally defeated and driven out of Turkey by Nationalist forces.
- March 21 - Aug. 1. *Hungary*. Communist regime under Bela Kun.
- March 23. *Italy*. Formation of the first "fascio di combattimento" by Mussolini in Milan.
- April 16. *Germany-Latvia*. German force occupies Libau and overthrows Latvian government.
- May 18. *Rumania-Russia*. Russia declares war on Rumania.
- June 21-22. *Germany-Latvia*. German forces defeated by Letts and driven from northern Latvia.
- June 28. *Treaty of Guarantee* signed, providing that Great Britain and the United States shall give assistance to France in the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany. Agreement to have no effect unless ratified by all parties. (Not ratified.)
- June 28. *Treaty of Versailles*, peace settlement between the Allied Powers and Germany. Germany agrees to:
 Accept with her allies the responsibility for having caused the War;
 Restore Alsace and Lorraine to France;
 Accept internationalization of the Saar Basin for fifteen years and of Danzig permanently; ultimate sovereignty over the Saar to be determined by a plebiscite;
 Cede to Belgium Eupen, Malmedy, and Prussian Moresnet;
 Accept the results of a plebiscite to decide whether Schleswig shall belong to Germany or Denmark;

Cede a small strip of Upper Silesia to Czechoslovakia and the rest to Poland;

Cede Memel to the Allies;

Cede to Poland most of Posen and parts of West Prussia and Pomerania;

Recognize the independence of Austria;

Renounce all colonial rights and territories;

Reduce her army to 100,000 men;

Dismantle all forts within 50 kilometers east of the Rhine;

Cease all importation and nearly all production of war material;

Accept Allied occupation of certain parts of Germany for 15 years;

Reduce her navy to six battleships, six light cruisers, and twelve destroyers, and maintain no submarines;

Have no military or naval air force;

Repay the Allies for all costs and damages arising out of the War;

Cede to Japan the Shantung Peninsula;

Agree to the abrogation of the Treaty of London of 1839, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium.

The Treaty of Versailles also provides for the establishment of the League of Nations, of which the Allied Powers ratifying the treaty become the original members. (Not ratified by the United States and China.)

June 28. *Polish Minorities Treaty*. Signed by Poland and the Allied Powers. Guarantees national minorities in Poland the free exercise of religion, and equality in civil and political rights.

July 31. *Germany*. Weimar Constitution adopted by vote of the German constitutional convention.

Sept. 10. *Treaty of St. Germain*, peace settlement between the Allies and Austria. Austria to accept partial guilt for the War; maintain her complete independence; reduce her army to 30,000 men; abolish her navy, pay a war reparation; safeguard the rights of her racial and religious minorities; cede the South Tyrol, Trentino, Trieste, Istria, and the islands off Dalmatia to Italy; cede Bukovina to Rumania; cede Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Dalmatian coast to Yugoslavia; cede Bohemia, Moravia, part of Lower Austria and Austrian Silesia to Czechoslovakia; cede Austrian Galicia to Poland; cede Teschen to Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Sept. 13. *Italy-Yugoslavia*. D'Annunzio seizes Fiume for Italy.

Sept. 30. *Russia*. Allied evacuation of Siberia completed.

Nov. 1. *Rumania-Russia*. Rumania announces the annexation of Bessarabia.

Nov. 27. *Treaty of Neuilly*, peace settlement between the Allies and Bulgaria. Western Bulgaria to be ceded to Yugoslavia; western Thrace and the Aegean coast to Greece; the Bulgarian army to be reduced to 33,000 men; Bulgaria to pay reparations as fixed by the Reparations Commission.

Dec. 8. *Lithuania-Poland*. Allied Supreme Council fixes "Curzon Line" as provisional frontier between Poland and Lithuania.

Dec. 14. *Lithuania-Russia*. Last Russian troops evacuate Lithuania.

1920 Jan. 3-24. *Latvia-Russia*. Soviet forces driven from Latvia by Lett army.

Jan. 10. *League of Nations*. Spain (a neutral state in 1914-19) becomes a member of the League.

Jan. 14. *First Baltic Conference*. Meeting of the representatives of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Finland.

Feb. 2. *Treaty of Dorpat*, peace settlement between Russia and Estonia. Recognizes the independence of Estonia and defines Russo-Estonian boundary.

Feb. 8. *Russia*. The government announces its refusal to assume responsibility for the debts of the Czarist government.

- 1920 Feb. 10. *Denmark-Germany*. Plebiscite in northern Schleswig gives majority for union with Denmark.
- March 1. *Hungary*. Admiral Horthy elected head of the Hungarian state.
- March 13-15. *Kapp Putsch*. Attempt at monarchical counter-revolution in Germany put down.
- March 19. *United States*. Senate declines to ratify the Versailles Treaty.
- March 19-28. *Germany*. Spartacist (Communist) uprisings put down by government troops.
- March 27. *Russia*. Novo-Rossisk, Gen. Deniken's last base, captured by Soviet forces. Deniken resigns command of White army and is succeeded by Gen. Wrangel.
- April 25-Oct. 12, 1921. *Russo-Polish Campaign*. Poles invade Russia, but are finally driven back to Warsaw by Soviet forces.
- June 4. *Treaty of Trianon*, peace settlement between the Allies and Hungary. Hungary to cede Transylvania and two thirds of the Banat of Tamsvar to Rumania; Croatia, Slavonia, and the western third of the Banat to Yugoslavia; Slovakia to Czechoslovakia; Bergenland to Austria. Italy and Yugoslavia to decide jointly on the disposition of Fiume. The Hapsburgs never to rule in Hungary.
- July 5-16. *Spa Conference*. Meeting of the Allied Powers to decide on a division of German reparations payments. France to get 52%, the British Empire 22%, Italy 10%, Belgium 8%.
- July 15. *Germany-Latvia*. Peace protocol signed in settlement of German-Latvian hostilities.
- July 20. *Treaty of Moscow*, signed by Russia and Lithuania. Recognizes Lithuanian independence and defines Russo-Lithuanian frontier.
- Aug. 10. *Treaty of Sèvres*, first peace settlement between the Allies and Turkey. All European Turkey, except Constantinople, ceded to Greece. Palestine and Mesopotamia ceded by Turkey to Great Britain, and Syria to France, as mandates. The Straits to be under international control and the Allies to supervise Turkish military and financial administration.
- Aug. 11. *Treaty of Riga*, signed by Russia and Latvia. Recognizes Latvian independence.
- Aug. 14. *Czechoslovakia-Yugoslavia*. Treaty of defensive alliance signed, providing for mutual assistance in case of unprovoked aggression by Hungary.
- Sept. 7. *Franco-Belgian Mutual Assistance Pact*. Each nation to support the other in the event of an attack by Germany.
- Oct. 7. *Lithuania-Poland*. The two states agree to accept the Curzon Line as a boundary, giving Vilna to Lithuania.
- Oct. 9. *Lithuania-Poland*. Gen. Zeligowski seizes Vilna for Poland.
- Oct. 14. *Treaty of Dorpat*, signed by Russia and Finland. Defines Russo-Finnish boundary.
- Oct. 15. *China*. Agreement for Bankers' Consortium concluded. American, British, French, and Japanese banking groups agree to allow one another equal participation in any loans to China that shall be concluded.
- Oct. 27. *Danzig*. Act of the Council of Ambassadors constitutes Danzig a free city.
- Oct. 28. *Rumania*. Treaty signed by Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Rumania recognizes Rumanian sovereignty over Bessarabia.
- Nov. 9. *Polish-Danzig Agreement*. Poland to control the foreign relations and commercial customs of Danzig; neither party to discriminate against the nationals of the other within its borders.

- 1920 Nov. 12. *Italy-Yugoslavia*. Treaty signed ceding Zara, on the Dalmatian coast, to Italy; Fiume to be a free city.
- Nov. 14. *Russia*. Gen. Wrangel and remnants of his White army take refuge on French warships as Soviet forces enter Sebastopol.
- Nov. 17. *Danzig*. Constitution of Danzig placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.
- Nov. 29. *Russia*. All industrial enterprises employing more than ten people nationalized.
- Dec. 6. *Great Britain - Ireland*. Irish Free State established by treaty between Great Britain and the greater part of Ireland. The Free State to have the same status as a self-governing dominion.
- 1921 Jan. 18. *Italy-Yugoslavia*. Italian troops occupy Fiume.
- Jan. 25. *China-Russia*. Canton government receives diplomatic representatives from Russia.
- Feb. 19. *Franco-Polish Alliance*. Treaty signed providing for co-operation in upholding existing treaty obligations and mutual support in case either party is attacked.
- March 3. *Polish-Rumanian Alliance*. Provides for mutual assistance in case of unprovoked aggression against either party on their eastern frontiers.
- March 4. *United States*. Inauguration of President Harding.
- March 8. *Germany*. Allied troops occupy Düsseldorf, Duisburg, and Ruhrort due to German default on reparations payments.
- March 16. *Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement*. British blockade of Russia to be raised; Russian propaganda in Great Britain prohibited.
- March 17. *Russia*. First NEP decree. Commandeering of agricultural products replaced by an agricultural tax.
- March 18. *Treaty of Riga*. Peace treaty following Russo-Polish hostilities. Boundary defined.
- March 26 - April 1. *Hungary*. Attempted restoration of King Charles fails.
- April 7. *China*. Sun Yat-sen elected President of China by the Canton Parliament.
- April 23. *Little Entente*. Treaty of alliance between Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The two states agree to co-operate to uphold the Treaty of Trianon and render each other military assistance in case of unprovoked aggression by Hungary.
- April 27. *Germany*. Reparations Commission fixes total German reparations at 132 billion gold marks (about \$33,000,000,000).
- April 30. *Austria*. League of Nations takes over management of Austrian finances.
- May 5. *Germany*. Allied ultimatum demands acceptance of London Schedule of reparations on penalty of occupation of the Ruhr.
- May 11. *Germany*. London Schedule of reparations payments accepted.
- May 19. *United States*. Immigration Act passed, limiting the number of aliens from any country to be admitted in any year to 3% of their number resident in this country in 1910.
- June 7. *Little Entente*. Treaty signed by Rumania and Yugoslavia providing for co-operation in upholding the Treaties of Trianon and Neuilly and for mutual assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by either Hungary or Bulgaria.
- June 20 - Aug. 5. *British Empire*. First postwar Imperial Conference. Dominions gain recognition of right to share in shaping British foreign policy.

- 1921 June 24. *Finland-Sweden*. League of Nations hands down decision in Aaland Islands controversy. Islands to be autonomous under Finnish sovereignty.
- July 25-28. *Helsingfors Conference*. Attended by Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. Protocol signed providing for periodical conferences of the foreign ministers of the participating states.
- Aug. 25. *Germany - United States*. Peace treaty signed, officially ending World War hostilities.
- Sept. 22. *League of Nations*. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia admitted to the League of Nations.
- Oct. 11. *China*. Canton government declares war on the Peking government.
- Oct. 21 - Nov. 1. *Hungary*. Second attempt of King Charles to regain the Hungarian throne fails.
- Nov. 5. *Yugoslavia*. Accession of King Alexander.
- Nov. 6. *Italy*. National Fascist Party constituted.
- Nov. 12. *Albania*. *De jure* recognition accorded to Albania by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.
- Nov. 12 - Feb. 6, 1922. *Washington Conference*. Meeting of five Great Powers—United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—plus the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, and China, on invitation of the United States, to settle outstanding problems in the Pacific and limit naval armaments.
- Dec. 13. *Four-Power Pacific Treaty*. Signed at Washington Conference by Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States. Signatories to respect each other's existing rights in the Pacific islands. Any disputes arising between any of the parties to be settled by a conference of all the signatories. Threatened aggression in the Pacific by any outside power to be met by united action.
- Dec. 16. *Austria-Czechoslovakia*. Non-aggression treaty signed.
- 1922 Jan. 6-13. *Cannes Conference*. Meeting of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Japan, and Germany to discuss reparations. Decision reached to call a conference on economic reconstruction at Genoa.
- Feb. 4. *Shantung Treaty*, signed at Washington Conference by Japan and China. Provides for the return of Shantung to China by Japan.
- Feb. 6. *Washington Naval Treaty*. Ratio of capital ship tonnage for the five great naval powers fixed as follows: Great Britain, 5; United States, 5; Japan, 3; France, $1\frac{3}{4}$; Italy, $1\frac{3}{4}$. No new capital ships to be built for ten years, and no new naval bases to be established in the Pacific.
- Feb. 6. *Nine-Power Treaty*. The states represented in the Washington Conference agree to maintain Chinese sovereignty and preserve equal opportunity for economic enterprise among all foreign nations in China.
- Feb. 28. *Egypt - Great Britain*. Termination of the British protectorate over Egypt with certain reservations as to protection of British interests in Egypt, the Sudan, and the Suez Canal.
- March 13-17. *Warsaw Conference*, meeting of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. Treaty signed providing for mutual preservation of neutrality in case any of the parties is attacked. (Not ratified by Finland.)
- April 10 - May 19. *Genoa Conference*. Meeting of thirty European states and the British dominions to discuss European economic reconstruction and a renewal of relations with Russia. No agreement.
- April 16. *Treaty of Rapallo*, signed by Germany and Russia. Provides for mutual renunciation of reparations, resumption of diplomatic relations, and mutual steps to facilitate trade between the two nations.
- May 15. *Polish-German Convention*. Provides for economic and political co-operation in the administration of Upper Silesia; to be in force fifteen years.

- 1922 July 12. *Germany*. Request made to the Allies for a two and one-half year moratorium on cash reparations payments.
- Aug. 1. *Balfour Note*. Great Britain offers to restrict sum demanded for reparations and war debt payments to sum she must pay the United States on war debt account.
- Aug. 1-5. *Italy*. General strikes broken by Fascists.
- Aug. 31. *Germany* is granted a six months moratorium on cash reparations payments.
- Oct. 25. *Japan-Russia*. Last Japanese troops evacuate Russian mainland.
- Oct. 28. *Italy*. Fascist march on Rome.
- Oct. 30. *Italy*. Mussolini invited by King to form a cabinet; becomes Premier.
- Nov. 14. *Russia*. National Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic votes for union with Russia.
- Nov. 25. *Italy*. Mussolini cabinet voted full powers of government for one year by the Italian Parliament.
- Dec. 30. *Declaration and Treaty of the U.S.S.R.* Russia, the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Transcaucasian Federation united.
- 1923 Jan. 9. *Germany*. Reparations Commission declares Germany to be in default on reparations payments.
- Jan. 11. *France-Germany*. French and Belgian troops occupy the Ruhr due to default in German reparations payments, as provided by the Versailles Treaty.
- Jan. 15. *Germany-Lithuania*. Lithuania seizes Memel.
- Jan. 31. *Great Britain - United States*. British war debt funding agreement ratified.
- March 15. *Lithuania-Poland*. Council of Ambassadors draws new Polish-Lithuanian boundary, giving Vilna to Poland.
- March 25 - May 3. *Fifth Pan-American Conference*, held at Santiago, Chile.
- April 14. *Japan - United States*. Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 (Nov. 2) canceled by the Hughes-Hanihara Notes.
- July 6. *Russia*. Constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted by approval of the Central Executive Committee.
- July 24. *Treaty of Lausanne*, peace settlement between the Allies and the new Turkish Nationalist government to replace the Treaty of Sèvres. Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, and Arabia to be free from Turkish control; Turkey to surrender all territory in Europe except East Thrace; the Dodecanese Islands and Rhodes to be ceded to Italy; all other Turkish Aegean islands to be ceded to Greece.
- Aug. 2. *United States*. Death of President Harding; succeeded by Vice-President Coolidge.
- Aug. 13. *Turkey*. Mustapha Kemal elected President.
- Aug. 14. *Straits Convention*, signed supplementary to the Treaty of Lausanne. Zone of the Straits at Constantinople to be demilitarized and open to ships of all nations in time of peace or war, unless Turkey is a belligerent. In this case neutral vessels shall continue to have free passage.
- Aug. 27 - Sept. 9. *Corfu Incident*. Gen. Tellini and other Italian members of the Greco-Albanian Boundary Commission assassinated on Greek territory. Italy bombards Corfu as a reprisal. As Italy refuses to allow League intervention, the dispute is referred to the Council of Ambassadors, which renders a satisfactory settlement.
- Sept. 1. *Japan*. Great earthquake and tidal wave devastates Tokyo, Yokohama, and Yokosuka, and wipes out many villages.

- 1923 Sept. 13. *Spain*. Gen. Primo de Rivera overthrows Spanish government and establishes a military dictatorship.
- Sept. *China-Russia*. Michael Borodin sent by the Russian government to act as advisor to the Kuomintang.
- Nov. 1. *Estonia-Latvia*. Treaty providing for defensive alliance and customs union signed.
- Nov. 8. *Germany: Beer Hall Putsch*. Adolph Hitler and General Ludendorff seize government of Munich; but the uprising is suppressed by government troops.
- Nov. 14. *Italy*. Acerbo Election law passed; provides that any party polling a plurality of votes in a national election shall have two thirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
- 1924 Jan. 1. *Japan*. New cabinet formed under Viscount Kiyoura.
- Jan. 21. *Russia*. Death of Lenin. Supreme power devolves upon the Central Committee of the Communist Party, composed of Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Stalin.
- Jan. 21-28. *China*. First National Congress of the Kuomintang meets in Canton. Sun Yat-sen elected President. Constitution adopted, admitting Chinese communists to membership.
- Jan. 22. *Great Britain*. Labor-Liberal coalition Government formed with Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister.
- Jan. 25. *Franco-Czechoslovakian Alliance*. Treaty signed providing for mutual assistance in case of unprovoked aggression, and for co-operation to uphold the peace treaties and to prevent a Hapsburg restoration in either Austria or Hungary.
- Jan. 27. *Italy-Yugoslavia*. Treaty signed providing that Fiume be annexed to Italy with a free customs zone and other special commercial facilities for Yugoslav nationals. Italo-Yugoslav boundary defined.
- Feb. 1. *Great Britain - Russia*. Great Britain accords *de jure* recognition to the Soviet government.
- March 15. *Memel*. Convention for the government of Memel signed by Lithuania, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. The territory to be "a unit enjoying legislative, administrative, and financial autonomy under the sovereignty of Lithuania," organized on democratic principles.
- March 25. *Greece*. King George deposed and Republic proclaimed.
- April 6. *Italy*. Fascists gain 64% of popular vote in general elections.
- May 11. *France*. Electoral victory of the Left Coalition.
- May 26. *United States*. Immigration Act passed, reducing the number of aliens of any country to be admitted in any year to 2% of the number residing in this country in 1890, and totally excluding the yellow race.
- May 31. *Sino-Russian Agreement*. Normal diplomatic relations re-established between China and Russia; all Czarist treaties with China affecting her sovereign rights to be void; Russian troops to be withdrawn from Mongolia; and each country to refrain from spreading propaganda against the institutions of the other. China eventually to purchase the Chinese Eastern Railroad with Chinese funds and meanwhile maintain administrative authority over it.
- June 6. *Japan*. Resignation of Kiyoura ministry.
- June 11. *Japan*. Viscount Kato forms a new coalition cabinet.
- June 16. *Italy*. Matteotti, leader of the Socialist opposition, murdered by Fascists.
- July 15. *Great Britain - Italy*. Treaty signed ceding Jubaland to Italy.

- 1924 Aug. 30. *Dawes Plan*. Protocol signed in London by France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium providing that after a two-year reparations moratorium, Germany shall pay annual installments of \$625,000,000 on reparations account. No reduction made in total to be paid. Bank for International Settlements established to facilitate the transfer of funds.
- Sept. 20. *China-Russia*. Agreement signed between Chang Tso-lin and the Russian government, recognizing the autonomy of Manchuria.
- Oct. 2. *Geneva Protocol*, recommended for signature of member states by the League Assembly. All ratifying states to bind themselves to submit all disputes to some form of arbitration, the decision of the arbitral body to be accepted in all cases. Any signatory state not accepting such a decision to be treated as an aggressor under the League Covenant.
- Oct. 11. *Germany*. Currency stabilized and Reichsbank reconstituted with Dr. Schacht as President.
- Oct. 28. *France-Russia*. France accords *de jure* recognition to the Soviet government.
- Oct. 29. *Great Britain*. Labor Government defeated in election. New Conservative Government formed under Stanley Baldwin.
- Dec. 1. *Estonia*. Communist revolt suppressed.
- 1925 Jan. 15. *Russia*. Trotsky relieved of his duties as chairman of Revolutionary War Council by the Central Executive Committee.
- Jan. 17. *Baltic States*. Treaty of arbitration and conciliation signed by Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. Replaces treaty of March 17, 1922.
- Jan. 20. *Russo-Japanese Treaty*. Japan recognizes the government of Russia and agrees to withdraw her troops from North Sakhalin; Russia agrees to refrain from propaganda directed against the established institutions of Japan and to grant Japanese concessions for the exploitation of her economic resources.
- Feb. 1 - April 21. *China*. Reorganization Conference. War lords confer on the control and political organization of China. The Kuomintang does not participate.
- March 4. *United States*. Inauguration of President Coolidge.
- March 11. *Greece-Turkey*. World Court decision providing for an interchange of populations accepted.
- March 12. *China*. Death of Sun Yat-sen.
- April 22. *Japan*. Dangerous Thoughts Law enacted: all persons forbidden to join or form societies whose aim is the alteration of the national constitution or repudiation of the system of private ownership.
- April 23. *Czechoslovakia-Poland*. Treaty signed providing for the pacific settlement of all disputes arising between the two countries except those affecting their territorial status.
- April 28. *Great Britain*. Resumption of gold standard with pound at prewar parity.
- May 13. *Russia*. Trotsky reinstated in Soviet government.
- June 25. *Greece*. Coup d'état of Gen. Pangalos.
- July 4. *Declaration of Warsaw*. Agreement between the Polish government and the Polish Jews, the Jews promising to recognize their duties as Polish citizens in return for a greater measure of economic and social equality.
- July 26. *France-Spain*. Agreement concluded providing for military and naval co-operation against the Riffs in Morocco.
- July 31. *France-Germany*. French evacuation of the Ruhr completed.

- 1925 Oct. 16. *Locarno Treaties*. Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium guarantee the maintenance of existing Franco-German and Belgo-German frontiers and demilitarization of the Rhineland zone. France, Germany, and Belgium agree not to resort to war except in self-defense or under the League Covenant and to settle all disputes by arbitration.
- Nov. 14. *Italy*. "Battle of Wheat" begun, to make Italy self-sufficient in foodstuffs.
- Nov. 14. *Italy-United States*. War debt settlement reached. Total Italian debt to the United States reduced by 75% to \$2,042,000,000, to be paid in 62 annual installments.
- Nov. 25. *Norway-Sweden*. Treaty signed providing for compulsory arbitration of all disputes between the two nations.
- Dec. 14. *Bulgaria-Greece*. League of Nations renders decision in Greco-Bulgarian dispute. Greece to pay an indemnity for her invasion of Bulgaria.
- Dec. 17. *Russia-Turkey*. Treaty of neutrality and friendship signed.
- Dec. 24 and 31. *Italy*. Laws passed providing that no motion may come before Parliament without the approval of the Prime Minister; that insults to the head of the state shall be punished by severe penalties; and that the press shall be strictly regulated by the state.
- Dec. 31. *Rumania*. Crown Prince Carol renounces the throne and is succeeded by his four-year-old son, Prince Michael.
- 1926 Jan. 11. *Arabia*. Ibn Saud proclaimed king of Hejaz.
- Jan. 30. *Japan*. Reijiro Wakatsuki becomes Premier.
- March 26. *Poland-Rumania*. Treaty of alliance signed; provides that the parties shall come to each other's assistance if either is attacked; shall consult together in matters of mutual concern; and shall refrain from concluding an alliance with any third power without the consent of the other. The treaty to remain in force for five years.
- April 3. *Italy*. Collective Labor Relations Act passed. Thirteen syndicates established: six of employers, six of employees, and one of intellectuals. Compulsory arbitration of labor disputes provided for; strikes and lockouts prohibited.
- April 24. *Germany-Russia*. Treaty of neutrality signed. Provides that if either party should be attacked by a third power, the other will remain neutral and neither country will join any coalition to impose an economic boycott on the other.
- April 29. *Franco - United States*. Franco-American debt agreement signed. French debt reduced by 53%, to \$4,025,000,000, to be paid in 62 annual installments.
- May 12-14. *Poland*. Pilsudski seizes control of the Polish government.
- May 27. *Spain*. Surrender of Abd-el-Krim, Riff leader in Morocco, to the Spanish forces.
- June 10. *Franco-Rumania*. Franco-Rumanian alliance concluded. The parties agree to arbitrate all disputes, uphold the peace treaties, and render each other assistance if attacked.
- June 11. *China*. General Chiang Kai-shek assumes rank of Commander in Chief of Nationalist armies in Canton.
- June 13. *Little Entente*. Treaty of alliance between Czechoslovakia and Rumania renewed for three years.
- June 30. *Austria*. League-of-Nations control of Austrian finances ends.
- July 15. *China*. Sun Chuan-fang, Wu Pei-fu, and Chang Tso-lin open attack on Nationalist forces.

- 1926 July 23. *France*. Poincaré cabinet formed to combat financial crisis.
- Aug. 7. *Spain-Italy*. Spanish-Italian Neutrality Treaty. Each party agrees to maintain a benevolent neutrality if the other is attacked by a third state.
- Aug. 17. *Greece-Yugoslavia*. Treaty of alliance signed.
- Aug. 28. *China*. General Feng Yu-hsiang admitted to Kuomintang.
- Aug. 31. *Afghanistan-Russia*. Treaty of friendship, neutrality, and non-aggression signed.
- Sept. 2. *Italy-Yemen*. Treaty of friendship and commerce signed.
- Sept. 8. *Germany* admitted to the League of Nations with a permanent seat on the Council.
- Sept. 11. *Spain* announces its withdrawal from the League of Nations.
- Sept. 28. *Lithuania-Russia*. Nonaggression treaty signed.
- Oct. 21. *Latvia-Russia*. Treaty of arbitration and neutrality signed.
- Oct. 23. *Russia*. Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev expelled from the Political Bureau.
- Oct. 23. *Germany* declares her inability to meet reparations payments and asks examination of her capacity to pay.
- Nov. 12. *France*. French Chamber adopts Poincaré's financial program to check inflation.
- Nov. 27. *Albania-Italy*. Treaty of Tirana signed. The two parties agree to co-operate to preserve the political and territorial status quo in Albania. Italy to have the right to intervene in Albanian affairs upon the request of Albania.
- Dec. 17. *Lithuania*. Coup d'état of Valdemaras.
- Dec. 25. *Japan*. Death of Emperor Yoshihito. Succeeded by Prince Regent Hirohito.
- 1927 Feb. 9. *United States*. The British government having declined to accept the American reservations to World Court accession, the Senate votes to rescind action by which it assented to membership.
- March 7. *Nicaragua-United States*. 2,000 United States marines land in Nicaragua to support the government of President Diaz.
- March 21. *China*. Shanghai is taken by Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek.
- March 24. *China*. Nationalists enter Nanking, attacking and looting foreign consulates.
- April 5. *Hungary-Italy*. Treaty of friendship, conciliation, and arbitration signed.
- April 6-28. *China*. Arrest and execution of Chinese and Russian Communists in Shanghai and Canton on orders of Chiang Kai-shek.
- April 17. *Japan*. Resignation of Wakatsuki ministry.
- April 18. *Japan*. Baron Tanaka heads new ministry.
- April 25. *United States*. President Coolidge announces that the United States regards its interest in the Central American republics as that of a mandatory power.
- May 4-23. *International Economic Conference*, held at Geneva under auspices of the League of Nations. Attended by fifty nations, including Russia and the United States. Recommends a general lowering of tariff barriers, nationalization of certain industries to lower costs of production, international industrial agreements to eliminate undue competition and overproduction, and improved methods and better credit facilities for agriculture.

- 1927 May 26. *Great Britain - Russia*. Diplomatic relations with U.S.S.R. severed by Great Britain.
- June 20 - Aug. 5. *Geneva Naval Conference*. Great Britain, United States, and Japan meet on invitation of President Coolidge to discuss limitations on sub-capital ships. No agreement.
- June 24. *China*. Declaration of Chiang Kai-shek, demanding expulsion of communists from Kuomintang.
- July 20. *Rumania*. Death of King Ferdinand.
- Oct. 1. *Persia-Russia*. Nonaggression treaty signed.
- Nov. 11. *Franco-Yugoslavia*. Treaty of Alliance signed, by which the two parties agree to arbitrate all disputes; uphold the peace treaties, and assist each other if attacked.
- Nov. 15. *Russia*. Trotsky expelled from the Communist Party.
- Nov. 22. *Albania-Italy*. Defensive alliance concluded.
- Dec. 10. *Lithuania-Poland*. Polish and Lithuanian governments accept a resolution by the League Council declaring that a state of war no longer exists between Poland and Lithuania and that Poland agrees to respect the independence and integrity of Lithuania.
- Dec. 15. *China-Russia*. Chinese Nationalist government breaks off diplomatic relations with Russia.
- Dec. 22. *Italy*. Lira stabilized at 5.3c.
- Dec. 27. *Russia*. Communist Party expels Kamenev, Radek, Piatakov, and other Opposition leaders.
- 1928 Jan. 3. *Russia*. Trotsky and twenty-nine other expelled or suspended members of the Communist Party banished to the provinces.
- Jan. 16 - Feb. 20. *Sixth Pan-American Conference*, held at Havana.
- Jan. 29. *Germany-Lithuania*. Treaty of arbitration and conciliation signed.
- March 22. *Spain* withdraws its resignation from the League of Nations.
- May 15. *Lithuania*. New constitution promulgated, designating Vilna as the capital.
- May 30. *Italy-Turkey*. Treaty of nonaggression, arbitration, and conciliation signed.
- June 4. *China*. Chang Tso-lin killed; succeeded by Chang Hsueh-liang, his son.
- June 8. *China*. Nationalist troops capture Peking.
- June 20. *China*. Chang Hsueh-liang joins Nationalist government as governor of Fengtien province.
- June 24. *France*. Resumption of gold standard with franc stabilized at 4c.
- Aug. 27. *Kellogg Peace Pact*. Signed by the United States, France, the British Empire, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Japan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The parties renounce war as an instrument of national policy and agree to seek a solution for all disputes arising among them by pacific means. Treaty open to further signatures.
- Aug. 31. *Russia* declared adherence to the Kellogg Pact.
- Sept. 1. *Albania* becomes a kingdom under Zog I.
- Sept. 23. *Greece-Italy*. Treaty of friendship and arbitration signed.
- Oct. 1. *Russia*. First Five-Year Plan announced.
- Oct. 10. *China*. General Chiang Kai-shek inaugurated President of China. Organic Law of the National Government promulgated. Provides for temporary dictatorship of the Kuomintang until democratic rule can be instituted.

- 1928 Dec. 8. *Italy*. Law passed legalizing the Fascist Grand Council as "supreme organ which co-ordinates and embraces all the activities of the regime which issued from the revolution of October, 1922."
- 1929 Jan. 6. *Yugoslavia*. King Alexander announces the establishment of a dictatorship.
- Jan. 18. *Russia*. Trotsky expelled from the Soviet Union for "anti-Soviet activities."
- Feb. 6. *Germany* ratifies the Kellogg Pact.
- Feb. 9. *Litvinov Protocol*. Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Rumania sign a protocol putting the Kellogg Pact into effect immediately as among themselves.
- Feb. 11. *Italy*. Lateran Accord, signed by Italy and the Holy See. The Pope recognized as sovereign over the Vatican City, and the Italian government over the rest of Italy. The Catholic Church to be the state church of Italy and have control of the religious life of the nation, but the state to exercise supervision over its work to prevent undesirable political activity on the part of the Church.
- March 4. *United States*. Inauguration of President Hoover.
- March 6. *Bulgaria-Turkey*. New treaty of neutrality, conciliation, and arbitration signed.
- March 14 - June 3. *China: Kwangsi Rebellion*. Revolt of war lords against Nanking government crushed.
- May 21. *Little Entente*. Treaties of alliance renewed.
- May 30. *Great Britain*. Labor Party wins plurality in election and Ramsay MacDonald forms a Labor-Liberal Government.
- June 27. *Japan* ratifies the Kellogg Pact.
- July 2. *Japan*. Resignation of Baron Tanaka as Premier. Succeeded by Yuko Hamaguchi.
- Sept. 5. *League of Nations*. Briand presents plan for a European Federal Union to League Assembly.
- Sept. 14 - Dec. 13. *France - Germany - Great Britain*. British and French troops evacuate Rhineland.
- Oct. 31. *Germany*. Death of Gustav Stresemann, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Nov. 5. *Great Britain - Russia*. Diplomatic relations with Russia renewed by Great Britain.
- Dec. 17. *Russia-Turkey*. Neutrality treaty of 1925 (Dec. 17) renewed.
- 1930 Jan. 20. *Young Plan* adopted. Total German reparations, including interest, fixed at \$26,350,000,000 payable over 58 years in installments of about \$500,000,000 a year. Of this, about \$165,000,000 "unconditional"; remainder postponable, if payment threatens German gold reserve. Any reduction in inter-Allied debts to be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in reparations.
- Jan. 21 - April 22. *London Naval Conference*. Called to continue provisions of the Washington Treaty (1922) and extend limitations to all classes of ships. Agreement finally signed by Great Britain, United States, and Japan. Provided for distribution of auxiliary ship tonnage in ratio of 5.4 for Great Britain, 5.3 for the United States, and 3.7 for Japan. No new capital ships to be built until 1936. Agreement not to hold if smaller naval powers should begin to increase their tonnage.
- Jan. 28. *Spain*. Resignation of Primo de Rivera as dictator.
- Jan. 30. *Spain*. General Berenguer becomes dictator.

- 1930 Feb. 2. *Russia*. Decree authorizing confiscation of property of kulaks marks opening of drive for farm collectivization.
- March 7. *Germany*. Dr. Hjalmar Schacht resigns as President of the Reichsbank in protest against the Young Plan.
- March 11. *Germany*. Reichstag ratifies the Young Plan.
- March 27 - 30. *Germany*. Chancellor Mueller's coalition cabinet resigns; succeeded by Brüning government.
- April 16. *Great Britain - Russia*. Provisional trade agreement signed.
- April 18. *China - Great Britain*. Convention for return of Weihaiwei to China signed.
- May 6. *China-Japan*. Sino-Japanese Tariff Agreement provides for Chinese tariff autonomy and mutual most-favored-nation treatment.
- May 14. *Bulgaria-Czechoslovakia*. Treaty of friendship and nonaggression signed.
- June 8. *Rumania*. Prince Carol returns to Bucharest and is proclaimed King by the Rumanian Parliament.
- June 10. *Greece-Turkey*. Treaty regarding exchange of populations signed.
- June 14. *United States*. President Hoover signs Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.
- June 30. *Germany*. Allied troops complete evacuation of the Rhineland.
- July 21. *Russia*. Litvinov succeeds Chicherin as Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- Aug. 2. *Italy-Russia*. Reciprocal trade agreement signed.
- Sept. 14. *Germany*. General election supports Brüning government, but National Socialists win 107 seats, and Communists 77, in Reichstag.
- Oct. 1 - Nov. 14. *British Empire*. Imperial Conference. Balfour report accepted, declaring members of the Empire to be autonomous states united only by allegiance to the crown.
- Oct. 5-12. *First Balkan Conference*. Attended by representatives of Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Albania.
- Nov. 14. *Japan*. Assassination of Premier Hamaguchi.
- Dec. 4. *France*. Resignation of the Tardieu government.
- Dec. 18-22. *Oslo Economic Conference*. Attended by Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, who agree by a convention to notify each other of any proposed new or higher tariff rates.
- 1931 Jan. 27. *France*. Laval forms new cabinet.
- Feb. 14. *Spain*. Resignation of General Berenguer as Spanish dictator.
- March 7. *Russo-Turkish Naval Protocol*. Each party agrees to give the other six months' notice before increasing its naval forces in the Black Sea.
- March 21. *Austria-Germany*. Agreement for a customs union announced.
- April 14. *Germany-Russia*. Agreement signed by which Germany extends credits to Russia for the purchase of German goods.
- April 14. *Spain*. Republic proclaimed under Zamora.
- April 28. *Italy-Russia*. Agreement signed extending credits to Russia for the purchase of Italian goods, a renewal and expansion of the commercial treaty of Aug. 2, 1930.
- May 6. *Lithuania-Russia*. Nonaggression treaty renewed for five years.
- May 11. *Austria*. Failure of the Credit-Anstalt in Vienna.
- June 24. *Afghanistan-Russia*. Neutrality and nonaggression treaty signed to replace treaty of Aug. 31, 1926.
- July 6. *Hoover Moratorium*. On the initiative of President Hoover, all reparations and war debt payments are postponed for one year.

- 1931 July 25. *Poland-Russia*. Nonaggression treaty signed.
 Aug. 25. *Great Britain*. Formation of National Government to combat financial and economic crisis.
 Sept. 3. *Austria-Germany*. Germany and Austria agree to abandon the Customs Union proposed March 21.
 Sept. 9. *Germany: Standstill Agreement*. Foreign creditors extend all existing short-term commercial credits to Germans for six months.
 Sept. 18. *China-Japan*. Dynamiting of a section of the South Manchuria Railway precipitates Sino-Japanese conflict. On Sept. 19 Mukden is bombarded and occupied by Japanese forces, and on Sept. 22 the League Council meets to consider the Sino-Japanese crisis over the situation in Manchuria.
 Sept. 20. *Great Britain*. Abandonment of the gold standard.
 Sept. 27. *Norway*. Gold standard abandoned.
 Sept. 29. *Denmark*. Gold standard abandoned.
 Oct. 13. *Spain*. Cortes votes for separation of the Church and State.
 Oct. 13. *Finland*. Gold standard abandoned.
 Oct. 16. *United States* accepts the League of Nations invitation to have a representative participate in a consideration of the Manchurian dispute.
 Oct. 23-25. *Hoover-Laval Conversations*. Laval agrees to have French capital withdrawals from the United States cease; Hoover admits that there is an intimate relation between reparations and war debts, and that any future moves such as the Hoover Moratorium should come from Europe.
 Oct. 27. *Great Britain*. Overwhelming electoral victory of National Government over Liberal and Labor opposition.
 Oct. 30. *Russia-Turkey*. Treaty of friendship and neutrality renewed for five years.
 Dec. 9. *Spain*. Cortes approves new Republican Constitution.
 Dec. 10. *Great Britain*. Statute of Westminster. Law passed by Parliament establishes principle that British Commonwealth is a union of equal and independent nations.
- 1932 Jan. 7. *The Stimson Doctrine*. American Secretary of State Stimson announces in a note to Japan that the United States will not recognize the legality of any situation or treaty resulting from action taken in violation of the Kellogg Pact.
 Jan. 12. *France*. Premier Laval and cabinet resign. New cabinet immediately formed with Laval as Premier and Foreign Minister.
 Jan. 21. *Finland-Russia*. Nonaggression treaty signed.
 Jan. 23. *Spain*. Decree signed dissolving the Jesuit order in Spain.
 Jan. 28 - 29. *China-Japan*. Japanese troops attack and occupy Chapei district in Shanghai.
 Feb. 2 - May 30, 1934. *World Disarmament Conference*. Sixty nations meet at Geneva to institute general disarmament in accordance with the League Covenant; but no agreement is reached.
 Feb. 5. *Latvia-Russia*. Nonaggression treaty signed.
 Feb. 18. *Manchuria* reorganized as the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo.
 Feb. 21. *France*. Tardieu becomes Premier and Foreign Minister.
 March 3. *League of Nations*. League Assembly meets to consider Manchurian crisis.
 March 9. *Manchukuo*. Henry Pu Yi crowned Emperor of Manchukuo, with the support of the Japanese government.

- 1932 March 14. *Poland*. Parliament passes legislation authorizing presidential decrees with the force of law for three years.
- April 10. *Germany*. Hindenburg victorious over Hitler (National Socialist, or Nazi) and Thalman (Communist) in presidential election.
- April 13. *Germany*. President Hindenburg issues decree abolishing National Socialist Storm Troops.
- May 4. *Estonia-Russia*. Nonaggression treaty signed.
- May 5. *China-Japan*. Agreement reached for cessation of hostilities around Shanghai.
- May 9. *Little Entente*. Treaty of alliance renewed.
- May 10. *France*. Resignation of the Tardieu government.
- May 15. *Japan*. Assassination of Premier Inukai.
- May 26. *Japan*. Saito cabinet assumes office.
- May 30. *Germany*. Dr. Brüning's government resigns.
- June 2. *Germany*. Von Papen becomes Chancellor.
- June 4. *France*. Herriot succeeds Tardieu as Premier.
- June 15. *Germany-Russia*. Trade agreement signed providing for extension of German credits to Russia for the purchase of German goods.
- July 8. *Lausanne Reparations Agreement*. Germany to be released from all further reparations on payment of lump sum of \$714,000,000 in 5% redeemable bonds; this agreement, however, to be contingent on a satisfactory debt settlement between the former Allies and the United States. (Not ratified.)
- July 18. *Canada - United States*. St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty signed. (Not ratified.)
- July 21 - Aug. 20. *Ottawa Conference*. Economic conference of the members of the British Commonwealth. Twelve bilateral trade treaties signed, based on the principle of imperial preference.
- July 25. *Poland-Russia*. Nonaggression treaty signed.
- Sept. 15. *Japan-Manchukuo Protocol*. Japan recognizes independence of Manchukuo and in return is granted certain special privileges, including the right to station troops at any desired point in Manchukuo.
- Sept. 21. *Hungary*. Count Karolyi and cabinet resign.
- Sept. 30. *Hungary*. Goemboes becomes Premier.
- Oct. 2. *Manchukuo*. Lytton Report on Sino-Japanese dispute made public.
- Nov. 2. *Poland*. Foreign Minister Zaleski resigns; succeeded by Colonel Beck.
- Nov. 17. *Germany*. Fall of the Von Papen government. Reichstag dissolved.
- Nov. 21. *Germany*. Hitler refuses a post in a coalition cabinet.
- Nov. 29. *Franco-Russia*. Nonaggression and conciliation treaty signed.
- Dec. 3. *Germany*. Formation of cabinet under General von Schleicher.
- Dec. 12. *China-Russia*. Diplomatic relations renewed.
- Dec. 14. *France*. Resignation of the Herriot government.
- Dec. 15. *United States*. France, Poland, Belgium, Estonia, and Hungary default in war debt payments to the United States.
- Dec. 18. *France*. Paul-Boncour takes office as Premier and Foreign Minister.
- Dec. 31. *Russia*. First Five-Year Plan completed.
- 1933 Jan. 28. *Germany*. Resignation of Chancellor von Schleicher.
- Jan. 29-31. *France*. Daladier government formed, succeeding that of Paul-Boncour.
- Jan. 30. *Germany*. Hitler becomes Chancellor of the Reich.

- 1933 Feb. 16. *Little Entente Pact (or Statute)*. Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia agree to the closest collaboration in foreign affairs; Permanent Council of Foreign Ministers established as a unifying organ.
- Feb. 24. *Manchukuo*. League of Nations unanimously declares Japan aggressor in Manchuria, and recommends to its members nonrecognition of Manchukuo.
- Feb. 27. *Germany*. Burning of the Reichstag building.
- March 4. *United States*. President Franklin D. Roosevelt inaugurated.
- March 5. *Germany*. National Socialists and Nationalists win majority in election.
- March 11-12. *Great Britain - Russia*. Six British engineers employed in the Soviet Union arrested by the OGPU on charges of bribery, espionage, and sabotage.
- March 16. *Germany*. Dr. Schacht returns as Chairman of the Reichsbank to succeed Dr. Luther.
- March 21. *Germany*. Reichstag passes enabling act, giving the Hitler government dictatorial powers for four years.
- March 27. *Japan* announces its withdrawal from the League of Nations.
- April 19 - July 1. *Great Britain - Russia*. British embargo instituted on importation of Russian goods.
- April 19. *United States*. The United States goes off the gold standard.
- April 22 - July 1. *Great Britain - Russia*. Russian counter-embargo placed on British goods.
- April 24. *Great Britain - Denmark*. Reciprocal trade agreement signed.
- May 5. *Germany-Russia*. Neutrality agreement of April 24, 1926, renewed.
- May 6. *Italy-Russia*. Tariff convention and agreement for the guarantee of credits signed.
- May 15. *Great Britain - Sweden*. Reciprocal trade agreement signed.
- May 17. *Germany* demands equality in armaments at Disarmament Conference.
- May 28. *Danzig*. Nazis gain a majority in the Volkstag elections.
- May 31. *China-Japan: Tangku Truce*. China and Japan terminate hostilities in Manchuria. Japanese troops to be withdrawn north of the Great Wall; demilitarized zone created between the Wall and the Tientsin-Peking line.
- June 12-Aug. 27. *World Economic Conference*. Sixty-six nations meet at London to discuss measures for economic recovery. Agreements signed to limit production of wheat and silver.
- June 15. *United States*. Partial war debt payments made by Great Britain, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Latvia. Finland pays in full. All other debtor nations default.
- June 21. *Danzig Enabling Act*. Volkstag gives the executive full power to govern by decree.
- June 22. *Germany*. Dissolution of the Social-Democratic Party by government decree.
- July 3. *Eastern Nonaggression Pact*, signed by Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, and Russia at the World Economic Conference in London.
- July 4. *Little Entente - Russia*. Convention of nonaggression concluded between Russia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
- July 5. *Lithuania-Russia*. Treaty of nonaggression signed.
- July 15. *Four-Power Treaty* signed for co-operation of Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy to promote peace and stability in Europe. (Not ratified.)

- 1933 Aug. 5. *Polish-Danzig Agreement*. Regulates the position of Polish nationals in Danzig and use of the port by Poland.
- Sept. 2. *Italy-Russia*. Treaty of friendship, neutrality, and nonaggression signed.
- Sept. 14. *Greco-Turkish Treaty*. Two parties mutually guarantee their common frontier; agree on collaboration in international conferences.
- Oct. 14. *Germany* withdraws from Disarmament Conference and announces withdrawal from the League of Nations.
- Oct. 27. *France*. Sarraut government succeeds that of Daladier.
- Nov. 12. *Germany*. Plebiscite approves Hitler's foreign policy by vote of 90%.
- Nov. 16. *Russia - United States*. Diplomatic relations established between the Soviet government and the United States.
- Nov. 27. *France*. Chautemps government succeeds that of Sarraut.
- Dec. 3-26. *Seventh Pan-American Conference*, in Montevideo, Uruguay. Declaration of "Good Neighbor" policy by President Roosevelt, renouncing right of United States intervention in Latin America.
- Dec. 10. *Italy*. National Council of Corporations takes over control of the economic life of the state.
- Dec. 30. *France*. Stavisky scandal reveals corruption among high government officials.
- 1934 Jan. 26. *Germany-Poland*. Ten-year pact of nonaggression signed.
- Jan. 30. *France*. Daladier government formed; succeeds that of Chautemps.
- Jan. 31. *United States*. Dollar reduced to 59% of its former gold value.
- Feb. 6. *France*. Riots between extreme Right and Left factions result in resignation of the Daladier government.
- Feb. 8. *France*. National Union cabinet formed under Doumergue with Barthou as Foreign Minister.
- Feb. 9. *Balkan Pact*, signed by Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Turkey. Pledges mutual consultation and co-operation in their common concerns, and a mutual guarantee of the security of all their Balkan frontiers.
- Feb. 12-17. *Austria*. Dollfuss government crushes the Social Democrats in a bloody struggle in Vienna.
- Feb. 16. *Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement*. Provides for equalization of Anglo-Russian trade by 1938.
- Feb. 17. *Estonia-Latvia*. Agreement signed for co-operation at international conferences, for representation by a common delegation, and for the establishment of a permanent council to co-ordinate Estonian and Latvian legislation.
- March 12. *League of Nations*. League Commission abandons efforts of conciliation between Bolivia and Paraguay in Chaco War.
- March 12. *Estonia*. Martial law declared in Estonia on the grounds of danger of a Nazi coup.
- March 17. *Rome Protocols*, signed by Italy, Austria, and Hungary. The three states pledge collaboration in their foreign policies and conclude agreements to increase their reciprocal trade.
- March 24. *United States*. Philippine Independence Bill, granting full independence to the Islands in ten years, enacted.
- April 4. *Baltic States - Russia*. Nonaggression treaties between Russia and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania renewed until 1945.
- April 6. *Finland-Russia*. Nonaggression treaty renewed until 1945.

- 1934 April 13. *United States*. The Johnson Act forbids dealings in the obligations of any foreign government that is in default in payments due on its debts to the United States.
- May 5. *Poland-Russia*. Soviet-Polish nonaggression treaty renewed until 1945.
- May 19. *Bulgaria*. Dictatorship under Gueorguiev established by coup d'état.
- May 29. *Cuba - United States*. Treaty regulating relations between the United States and Cuba signed, abrogating the Treaty of 1903 containing the Platt Amendment.
- June 9. *Rumania-Russia*. Rumania recognizes the Soviet government.
- June 9. *Czechoslovakia-Russia*. Czechoslovakia establishes diplomatic relations with Russia.
- June 12. *United States*. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act authorizes the President to negotiate trade agreements with foreign governments for a period of three years. By these agreements United States tariff rates may be raised or lowered by not more than 50%.
- June 14-16. *Germany-Italy*. Conference between Hitler and Mussolini in Venice.
- June 14. *Germany* suspends cash payments on all foreign debts.
- June 16. *United States*. Silver Purchase Act requires the government to purchase silver on the market until one fourth of the value of the monetary metals of the United States is in silver or until the price of silver is more than \$1.29 per ounce.
- June 30. *Germany: Nazi Blood Purge*. Dissident elements in the Nazi party, including General von Schleicher, are assassinated.
- July 3. *Japan*. Resignation of Saito cabinet.
- July 7. *Japan*. Coalition government under Admiral Okada takes office.
- July 25. *Austria*. Assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss by Nazis. Italian troops mobilized on the Austrian border to prevent a Nazi coup.
- July 30. *Great Britain*. Stanley Baldwin, President of the Council, declares the Rhine to be Britain's military frontier.
- Aug. 2. *Germany*. Death of President von Hindenburg.
- Aug. 2. *Germany*. Dr. Schacht appointed Minister of Economics.
- Aug. 19. *Germany*. Consolidation of offices of President and Chancellor approved by popular vote, these offices being held by Hitler.
- Sept. 10. *Germany* formally rejects an "Eastern Locarno" Pact.
- Sept. 12. *Baltic Pact*. Treaty for mutual understanding and agreement on foreign political questions of mutual importance, signed by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
- Sept. 18. *Russia* admitted to the League of Nations.
- Oct. 9. *France*. Assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Foreign Minister Barthou at Marseille.
- Nov. 9. *France*. Flandin government succeeds that of Doumergue.
- Dec. 1. *Russia*. Assassination of Kirov, member of the Political Bureau of the Soviet government.
- Dec. 5. *Ual Ual Incident*. Italian and Ethiopian troops clash in disputed border area.
- Dec. 14 - Mar. 25, 1935. *Lithuania*. Kaunas Trial: 126 Lithuanian Nazis tried on charge of planning a Nazi coup in Memel.
- Dec. 23. *Hungary-Russia*. Hungary resumes diplomatic relations with Russia.
- Dec. 29. *Japan* files notice she will withdraw from Washington Naval Treaty in 1936.

- 1935 Jan. 3. *Ethiopia* appeals to the League of Nations for action under Article XI of the Covenant to settle the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.
- Jan. 7. *Franco-Italian Pact*. Settles boundary between Libya and French African possessions. France cedes 44,500 square miles to Italy; the two states agree to co-operate to maintain Austrian independence.
- Jan. 13. *Germany*. The Saar plebiscite, held in accordance with the Versailles Treaty, under control of the League of Nations, gives the Saar to Germany by overwhelming vote.
- Jan. 28. *United States* becomes a member of the International Labor Office.
- Jan. 29. *United States*. The Senate rejects ratification of United States adherence to the World Court.
- Jan. 31. *Russia - United States*. Final breakdown of Russian-American negotiations for settlement of debt question and extension of American commercial credits to Russia.
- Feb. 10. *Ethiopia-Italy*. Italian mobilization against Ethiopia announced.
- Feb. 14-16. *Scandinavian Economic Conference*. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland confer at Stockholm.
- Feb. 27. *Belgium - United States*. Reciprocal trade agreement signed.
- March 9. *Germany*. Foreign attachés in Berlin informed that German air force had come into existence officially as from March 1.
- March 16. *Germany* announces a reinstitution of military conscription, in contravention of the Versailles Treaty.
- March 23. *Japan-Russia*. Sale of Russian rights in Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchukuo.
- April 7. *Danzig Election*. Nazis poll 59% of vote, thus failing to gain a two-thirds majority in the Volkstag.
- April 11-14. *Sresa Conference*. British, French, and Italian governments denounce German rearmament and agree to co-operate to uphold European peace.
- April 18. *Japan: Amai Declaration*. The Japanese foreign office announces that Japan assumes sole responsibility for the maintenance of order in China.
- May 2. *Franco-Russian Treaty of Mutual Assistance (or Security Pact)*. Provides for immediate consultation as to enforcement of Article X of the League Covenant in case either party is threatened by aggression. If the League Council is unable to reach a unanimous decision as to the dispute, the parties are mutually obligated to assist each other in case either is the victim of unprovoked aggression by a European state.
- May 12. *Poland*. Death of Pilsudski, Polish dictator; succeeded by General Smigly-Rydz.
- May 16. *Czechoslovak-Russian Mutual Assistance Treaty*. Provides that if either state is the victim of unprovoked aggression, it shall be supported by the other, on condition that the victim of aggression also receive aid from France.
- May 17. *Poland*. New constitution inaugurated, concentrating power in the hands of the President.
- May 25. *Sweden - United States*. Reciprocal trade agreement signed.
- May 31. *Franco*. Flandin government resigns.
- June 4. *Japan-Russia*. Mongolian-Manchukuoan Mixed Commission, with Japanese and Russian advisors, set up to settle border disputes.
- June 7. *Franco*. Laval government formed.
- June 7. *Great Britain*. Ramsay MacDonald resigns as Prime Minister; succeeded by Stanley Baldwin.

- 1935 June 10. *China-Japan*. Ho-Umezu Agreement: China agrees to take certain steps demanded by the Japanese to lessen Chinese opposition to Japanese activities in North China and Manchukuo.
- June 18. *Anglo-German Naval Agreement*. Total German naval tonnage not to exceed 35% of that of the British Commonwealth.
- July 13. *Soviet-American Trade Agreement*. The United States agrees to extend to Russia all reductions in duties effected under the Trade Agreements Act of 1934; Russia to increase "substantially" her purchases in the United States.
- July 25 - Aug. 20. *Russia*. First meeting of the Third (Communist) International since 1928. Decision taken to co-operate with non-Communist, anti-Fascist groups to combat Fascism.
- Aug. 24. *United States Neutrality Resolution*. Provides for an embargo on the shipment of munitions of war to belligerents after the President has recognized a state of war to exist between them.
- Sept. 4. *Ethiopia-Italy*. Ual Ual commission reports neither Italy nor Ethiopia responsible for clash.
- Sept. 18. *Ethiopia-Italy*. League Committee of Five presents proposals for settlement of the Ethiopian dispute. Accepted by Ethiopia; rejected by Italy.
- Oct. 10. *Greece*. Coup d'état in Greece re-establishes monarchy.
- Oct. 11. *Italy*. League of Nations declares Italy to be the aggressor in the Italo-Ethiopian War; establishes an arms embargo against her.
- Oct. 17. *Austria*. Schuschnigg becomes Chancellor, with Prince Starhemberg as Vice-Chancellor.
- Oct. 26. *Great Britain - Italy*. Great Britain bans arms exports to Italy and imposes financial sanctions.
- Nov. 3. *China* abandons the silver standard.
- Nov. 14. *Great Britain*. General election supports the National Government.
- Nov. 15. *Canada - United States*. Reciprocal trade agreement signed.
- Nov. 18. *Italy*. Economic sanctions against Italy ordered by the League of Nations, go into effect.
- Nov. 24. *China*. Eighteen counties in and near the demilitarized zone along the Great Wall declare their independence of Nanking.
- Nov. 27. *Japan-Russia*. Mixed Commission abandons attempt to settle border disputes between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo.
- Dec. 8. *Ethiopia-Italy*. Italy rejects the Hoare-Laval peace plan.
- Dec. 9 - March 25, 1936. *Five-Power Naval Conference*. Powers meet in London to renew Washington and London treaties. Great Britain, France, and the United States agree on limitations of size and armament of various categories of vessels. No new heavy cruisers to be built until 1943. Agreement not to hold if any part of pact is violated by any signatory or nonsignatory power, or if any signatory power is threatened by war.
- Dec. 12. *China*. Hopei-Chahar Council created to govern northern China.
- Dec. 16. *China*. Chiang Kai-shek assumes office of Premier in addition to that of Commander in Chief of Nationalist armies.
- Dec. 18. *Czechoslovakia*. Beneš elected President.
- Dec. 18. *France*. Chamber passes law for dissolution of Fascist leagues.
- 1936 Jan. 4. *Netherlands - United States*. Reciprocal trade agreement signed.
- Jan. 20. *Great Britain*. Death of George V; succeeded by Edward VIII.
- Jan. 24. *Danzig*. Council of the League of Nations warns Nazi administration in Danzig that its acts have violated the Danzig constitution.

- 1936 Jan. 24. *France*. Government under Sarraut succeeds that of Laval.
 Feb. 20. *Japan*. Liberal parties register gains in Japanese elections.
 Feb. 23. *Estonia*. Majority votes for a return to constitutional government.
 Feb. 29. *United States*. Neutrality Resolution of Aug. 31, 1935, amended and extended.
 Feb. 26-29. *Japan*. Assassination of Takahashi, Saito, and Watanabe, liberal statesman, and attempted military coup d'état by Tokyo garrison.
 March 3. *Italy*. Private banking abolished.
 March 5. *Japan*. Koki Hirota becomes Premier.
 March 7. *Germany*. German troops occupy Rhineland in contravention of Locarno and Versailles treaties.
 March 12. *France - Great Britain - Italy*. Great Britain and Italy refuse to enforce sanctions against Germany for her treaty violations in regarrisoning the Rhineland.
 March 12. *Russia - Outer Mongolia*. Mutual assistance treaty signed.
 March 22. *Austria-Italy-Hungary*. Rome Protocols of 1934 reasserted by Italy, Austria, and Hungary.
 March 24. *Germany* rejects proposal of Locarno powers for a temporarily demilitarized zone along the Rhine.
 April 1. *Austria* repudiates Treaty of St. Germain and institutes universal military service.
 April 17. *Ethiopia*. The League of Nations admits failure to settle Ethiopian conflict by conciliation.
 April 27. *Japan-Russia*. Agreement reached on commissions for definition of Manchukuo-Russian frontier.
 May 3. *France*. Left parties gain large majority in elections.
 May 6. *France - United States*. Reciprocal trade agreement signed.
 May 9. *Ethiopia-Italy*. Italy formally annexes Ethiopia.
 May 18. *Finland - United States*. Reciprocal trade agreement signed.
 June 2. *China*. Canton government dispatches ultimatum to Nanking, threatening civil war unless steps against Japanese aggression are taken.
 June 4. *France*. Popular Front government under Leon Blum takes office.
 June 9. *Italy*. Count Ciano appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 June 25. *Conference of World War Neutral States*. The Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark meet to formulate common policy on Ethiopia. Decide to accept the end of sanctions against Italy.
 June 29. *Japan* formally declares her intention not to sign the new London Naval Treaty.
 July 11. *Austro-German Agreement*. Germany agrees to recognize and respect Austrian independence; Austria agrees to recognize herself as a German state.
 July 15. *Italy*. The League of Nations sanctions against Italy officially ended.
 July 17. *Spain*. Beginning of the Spanish Civil War. The Foreign Legion, under General Franco, revolts in Spanish Morocco.
 July 20. *Montreux Straits Convention*, signed by Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria; modifies Straits Convention of 1923, permitting Turkey to refortify the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and close them during war or at the threat of war. Russian fleet to be allowed free passage in time of peace. Other powers not to send more than 30,000 tons of warships into the Black Sea at any one time. All merchant ships to be allowed free passage in peace time.

- 1936 July 25. *Germany-Italy*. Germany recognizes Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia.
- Aug. 24. *Germany*. Period of compulsory military service increased to two years.
- Aug. 25. *Russia*. Execution of Zinoviev and Kamenev, convicted of a plot to assassinate Stalin and other Soviet leaders.
- Sept. 5. *Germany* agrees to be represented on Non-intervention Committee, on condition its activities are limited to the preventing of the shipment of arms and money into Spain.
- Sept. 6. *China*. Settlement reached between Nanking and Canton governments on Japanese policy.
- Sept. 8. *Non-intervention Committee*. Delegates from twenty-three countries meet to enforce the Spanish non-intervention agreement.
- Sept. 9. *Germany*. Four-year plan for self-sufficiency announced.
- Sept. 12. *Germany*. Hitler anti-Communist speech at Nuremberg, with references to the resources of the Ural Mountains and the Ukraine.
- Sept. 15. *France-Poland*. Renewal of the Franco-Polish alliance.
- Sept. 25. *Franco-British-American Monetary Agreement*. The three national currencies to be stabilized by purchase and sale of gold by the respective governments.
- Oct. 2. *France*. Chamber passes bill devaluing the franc.
- Oct. 15. *Italy*. Lira devalued 41%; old parity with the dollar and pound re-established.
- Nov. 11-12. *Austria-Hungary-Italy*. Conference of the Rome Protocol states—Austria, Hungary, and Italy—at Vienna. Agree to continue economic and political co-operation.
- Nov. 14. *Germany* renounces the international control of the Rhine, Elbe, Oder, and Danube rivers, provided for by the Versailles Treaty.
- Nov. 18. *Germany-Italy-Spain*. Germany and Italy formally recognize the government of General Franco.
- Nov. 20. *Belgium - France - Great Britain*. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden assures France and Belgium of military support in case of unprovoked aggression.
- Nov. 25. *German-Japanese Anti-Communist Pact*. The two nations agree to collaborate in combating the spread of communism by the Communist International.
- Nov. 27. *Spain*. The Spanish government appeals to the League of Nations under Articles X and XI of the Covenant against the armed intervention of Germany and Italy in the Spanish War.
- Nov. 28. *Poland-Rumania*. Rumanian Foreign Minister visits Warsaw and reaffirms Polish-Rumanian alliance.
- Dec. 1-23. *Eighth Pan-American Conference*, held at Buenos Aires, Argentina.
- Dec. 5. *Russia*. New constitution adapted by the All Union Congress of the U.S.S.R.
- Dec. 10. *Great Britain*. Abdication of Edward VIII; accession of George VI.
- Dec. 10. *Italy* agrees to accept the Franco-British proposal for enforcement of non-intervention in Spain.
- Dec. 12-25. *China*. Kidnaping, and release, of Chiang Kai-shek by General Chang Hsueh-liang.
- Dec. 23. *American Collective Security Convention*, signed by twenty-one nations at Buenos Aires Conference. Provides for consultation if the peace of the Americas is threatened; and for obligatory arbitration of disputes.

- 1937 Jan. 2. *Anglo-Italian Mediterranean Agreement*. Great Britain and Italy agree to respect and uphold the status quo in the Mediterranean.
- Jan. 11. *France-Germany*. Chancellor Hitler and the French Ambassador exchange mutual pledges to respect the status quo in Spain and Spanish Morocco.
- Jan. 13-23. *Germany-Italy*. Visit of General Goering to Rome.
- Jan. 24. *Bulgaria-Yugoslavia*. Treaty of friendship signed.
- Feb. 2. *France*. Chamber votes 19,000,000,000-franc appropriation for armaments.
- Feb. 2. *Japan*. Hayashi becomes Premier.
- Feb. 8. *Finland-Russia*. Visit of Foreign Minister Holsti of Finland to Russia.
- Feb. 16. *Great Britain*. The Government announces \$7,500,000,000 five-year armament program.
- Feb. 21. *Spain*. The Non-intervention Committee's ban on foreign volunteers to Spanish War becomes effective.
- Feb. 25. *United States*. The President's power to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements renewed for three years.
- March 26. *Italo-Yugoslav Pact*. The parties agree to respect their present land and sea frontiers and to refrain from support of any aggressor in case either should be attacked by a third power.
- April 11. *Belgium*. The Rexists decisively defeated in the Belgian elections.
- April 19. *Spain*. Patrol of Spanish land and sea frontiers, provided by the Non-intervention Committee, to prevent entrance of volunteers and munitions, begins.
- April 22-23. *Austria-Italy*. Visit of Chancellor Schuschnigg of Austria to Venice.
- April 24. *Franco-British Declaration*. France and Great Britain announce that they release Belgium from her obligation under the Locarno Treaties but will continue to be bound by their own obligations to preserve the integrity of Belgium.
- April 30. *United States*. Neutrality Law: forbids shipments of munitions or extension of loans to belligerents upon a declaration of the President that a state of war exists; provides for a discretionary embargo by the President of certain other commodities unless such commodities are paid for before shipment and are transported in non-American vessels. Export of munitions to nations engaged in a civil war may be forbidden at the discretion of the President.
- April 30. *Japan*. General election gives opposition parties 400 out of 466 seats in the lower house.
- May 25. *Danzig*. Nazis gain a two-thirds majority in the Danzig Volkstag.
- May 31. *Japan*. Premier Hayashi resigns.
- May 31. *Non-intervention Committee*. Germany and Italy withdraw from the Spanish Non-intervention patrol, following bombing of German battleship *Deutschland* by Spanish Loyalist planes.
- June 4. *Japan*. Prince Konoye becomes Premier.
- June 16. *Non-intervention Committee*. Italy and Germany rejoin the Non-intervention Committee's naval patrol.
- June 22. *France*. Chautemps government succeeds that of Blum.
- June 29-30. *Japan-Russia*. Two Soviet gunboats sunk by Japanese artillery on the Amur River.
- June 30. *France*. Franc devalued; allowed to fall from 4.35 to 3.83 cents.

- 1937 July 1. *Irish Free State* adopts new constitution, describing Ireland as a "sovereign independent democratic state," and making no mention of the British King or Commonwealth.
- July 7. *China-Japan*. Japanese troops engaging in night maneuvers near Peiping, clash with units of the Chinese Twenty-ninth Army, precipitating general Sino-Japanese hostilities in northern China.
- July 8. *Great Britain*. Royal Commission Report published, recommending the partition of Palestine into independent Jewish and Arab states, Great Britain retaining as a permanent mandate Jerusalem and Bethlehem with a corridor to the sea near Jaffa.
- July 10. *Franco-Germany*. Commercial treaty signed, providing for mutual most-favored-nation treatment and tariff reductions. Service on the Dawes and Young loans assured by Germany.
- July 17. *Germany-Great Britain-Russia*. Treaties signed bringing Germany and Russia within the terms of the London Naval Treaty of 1936, except that Russia is not required to give information in regard to its Far Eastern fleet, provided these ships are never transferred to the Baltic or Black Seas.
- July 29. *Egypt*. Investiture of King Farouk.
- July 31. *Germany-Spain*. Commercial agreement between Germany and the Franco government published, providing for mutual most-favored-nation treatment.
- Aug. 14. *China-Japan*. Opening of hostilities between Chinese and Japanese forces in Shanghai.
- Aug. 21. *China-Russia*. Five-year nonaggression pact signed. Each party renounces war as an instrument of national policy and undertakes not to assist any third nation in attacking the other.
- Sept. 4. *Italy-Yemen*. Treaty of Friendship signed, in which Italy recognizes the absolute independence of Yemen and each party grants the other most-favored-nation treatment.
- Sept. 14. *Nyon Agreement*. Great Britain, France, Russia, and six other nations having Mediterranean and Black Sea interests (not including Italy and Germany) agree on the establishment of a naval patrol to prevent submarine attacks on neutral shipping in the Mediterranean.
- Sept. 14. *United States*. President Roosevelt forbids government-owned ships to carry arms and munitions to China and Japan and states that other ships will do so at their own risk.
- Sept. 17. *Non-Intervention Committee*. Great Britain and France abandon patrol of Spanish coasts.
- Sept. 25-29. *Germany-Italy*. Visit of Mussolini to Hitler.
- Sept. 30. *Franco-Great Britain-Italy*. Agreement reached for participation of Italy in Mediterranean anti-piracy patrol.
- Oct. 6. *League of Nations*. Assembly adopts report of the Far Eastern Advisory Committee declaring Japan to have violated the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact; proposing a conference of Nine-Power Treaty signatories and other interested states as provided by that treaty; and recommending that League members should individually aid China.
- Oct. 12. *Franco-Yugoslavia*. Treaty of Alliance of Nov. 11, 1927, renewed for five years.
- Oct. 13. *Belgium-Germany*. Declaration by Germany that she intends to respect the integrity and inviolability of Belgium and to support her if attacked.
- Nov. 3-24. *Brussels Conference*. Signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty meet on invitation of the Belgian government to consider measures for ending the

- 1937 Sino-Japanese conflict. Japan declines to attend. Russia and Germany, non-signatories, also invited; Russia accepts, Germany declines. Declaration adopted by a majority of the fifteen participating nations condemning Japan's armed intervention in China.
- Nov. 6. *Germany-Italy-Japan*. Italy becomes a signatory of the German-Japanese Anti-Communist Pact of Nov. 25, 1936.
- Nov. 10. *Brazil*. Coup d'état of President Vargas.
- Nov. 26. *Germany*. Funk replaces Schacht as Minister for Economic Affairs.
- Nov. 29. *Italy-Manchukuo*. Italy recognizes Manchukuo as an independent state.
- Dec. 12. *Japan-United States*. U. S. gunboat *Panay* sunk by Japanese planes on the Yangtze River.
- Dec. 12. *League of Nations*. Italy announces its withdrawal from the League.
- Dec. 13. *Sino-Japanese War*. Nanking captured by the Japanese.
- Dec. 29. *Eire*. New constitution, completely separating Ireland from the British Commonwealth in domestic affairs, comes into effect.
- 1938 Jan. 1. *Estonia*. New constitution, providing for a corporative state, becomes effective.
- Jan. 14-18. *France*. Chautemps government resigns; Chautemps forms new cabinet.
- Jan. 27. *Van Zeeland Report* on the possibilities of a reduction of barriers to international trade published.
- Feb. 10. *Rumania*. King Carol dismisses Premier Goga and inaugurates a personal dictatorship.
- Feb. 12. *Austria-Germany*. Conversations between Hitler and Chancellor Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden.
- Feb. 20. *Great Britain*. Resignation of Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary.
- March 9. *Austria*. Chancellor Schuschnigg announces a plebiscite to be held on the question of Austrian independence.
- March 10-13. *France*. Resignation of the Chautemps government; succeeded by Leftist government under Blum.
- March 11. *Austria-Germany*. Chancellor Schuschnigg resigns; succeeded by Seyss-Inquart, Austrian Nazi. German troops begin occupation of Austria.
- March 13. *Austria-Germany*. Austria incorporated by law into the German Reich.
- March 18. *Great Britain, United States-Mexico*. The Mexican government confiscates the properties of 17 British and American oil companies, valued at \$350,000,000, following their refusal to pay wage increases as ordered by the Conciliation and Arbitration Board.
- March 19. *Lithuania-Poland*. Lithuania agrees to accept a Polish ultimatum, backed by a mobilization of troops on the frontier, to restore diplomatic and trade relations and renounce Vilna as its capital.
- April 8-10. *France*. Blum government resigns; succeeded by Radical Socialist-Center government under Daladier.
- April 16. *Anglo-Italian Agreement* signed. Signatories reaffirm their Declaration of Jan. 2, 1937, guaranteeing the status quo in the Mediterranean; agree to respect and preserve the independence of Saudi Arabia and Yemen; neither party to use propaganda to injure the interests of the other; both to adhere to the Convention of 1888, guaranteeing freedom of transit in the Suez Canal for all nations at all times. Italy promises to co-operate in the proportional evacuation of foreign volunteers from Spain and agrees that if any Italian

- 1938 volunteers and war material remain in Spain at the close of the war, they shall be immediately withdrawn. It is understood that settlement of the Spanish question is a prerequisite to the entry into force of the agreement.
- April 23. *Czechoslovakia-Germany*. Konrad Henlein announces the program of the Sudeten German party, including complete autonomy for the German minority and the abandonment of the Russian alliance.
- April 25. *Anglo-Irish Agreements* signed. British Admiralty property rights at Cobh, Berhaven, and Lough Swilly to be transferred to Eire; £10,000,000 to be paid by Eire to Great Britain in settlement of all financial claims between the two governments, and a trade agreement to be signed.
- April 28-29. *France-Great Britain*. British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary confer with French Premier and Foreign Minister in London. Arrangements made for the co-ordination of military and foreign policies.
- April 30. *Switzerland* announces her reversion to a policy of complete neutrality, including nonparticipation in League sanctions.
- May 12. *Germany-Manchukuo*. Germany recognizes Manchukuo.
- May 14. *Great Britain-Mexico*. Mexico recalls her minister from Great Britain, following British demand that confiscated oil properties be returned.
- May 21. *Czechoslovakia-Germany*. Czechoslovakia mobilizes troops on the German frontier, following German troop movements in that vicinity.
- May 27. *Scandinavian States*. Representatives of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland sign a declaration pledging their governments to adopt common rules of neutrality in the event of war between other states.
- June 2. *Chile-League of Nations*. Formal notice of withdrawal from League given by Chile.
- June 21. *Germany-Italy-Switzerland*. Germany and Italy, in notes to Switzerland, assure her that they will respect her neutrality.
- June 23. *Non-Intervention Committee*. Germany and Italy withdraw from Spanish naval patrol, following alleged submarine attacks on German cruiser *Leipzig*.
- June 30. *1936 Naval Treaty*. Protocol signed by France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, establishing a new limit of 45,000 tons for capital ships.
- July 4. *France-Turkey*. Pact of friendship and treaty for the temporary joint control of the Sanjak of Alexandretta signed.
- July 6-15. *Evian Conference*. Representatives of 32 countries meet to consider steps to be taken to aid German refugees. Permanent organization set up.
- July 12. *League of Nations-Venezuela*. Venezuela notifies the Secretariat of its withdrawal from the League.
- July 21. *Bolivia-Paraguay*. Agreement concluded for arbitration of the Chaco boundary dispute.
- July 24. *Oslo Powers*. Communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, declaring that their states do not regard the sanctions system of the League of Nations as obligatory.
- July 29-Aug. 10. *Japan-Russia*. Fighting between Japanese and Russian troops in a border clash at and near Changkufeng, on the Manchukuo-Russian frontier.
- July 31. *Balkan Entente-Bulgaria*. Agreement of nonaggression signed by the signatories of the Balkan Pact of February 9, 1934 (Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia) and Bulgaria. Parties also renounce the clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly limiting Bulgarian military and naval forces.
- August 3. *Czechoslovakia-Germany-Great Britain*. Lord Runciman arrives in Prague to act as mediator in the Czechoslovak-Sudeten German controversy.

- 1938 Aug. 10. *Great Britain-United States*. Agreement reached on conflicting claims to Canton and Enderby Islands. Equality of access to communication and aviation facilities assured; question of title to be left in abeyance.
- Sept. 8. *Hatay*. Constitution adopted by the autonomous Republic of Hatay, formerly the Sanjak of Alexandretta.
- Sept. 12. *Czechoslovakia-Germany*. Hitler, speaking at the annual Nazi Party Congress, attacks Czechoslovakia and promises the Reich's support for the Sudeten Germans. Following the speech, planned outbreaks, led by the Henlein party, take place in Czechoslovakia.
- Sept. 13. *Czechoslovakia*. Martial law declared in the Sudeten area.
- Sept. 15. *Germany-Great Britain*. First conference between Chamberlain and Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Hitler demands the inclusion of the Sudeten Germans in the Reich under the principle of self-determination.
- Sept. 19. *Czechoslovakia-France-Great Britain*. Anglo-French proposals for settlement of the Czech-German dispute presented to Czechoslovakia. Areas inhabited predominantly by Germans to be ceded to Germany. It is "hoped" that the frontier revision will be carried out by an international commission including a Czechoslovakian representative and that this commission should supervise a subsequent exchange of populations under the right of option. As part of the settlement, Great Britain is ready to participate in an international guarantee of Czechoslovakia against unprovoked aggression.
- Sept. 21. *Czechoslovakia-Germany*. President Benes accepts the Anglo-French plan for the cession of Sudeten territory to Germany.
- Sept. 22-24. *Germany-Great Britain*. Conference at Gödesberg between Hitler and Chamberlain. Hitler presents his memorandum re Czechoslovakia, providing for military occupation of the Sudeten areas by Oct. 1, with subsequent plebiscites to be held in doubtful areas.
- Sept. 23. *Czechoslovakia*. Army mobilized.
- Sept. 25. *Czechoslovakia-Germany*. Czechoslovakia rejects Hitler's Gödesberg demands.
- Sept. 29-30. *Munich Conference*. Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, and Mussolini meet and agree on terms for settlement of the German-Czechoslovak dispute. Four zones of Sudeten territory to be occupied by Germany between October 1 and 7, and a fifth, containing the remainder of the predominantly German territory, to be determined by a mixed commission and occupied by Oct. 10. The Commission to select further areas in which plebiscites under international control should be held and to make a final determination of frontiers. Inhabitants of the transferred territories to have the right of option into and out of the territories for six months. The Czech evacuation to be carried out without damage to existing installations. Germany and Italy to join England and France in an international guarantee of the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia when the Hungarian and Polish minority questions have been settled.
- Sept. 30. *Czechoslovakia*. Government accepts the four-power Munich agreement.
- Sept. 30-Oct. 1. *Czechoslovakia-Poland*. Poland sends an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia, demanding a cession of the Teschen district. Demand granted.
- Oct. 21. *Czechoslovakia-Russia*. Czechoslovakia informs Russia it is no longer interested in the Czech-Russian mutual assistance pact of May 16, 1935.
- Oct. 21. *Sino-Japanese War*. Japanese occupy Canton.
- Oct. 25. *Sino-Japanese War*. Japanese capture Hankow. Chinese capital shifted to Chungking.

- 1938 Nov. 2. *Czechoslovakia-Hungary*. Arbitral award on Hungarian territorial claims handed down by German-Italian commission. Hungary gets 4,200 sq. miles with 1,060,000 inhabitants.
- Nov. 2. *Great Britain-Italy*. The House of Commons approves ratification of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16.
- Nov. 10. *Germany*. Widespread destruction of Jewish property by Storm Troopers.
- Nov. 10-11. *Turkey*. Kemal Atatürk dies; succeeded by Gen. Ismet İnönü.
- Nov. 17. *Great Britain-United States*. Reciprocal trade agreement signed.
- Nov. 19. *Czechoslovakia*. Autonomy granted to Slovakia and Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine).
- Nov. 23. *Germany*. German Jews fined 1,000,000,000 marks for the shooting of the Third Secretary of the German Embassy in Paris by a Jew.
- Dec. 6. *Franco-German Declaration of Friendship*, affirming that no territorial questions exist between the two nations and that they will consult together in case of international difficulties, signed.
- Dec. 9-26. *Eighth Pan-American Conference* held at Lima. Declaration adopted affirming the intention of the Pan-American states to co-operate to defend their security and independence.
- Dec. 22. *France-Italy*. Italy notifies France it regards the treaty of Jan. 7, 1935 as null and void.
- 1939 Jan. 4-5. *Japan*. Prince Konoye resigns as Prime Minister; succeeded by Baron Hiranuma.
- Jan. 20. *Germany*. Hitler relieves Schacht of the presidency of the Reichsbank and appoints Funk to succeed him.
- Jan. 26. *Spanish War*. Nationalist forces capture Barcelona.
- Jan. 27. *France-United States*. President Roosevelt announces that he has approved the sale of military planes to France.
- Feb. 2. *Germany-Great Britain*. Germany announces her intention to build up to parity with Great Britain in submarine tonnage as provided under the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935.
- Feb. 4. *Yugoslavia*. Resignation of Premier Stoyadinovitch; succeeded by Dragisa Cvetkovitch.
- Feb. 7. *Palestine*. Convening of the Round Table Conference on Palestine in London.
- Feb. 10. *Sino-Japanese War*. Japan occupies the island of Hainan.
- Feb. 20-22. *Balkan Entente*. Meeting of the Fifth Annual Balkan Conference at Bucharest.
- Feb. 23. *United States*. Proposal for improving harbor facilities at Guam defeated in the House of Representatives.
- Feb. 24. *Hungary*. Hungarian National Socialist movement dissolved by decree.
- Feb. 24. *Anti-Comintern Bloc*. Hungary and Manchukuo sign Anti-Comintern Pact.
- Feb. 27. *Spanish War*. France and England recognize the Nationalist Government.
- March 10. *Czecho-Slovakia*. Prime Minister Beran dismisses Father Tiso, Slovak Premier, and all the other Ministers except two.
- March 11. *Czecho-Slovakia*. New Slovakian cabinet appointed with Karl Sidor as Premier.

- 1939 March 13. *Czecho-Slovakia - Germany*. Conference between Father Tiso and Hitler in Berlin.
- March 14. *Czecho-Slovakia - Germany*. Conference between President Hacha, Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky, and Chancellor Hitler in Berlin.
- March 14. *Czecho-Slovakia - Hungary*. Hungary sends a 12-hour ultimatum to Prague, demanding the withdrawal of Czech troops from the Carpatho-Ukraine. Hungarian troops cross the frontier and advance toward Hust.
- March 14. *Czecho-Slovakia*. Slovakian Diet declares independence of the Slovak state.
- March 15. *Czecho-Slovakia - Germany*. German troops occupy Czecho-Slovakia. Hitler and Hacha sign an agreement making Bohemia and Moravia a protectorate of Germany.
- March 16. *Czecho-Slovakia - Hungary*. Hungary formally annexes Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine).
- March 16. *Germany-Slovakia*. Slovakia made a German protectorate.
- March 17. *Palestine*. Adjournment of London Round Table conference on Palestine without agreement, as both Jews and Arabs reject all British proposals.
- March 18. *Germany-United States*. United States applies 25% countervailing duty on all dutiable German goods, effective April 22.
- March 18. *France - Germany - Great Britain*. France and Great Britain protest illegality of German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia.
- March 19. *France*. Senate adopts the Special Powers Bill authorizing the Cabinet to rule by decree until Nov. 30, 1939.
- March 20. *Germany - United States*. American note refusing to recognize legality of German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia received in Berlin.
- March 21-24. *France - Great Britain*. Visit of President and Madame Lebrun to London.
- March 22. *Germany-Lithuania*. Treaty signed providing for the cession of the Memel district to Germany and including a nonaggression clause.
- March 23. *Hungary-Slovakia*. Hungarian troops cross the eastern frontier of Slovakia.
- March 23. *Germany-Slovakia*. Treaty signed by which Germany guarantees the political independence and territorial integrity of Slovakia for 25 years.
- March 23. *Germany-Rumania*. Trade agreement signed, providing for increased reciprocal trade and for joint German-Rumanian exploitation of Rumanian agricultural and mineral resources.
- March 27. *Anti-Comintern Bloc*. Spanish Nationalist government signs Anti-Comintern Pact.
- March 28. *Spanish War*. Nationalist troops occupy Madrid.
- March 31. *France-Japan*. Japan announces the annexation of the Spratly Islands, claimed by France.
- March 31. *Great Britain - Poland*. The British government announces it will defend Poland in the event of any action that threatens its independence.
- March 31. *France-Rumania*. Trade agreement signed.
- March 31. *Hungary-Slovakia*. Mixed Hungarian-Slovakian Commission modifies the Slovak-Ruthenian frontier, giving Hungary an additional 400 square miles with control of the Ung Valley.
- April 2. *Japan-Russia*. Agreement signed, regulating Japanese fishing in Russian waters.

- 1939 April 5. *France*. Lebrun re-elected President.
- April 6. *Great Britain - Poland*. Poland agrees to regard the British guarantee of March 31 as a mutual obligation, pending conclusion of a permanent agreement to that effect.
- April 7-8. *Albania-Italy*. Italian troops invade and occupy Albania.
- April 11. *Hungary - League of Nations*. Hungary announces its withdrawal from the League.
- April 11. *Peru - League of Nations*. Peru announces its withdrawal from the League.
- April 13. *France, Great Britain - Greece, Rumania*. Great Britain and France guarantee the independence of Greece and Rumania.
- April 13. *Albania-Italy*. Italy formally annexes Albania.
- April 15. *Germany, Italy - United States*. President Roosevelt asks Hitler and Mussolini to give a ten-year pledge of nonaggression to thirty states of Europe and the Near East.
- April 19. *Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland - Great Britain*. Prime Minister Chamberlain indicates Great Britain will defend the independence of Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
- April 20. *Italy - United States*. Mussolini rejects President Roosevelt's suggestion of nonaggression guarantee.
- April 26. *Great Britain*. Cabinet decides to adopt military conscription.
- April 28. *Germany - United States*. Hitler rejects President Roosevelt's suggestion for a guarantee of nonaggression.
- April 28. *Germany - Great Britain*. Germany denounces the Anglo-German naval treaty of June 18, 1935.
- April 28. *Germany - Poland*. Germany denounces the ten-year nonaggression treaty of Jan. 26, 1934; demands the return of Danzig to the Reich and a German rail and motor road across the Corridor.
- May 3. *Russia*. Litvinov relieved of office as Foreign Commissar; replaced by Molotov.
- May 5. *Germany - Poland*. Poland rejects Germany's request for the return of Danzig and for a rail and motor road across the Corridor.
- May 11. *Japan - Russia*. Opening of hostilities between Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese forces along the Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian border in the region of Lake Bor.
- May 12. *Great Britain - Rumania*. Trade treaty announced.
- May 12. *Great Britain - Turkey*. Announcement of agreement on military co-operation in case of war in the Mediterranean.
- May 17. *Germany - Scandinavian States*. Denmark accepts German offer of nonaggression treaty; Finland, Norway, and Sweden decline like offers.
- May 17. *Palestine*. British government announces its plan for the future status of Palestine. Britain to retain control during a transitional period, anticipating the establishment of Palestine as a single, independent state. Jewish immigration to be limited to 75,000 during the next five years; thereafter further immigration to be prohibited except with the consent of the Arab population.
- May 22. *Germany-Italy*. Signing of formal military alliance.
- May 31. *Denmark - Germany*. Ten-year nonaggression treaty signed. Contracting parties agree not to employ force against each other and to remain neutral in the event of aggression on either by a third power. Trade with such a third power, however, not to be regarded as a breach of neutrality.

- 1939 June 1. *Germany - Yugoslavia*. Hitler states that Germany and Yugoslavia have common borders, "established for all time."
- June 7. *Estonia - Germany; Latvia - Germany*. Ten-year nonaggression treaties signed by which the contracting parties agree not to resort to force against each other and to remain neutral in the event of an attack on the other by a third power. Trade with such an attacking power, however, not to be regarded as inconsistent with neutrality.
- June 7-12. *Great Britain - United States*. Visit of the King and Queen of England to the United States.
- June 14. *Great Britain - Japan*. Japanese forces surround and isolate the British and French concessions in Tientsin in dispute over four alleged Chinese assassins who took refuge in the concession.
- June 23. *France - Turkey*. Mutual assistance treaty signed by which parties promise to co-operate "in case of an act of aggression that might lead to war in the Mediterranean region." A second agreement signed ceding the autonomous Republic of Hatay to Turkey.
- July 8. *Germany - Italy*. Agreement for gradual transfer to the Reich of German inhabitants of the South Tirol who choose not to be Italianized.
- July 11. *United States*. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations decides to defer revision of Neutrality Law until the next session of Congress.
- July 18. *Great Britain - Turkey*. Co-operation in construction of joint naval and air base at Chesme, near Smyrna, announced.
- July 24. *Great Britain - Japan*. The British government formally recognizes the "special requirements" of the Japanese forces in China for "safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order in the regions under their control" and states that it has "no intention of countenancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment of the above-mentioned objects . . ."
- July 26. *Japan - United States*. The United States denounces the American-Japanese commercial treaty of 1911.
- Aug. 11-13. *Rome - Berlin Axis*. Conference of Hitler, von Ribbentrop (German Foreign Minister), and Ciano (Italian Foreign Minister).
- Aug. 12. *France - Great Britain - Russia*. Opening of military and naval staff conversations in Moscow.
- Aug. 19. *Germany - Russia*. Trade agreement signed.
- Aug. 23. *Germany - Russia*. A ten-year nonaggression treaty signed.
- Aug. 24. *Yugoslavia*. Agreement signed between Premier Cvetkovitch and Dr. Matchek, leader of the Croats, granting the latter a semi-autonomous regime.
- Aug. 24. *Danzig*. Albert Föerster, Danzig National Socialist leader, is declared "supreme head of the state" by the Danzig Senate.
- Aug. 25. *Great Britain - Poland*. Formal defensive alliance concluded.
- Aug. 25. *Germany - Great Britain*. Interview between Hitler and the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson. Hitler demands as a basis for the settlement of the German-Polish dispute: (1) abandonment of the Anglo-Polish alliance, (2) the return of Danzig to Germany, (3) a German right of way across the Polish Corridor.
- Aug. 26. *France - Germany*. Premier Daladier in a note to Hitler urges him to enter into direct negotiations with Poland to settle the German-Polish controversy; but Hitler, Aug. 27, refuses.
- Aug. 28. *Japan*. Resignation of Premier Hiranuma and his cabinet. General Abe succeeds him as prime minister.

RECENT EVENTS

This treatment is divided into four parts, supplementing respectively the four chapters on Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy.

GERMANY (Continued from page 232)

To students of international relations, German foreign policy under Hitler offers the most interesting contemporary example of *Realpolitik* to be found. Through his ability of seeming to force the frightful alternatives of war or surrender under duress, the Fuehrer has achieved a program of "peaceful change" far beyond anything previously dreamed of short of armed conquest.

In attempting to gauge the success of German imperialist expansion, consideration must be given to the skillful technique employed. As has been indicated in Chapter XI, the historical, material, and psychological urges were already ripe for utilization by the masters of Nazi propaganda and leadership. With the armament program well advanced, the Rhineland remilitarized, and the "Siegfried line" of fortifications¹ along the French frontier nearing completion, there remained but one necessity on the home front—the assurance of complete national unity. Unification had to embrace all aspects of national life: social, political, economic, military, and diplomatic.

In so far as mass public opinion was concerned, there was nothing to fear. Regimentation of national thought

¹ This fortified zone, popularly known as the "Siegfried Line," is also called the "West Wall."

had become an accomplished fact, both through censorship and through the most highly developed propaganda technique in the world. In addition, all societies and groups capable of subversive activities had been either liquidated or brought completely under governmental control. Even religious bodies were forced into line through the imprisonment of such leaders as the great Lutheran pastor Martin Niemöller, the trials of members of Catholic religious orders,¹ the confiscation of church properties, or threats of withdrawal of state subsidies. A third element, the Jews, had of course been reduced to complete impotence.

But to the assurance of mass subservience was to be added unqualified loyalty and obedience at the top. On February 4, 1938, a bloodless purge of the diplomatic and military hierarchy commenced with the displacement of the Minister of War, von Blomberg, by General William Keitel. Shortly thereafter the Commander-in-Chief von Fritsch was displaced by von Brauchitsch, and the Conservative non-Nazi von Neurath by the Nazi party's most accomplished diplomatic agent and Ambassador to London, von Ribbentrop.

Thus by March, 1938, German unity and power were such as to assure the accomplishment of the first stage of Hitler's expansionist program, provided opposition from abroad could be outbluffed or overcome. Since no effective dissent could arise at home from either official or nonofficial sources, it was relatively simple for the guiding genius of Nazi diplomacy to work according to plan in the realization of the Pan-German dream.²

¹ Mason, John Brown, *Hitler's First Foes*, 1936.

² For recent publications giving the background of the *Anschluss* and Munich, see: Orton, William A., *The Twenty Years' Armistice: 1918-1938*; Gunther, John, *Inside*

While it is easy to be wise after the event, it is curious in retrospect to observe the facility and logic with which each blow was successively delivered by the Fuehrer in smashing the allied ring which had been so carefully forged about him. Nor were his calculations wrong, as the event was to prove. For not only had France been weakened by political dissensions resulting from the social experiments of the Popular Front, but the effective power of Soviet Russia was presumed to have been seriously undermined by a purge of the military and governmental hierarchy. Finally, the British remained psychologically unprepared to commit themselves definitely to the preservation of the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe.¹ Though the British navy was still supreme and the French army the most powerful in Europe, there had been created in Germany at the same time, under the very eyes of the democratic states, the largest air force in the world, which, as an instrument of terror, was to prove a most effective weapon in the Nazi diplomacy of threat and blackmail.

The opening event was the German Fuehrer's sum-

Europe, 1938; Schacher, Gerhard, *Germany Pushes South-East*, 1937; Freund, Richard, *Watch Czechoslovakia!* 1938; Wiskemann, Elizabeth, *Czechs and Germans*, 1938; Hitler, Adolf, *Mein Kampf*, 1939; Schuman, Frederick L., *Europe on the Eve*, 1939; Roberts, Stephen H., *The House That Hitler Built*, 1938; Lichtenberger, Henri, *The Third Reich*, 1937. For studies on Munich and after see: Dean, Vera M., *Europe in Retreat*, 1939; Gedye, G. E. R., *Betrayal in Central Europe*, 1939; Armstrong, H. F., *When There Is No Peace*, 1939; Hutton, Graham, *Survey After Munich*, 1939; Wolfe, Henry C., *The German Octopus*, 1938; Foreign Policy Association, "Diplomatic Background of the Munich Accord," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIV, No. 20, 1939; Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Bulletin of International News*, "The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Munich Agreement: Documents and Speeches together with a Chronological Summary of Events," Vol. XV, No. 20, 1938, also Vol. XV, No. 19, 1938.

¹ On February 20, 1938 Anthony Eden, who had come to represent the "strong action" group, resigned as British Foreign Secretary because of a "fundamental difference" with Prime Minister Chamberlain regarding the latter's method of dealing with the authoritarian states.

moning of Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938. On this occasion the Austrian Chancellor was confronted with demands for immediate concessions to the Austrian Nazis, giving them virtual control of the Vienna government. From that moment Austria's sovereignty had in reality come to an end, an event which was confirmed a month later, on March 11, when Hitler's troops crossed the border in reply to Schuschnigg's defiant order, two days previously, for a plebiscite on Austria's future. By this event the world came fully to understand the meaning of the Fuehrer's address of February 20, 1938, before the Reichstag, when he declared himself the protector of 10,000,000 Germans living beyond the confines of the Reich.

If *Anschluss* placed Hitler's Germany on the threshold of southeastern Europe and made a geographic unit of the Rome-Berlin axis, it at the same time spelled the doom of Czechoslovakia. For although the standing army and reserves of that valiant little country numbered at least 35 divisions, superior in equipment and training to those of the Reich, strategically her position had become impossible. (See the map on page 225). Surrounded for the most part by German territory and hopelessly separated from probable allies, the best of war equipment could not save Czechoslovakia from the superior might of the army of the Reich if and when utilized as the instrument of Hitler's fury.

Such were the circumstances under which Europe was to witness toward the end of May a dress rehearsal of the tragedy which followed in October. While the spring maneuvers of the German army¹ near the Sudeten

¹ Rosinski, Herbert, *The German Army*, 1939.

border naturally aroused the suspicions of a Europe still disturbed by memories of *Anschluss*, it was the shooting of two German spies at the border town of Eger by a Czech police patrol on the morning of May 19 which precipitated the event. Because of German threats immediately following, complete mobilization took place in Czechoslovakia, with British and French encouragement. The crisis passed, however, as Germany was not yet prepared,¹ though it became thenceforth the single purpose of the Fuehrer to punish not only the government of Czechoslovakia but particularly Dr. Eduard Benes, its president, who was held to be the real devil in the piece.

During the summer months, too, every means of propaganda at Germany's command was utilized in building up agitation to the breaking point in the Sudeten area. On September 12, Hitler's declaration in his Nuremberg speech pledging aid to the Sudetens, was the signal for serious riots in the German portions of Czechoslovakia. These acts not only made further negotiations between the representatives of the Sudeten leader Henlein and the Prague government impossible, but resulted in the imposition, by that government, of martial law on September 13 in the disaffected areas.

It was under such conditions that the British cabinet, which was already deeply committed by virtue of the

¹ In his speech before the Reichstag Jan. 30, 1939, Hitler, having commented upon the "severe loss of prestige for the Reich," which the Czech mobilization in May, 1938, had caused, continued with the following amazing statement (*italics mine*): "I therefore decided on the grounds of this intolerable provocation, which was further strengthened by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of our Germans there, to settle the Sudeten German question finally and radically. On May 28th, I gave the order (1) to prepare for military action against this State *as from October 2;* (2) to extend the vast defensive front in the west at a rapid rate."

Runciman mission,¹ approved Chamberlain's decision to fly to Berchtesgaden September 15 as a dramatic gesture of appeasement.² On this occasion Hitler made clear his determination to use force for the "liberation" of the suppressed German minorities in Czechoslovakia unless British support for "self-determination" in a way favorable to the German thesis were forthcoming.

Between September 16, the date of Chamberlain's return to London, and September 22-24, when he conferred with Hitler at Gödesberg, there were serious negotiations between Paris and London, during which tension in Europe became tremendously more acute. Nor had any abatement occurred when Chamberlain next saw the Fuehrer at Gödesberg. In answer to the Anglo-French plan suggesting a peaceful, orderly transfer of areas containing over fifty per cent German inhabitants, with subsequent adjustments of the permanent frontier by International Commission, Hitler gave an ultimatum demanding unconditional military occupation by Nazi troops of the Sudetenland areas which in the Fuehrer's opinion contained a majority of German inhabitants. And while the Anglo-French plan, submitted by the British Prime Minister, had proposed an international guarantee of Czechoslovak security to replace the existing system of alliances with France and Soviet Russia, the Gödesberg ultimatum made no mention whatsoever of any guarantee.

¹ Lord Runciman was sent to Czechoslovakia by the British government, with the consent of Prague, August 3, 1938, returning to London on September 16. His function was to act with regard to the Sudeten crisis not as an "arbitrator" but as an "investigator," "advisor," and "mediator." Lord Runciman's report delivered to Chamberlain September 21 and published September 28 had great influence upon the ultimate decision of the British government in its negotiations with Hitler.

² For an account of meetings at Berchtesgaden, Gödesberg, and Munich see Armstrong, H. F., *When There Is No Peace*, 1939.

The suspense of the intervening week between Gödesberg and Munich can be compared only to the days immediately preceding the Great War. By September 23, Prague had already commenced mobilization at French and British behest. This was followed by general troop movements in most of Europe, France hastily occupying the forts of the Maginot line, with the British concentrating their fleet in the North Sea.

The atmosphere, therefore, was highly charged when on September 26 the Fuehrer delivered to the world his defiant, hysterical address in the Sportspalast in Berlin. Nor was the tension alleviated the following day by the announcement that Sir Horace Wilson, who had been dispatched by Chamberlain to Berlin to intercede with the Fuehrer, had been informed that German "action" was fixed for 2 p.m. September 28 instead of October 1.¹

Hitler's timing was indeed perfect for its dramatic effect, since the hour set for German "action" was the same as the convening of the British Parliament. The astonishment of Parliament and the "listening" world was therefore heightened when at the close of the Prime Minister's address, in which he gave a full account of his "last, last effort" for peace, a slip of paper was placed in his hands conveying the Fuehrer's invitation to Chamberlain, Mussolini, and Daladier to come to Munich the next morning.

Of Munich itself little need be said. It was not a negotiated settlement but one imposed, the Czecho-

¹ It will be observed that at every successive step in the negotiations during the Munich crisis Hitler violated previous promises and successfully gained in each case more concessions through threats of war. This is *Realpolitik* at its best.

slovakian delegates never having been so much as consulted concerning its terms.¹ Abandoned by France and Britain, and surrounded by a hostile Germany, there was nothing left but capitulation.²

On October 1, the occupation of the Sudeten regions by Nazi troops was begun,³ and it was virtually completed by October 10, resulting in the loss of 10,800 square miles of territory together with 3,500,000 population. On October 2, Polish forces occupied Teschen, a highly industrialized area of 400 square miles, with a population of 240,000. Finally, on November 2, the German-Italian Commission meeting in Vienna handed down its award, granting to Hungary 4,200 square miles of Slovak-Ruthenian territory with a population of 1,060,000.

Thus the principles of nationality and self-determination, which were applied in 1919 partly to prevent the rise of a Pan-German colossus, were converted twenty years later by the German people themselves into an instrument for their own aggrandizement. On the latter occasion, however, it was not the allied victor who imposed the terms, but the diplomacy of terror of a resurrected, rearmed Reich.

¹ For text of Munich Pact see Appendix Q.

² There is every evidence that despite the abandonment of Czechoslovakia by France and Britain, Russian aid was offered to the last. It was declined, however, because of the desire of the Prague government to avoid at all hazards the impression being created that Czechoslovak independence was being defended by the Communist army of Russia alone.

³ On October 6 the International Commission, composed of representatives of the Four Powers and Czechoslovakia, established by the Munich Pact for overseeing the execution of its provisions, announced its decision to take the Austrian census of 1910 instead of the Czechoslovakian census of 1930 as the basis for determining German majorities within the zones under consideration. This astonishing decision, obviously arrived at under German pressure, made impossible the holding of a plebiscite in any zone, thus violating the Pact itself. It is not surprising that President Benes resigned on the 5th of October because his country's relationship to its neighbors was being based on "different premises" from those which he had himself followed.

Was Munich "peace for our time"? Did it provide "appeasement" or merely an "armistice"? While opinions have differed as to the correct answer to these questions, the student of international relations should at least take into account the fundamental changes in the position of Germany produced by the settlement itself.

During twenty years following the World War, Germany had sought to achieve national unity, security, and prosperity. Through *Anschluss* and Munich she had virtually realized racial *unity*, the first of these basic objectives of her national policy. After the annexation of Memel¹ (March 22, 1939) only Danzig remained as an immediate irredentist cause,² though Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen, Malmedy, Schleswig, the Polish Corridor, Upper Silesia, and northern Switzerland might still be used as justification for further expansion in the name of racial unity.

As to *security*, Germany's situation was undoubtedly improved geographically and otherwise. Not only had she obtained possession of the protecting mountain barrier along the Italian frontier through the annexation of Austria, but the dagger point of Czechoslovakia,

¹ Memel was formally annexed to the German Reich on March 22, 1939, Lithuania being forced to accede to German pressure by threat of invasion.

² In the elections of May 25, 1937, the Danzig National Socialist Party secured a two-thirds majority in the Volkstag and with it the legal power to amend the Constitution. In October, the Catholic Center Party, the last organized opposition group, was dissolved by law and in February, 1938, Foerster, leader of the Danzig Nazis, declared that the control of the foreign policy of the Free City rested in Berlin. Agitation for a return to the Reich was continuous. In the spring of 1939, following the Polish refusal of the German request for the reincorporation of Danzig into Germany, the Reich launched an active propaganda campaign for *Anschluss*, and late in June there began an infiltration of German men and war materials into the Free City. In July Foerster held a conference with Hitler. These latter developments, clearly reminiscent of the tactics employed against Czechoslovakia during the pre-Munich crisis, increased tension throughout Europe.


which had been largely removed from the heart of the Reich by Munich became entirely absorbed a few months later through the lightning stroke of March 15, 1939. On that date Hitler took possession of what remained of Bohemia and Moravia,¹ and then set up a "protectorate" over the province of Slovakia, with a government similar to that of the "puppet state" of Manchukuo.² Nor did the simultaneous Hungarian occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine, which gave Poland and Hungary a common frontier, decrease in any way Hitler's newly won strategic advantage. For not only was he so placed as to checkmate the military threat of either nation upon the territory of the Reich, but his effective striking power had been advanced to within one hundred miles of the Rumanian oil fields and the frontier of the Ukraine.

To the west, the fortifications of the Siegfried line offered a barrier equally as formidable as the opposing French Maginot line. By artificial means, therefore, the Germans had succeeded in closing the western door

¹ On March 16, Hitler issued a proclamation from the Hradschin Palace in Prague, defining the future status of Czechia. According to his decree Czechia was henceforth to be known as the "protectorate" of Bohemia and Moravia. Autonomy was promised, subject to German veto through the "Reich's protector" who was to be resident in Prague. Foreign and military affairs, communications, and customs were placed entirely under German jurisdiction. Germans of this territory were considered to be citizens of the Reich, whereas all other peoples were to be citizens of the protectorate. Dr. Emil Hacha, former President of Czecho Slovakia, was appointed by Hitler to continue as nominal head of the "protectorate" of Bohemia and Moravia; Constantin von Neurath, former Foreign Minister of the Reich, being appointed as "Reich's Protector."

² The status of Slovakia, which at first remained in doubt, was defined by the 25-year Reich-Slovak Treaty, March 23, 1939 (for text see Appendix T). According to the provisions of the treaty, Slovakia became an autonomous protectorate, quasi independence being retained in purely domestic matters and in the retention of diplomatic representatives abroad, its relations to be conducted always "in close co-operation with the German government." Its status was, in other words, that of a "puppet state" similar to Manchukuo. Dr. Joseph Tiso, former Premier of Slovakia, continued, at the command of Hitler, as head of the autonomous protectorate of Slovakia.

ANSCHLUSS AND AFTER



to danger of sudden attack, a strategic advantage which they were likewise achieving in the east, first by fortifications along the Polish frontier and, second, through virtual annexation of Czechia¹ and the establishment of a "puppet state" of Slovakia, both of which were placed under the military domination of the Reichswehr.

To the south, the security of the Reich was assured so long as the Rome-Berlin Axis stood and Yugoslavia remained impotent to move in the face of the combined Italo-German menace.² To the north, German naval dominance in the Baltic was uncontested, assuring her from attack from Scandinavia or Finland. Finally, with the rebuilding of her army and her status of first rank in air power, she had regained, and could continue to enjoy, security so long as her policies did not provoke again the formation of an overwhelming alliance system against her.

What then of *prosperity*?³ Had expansion in the name of national unity and territorial security given to the Reich at the same time resources in foodstuffs and raw materials and the vast consuming markets necessary for its economic prosperity? To this query the answer in most cases is in the negative. For although the annexation of Austria, Sudetenland, Czechia, and Memel, plus the "puppet state" of Slovakia, added approxi-

¹ By virtue of the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, Germany not only increased her steel capacity by ten per cent but came into possession of the Skoda Works and other munitions plants, having all told a production capacity equal to that of Germany's ally, Italy.

² The Italian occupation of Albania the second week of April, 1939, further assured the "good behavior" of Yugoslavia, vis-à-vis the Axis Powers.

³ Foreign Policy Association, "Germany's Controlled Economy," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIV, No. 24, 1939; Trivanovitch, Vaso, *Economic Development of Germany Under National Socialism*, 1937; Hutton, Graham, *Survey After Munich*, 1939; Editorial Research Reports, "Foreign Trade in German Economy," Vol. I, No. 10, 1939.

mately 77,000 square miles to her territorial control, with about 20,000,000 inhabitants, Germany increased thereby rather than decreased her population pressure. These areas, furthermore, were actually more dependent upon foreign sources of food supplies and raw materials than was the German Reich.¹

Germany, it is true, came into possession of important magnesite deposits in Austria, together with small amounts of iron ore and zinc. In the Sudetenland, Bohemia, and Moravia, there were likewise discoverable limited quantities of copper, iron, zinc, and lead, but these, together with certain important forest regions, were not in sufficient quantities to make up the difference in the Reich's raw material deficit. On the debit side, moreover, the Austrian, Sudeten, and Czech industries were not only competitors of Germany in steel, munitions, textile, and luxury trades, but their dependence upon foreign sources of raw material was even greater proportionately, thus adding further in most cases to the self-sufficiency problem of the Reich. In 1938 Germany had an import surplus of 432,400,000 marks as contrasted with a favorable balance of 443,000,000 in the previous year. This represented a deficit for 1938 alone approximately equal to the total gold and foreign exchange taken at the time of the Austrian annexation.²

But, whereas fundamentally the dependence of Germany's economy upon the outside world remained

¹ Foreign Policy Association, "Germany's Controlled Economy," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIV, No. 24, 1939; Hutton, Graham, *Survey After Munich*, 1939; National Industrial Conference Board, "Germany's Resource Position in 1938," Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1939.

² In addition to about \$90,000,000 appropriated at the time of *Anschluss*, Germany seized in Prague a year later, on March 15, 1939, approximately \$80,000,000 in gold and foreign exchange.

largely unchanged despite the recent annexations, she had gained greater freedom of action both economically and politically in the rich regions of southeastern Europe. Thus on March 23, 1939, the day of Hitler's arrival in Memel, an announcement was made of the sweeping economic concessions granted by Rumania to Germany in a new trade agreement.¹ Providing as it did for a possible German monopoly in Rumania's trade and the exploitation of her resources, agricultural and mineral, as well as the development of her utilities, this agreement gave promise of becoming the model for similar arrangements between the Reich and other Balkan states.²

Thus it was clear that in the vast areas lying between the new Germany and the Soviet Republic, in which the Reich had presumably been given a free hand by the Munich settlement, at least three forms of exploitation were envisioned.³ The first was exemplified by Bohemia and Moravia, which had been incorporated

¹ The German-Rumanian trade agreement signed on March 23, 1939, provided for the following: (1) German capital to be allowed to exploit Rumanian oil fields; (2) free ports on the Danube and Black Sea to be accorded to Germany; (3) Germany on a barter basis to buy more Rumanian farm products, while Rumania adjusted her agriculture to German needs; (4) war materials and industrial machinery to be supplied Rumania by Germany; (5) Germany to overhaul the Rumanian railways, build roads, improve riverways; (6) German and Rumanian banking systems to co-operate closely; (7) Germany to aid in constructing new electric plants and in introducing new farm products needed by the Reich.

² The alarm at first provoked by the German-Rumanian trade treaty was considerably lessened by the announcements of Rumanian trade agreements with France (March 31) and with Great Britain (May 12), the former providing for consumption of considerable amounts of Rumanian oil and the latter providing for agricultural products.

³ Except for foodstuffs, eastern and southeastern Europe can by no means provide for German self-sufficiency. While the *bauxite* (aluminum) of Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Greece, the *chromium* of Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia, *magnetite* and *graphite* of Austria, and the *petroleum* of Rumania might supply at least the peace-time needs of Germany, this about exhausts the list. *Phosphates*, *tin*, *cotton*, *rubber*, and *tropical vegetable oils* are entirely missing. *Iron ore*, *manganese*, *nickel*, *lead*, *zinc*, *tungsten*, *antimony*, and *copper* exist in totally inadequate quantities.

into the Reich with the status of an inferior colony. The second, illustrated by the 25-year treaty with Slovakia, permitted to the peoples of this region the status of a "puppet state," by which the formalities of independence were granted, though under the complete dominance of German influence and control. The third and probably more universally applicable form of exploitation was represented by the German-Rumanian trade agreement, foreshadowing the establishment of an economic protectorate under the Reich as the price of territorial independence.

From the middle of March, 1939, to the middle of July, events moved rapidly. The annexation of the Czechs proved conclusively to the British and French for the first time that Hitler's intentions reached beyond his original declaration of desiring only to include Germans in the Third Reich. From that time on, the Anglo-French alliance began to function for the single purpose of stopping Hitler.

The rapid progress in the consolidation of the balance between the Axis and the Democratic Front, popularly known as the "Peace Front," can be no more clearly illustrated than by the chronological citation of countervailing actions on the part of both sides.

AXIS (items in Italic type):

March 15, 1939, German troops occupy Czechoslovakia.

DEMOCRATIC FRONT (items in ordinary Roman type):

March 17, Chamberlain announces Britain's intention to offer resistance "to the utmost of its power" to any power attempting to dominate the world by force.

March 18, Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union refuse recognition of the annexation of Czechoslovakia. The United States imposes an additional 25% tax on all dutiable German imports.

March 19, The French Chambers grant rule by decree to the French Cabinet.

March 22, Hitler's troops occupy Memel.

March 23, German-Rumanian trade agreement signed.

March 27, Nationalist Spain signs Anti-Comintern Pact.

March 31, Japan annexes Spratly Islands, which lie between Singapore and French Indo-China, and are claimed by France.

March 31, British government announces guarantee of Polish independence.

April 6, Poland accepts British offer of mutual guarantee.

April 7-8, Italy occupies Albania.

April 13, France and Britain announce guarantee of independence of Greece and Rumania. Negotiations for an Anglo-Russian alliance are commenced.

April 15, President Roosevelt requests Hitler and Mussolini to grant a ten-year pledge of nonaggression with regard to thirty specified states of Europe and the Near East.

April 19, Britain indicates intention to defend the independence of Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.

April 20, Mussolini rejects President Roosevelt's nonaggression proposal.

April 23, Britain appoints a Ministry of Supply for the organization and mobilization of war industries and materials.

April 26, Britain announces the adoption of military conscription.

April 28, Hitler rejects President Roosevelt's proposal for non-aggression and denounces the Anglo-German naval agreement and the German-Polish nonaggression pact.

May 5, Poland rejects Germany's request for return of Danzig and for extraterritorial passage across the Corridor.

May 7, Germany and Italy announce their intention of concluding a military alliance.

May 12, British-Rumanian trade treaty announced.

May 12, British-Turkey treaty of mutual guarantee signed, providing for free passage of British fleet through the Dardanelles for defense of Rumania, in return for British defense of Turkey.

May 12, Chamberlain and Daladier reaffirm the determination of their respective countries to stand by their guarantee of the independence of European states threatened by the aggression of any power.

May 22, Germany and Italy conclude a formal military alliance.

May 31, German-Danish nonaggression treaty signed.

June 7, Germany signs nonaggression pacts with Latvia and Estonia.

June 14, Japanese forces impose blockade on the British and French concessions at Tientsin.

June 23, Franco-Turkish mutual assistance treaty signed.

July 10, Chamberlain indicates that any attempted unilateral action to reunite Danzig with Germany will bring into operation the Anglo-Polish mutual defense agreement.

July 18, Britain announces joint construction with Turkey of a naval and air base at Chesme near Smyrna and not far from the Italian Dodecanese Islands.

August 12, Military and naval staff conversations between France, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia commence in Moscow.

August 11-13, Conferences in Salzburg and Berchtesgaden between Hitler, the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and the Italian Foreign Minister Ciano.

August 23, A ten-year German-Russian nonaggression treaty is signed at Moscow.

To the student of international relations, the above dramatic sequence of events is most important. For not only does it signify the functioning of the balance of power in its more acute form, but likewise illustrates the old law of the European states system that any nation which aims to dominate the Continent creates thereby the very coalition of opposing forces which its policies seek to prevent. And whereas recent German actions may have had as their ultimate purpose the assurance of the basic necessities of nationhood, *i.e.*, territorial and economic security, the methods employed have served to produce largely the opposite effect.

By midsummer of 1939 there could have existed no illusions among Nazi leaders as to the power and intent of the Democratic Front to oppose German purposes

successfully in the ultimate contingency of a war of attrition. With the rapid development of the British-inspired and -led coalition, Germany's historical nightmare, "encirclement," was already far advanced. And when on May 5 Poland refused, with British and French backing, Germany's request for the return of Danzig and the granting of a highway across the Corridor, the future reality of a war on two fronts became clear to the Reich.

But three alternative courses in fact presented themselves. The first was to make war at once before the coalition system and armament programs of the democratic Powers had made further gains. Such an alternative necessitated the use of the "*Blitzkrieg*" or "lightning stroke," which in itself was an admission of inability to win through a war of attrition.

The second alternative was for Hitler to resign himself to giving up the method of expansion by threat of terror and force. To do this, however, would mean not only the abandonment of his declared program but the making of Germany a static nation. Such an eventuality could scarcely be faced, because German mobilization for war purposes had reached such a pitch and the entire economic fabric of the nation had become so tuned to war demands that demobilization would lead to disorganization and revolution within.

The third alternative, that of the continuance of the policy of threat with the postponement of action so far as actual war was concerned, remained the only one apparently to be pursued. By bringing pressure to bear wherever a point of weakness appeared, from Djibouti to Danzig, and from Gibraltar to Bucharest, the Axis Powers could keep the nerves of Europe

sufficiently on edge to gain occasional small victories abroad for the consumption of an intoxicated public at home.

In midsummer of 1939, the German dilemma had become therefore acute. To the realization that a return to normalcy and peace was impossible was added the knowledge that war, if postponed, would mean defeat by virtue of the fast-accumulating superior forces of the Democratic Front. On the other hand it was quite evident that the strain upon national economy and nerves of a continuance of diplomacy by threat might soon carry the Reich, and with it the rest of the world, to the breaking point. Only the vague hope of conference instead of war remained; a conference in which the two parties, the Axis and the Democratic Front, now more equally balanced, might come to such broad and sweeping arrangements as to make possible a retreat from disaster.

While it was obviously impossible to foresee precisely future events, the accumulated effects of Nazi diplomacy were at least evident. Although outwardly the Rome partner remained true to the Axis, historical precedent as well as the financial and commercial necessities of Rome could not be reassuring as to perpetual loyalty. Likewise, despite the fact that the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia and the achievement of *Anschluss* had vastly extended the territorial base of the Third Reich, this growth in power had caused such alarm abroad as to produce the very coalition of opposing states which it had been German purpose to prevent. If Czecho-Slovakia had been lost to the Democratic Front at Munich, Poland was won back to it at Prague. With the extension, moreover, of the British

guarantee to Greece, Rumania, and Turkey and the continued negotiations for an understanding between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Front, "encirclement" of the Reich was proceeding rapidly.¹ Before the student of international relations, however, can judge adequately of the successes and failures of German policy, he must examine in the Chapters XII-XVI the situations of the other Powers and the Smaller States of Europe.

¹ On the other hand, the Germans claimed great importance for the German-Russian nonaggression treaty signed August 23. For its text, see Appendix V.

FRANCE (Continued from page 260)

FROM the election of May, 1936, until the arrival of the Daladier government in April, 1938,¹ France was destined to struggle in a morass of domestic troubles.² In its over-eagerness to achieve an ambitious program of belated social reforms, the Popular Front showed serious disregard for developments transpiring abroad, which were bound eventually to affect French security. While Germany forged madly ahead in the creation of her vast armament structure, France's industrial plant was thrown severely out of gear through labor disputes, strikes, the flight of capital, the decline of the franc, and the general instability resulting from "reform politics." Nor could the new 40-hour week, suddenly imposed upon French employers, enable her armament industries to compete with those of Germany and Italy, which were not only working overtime but were largely state-controlled.³

¹ June 4, 1936, First Popular Front government, Léon Blum, Premier, Yvon Delbos, Foreign Minister; June 22, 1937, Second Popular Front government, Camille Chautemps, Premier, Yvon Delbos, Foreign Minister; Jan. 14-18, 1938, Ministerial crisis, Chautemps resigns, is reappointed and forms a new Cabinet, with Yvon Delbos as Foreign Minister; March 10-13, 1938, Ministerial crisis, Chautemps resigns, Léon Blum succeeds, Joseph Paul-Boncour, Foreign Minister; April 8-10, 1938, Ministerial crisis, Blum resigns, Edouard Daladier forms Cabinet with support of Radical Socialist and Center parties, George Bonnet, Foreign Minister.

² *Foreign Policy Reports*, "The New Deal in France," Vol. XIII, No. 12, 1937.

³ For an account of the interrelated economic, social, and political problems in France see Belgium, Montgomery, *News of the French*, 1938.

In June, 1937, there occurred the first Ministerial crisis of the Popular Front, caused primarily by the refusal of the Senate to grant emergency decree powers with respect to finances. Nor was the Chautemps government which succeeded any more successful. To the further aggravation of the financial crisis, intensified by the flight of capital and a new wave of strikes, the unity of the Popular Front was put under severe strain. In the foreign field, moreover, the Chautemps government continued the policy of dependence upon British leadership, both in Spain and in relation to the Axis Powers. In only one aspect was the situation really improved, through the appointment of the capable General Gamelin as Chief-of-Staff, who was to function as co-ordinator of the armed forces.

By the beginning of 1938, then, France had reached the most serious turning point in her postwar history. It was at this juncture that she became aware of Hitler's intentions to dominate Austria and thus shatter the postwar security system of alliances. A further blow was dealt when Anthony Eden, the staunchest friend of France, resigned as British Foreign Secretary.

It was under these circumstances that Delbos, the Foreign Minister, reiterated before the Chamber of Deputies on February 26, 1938, the basic principles of French foreign policy as viewed at the time, which included loyalty to the League, close relations with England, maintenance of the Franco-Soviet Pact, defense of Czechoslovakia, continued nonintervention in Spain, and assurance of the status quo in the Mediterranean. In other words, France at long last appeared ready to save what remained of the postwar system and to continue loyalty to her alliances in central and

eastern Europe with Poland, the Little Entente, and Russia.

Yet scarcely two weeks later, March 10-13, in the midst of another Ministerial crisis produced largely by the financial situation, Germany peacefully occupied Austria. Nor is it without significance that on March 13, when Léon Blum succeeded Chautemps as Prime Minister of a French government that was helpless to act, German troops joined with those of Italy at the Brenner Pass.

By the end of March it was evident that the Popular Front could no longer maintain its position and that a change in party coalitions was imminent. On April 10, 1938, Daladier became Prime Minister with a national Cabinet composed largely of personalities rather than representatives of parties or ideologies, his support being derived from the Radical Socialist and Center groups. Unlike its predecessors of the Popular Front, the Daladier government was granted by the Chambers the right to rule by decree, in so far as French finances were concerned.

Daladier's primary purpose was to see to the restoration of confidence in the national economic structure through settlement of the strike situation, the balancing of the budget, and the eradication of unemployment by public works and colonial development. While this meant an increase in taxes, both direct and indirect, together with a severe devaluation of the franc, it at least resulted in the return of sufficient confidence to bring about a repatriation of considerable money hoarded abroad.¹

¹ This remarkable recovery in the economic stability of France was credited largely to the confidence inspired by the retrenchment measures of Paul Reynaud, who became Minister of Finance in November, 1938.

On the side of foreign relations an important development was the conclusion of the Franco-British alliance on April 29, 1938. The most sweeping engagement of its kind since the World War, it provided not only for complete diplomatic co-operation but also for the establishment of a unitary command of the British and French military, naval, and air forces. This show of unity, together with the Czech mobilization, undoubtedly persuaded Hitler to postpone the Sudeten issue during the May crisis.

The visit of the King and Queen of England to Paris the middle of July gave ceremonial sanction to the newly created Franco-British entente. In the succeeding weeks, moreover, it became increasingly evident that the tension between opposing ideological fronts in Europe was on the increase. Throughout the summer months the Germans were rushing to completion the Siegfried line along their western frontier. On September 5 Daladier canceled all leaves for the army and air forces and summoned reservists to occupy the Maginot line. By September 10, France had 1,200,000 soldiers under virtual mobilization, to balance which the British navy had concentrated its principal contingents in the North Sea.

Yet with all this show of force at the time of the Munich crisis, the French government, in complete agreement with its British ally, accepted the demands of Hitler as presented at Gödesberg. For France this constituted one of the greatest defeats in her history. She lost not only the defense advantage of thirty-five well-equipped divisions in Czechoslovakia, but her alliances and prestige in eastern Europe as well. While temporary peace was thus purchased at a heavy price,

the sacrifice was not to mark the end of concessions sought by the Axis Powers.

On November 30, in the Italian Chamber, the speech of the Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, was greeted with a staged demonstration of the Deputies, during which shouts of "Tunis," "Nice," and "Corsica" were made. This manifestation of anti-French feeling occurred, moreover, on the very day of the calling of the general strike in France. Nor was the signing of the Franco-German Declaration of Friendship¹ a week later to offer much assurance of confidence in the ultimate purposes of the Axis Powers; for on December 22 Italy notified France that thenceforth it regarded the Treaty of January 7, 1935, by the terms of which Franco-Italian colonial and naval claims were supposedly settled, to be null and void. Under these ominous circumstances Premier Daladier commenced his tour of inspection of the defense establishments in Corsica and the North African colonies on January 1, 1939, a gesture of defiance the meaning of which was not lost to the rest of the world.

Upon his return, the Prime Minister declared, in the course of an address before the Chamber, on January 26, that "not an inch of territory would be ceded." To reinforce the apparent stiffening of the French position, moreover, the 1939 budget called for the expenditure of forty billion francs on defense alone, the largest peace-time budget of its kind in French history.

It is true, of course, that the German seizure of Czechoslovakia and Memel, the final victory of Franco's forces in Spain, the German-Rumanian trade treaty, Japanese seizure of Hainan and the Spratly Islands, and

¹ For text, see Appendix R.

the continued demands of the Axis Powers for colonial concessions, dealt successive blows thereafter to the security and prestige of France. Nevertheless, the shock of these events resulted in the creation of counterbalancing forces of tremendous import. In addition to the rearmament program the Daladier government was granted by both Chambers,¹ on March 19, four days after Hitler entered Prague, sweeping plenary powers to rule by decree wherever necessary to meet any further emergency endangering the safety of France. Twelve days later Neville Chamberlain announced, in the House of Commons, a British guarantee of the independence of Poland, thus committing the Empire for the first time to the collective system as applied in eastern Europe.²

By the spring of 1939 it was apparent, therefore, that the weaker member of the Anglo-French front was not only reinforced by the British guarantee but was prepared itself to stand firm. And still more important were the psychological and material changes in France herself. If Munich had been a shock it likewise had been an education. France, in 1939, having largely overcome her internal weakness by the restoration of

¹ The decree powers were granted to the Daladier government by only a small majority in the Chamber, 321 votes to 264; the vote in the Senate being 186 to 17. As this vote of confidence immediately preceded the state visit of President and Madame Lebrun to London, it added strength to the Anglo-French front at a peculiarly opportune moment.

² On April 13 a joint Anglo-French guarantee of protection of the independence of Rumania and Greece was announced. Poland, however, up to July, was the only one of these three eastern European states to agree to a reciprocal guarantee with the democratic powers, though no doubt remained that a similar acceptance by Rumania awaited the outcome of similar negotiations between Russia and the Western democracies. Turkey, on the other hand, announced on May 12 official acceptance of the British offer of guarantee. This provided the right to the British fleet to enter the Black Sea through the Dardanelles in defense of Rumania, in return for the British promise of the defense of Turkey.

relative industrial peace and greater financial stability, was united—a unity to which Italian pretensions had likewise greatly contributed. Entrenched behind their Maginot line, the French people knew that they had the most powerful army in Europe and that their British ally was still supreme in European waters. If war could but be postponed until the winter of 1940 the balance in air power would likewise have shifted in favor of the Democratic Front.

In the post-Munich world, therefore, the lines of French policy were becoming increasingly clear. They had already taken the form of a distinct Western orientation, the game in Danubia being that of "watchful waiting," French commitments going no further than those of Britain.

Although the burden of maintaining the status quo in eastern Europe had in the past been too great, France, having survived the crisis of the destruction of her postwar alliance system, emerged united in the spring of 1939, and with the knowledge that the revived Democratic Front ("Peace Front"), under British leadership, might yet hold.

GREAT BRITAIN (Continued from page 288)

DESPITE the general awakening of British public opinion to existing dangers early in 1937,¹ the policy of compromising with the dictators was to be pursued by the Anglo-French Entente, under British leadership, until the spring of 1939. On January 2, 1937, the Anglo-Italian Declaration guaranteeing the continuance of the status quo in the Mediterranean, was announced.² While obviously made as a gesture of appeasement, on Britain's part, due to complications arising from the Ethiopian crisis and Italian aid to the Rebel cause in Spain, its nebulous character was emphasized six weeks later by the announcement in the British Parliament of the adoption of a five-year armament program at the unprecedented peace-time figure of \$7,500,000,000.

The British policy of surrender to Fascism in the Spanish civil war, while contrary to prevailing democratic opinion in England, was adopted apparently to

¹ Churchill, Winston S., *While England Slept*, 1938.

² The Anglo-Italian Declaration "concerning assurances with regard to the Mediterranean," provided: (1) for the freedom of entry, exit and transit of both parties through the Mediterranean; (2) for the renouncement of any desire to modify or see modified the status quo as regards national sovereignty of territories in the Mediterranean area; (3) for the respect of each other's rights and interests in said area; and (4) discouragement of activities liable to impair the relations of the two signatories. In addition an exchange of notes between Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, and Sir Eric Drummond (Lord Perth), the British Ambassador, contained an Italian guarantee concerning the "integrity of the present territories of Spain."

avoid the danger of war in the Mediterranean at a time when concern was great over the potentialities of the German menace in the north. And though the resignation of Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary, on February 20, 1938, indicated a decided division of official judgment as to the wisdom of the methods which were being employed in dealing with the totalitarian states, British policy was to continue throughout that momentous year along traditional lines under the leadership of Neville Chamberlain, aided by Lord Halifax, Captain Eden's successor to the Foreign Office.

The events which followed, as we have already observed in the chapter on Germany, were the logical consequence of the circumstances produced by the Anglo-French policy of retreat and compromise. The very day, in fact, that Anthony Eden resigned, Adolf Hitler prophetically declared himself protector of the ten million Germans living beyond the borders of the Reich. Scarcely a month later, on March 15, the Fuehrer had made his triumphant entry into Vienna, thus not only sealing the fate of democracy's outpost, Czechoslovakia, but bringing into reality the Anglo-French nightmare of Nazi dominance in central and eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, for the remainder of 1938, the British were to continue their defeatist policy of a futile show of strength after the event. On April 16 the Anglo-Italian Declaration of January, 1937, was reaffirmed,¹ its most important terms to be applicable only following

¹ The futility of its provisions was to be demonstrated during the twelve months which followed. Italy not only continued to provide General Franco with forces and munitions necessary to insure his victory in March, 1939, but early in April of the same year Italian forces annexed Albania, thus violating further the status quo in the Mediterranean. For provisions of the Anglo-Italian agreement of April 16, 1938, see Chronology.

the settlement of the Spanish question. This retreat from the challenge of Italian provocations, which was to assure Mussolini victory in Spain, was followed two weeks later (April 29) by the Anglo-French treaty of alliance providing for the co-ordination of their military and foreign policies.

Such a belated stiffening of the Democratic Front, however, could not permanently override the weakening effects of continuous compromise in a Europe which had been plunged full-blown into an era of *Realpolitik*. For, although the firm stand taken by London and Paris the last of May, 1938, at the time of the first Czech crisis, postponed temporarily the Nazi expansionist program, this democratic show of strength crumbled completely before Hitler's onslaught four months later at Munich.

Following the occupation of Prague, however, March 15, 1939, a dramatic change in British policy took place, foreshadowed by Chamberlain's Birmingham address of March 17, which promised British resistance "to the utmost of its power to any power which attempted to dominate the world by force." The joint Anglo-French protest to the Reich against an "alleged illegality" in German action in Bohemia and Moravia, was reinforced by the simultaneous withdrawal of their ambassadors from Berlin. At the same time the Special Powers Bill was passed by the French Chambers authorizing the cabinet to rule by decree. This measure, coinciding as it did with the state visit to London of President and Madame Lebrun, gave added strength and solidity to the Democratic Front.

On March 31, less than two weeks after Hitler's entry

into Memel and the signing of the German-Rumanian trade agreement, the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons the British guarantee of Polish independence.¹ Thereafter events moved rapidly, each aggressive move on the part of the Axis being countered by further Anglo-French guarantees.

On April 6 Poland agreed to regard the British guarantee as a mutual obligation,² thus making more effective the new principle of British commitments for the maintenance of the status quo in eastern Europe. On the following day Mussolini, with the encouragement of Hitler, invaded Albania, formal annexation being declared on April 13, simultaneously with the Anglo-French announcement of a guarantee of the independence of Greece and Rumania.

It was at this point of highest tension that President Roosevelt dispatched his dramatic telegrams to Hitler and Mussolini, requesting as a minimum a ten-year pledge of nonaggression with respect to thirty specified states and offering the mediation of the United States.³ While the President's request was rejected both by Mussolini on April 20 and by Hitler on April 28, the American intervention served not only to encourage Anglo-French policy of resistance but placed the Axis Powers in the embarrassing position of appearing to be "aggressors" in any future territorial expansion.

¹ "In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government . . . I have now to inform the House that . . . in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power."

² Polish intentions to abide by the agreement were reaffirmed on May 5 by the rejection of Germany's request for the return of Danzig and for a rail and motor road across the Corridor.

³ For text, see Appendix U.

On April 19, the day preceding Mussolini's rejection of the American note, Chamberlain indicated British intention to extend the guarantee of independence to Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In similar fashion, two days before Hitler's speech of April 28 to the Reichstag, in which he denounced both the Anglo-German naval treaty and the German-Polish ten-year nonaggression pact, the British cabinet announced the adoption of military conscription.¹

Thus by the first of May, 1939, it had become perfectly clear that Europe had not only returned with a vengeance to the prewar system of the balance of power, but that it was witnessing the commencement of Britain's historical role of creator of coalitions as a means of preventing the rise of any single power to dominate the Continent.² By the middle of August only an agreement with Russia and the acceptance by Rumania of the principle of mutual guarantee remained to complete the basic structure in the British system of encirclement.³

Of greater importance to the immediate future, however, was the change which had taken place in British public opinion. For whereas at Munich there was universal relief that conflict had been avoided even at a heavy price, there remained no doubt by the spring of

¹ At the same time a Minister of Supply was established for the purpose of mobilizing all resources essential to British war industries.

² It was British-created and -led coalitions which defeated Louis XIV, Napoleon I, and William II.

³ On May 12, an announcement was made of the official acceptance of a treaty of guarantee between Britain and Turkey, in which the government of Ankara promised that the Dardanelles would at all times be open to the British fleet for entrance into the Black Sea for the defense of Rumania in return for British promise of the naval defense of Turkey, particularly against Italian aggression in the eastern Mediterranean. Such an agreement not only brought nearer the possibility of Rumania's acceptance of the principle of mutual guarantee with Britain and France, but also gave hope of smoothing the way for an Anglo-Russian understanding

1939 that the British public was now prepared to resist to the full the further extension of German dominance upon the Continent. Nor could the world ignore the fact that the fully mobilized resources of the Empire, material and financial, could not be matched in the long run by the challengers of peace. It was, therefore, with the full knowledge of public support and of British power that Chamberlain declared in his Albert Hall address of May 12, that "no more deadly mistake could be made" than to assume that "Britain and France were not in earnest and could not be relied on to carry out their promises."

To the student of international relations the Fascist conception of the necessity of imperialist expansion offers at least a partial explanation of the Italian policy of expediency. Of far greater importance, however, is the question of the extent to which Fascist policy since the creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis may or may not have enhanced Italy's security and prosperity.

The most important consequence, to Italy and to Europe, of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia was, of course, the annexation of Austria by Germany. For not only did the sanctions imposed upon Italy in the name of the League and at the insistence of Britain serve to destroy the collective system and the Stresa Front, but the rise of the German colossus was thereby assured. After Italy's annexation of Ethiopia in May, 1936, moreover, the postwar European balance of power was drastically altered through a sequence of events which changed the map into a whirling kaleidoscope.

On July 17, but two days following the official ending of the League's sanctions against Italy, the Spanish civil war commenced. A week later Hitler foreshadowed future close Italo-German co-operation through his recognition of Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia, a

gesture which was to receive concrete sanction by the two dictatorship Powers through their joint *de jure* recognition, in November, of General Franco's government in Spain.

During the following months the Spanish civil war largely preoccupied the foreign concerns of the democratic Powers. It likewise provided a valuable breathing spell for the Rome-Berlin Axis. By taking advantage of the obvious desire of France and Britain to avoid war both in the Mediterranean and along the Rhine, Italy and Germany were free to accomplish the double purpose of rearming themselves at top speed while providing General Franco, at the same time, with war materials and troops, in violation of the nonintervention agreements.

Events to come cast their shadow before, in April, 1937, when Chancellor Schuschnigg was told by Mussolini in Venice that Italy could no longer guarantee the integrity of Austria. At the end of September, just a year prior to the Munich crisis, Mussolini made his state visit to Hitler in Berlin. Scarcely five weeks thereafter, on November 6, Italy joined Germany and Japan as an adherent of the Anti-Comintern or Anti-Communist Pact, thus establishing a triad of "Have-not" powers which was to plague the faltering steps of Anglo-French diplomacy in the months to follow, both in Europe and in Asia.

With the German occupation of Austria in the middle of March, 1938, the Rome-Berlin Axis succeeded in achieving a common frontier, erecting thereby a formidable economic, political, and strategic land barrier between the western democracies and eastern Europe. This barrier was reinforced, moreover, by German com-

mand of the Baltic and Italian threats to Franco-British colonies and trade routes in the Mediterranean. When, therefore, Britain and France were forced to surrender Danubia to the German Reich at Munich in September, 1938, the realities of the new Europe, split by the solid bloc of dictatorship Powers, had become unmistakably clear.

Germany's absorption of Czecho-Slovakia in March, 1939, on the first anniversary of *Anschluss*, her annexation of Memel a week later, and the further extension of her dominance in the Balkans by virtue of the Rumanian trade treaty, followed logically. Nor did there appear to be an end to the continued rearrangement of political and economic frontiers in eastern Europe until either Germany had achieved her ultimate purpose of Mittel-europa or the western democracies had abandoned their policy of "appeasement by retreat."

While the final victory of Franco's forces in Spain at the close of March, 1939, marked yet another defeat of the Democratic Front under Italo-German auspices, it at least swept away one of the uncertainties in the alignment of forces on the ideological front, particularly with the announcement, in April, of Spanish adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Obviously, therefore, the recent Italian course of diplomacy by threat and blackmail in partnership with Germany had produced a succession of momentary triumphs. Yet, far from being one of the "satisfied" nations, the Italians were becoming even more insistent in their demands for colonial concessions and special rights in areas under the control of the democratic Powers. Nor could the Anglo-French allies

ignore the fact that in the Italian search for security the price of Italy's aid in the German expansion program at Munich and after had yet to be fully exacted. For clearly the Italian annexation of Albania, in the middle of April, and the removal of Austrian and German inhabitants from the Italian Tirol (or Upper Adige), which commenced in July, could hardly be considered just compensation.¹

In the summer of 1939, therefore, it was obvious that although recent Italian policy had been productive of certain dramatic effects, in reality the Italian position, both strategic and economic, had worsened. On the strategic side, Fascist threats to the status quo in the Mediterranean had produced reactions in France and Britain in the form of naval programs beyond the capacity of Italy to meet. The concentration of the fleets of the democratic Powers within the Mediterranean, and their extension of guarantee of territorial integrity to Turkey and Greece, were serving to counterbalance Fascist victory in Spain.² Even the German partnership, as every Italian knew, could not be permanent. And while statesmen of Rome and Berlin continued in the exchange of confidences and greetings, these did not discourage the continued construction of fortifications on the Fascist side of the Brenner Pass.

¹ On July 8, 1939, the Axis Powers announced an agreement providing for the gradual transfer to the Reich of about 200,000 German-speaking Austrians and 10,000 Germans from Southern Tirol, a region surrendered to Italy by Austria in 1919. The inhabitants were to be given the choice, however, of either migration or "Italianization." The simultaneous order of immediate expulsion of all other foreigners, particularly tourists, from the area gave rise to considerable speculation abroad as to the underlying reasons for the agreement.

² On July 18, 1939, announcement was made of British co-operation with Turkey in the construction of a large naval and air base, for their joint use, at Chesme near Smyrna. Within easy reach of the Italian Dodecanese, such a fortified base would greatly strengthen the British position in the eastern Mediterranean.

Economically, too, the Italian situation had become still more aggravated, both through the terrific costs of armaments and colonial adventures and through the crushing strain of a war economy upon national industry, commerce, and finance. Nor could Germany offer relief either in finance or in trade, a role which only the democratic Powers could fulfill. Having largely made possible the rise of the German colossus, moreover, the painful realities of the dominance of Berlin in Rome were becoming as evident as they were resented. Even the widely publicized announcement, on May 7, of the intentions of the Axis Powers to conclude a military alliance against the Anglo-French "Peace Front" could not hide the fact that the Italian people themselves would never fight willingly for a German cause.

It was becoming clear, therefore, that the usefulness of the Axis to Italy showed signs of waning. For just as everyone suspected that in case of a German-created war Rome would abandon her partner as she had in 1914, so it was becoming evident that in the future the Democratic Front could prove more useful to Italian finance and commerce than the Reich. Expediency remained, therefore, as always, the guiding principle of Italian policy.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ¹

The High Contracting Parties,

In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security:

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and

by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE I

1. The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

2. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission

¹ The Covenant is given with annotations as found in *Ten Years of World Cooperation*. Amendments in force, as mentioned in footnotes, are included in the text in italics; other proposed amendments have been added in footnotes. The paragraphs are given as officially numbered by an Assembly resolution of September 21, 1926.

is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

3. Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

ARTICLE II

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

ARTICLE III

1. The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League.

2. The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

3. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

4. At meetings of the Assembly, each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.

ARTICLE IV

1. The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,¹ together with Representatives of four² other Members of the League. These four² Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be Members of the Council.

¹ The Principal Allied and Associated Powers were the following: The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan (see Preamble of the Treaty of Peace with Germany); but the United States did not accept membership.

² See following Paragraph 2 and note.

2. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League, whose Representatives shall always be Members of the Council;¹ the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.²

2 bis.³ The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules dealing with the election of the non-permanent Members of the Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and the conditions of re-eligibility.

3. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

*4. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

5. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.

6. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative.

ARTICLE V

1. Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

2. All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

¹ In virtue of this paragraph of the Covenant, Germany was nominated as a permanent Member of the Council on September 8, 1926.

² The number of Members of the Council selected by the Assembly was increased to six instead of four by virtue of a resolution adopted at the third ordinary meeting of the Assembly on September 25, 1922; and it was further increased to nine by a resolution adopted by the Assembly on September 8, 1926.

³ This amendment came into force on July 29, 1926, in accordance with Article XXVI of the Covenant.

3. The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

ARTICLE VI

1. The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as may be required.

2. The first Secretary-General shall be the person named in the Annex; thereafter the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly.

3. The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council.

4. The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.

5.¹ *The expenses of the League shall be borne by the Members of the League in the proportion decided by the Assembly.*

ARTICLE VII

1. The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.

2. The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere.

3. All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.

4. Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

5. The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.

ARTICLE VIII

1. The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

¹ This paragraph came into force August 13, 1924, in accordance with Article XXVI.

3. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

4. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

5. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

6. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes, and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.

ARTICLE IX

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles I and VIII and on military, naval and air questions generally.

ARTICLE X

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE XI

1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of

the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

ARTICLE XII¹

1. The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration *or judicial settlement* or to enquiry by the Council and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators *or the judicial decision* or the report by the Council.

2. In any case under this Article, the award of the arbitrators *or the judicial decision* shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

ARTICLE XIII¹

1. The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration *or judicial settlement*, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration *or judicial settlement*.

2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration *or judicial settlement*.

3. *For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article XIV, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.*

4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award *or decision* that may be rendered, and that

¹ The amendments printed in italics in Articles XII and XIII came into force on September 26, 1924, in accordance with Article XXVI of the Covenant.

they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award *or decision*, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

ARTICLE XIV

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

*

ARTICLE XV

1.¹ If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration *or judicial settlement* in accordance with Article XIII, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

2. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

3. The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute and, if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

5. Any Member of the League represented on the Council may

¹ The amendment to the first paragraph of this article came into force on September 26, 1924, in accordance with Article XXVI of the Covenant.

make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the Members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

7. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

9. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article XII relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

ARTICLE XVI

1.¹ Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII or XV, it shall *ipso facto*

¹ The following proposal for the amendment of Paragraph 1 of Article XVI was awaiting ratification in 1935:

"Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII, or XV, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of

be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League.

war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations and to prohibit all intercourse at least between persons resident within their territories and persons resident within the territory of the covenant-breaking State and, if they deem it expedient, also between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and to prevent all financial, commercial or personal intercourse at least between persons resident within the territory of that State and persons resident within the territory of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not, and, if they deem it expedient, also between the nationals of that State and the nationals of any other State whether a Member of the League or not.

"It is for the Council to give an opinion whether or not a breach of the Covenant has taken place. In deliberations on this question in the Council, the votes of Members of the League alleged to have resorted to war and of Members against whom such action was directed shall not be counted.

"The Council will notify to all Members of the League the date which it recommends for the application of the economic pressure under this Article.

"Nevertheless, the Council may, in the case of particular Members, postpone the coming into force of any of these measures for a specified period where it is satisfied that such a postponement will facilitate the attainment of the object of the measures referred to in the preceding paragraph, or that it is necessary in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience which will be caused to such Members."

4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

ARTICLE XVII

1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles XII to XVI inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

2. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an enquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

3. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article XVI shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE XVIII

Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

ARTICLE XIX

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

ARTICLE XX

1. The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

2. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligation inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

ARTICLE XXI

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

ARTICLE XXII

1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the

rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

6. There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

8. The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories, and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

ARTICLE XXIII

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League:

- (a) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children, both in

their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations;

- (b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control;
- (c) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;
- (d) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;
- (e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind;
- (f) will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

ARTICLE XXIV

1. There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.

2. In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

3. The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.

ARTICLE XXV

The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and cooperation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

ARTICLE XXVI¹

1. Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly.

2. No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

ANNEX

I. ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
[names omitted]

II. FIRST SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Honorable Sir James Eric Drummond, K.C.M.G., C.B.

¹ The following amendment has been offered to replace Article XXVI, and was awaiting ratification in 1935:

"Amendments to the present Covenant the text of which shall have been voted by the Assembly on a three-fourths majority, in which there shall be included the votes of all the Members of the Council represented at the meeting, will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives composed the Council when the vote was taken and by the majority of those whose Representatives form the Assembly.

"If the required number of ratifications shall not have been obtained within twenty-two months after the vote of the Assembly, the proposed amendment shall remain without effect.

"The Secretary-General shall inform the Members of the taking effect of an amendment.

"Any Member of the League which has not at that time ratified the amendment is free to notify the Secretary-General within a year of its refusal to accept it, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League."

Appendix B

WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS, ETC.

1. The Fourteen Points, Part of President Wilson's Address to Congress on January 8, 1918

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more

than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations,

which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

2. Part of President Wilson's Address at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918

There can be but one issue. The settlement must be final. There can be no compromise. No halfway decision would be tolerable. No halfway decision is conceivable. These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace:

I. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

II. The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

III. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

IV. The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot

be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

These great objects can be put into a single sentence. What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.

Appendix C

TEXT OF THE FOUR-POWER PACIFIC TREATY

Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan Relating to Their Insular Possessions and Insular Dominions in the Region of the Pacific Ocean

Concluded December 13, 1921, at the Washington Conference

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan,

With a view to the preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean,

Have determined to conclude a Treaty to this effect and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: [names omitted]

Who, having communicated their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

I

The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

II

If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

III

This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall continue to be in force subject to the right of any of the High Contracting Parties to terminate it upon twelve months' notice.

IV

This Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate. The Government of the United States will transmit to all the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, in French and in English, shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to each of the Signatory Powers.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the thirteenth day of December, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-One.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE FOUR-POWER TREATY

In signing the Treaty this day between The United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan, it is declared to be the understanding and intent of the Signatory Powers:

1. That the Treaty shall apply to the Mandated Islands in the Pacific Ocean; provided, however, that the making of the Treaty

shall not be deemed to be an assent on the part of The United States of America to the mandates and shall not preclude agreements between The United States of America and the Mandatory Powers respectively in relation to the mandated islands.

2. That the controversies to which the second paragraph of Article I refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective Powers.

Washington, D.C., December 13, 1921.

SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO THE FOUR-POWER TREATY

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan have, through their respective Plenipotentiaries, agreed upon the following stipulations supplementary to the Quadruple Treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921:

The term "insular possessions and insular dominions" used in the aforesaid Treaty shall, in its application to Japan, include only Karafuto (or the Southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa, and the Pescadores, and the islands under the mandate of Japan.

The present agreement shall have the same force and effect as the said Treaty to which it is supplementary.

The provisions of Article IV of the aforesaid Treaty of December 13, 1921, relating to ratification shall be applicable to the present Agreement, which in French and English shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Contracting Powers.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement.

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-two.

Appendix D

TEXT OF THE NINE-POWER TREATY

Treaty Between the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal Relating to Principles and Policies Concerning China

Concluded February 6, 1922, at the Washington Conference

The United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal:

Desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity;

Have resolved to conclude a treaty for that purpose and to that end have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries: [names omitted]

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

ARTICLE 2

The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article 1.

ARTICLE 3

With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agree that they will not seek, nor support their respective nationals in seeking—

(a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China;

(b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration, or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this Article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial, or financial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research.

China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in the foregoing stipulations of this Article in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether parties to the present Treaty or not.

ARTICLE 4

The Contracting Powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.

ARTICLE 5

China agrees that, throughout the whole of the railways in China, she will not exercise or permit unfair discrimination of any kind. In particular there shall be no discrimination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which or to which they are proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the country from which or to which they are consigned, or the nationality or ownership of the ship or other means of conveying such passengers or goods before or after their transport on the Chinese Railways.

The Contracting Powers, other than China, assume a corresponding obligation in respect of any of the aforesaid railways over which they or their nationals are in a position to exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement, or otherwise.

ARTICLE 6

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree fully to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war to which China is not a party; and China declares that when she is a neutral she will observe the obligations of neutrality.

ARTICLE 7

The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.

ARTICLE 8

Powers not signatory to the present Treaty, which have Governments recognized by the Signatory Powers and which have treaty

relations with China, shall be invited to adhere to the present Treaty. To this end the Government of the United States will make the necessary communications to non-signatory Powers and will inform the Contracting Powers of the replies received. Adherence by any Power shall become effective on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the United States.

ARTICLE 9

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Powers in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other Contracting Powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other Contracting Powers.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington the Sixth day of February, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Two.

Appendix E

THE LOCARNO PACT

ANNEX A: Treaty of Mutual Guarantee Between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy

(Translation)

The President of the German Reich, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of Italy;

Anxious to satisfy the desire for security and protection which animates the peoples upon whom fell the scourge of the war of 1914-18;

Taking note of the abrogation of the treaties for the neutralization of Belgium, and conscious of the necessity of ensuring peace in the area which has so frequently been the scene of European conflicts;

Animated also with the sincere desire of giving to all the signatory Powers concerned supplementary guarantees within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties in force between them;

Have determined to conclude a treaty with these objects, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: [names omitted]

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

Article 1. The high contracting parties collectively and severally guarantee, in the manner provided in the following articles, the maintenance of the territorial status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and

France and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulations of articles 42 and 43 of the said treaty concerning the demilitarized zone.

Article 2. Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.

This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of—

1. The exercise of the right of legitimate defence, that is to say, resistance to a violation of the undertaking contained in the previous paragraph or to a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of the said Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary.

2. Action in pursuance of article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

3. Action as the result of a decision taken by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations or in pursuance of article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that in this last event the action is directed against a State which was the first to attack.

Article 3. In view of the undertakings entered into in article 2 of the present treaty, Germany and Belgium and Germany and France undertake to settle by peaceful means and in the manner laid down herein all questions of every kind which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy:

Any question with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights shall be submitted to judicial decision, and the parties undertake to comply with such decision.

All other questions shall be submitted to a conciliation commission. If the proposals of this commission are not accepted by the two parties, the question shall be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which will deal with it in accordance with article 15 of the Covenant of the League.

The detailed arrangements for effecting such peaceful settlement are the subject of special agreements signed this day.

Article 4. (1) If one of the high contracting parties alleges that

a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.

(2) As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present treaty, who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed.

(3) In case of a flagrant violation of article 2 of the present treaty or of a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high contracting parties, each of the other contracting parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary. Nevertheless, the Council of the League of Nations, which will be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this article, will issue its findings, and the high contracting parties undertake to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Council provided that they are concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the parties which have engaged in hostilities.

Article 5. The provisions of article 3 of the present treaty are placed under the guarantee of the high contracting parties as provided by the following stipulations:—

If one of the Powers referred to in article 3 refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral or judicial decision and commits a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, the provisions of article 4 shall apply.

Where one of the Powers referred to in article 3, without committing a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral or judicial decision, the other party shall bring the matter before

the Council of the League of Nations, and the Council shall propose what steps shall be taken; the high contracting parties shall comply with these proposals.

Article 6. The provisions of the present treaty do not affect the rights and obligations of the high contracting parties under the Treaty of Versailles or under arrangements supplementary thereto including the agreements signed in London on the 30th August, 1924.

Article 7. The present treaty, which is designed to ensure the maintenance of peace, and is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

* *Article 8.* The present treaty shall be registered at the League of Nations in accordance with the Covenant of the League. It shall remain in force until the Council, acting on a request of one or other of the high contracting parties notified to the other signatory Powers three months in advance, and voting at least by a two-thirds' majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the high contracting parties; the treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of one year from such decision.

Article 9. The present treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British dominions, or upon India, unless the Government of such dominion, or of India, signifies its acceptance thereof.

Article 10. The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be deposited at Geneva in the archives of the League of Nations as soon as possible.

It shall enter into force as soon as all the ratifications have been deposited and Germany has become a member of the League of Nations.

The present treaty, done in a single copy, will be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, and the Secretary-General will be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the high contracting parties.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty.

Done at Locarno, the 16th October, 1925.

Appendix F

THE PACT OF PARIS

(Also called the Kellogg Pact or the Kellogg-Briand Pact)

The President of the German Reich, the President of the United States of America, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the President of the Republic of Poland, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic;

Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind;

Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;

Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;

Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy;

Have decided to conclude a Treaty . . .

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

ARTICLE III

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington.

This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers parties hereto.

It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States to furnish each Government named in the Preamble and every Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty with a certified copy of the Treaty and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the Government of the United States telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence.

Appendix G

STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER

Enacted by the British Parliament, December 10, 1931

1. In this Act the expression "Dominion" means any of the following Dominions, that is to say, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland.

2. (1) The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, shall not apply to any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion.

(2) No law and no provision of any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule, or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Parliament of a Dominion shall include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule, or regulation in so far as the same is part of the law of the Dominion.

3. It is hereby declared and enacted that the Parliament of a Dominion has full power to make laws having extra-territorial operation.

4. No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement of this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof.

5. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions of this Act, sections seven hundred and thirty-five and seven hun-

dred and thirty-six of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, shall be construed as though reference therein to the Legislature of a British possession did not include reference to the Parliament of a Dominion.

6. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions of this Act, section four of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 (which requires certain laws to be reserved for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure or to contain a suspending clause), and so much of section seven of that Act as requires the approval of His Majesty in Council to any rules of Court for regulating the practice and procedure of a Colonial Court of Admiralty, shall cease to have effect in any Dominion as from the commencement of this Act.

7. (1) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment, or alteration of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930, or any order, rule, or regulation made thereunder.

(2) The provisions of section two of this Act shall extend to laws made by any of the Provinces of Canada and to the powers of the legislatures of such Provinces.

(3) The powers conferred by this Act upon the Parliament of Canada or upon the legislatures of the Provinces shall be restricted to the enactment of laws in relation to matters within the competence of the Parliament of Canada or of any of the legislatures of the Provinces respectively.

8. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to confer any power to repeal or alter the Constitution or the Constitution Act of the Commonwealth of Australia or the Constitution Act of the Dominion of New Zealand otherwise than in accordance with the law existing before the commencement of this Act.

9. (1) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to authorize the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia to make laws on any matter within the authority of the States of Australia, not being a matter within the authority of the Parliament or Government of the Commonwealth of Australia.

(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to require the concurrence of the Parliament or Government of the Commonwealth of Australia in any law made by the Parliament of the United Kingdom with respect to any matter within the authority of the States of Australia, not being a matter within the authority of the Parliament or Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, in any

case where it would have been in accordance with the constitutional practice existing before the commencement of this Act that the Parliament of the United Kingdom should make that law without such concurrence.

(3) In the application of this Act to the Commonwealth of Australia the request and consent referred to in section four shall mean the request and consent of the Parliament and Government of the Commonwealth.

10. (1) None of the following sections of this Act, that is to say, sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, shall extend to a Dominion to which this section applies as part of the law of that Dominion unless that section is adopted by the Parliament of the Dominion, and any Act of that Parliament adopting any section of this Act may provide that the adoption shall have effect either from the commencement of this Act or from such later date as is specified in the adopting Act.

(2) The Parliament of any such Dominion as aforesaid may at any time revoke the adoption of any section of this Act.

(3) The Dominions to which this section applies are the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and Newfoundland.

11. Notwithstanding anything in the Interpretation Act, 1889, the expression "Colony" shall not, in any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement of this Act, include a Dominion or any Province or State forming part of a Dominion.

12. (1) This Act may be cited as the Statute of Westminster, 1931.

(2) This Act shall come into operation on the first day of December, nineteen hundred and thirty-one.

Appendix H

STATUTE OF THE LITTLE ENTENTE

(Translation)

H. M. the King of Yugoslavia, H. M. the King of Rumania, H. E. the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, being desirous of maintaining and organizing peace, and firmly intent on strengthening economic relations with all countries without distinction and in particular with the States of Central Europe; being anxious to see peace safeguarded in all circumstances, to assure the progress of Central Europe towards a condition of definite stability, and to secure proper regard for the common interests of their three countries; having resolved for this purpose to give to the relations of friendship and alliance already existing between their three States an organic and stable basis, and being convinced of the necessity of effecting this stability on the one hand by the complete unification of their general policy and on the other hand by creating a body which shall direct this policy common to the group of the three States, which will thus form a higher international unit open to other States under the conditions applicable to each particular case, have resolved to put into effect that which is contained in the following articles:—

Article 1. A Permanent Council of the States of the Little Entente formed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the respective countries and of delegates specially appointed for this purpose is hereby created as directing body of the common policy of the group of the three states. Decisions of the Permanent Council must be unanimous.

Article 2. The Permanent Council, in addition to its regular intercourse through diplomatic channels, shall be under obligation to

meet at least three times a year. One of the obligatory meetings each year shall take place in each of the three States in turn; the others will be held at Geneva following the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Article 3. The President of the Permanent Council shall be the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State where the annual obligatory meeting is held. It will devolve upon him to take the first steps for fixing the date and designating the place of meeting, for drawing up an agenda and preparing resolutions. He will remain President of the Permanent Council until the first obligatory meeting of the next year.

Article 4. In all questions discussed as also in all decisions taken, whether concerning the relations of the States of the Little Entente to one another or their relations to others, the principle of absolute equality between the three States of the Little Entente must be rigorously respected.

Article 5. The Permanent Council shall be at liberty to decide that in any given question the defense of the point of view of the States of the Little Entente shall be entrusted to a single delegate or to the delegation of a single State.

Article 6. Every political treaty of each State of the Little Entente, every unilateral act changing the actual political situation of one of the States of the Little Entente in regard to an outside State, as also every economic agreement involving important political consequences, will require in advance the unanimous consent of the Council of the Little Entente. The existing political treaties of each State of the Little Entente with outside States shall be made progressively and as far as possible uniform.

Article 7. An Economic Council of the States of the Little Entente for the progressive co-ordination of the economic interests of the three States, whether as regards one another or in their relations with outside States, shall be constituted.

Article 8. The Permanent Council is empowered to appoint other stable temporary bodies, commissions, or committees, whether for special questions or for groups of given questions, with a view of studying them and providing the Permanent Council with material for their solution.

Article 9. A secretariat of the Permanent Council shall be appointed. Its seat shall be in turn for one year in the capital of the

acting President of the Permanent Council. One section of the secretariat shall be permanently located at the seat of the League of Nations at Geneva.

Article 10. The common policy of the Permanent Council should be inspired by the general principles contained in all the great political pacts concluded since the war, as, for instance, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, the general Pact of Arbitration, disarmament pacts that may eventually be concluded, and the Pacts of Locarno. For the rest, nothing in the present Pact shall be held to be contrary to the principles and regulations of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 11. The treaties of alliance between Rumania and Czechoslovakia dated April 23, 1921, between Rumania and Yugoslavia of June 7, 1921, and between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia of August 31, 1922, which were extended on May 21, 1929, and which are supplemented by the terms of the present Pact, as also the Act of Conciliation, Arbitration, and Judicial Regulation signed by the three States of the Little Entente at Belgrade on May 21, 1929, are renewed for an indefinite period.

Article 12. The present Pact will be ratified and the exchange of ratifications shall take place at Prague at the latest on the occasion of the next obligatory meeting. It will come into force on the day of the exchange of ratifications.

In token of which the plenipotentiaries hereinunder named have signed the present Pact.

Done at Geneva, February 16th, 1933, in three identical copies.

JEVTICH
TITULESCU
BENEŠ

Appendix I

FINAL TEXT OF THE PROPOSED FOUR-POWER TREATY

Signed at Rome, July 15, 1933

Agreement of Understanding and Coöperation

PREAMBLE

The President of the German Reich, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of Italy;

Conscious of the special responsibilities incumbent on them as possessing permanent representation on the Council of the League of Nations, where the League itself and its members are concerned, and of the responsibilities resulting from the common signature of the Locarno agreements;

Convinced that the state of disquiet which obtained throughout the world can only be dissipated by reinforcing their solidarity in such a way as to strengthen confidence in peace in Europe;

Faithful to the obligations which they have assumed in virtue of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaties, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and taking into account the declaration of the renunciation of force, the principle of which was proclaimed in the declaration signed at Geneva on December 11, 1932, by their delegates at the Disarmament Conference and adopted on March 2, 1933, by the Political Commission of that Conference;

Anxious to give full effect to all the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, while conforming to the methods and procedure laid down therein, from which they have no intention of departing;

Mindful of the rights of every State, which cannot be affected without the consent of the interested party;

Have resolved to conclude an agreement with these objects, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: [names omitted]

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties will consult together as regards all questions which appertain to them. They undertake to make every effort to pursue, within the framework of the League of Nations, a policy of effective co-operation between all Powers with a view to the maintenance of peace.

ARTICLE 2

In respect of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and particularly Articles 10, 16, and 19, the High Contracting Parties decide to examine between themselves, and without prejudice to decisions which can only be taken by the regular organs of the League of Nations, all proposals relating to methods and procedure calculated to give due effect to these articles.

ARTICLE 3

The High Contracting Parties undertake to make every effort to insure the success of the Disarmament Conference and, should questions which particularly concern them remain in suspense on the conclusion of that Conference, they reserve the right to re-examine these questions between themselves under the present agreement with a view to insuring their solution through the appropriate channels.

ARTICLE 4

The High Contracting Parties affirm their desire to consult together as regards all economic questions which have a common interest for Europe, and particularly for its economic restoration, with a view to seeking a settlement within the framework of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 5

The present agreement is concluded for a period of 10 years from the date of its entry into force.

If before the end of the eighth year none of the High Contracting Parties shall have notified to the others its intention to terminate the agreement, it shall be regarded as renewed and will remain in force indefinitely, each of the High Contracting Parties possessing in that event the right to terminate it by a declaration to that effect on giving two years' notice.

ARTICLE 6

The present agreement, drawn up in English, French, German, and Italian, of which the French text prevails in case of divergence, shall be ratified and the ratification shall be deposited at Rome as soon as possible. The Government of the Kingdom of Italy will deliver to each of the High Contracting Parties a certified copy of the *procès-verbaux* of deposit.

The present agreement will enter into force as soon as all the ratifications have been deposited.

It shall be registered at the League of Nations in conformity with the Covenant of the League.

Done at Rome, the _____ day of _____, 1933, in a single copy, which will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the Kingdom of Italy; certified copies will be delivered to each of the High Contracting Parties. In faith whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement.

Appendix J

GERMAN-POLISH DECLARATION

(Translation)

The Polish and German Governments consider that the time has come to begin a new era in the relations between Poland and Germany through a direct contact between the two countries. They have therefore agreed through the present declaration to establish the basis for the future development of these relations.

Both Governments start with the assumption that the maintenance and consolidation of permanent peace between their respective countries constitutes an essential condition to the general peace of Europe. They have, therefore, agreed to base their own relations upon the principles set forth in the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928. Furthermore, in respect of the relations between Poland and Germany, they desire to clarify the application of these principles.

Accordingly both Governments assert that the peaceful development of their mutual relations will not impair any international obligations which they have hitherto undertaken in respect of other states prior to the making of this Declaration. And they further affirm that this Declaration does not repudiate these obligations but on the contrary leaves them undisturbed. Nor does this Declaration include within its purview such questions as are, by international law, recognized to be purely domestic issues of either state.

Both Governments announce their intention to communicate directly with each other in all questions which may arise pertaining to their mutual relations. Should disputes arise notwithstanding and should settlement not be attained by direct negotiations, then they agree, in such special instance, to seek solution through some other peaceful means and by common understanding so that the pos-

sibility of such settlement may not be disturbed. And, in case of necessity, they agree to employ those measures of procedure which have already been fixed by them, to arrive at future accord. And they further agree under no circumstances to use force to settle such disputes.

The guarantee of peace based upon these foregoing principles will facilitate the task of the two nations in finding solutions of the political, economic, and cultural problems, which must be discovered in settlements equally just and reasonable for the interests of both nations.

Both Governments are convinced that, in this fashion, the relations between their respective countries will develop fruitfully and will lead to the establishment of a good neighborly intercourse which will be a blessing not alone for their two nations but also for all Europe as well.

The present agreement shall be ratified and the documents of ratification shall be exchanged in Warsaw at the earliest possible date. It shall remain in force for a period of ten years, starting from the date of the notification of ratification. In case it is not denounced by one of the two contracting nations six months before the expiration of that period it shall remain in force thereafter. But it can then be denounced by either Government upon six months' notice.

Prepared in double original in Polish and in German.

Berlin, 26 January, 1934.

Appendix K

THE BALKAN PACT OF FEBRUARY 9, 1934¹ (*Translation*)

His Majesty the King of Rumania, the President of the Hellenic Republic, the President of the Turkish Republic, His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia, wishing to contribute to consolidation and peace in the Balkans, animated with the spirit of understanding and conciliation which prevailed at the preparation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the decisions relating to it taken by the League of Nations, and firmly decided to guarantee respect for the contractual engagements already existing and the maintenance of the territorial order at present established in the Balkans, have resolved to conclude a Pact of Balkan Understanding, and to this end have appointed their respective Plenipotentiaries, who have arrived at the following dispositions:—

Article 1. Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia guarantee mutually the security of their Balkan frontiers.

Article 2. The High Contracting Parties undertake to consult with each other on the measures to be taken in the face of eventualities capable of affecting their interest as they are defined by the present Agreement. They undertake not to embark on any political action towards any other Balkan country non-signatory of the present Agreement, without previous mutual discussion, nor to assume any political obligation towards any other Balkan State without the consent of the other High Contracting Parties.

Article 3. The present Agreement will come into force immediately after its signature by all the contracting Powers and will be ratified as soon as possible. It will be open to any Balkan countries whose adhesion will be the object of a favorable examination by the contracting parties, and will take effect as soon as the other signatory countries shall have ratified their agreement.

¹Under the eighth Protocol attached to the Pact it will continue for two years, then, failing agreement to the contrary, for a further five years, and thereafter, failing denunciation, for a period equal to the whole period during which it shall already have been in force.

Appendix L

THE ROME PROTOCOLS OF MARCH 17, 1934¹

(Translation)

PROTOCOL I

The three Governments [Italy, Austria, and Hungary], animated by the intention to aid the maintenance of peace and the economic restoration of Europe on the basis of respect for the independence and rights of every State; persuaded that collaboration between the three Governments in this sense can establish real premises for wider co-operation with other States; undertake for the above-mentioned objects:—

To concert together on all the problems which particularly interest them and also on those of a general character with the aim of developing, in the spirit of the existing Italo-Austrian, Italo-Hungarian, and Austro-Hungarian treaties of friendship based upon the recognition of the existence of their numerous common interests, a concordant policy which shall be directed towards effective collaboration between the European states, and particularly between Italy, Austria, and Hungary. To this end the three Governments will proceed to common consultation each time that at least one of them may consider this course opportune.

PROTOCOL II

In the endeavor to develop economic relations between the three countries by giving a new impulse to the exchange of their products

¹ The negotiations between the governments of Italy, Austria, and Hungary in Rome led to the conclusion of three protocols. The first dealt with political, the second with economic collaboration between the three states; the third dealt with the further development of economic relations between Italy and Austria.

and thus opposing the unhealthy tendencies towards economic self-sufficiency, the three Governments are agreed on the following in harmony with the spirit of the decisions taken at the Stresa Conference and with the principles contained in the Danubian memorandum presented by Italy under date September 29, 1933:—

Article i. They undertake to extend the scope of the accords already in force by increasing the facilities for reciprocal export and thus exploiting the complementary nature of the respective national economies. To this end new bilateral accords will be concluded before May 15, 1934.

Article ii. The Governments resolve to take the necessary measures to overcome the difficulties felt by Hungary from the fall in the prices of grain. The conventions for this purpose will be concluded as soon as possible and in any case before May 15, 1934.

Article iii. The three Governments agree to facilitate and to develop to as great a degree as possible the transit traffic through the Adriatic ports, and to this end will conclude as quickly as possible bilateral agreements.

Article iv. The Governments will set up a permanent committee of three experts to follow the course of economic relations and to formulate concrete proposals for their development in the spirit of this protocol.

PROTOCOL III

Italo-Austrian Addendum to Protocol II

The Italian and Austrian Governments, on the ground of the experience hitherto gained, which has shown that both national economies have been greatly developed, agree further to develop the economic relations between the two countries. To this end they are agreed upon the following measures:—

Article i. On April 5, 1934, the two Governments will institute negotiations for the conclusion of a new agreement in order to widen the scope of the existing economic agreements between the two countries. The new agreement will be concluded as soon as possible and in any case before May 15, 1934.

Article ii. The agreement to be concluded will set up a preferential system for as large a number of products as possible originating in and coming from Austria into Italy. The contracting parties will take care to keep the concessions within reasonable limits according

to the principles laid down in Italy's Danubian Memorandum. Before May 15th two lists will be drawn up. One of these will indicate the products for which Customs facilities may be conceded by means of the preliminary conclusion of understandings between the interested producers of the two countries. The other list will contain products for which concessions are considered applicable independently of undertakings between the producers themselves. So far as concerns the products on the first list the two Governments agree to take the measures necessary to facilitate the conclusion of industrial accords.

Appendix M

TEXT OF FRANCO-SOVIET TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

(Translation)

ARTICLE 1

In the event of France or the U.S.S.R. being threatened with, or in danger of, aggression on the part of any European State, the U.S.S.R., and reciprocally France, undertake mutually to proceed to immediate consultation in regard to measures to be taken for the enforcement of Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant.

ARTICLE 2

In the event France or the U.S.S.R., under circumstances specified in Article 15, Section 7, of the League Covenant, being subjected, in spite of the genuinely peaceful intentions of both countries, to an unprovoked aggression on the part of any European State, the U.S.S.R., and reciprocally France, shall immediately come to each other's aid and assistance.

ARTICLE 3

In consideration of the fact that under Article 16 of the League Covenant any member of the League having recourse to war, contrary to pledges given under Articles 12, 13 or 15 of the Covenant, is *ipso facto* considered as having committed an act of war against all other members of the League, France, and reciprocally the U.S.S.R., agree in the event of one of them being subjected, under these conditions, and in spite of the genuinely peaceful intentions of both countries, to an unprovoked aggression on the part of any European

State, to lend each other aid and assistance in application of Article 16 of the Covenant.

The same obligation is assumed in the event of France or the U.S.S.R. being subjected to aggression on the part of any European State in circumstances specified in Article 17, Sections 1 and 3, of the League Covenant.

ARTICLE 4

The undertakings stipulated above being consonant with obligations of the high contracting parties as members of the League of Nations, nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as restricting the duty of the latter to take proper measures efficiently to safeguard peace in the world, or as restricting obligations laid upon the high contracting parties of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 5

This treaty, of which the French and Russian versions are equally valid, shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification exchanged at Moscow as soon as possible. It shall be registered at the secretariat of the League of Nations.

It will come into force as soon as the ratifications have been exchanged and will remain operative for five years. If it is not denounced by either of the high contracting parties, giving notice thereof at least one year before the expiration of that period, it will remain in force indefinitely, each of the high contracting parties being at liberty to terminate it at a year's notice by a declaration to that effect.

In witness whereof, the plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this treaty.

Done in Paris, May 2, 1935.

Protocol of Signature

I

It is understood that the effect of Article 10 is to oblige each contracting party immediately to come to the assistance of the other, by immediately complying with recommendations of the League Council, as soon as they have been issued under Article 16 of the Covenant.

It is further understood that the two contracting parties shall take joint action to obtain that the Council shall issue their recommendations with all speed required by circumstances, and that should the Council, nevertheless, for whatever reason, issue no recommendation or fail to reach a unanimous decision, the obligation of assistance shall apply none the less.

It is also understood that undertakings of assistance in this treaty refer only to cases of aggression against either of the contracting parties' own territory.

II

The common intention of both governments being in no way to invalidate by this treaty any obligations undertaken by France and by the U.S.S.R. in respect of third parties, under treaties that have been published, it is understood that provisions of the aforesaid treaty shall not be carried out in any way which, being inconsistent with treaty obligations undertaken by one of the contracting parties, might expose the latter to sanctions of international character.

III

The two governments, feeling the desirability of the conclusion of a local agreement aiming at the organization of security as between the contracting States, and liable to embody or be accompanied by additional pledges of mutual assistance, leave it open to each other to become parties by mutual consent, should occasion arise, to like agreement in any form, whether direct or indirect, that may seem appropriate, the obligations under such several agreements to take the place of those resulting from this treaty.

IV

The two governments put on record that the negotiations which have just resulted in the signature of this treaty were primarily entered upon in order to complete a security agreement comprising all countries of Northeastern Europe—the U.S.S.R., Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic States bordering upon the U.S.S.R. Besides this agreement, there was to have been concluded a treaty of assistance between the U.S.S.R., France, and Germany, under which each of these three States would be pledged to come to

the assistance of any one of them subjected to an aggression on the part of one of these three States.

Although circumstances have not hitherto permitted the conclusion of these agreements which the two parties still look upon as desirable, it remains a fact, nevertheless, that the undertakings set forth in the Franco-Soviet treaty of assistance should be understood to come into play only within the limits contemplated in the tripartite agreement previously projected.

Apart from the obligations resulting from this treaty, it is called to mind at the same time that in accordance with the Franco-Soviet pact of non-aggression, signed November 29, 1932, and without prejudice to the universal character of the undertakings under that pact in the event of either of the two parties being subjected to aggression on the part of one or several third European Powers not referred to in the above-mentioned tripartite agreement, the other contracting party will have to refrain from extending any aid or assistance, direct or indirect, to the aggressor or aggressors, each party, moreover, declaring itself to be bound by no agreement of assistance which is inconsistent with this undertaking.

Done in Paris, May 2, 1935.

Appendix N

TEXT OF GERMAN-JAPANESE ANTI-COMMUNIST PACT OF 1936

(Translation)

The German Government and the Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist Internationale known as the Comintern is directed at disrupting and violating existing States with all means at its command, and convinced that to tolerate the Communist Internationale's interference with the internal affairs of nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being but threatens world peace at large, animated by a desire to work in common against Communist disruptive influences, have arrived at the following agreement:

I

The high contracting parties agree mutually to inform each other concerning the activities of the Communist Internationale, to consult with each other concerning measures to combat this activity, and to execute these measures in close co-operation with each other.

II

The two high contracting States will jointly invite third parties whose domestic peace is endangered by the disruptive activities of the Communist Internationale to embark upon measures for warding these off in accordance with the spirit of this agreement or to join in it.

III

For this agreement, both the German and Japanese texts are regarded as original versions. It becomes effective the day of signing and is in force for a period of five years.

The high contracting States will, at the proper time before expiration of this period, arrive at an understanding with each other concerning the form this co-operation is to take.

Supplementary Protocol

A. The competent authorities of both high contracting parties will co-operate most closely in connection with the exchange of information concerning the activities of the Communist Internationale, as well as in connection with publicity and defense measures against the Communist Internationale.

B. The competent authorities of both high contracting parties will, within the framework of existing laws, take strict measures against those who, at home or abroad, directly or indirectly are active in the service of the Communist Internationale or lend a helping hand to its disruptive work.

With a view to facilitating the co-operation of the competent authorities of both high contracting parties, specified in (A), a permanent commission will be created. In this commission the further defensive measures necessary for combating the disruptive work of the Communist Internationale will be considered and deliberated upon.

Berlin, Nov. 25, 1936; that is, the Nov. 25 of the eleventh year of the Showa Period.

RIBBENTROP
MUSHAKOJI

Appendix O

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OF INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY AND CO-OPERATION, ADOPTED BY THE BUENOS AIRES CONFERENCE

Approved December 21, 1936

The Governments of the American Republics, having considered:

That they have a common likeness in their democratic form of government, and their common ideals of peace and justice, manifested in the several Treaties and Conventions which they have signed for the purpose of constituting a purely American system tending towards the preservation of peace, the proscription of war, the harmonious development of their commerce and of their cultural aspirations demonstrated in all of their political, economic, social, scientific, and artistic activities;

That the existence of continental interests obliges them to maintain solidarity of principles as the basis of the life of the relations of each to every other American nation;

That Pan-Americanism, as a principle of American International Law, by which is understood a moral union of all of the American Republics in defense of their common interests based upon the most perfect equality and reciprocal respect for their rights of autonomy, independence and free development, requires the proclamation of principles of American International Law; and

That it is necessary to consecrate the principle of American solidarity in all non-continental conflicts, especially since those limited to the American Continent should find a peaceful solution by the means established by the Treaties and Conventions now in force or in the instruments hereafter to be executed,—

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace
Declares:

1. That the American Nations, true to their republican institutions, proclaim their absolute juridical liberty, their unrestricted respect for their several sovereignty, and the existence of a common democracy throughout America;

2. That every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them, and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation provided for in the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Re-establishment of Peace, executed at this Conference; and

3. That the following principles are accepted by the international American community:

(a) Proscription of territorial conquest and that, in consequence, no acquisition made through violence shall be recognized;

(b) Intervention by one State in the internal or external affairs of another State is condemned;

(c) Forcible collection of pecuniary debts is illegal; and

(d) Any difference or dispute between the American nations, whatever its nature or origin, shall be settled by the methods of conciliation, or full arbitration, or through operation of international justice.

Appendix P

CONVENTION FOR THE MAINTENANCE, PRESERVATION, AND RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE

Signed December 23, 1936, at Buenos Aires

Article I. In the event that the peace of the American Republics is menaced, and in order to co-ordinate efforts to prevent war, any of the Governments of the American Republics signatory to the Treaty of Paris of 1928 or to the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation of 1933, or to both, whether or not a member of other peace organizations, shall consult with the other Governments of the American Republics, which, in such event, shall consult together for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful co-operation.

Article II. In the event of war, or a virtual state of war between American States, the Governments of the American Republics represented at this Conference shall undertake without delay the necessary mutual consultations, in order to exchange views and to seek, within the obligations of the pacts above mentioned and from the standards of international morality, a method of peaceful collaboration; and, in the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of the American Republics, such consultation shall also take place to determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory States, if they so desire, may eventually co-operate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the American Continent.

Article III. It is agreed that any question regarding the interpretation of the present convention, which it has not been possible to settle through diplomatic channels, shall be submitted to the pro-

cedure of conciliation provided by existing agreements, or to arbitration or to judicial settlement.

Article IV. The present convention shall be ratified by the high contracting parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. The original convention shall be deposited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, which shall communicate the ratifications to the other signatories. The Convention shall come into effect between the high contracting parties in the order in which they have deposited their ratifications.

Article V. The present Convention shall remain in effect indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one year's notice, after the expiration of which period the Convention shall cease in its effect as regards the party which denounces it but shall remain in effect for the remaining signatory States. Denunciations shall be addressed to the Government of the Argentine Republic, which shall transmit them to the other contracting States.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries sign the present Convention in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French and hereunto affix their respective seals, at the City of Buenos Aires, capital of the Argentine Republic, on the twenty-third day of the month of December, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

Reservation of Paraguay: "With the express and definite reservation in respect to its peculiar international position as regards the League of Nations."

THE MUNICH SETTLEMENT

September 29, 1938

Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfillment:

1. The evacuation will begin on the 1st of October.
2. The United Kingdom, France, and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th of October, without any existing installations having been destroyed and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.
3. The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia.
4. The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on the 1st of October. The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order: the territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October, the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October, the territory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of October, the territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission

forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

5. The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

6. The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. This commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, in certain exceptional cases minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.

7. There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population, and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

8. The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.

MUNICH SETTLEMENT—ANNEX

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th of September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

MUNICH SETTLEMENT—SUBSIDIARY DECLARATIONS

The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present.

All questions which may arise out of the transfer of the territory shall be considered as coming within the terms of reference to the international commission.

The four Heads of Government here present agree that the international commission provided for in the agreement signed by them today, shall consist of the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, the British, French, and Italian Ambassadors accredited in Berlin, and a representative to be nominated by the Government of Czechoslovakia.

SUPPLEMENT

On Friday morning, before leaving Munich, Mr. Chamberlain had an intimate conversation with Chancellor Hitler. Before separating they put their signatures to the following short and simple declaration:

"We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

"We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

"We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe."

Appendix R

FRANCO-GERMAN DECLARATION OF FRIENDSHIP

December 6, 1938 (Translation)

(1) The French Government and the German Government fully share the conviction that peaceful and good neighborly relations between France and Germany constitute one of the essential elements for the consolidation of the situation in Europe and the maintenance of general peace. The two Governments will in consequence use all their efforts to ensure the development in this direction of the relations between their countries.

(2) The two Governments recognize that between the two countries there is no territorial question outstanding, and they solemnly recognize as final the frontiers between their countries as they now exist.

(3) The two Governments are resolved, due account being taken of their particular relations with other Powers, to remain in contact with regard to all questions interesting their two countries, and mutually to consult should a later evolution of those questions threaten to lead to international difficulties.

DECLARATION OF LIMA

*As signed by all twenty-one American Delegates at Lima,
December 24, 1938*

That the peoples of America have achieved spiritual unity through the similarity of their republican institutions, their unshakable will for peace, their profound sentiment of humanity and tolerance, and through their absolute adherence to the principles of international law, of equal sovereignty of States, and of individual liberty without religious or racial prejudices;

That on the basis of such principles and will, they seek and defend the peace of the continent and work together in the cause of universal concord;

That respect for the personality, sovereignty, and independence of each American State constitutes the essence of international order sustained by continental solidarity, which historically has found expression in the declarations of the various States, or in agreements that were applied, and sustained by new declarations and by treaties in force;

That the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires approved on Dec. 21, 1936, a Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation and approved on Dec. 23, 1936, a protocol of non-intervention:

The governments of the American States declare:

First, that they reaffirm their continental solidarity and their purpose to collaborate in the maintenance of principles upon which said solidarity is based;

Second, that faithful to the above-mentioned principles and to their absolute sovereignty they reaffirm their decision to maintain

them and defend them against all foreign intervention or activity that may threaten them;

Third, and in case the peace, security, or territorial integrity of any American republic is thus threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern and their determination to make effective their solidarity, coordinating their respective sovereign wills by means of the procedure of consultation established by the conventions in force and by declarations of inter-American conferences, using measures that in each case circumstances may make advisable.

It is understood that the governments of the American republics will act independently in their individual capacities, recognizing fully their juridical equality as sovereign States.

Fourth, that in order to facilitate the consultations established in this and other American peace instruments, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics, when deemed desirable and at the initiative of any one of them, will meet in their several capitals by rotation and without protocolary character.

Each government may, under special circumstances or for special reasons, designate a representative as a substitute for its Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Fifth, this declaration shall be known as the Declaration of Lima.

Appendix T

THE REICH-SLOVAK TREATY

March 23, 1939 (Translation)

ARTICLE I

The German Reich undertakes to protect the political independence of the Slovak State and the integrity of its territory.

ARTICLE II

For execution of the protection undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces have the right at all times to erect military plants within a zone lying west of the borders of the Slovak State and east of the general eastern ridge of the Little Carpathians, the eastern ridge of the White Carpathians and the eastern ridge of the Javornitz Mountains and to maintain them at a strength deemed necessary.

The Slovak Government will see to it that the ground and soil necessary for these plants are placed at the disposal of the German armed forces.

In addition the Slovak Government will agree to such regulation as may be necessary for supplying the troops duty free and for supplying the plants also duty free.

In the zone described above, military rights of sovereignty are exercised by German armed force (*Wehrmacht*).

Private German persons of German nationality who, on the basis of private contracts, are charged with erecting military plants in the zone described, are subject to German legal jurisdiction.

ARTICLE III

The Slovak Government will organize its own military forces in close collaboration with the German armed force.

ARTICLE IV

Corresponding to the relationship of protection agreed upon, the Slovak Government will always conduct its policy in close co-operation with the German Government.

ARTICLE V

This treaty becomes effective at once upon signature and is valid for twenty-five years.

The two governments will come to an understanding well ahead of the passage of this period of time.

Appendix U

COMMUNICATION OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO CHANCELLOR HITLER AND PREMIER MUSSOLINI

April 14, 1939

You realize, I am sure, that throughout the world hundreds of millions of human beings are living today in constant fear of a new war or even a series of wars.

The existence of this fear—and the possibility of such a conflict—is of definite concern to the people of the United States for whom I speak, as it must also be to the peoples of the other nations of the entire Western Hemisphere. All of them know that any major war, even if it were to be confined to other continents, must bear heavily on them during its continuance and also for generations to come.

Because of the fact that after the acute tension in which the world has been living during the past few weeks there would seem to be at least a momentary relaxation—because no troops are at this moment on the march—this may be an opportune moment for me to send you this message.

On a previous occasion I have addressed you in behalf of the settlement of political, economic, and social problems by peaceful methods and without resort to arms.

But the tide of events seems to have reverted to the threat of arms. If such threats continue, it seems inevitable that much of the world must become involved in common ruin. All the world, victor nations, vanquished nations, and neutral nations will suffer. I refuse to believe that the world is, of necessity, such a prisoner of destiny. On the contrary, it is clear that the leaders of great nations have it in their power to liberate their peoples from the

disaster that impends. It is equally clear that in their own minds and in their own hearts the peoples themselves desire that their fears be ended.

It is however, unfortunately necessary to take cognizance of recent facts.

Three nations in Europe and one in Africa have seen their independent existence terminated. A vast territory in another independent nation of the Far East has been occupied by a neighboring state. Reports, which we trust are not true, insist that further acts of aggression are contemplated against still other independent nations. Plainly the world is moving toward the moment when this situation must end in catastrophe unless a more rational way of guiding events is found.

You have repeatedly asserted that you and the German [Italian] people have no desire for war. If this is true there need be no war.

Nothing can persuade the peoples of the earth that any governing power has any right or need to inflict the consequences of war on its own or any other people save in the cause of self-evident home defense.

In making this statement we as Americans speak not through selfishness or fear or weakness. If we speak now it is with the voice of strength and with friendship for mankind. It is still clear to me that international problems can be solved at the council table.

It is therefore no answer to the plea for peaceful discussion for one side to plead that unless they receive assurances beforehand that the verdict will be theirs, they will not lay aside their arms. In conference rooms, as in courts, it is necessary that both sides enter upon the discussion in good faith, assuming that substantial justice will accrue to both; and it is customary and necessary that they leave their arms outside the room where they confer.

I am convinced that the cause of world peace would be greatly advanced if the nations of the world were to obtain a frank statement relating to the present and future policy of governments.

Because the United States, as one of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, is not involved in the immediate controversies which have arisen in Europe, I trust that you may be willing to make such a statement of policy to me as the head of a nation far removed from Europe in order that I, acting only with the responsibility

and obligation of a friendly intermediary, may communicate such declaration to other nations now apprehensive as to the course which the policy of your Government may take.

Are you willing to give assurance that your armed forces will not attack or invade the territory or possessions of the following independent nations: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain and Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iraq, the Arabias, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran?

Such an assurance clearly must apply not only to the present day but also to a future sufficiently long to give every opportunity to work by peaceful methods for a more permanent peace. I therefore suggest that you construe the word "future" to apply to a minimum period of assured nonaggression—ten years at the least—a quarter of a century, if we dare look that far ahead.

If such assurance is given by your Government, I will immediately transmit it to the governments of the nations I have named and I will simultaneously inquire whether, as I am reasonably sure, each of the nations enumerated above will in turn give like assurance for transmission to you.

Reciprocal assurances such as I have outlined will bring to the world an immediate measure of relief.

I propose that if it is given, two essential problems shall promptly be discussed in the resulting peaceful surroundings, and in those discussions the Government of the United States will gladly take part.

The discussions which I have in mind relate to the most effective and immediate manner through which the peoples of the world can obtain progressive relief from the crushing burden of armament which is each day bringing them more closely to the brink of economic disaster. Simultaneously the Government of the United States would be prepared to take part in discussions looking towards the most practical manner of opening up avenues of international trade to the end that every nation of the earth may be enabled to buy and sell on equal terms in the world market as well as to possess assurance of obtaining the materials and products of peaceful economic life.

At the same time, those governments other than the United States which are directly interested could undertake such political discussions as they may consider necessary or desirable.

We recognize complex world problems which affect all humanity but we know that study and discussion of them must be held in an atmosphere of peace. Such an atmosphere of peace cannot exist if negotiations are overshadowed by the threat of force or by the fear of war.

I think you will not misunderstand the spirit of frankness in which I send you this message. Heads of great governments in this hour are literally responsible for the fate of humanity in the coming years. They cannot fail to hear the prayers of their peoples to be protected from the foreseeable chaos of war. History will hold them accountable for the lives and the happiness of all—even unto the least.

I hope that your answer will make it possible for humanity to lose fear and regain security for many years to come.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Appendix V

GERMAN-RUSSIAN TREATY

August 23, 1939 (Translation)

The German Reich Government and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, moved by a desire to strengthen the state of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and in the spirit of the provisions of the neutrality treaty of April, 1926, between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have decided the following:

ARTICLE I

The two contracting parties obligate themselves to refrain from every act of force, every aggressive action and every attack against one another, including any single action or that taken in conjunction with other powers.

ARTICLE II

In case one of the parties to this treaty should become the object of warlike acts by a third power, the other party will in no way support this third power.

ARTICLE III

The governments of the two contracting parties in the future will constantly remain in consultation with one another in order to inform each other regarding questions of common interest.

ARTICLE IV

Neither of the high contracting parties will associate itself with any other grouping of powers which directly or indirectly is aimed at the other party.

ARTICLE V

In the event of a conflict between the contracting parties concerning any question, the two parties will adjust this difference exclusively by friendly exchange of opinions or, if necessary, by an arbitration commission.

ARTICLE VI

The present treaty will extend for a period of ten years, with the condition that if neither of the contracting parties announces its abrogation within one year of expiration of this period, it will continue in force automatically for another period of five years.

ARTICLE VII

The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The exchange of ratification documents shall take place in Berlin. The treaty becomes effective immediately upon signature.

Drawn up in two languages, German and Russian.
Moscow, 23d of August, 1939.

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